Opinions ... Gamey or Not?

[kaleun]

I also favor Kings pawn with white; playing the Spanish against e-4 or the kings indian attack against everything else. With black I favor the kings indian defense, or the Alekhine against e-4.
[8|]
I knew there had to be some chess players out there[8D]

[Pascal_slith]

Well, I've been gone for two weeks and haven't had a chance to read the forum until today. This one is a doosie (sic?).

OK, a few of my own additions to the opinions here:

1. taking the islands as Frag suggests is not gamey. But, I definitely agree the US player should be able to redeploy a certain amount of units BEFORE the game to add to the Fog of War.

2. taking the islands would have made it more difficult to send supplies/troops/planes to OZ from US, but not impossible. As I've harped before, there are missing islands on the map in the eastern part of the South and Central Pacific (eg. Bora Bora, a major US base in WWII). These would have allowed for movement of aircraft from South America through these islands to the ANZAC area. The Japanese would have to have done more than take the islands listed by Frag.

3. Remember about ANY open options in this game: the US is going to defeat Japan almost no matter what the latter does, it is just a question of time. That is also why the victory conditions for the Japanese are only about WHEN he LOSES the war. Japan lost the war the day they decided to attack US forces/territory. They knew it was a matter of time, thus their whole objective was to get to the negotiating table ASAP after they grabbed the territory they wanted. They totally misunderstood American willingness for unconditional surrender (what would you have thought reading all the isolationist politics in the late 1930's?).

SO, WHEN CAN I DOWNLOAD THE GAME??

[mdiehl]

Keeping in mind that we both agree it would be nice if the PPs were an option, what is it you believe to be out of balance? Is it the limited number of units the Allies can redeploy early in the game (this limit dictated more by lack of PPs than on actual prohibitions placed on certain units)? Or is it that you believe Allied units are prohibited from redeploying to particular places?

Frag has identified a problem. There exists a gamey tactic that is exploitable solely because the IJN player knows that which the real Japanese did not at start, and also (the "and" is crucial) knows that the underlying game mechanics prevent destroyed base units from coming back rapidly, and can use this knowledge to stall Allied build up and eployments to outlying bases. If anything, the Japanese at the time understood that attacking US strategic assets in re people and supplies, as an objective independent of the ground on which they stood, was largely a waste of time because anything that they could destroy the US could replace quickly. The only notable exception being heavily armored capital ships.

I would like to see the Allied player given the capacity, in a historical game, to shift the positions of a limited number of units, during the set-up, before the game starts. Since the Allied player will have no particular knowledge of what the Japanese player intends to attack, this does not obviate any notion of "surprise" nor would it reduce the effectiveness of any initial "surprise attacks." It just means that there is a certain fog of war and realistic sense of doubt in the mind of the Japanese player. He can slam Pearl Harbor, interidict for a week by hovering along the Oahu-Canton line, and try to grab Canton in a hasty, weak invasion. He may succeed. Canton may be empty. There may only be a "base unit" with a bunch of armed cooks and civilian contractors. Or there may be a highly trained, dug-in USMC regiment, resulting in a horrid and bloody repulse akin to the one in the first Japanese attempt on Wake Island.

If the USA wanted to make these islands (in question) defensible, they had their chance (and could have, look at defenses in Hawaii on 12/7/41).

Non-sequitur. Your statement presumes that in an alternate-history game the Allied player is incapable of pursuing an alternative strategy. One could as equally object to any Japanese player's attempt to attack these islands because the real Japanese had the opportunity and turned it down.

Boerwar says

Early war amphibious assualts were a dicey proposition. Seems to me some discussion about the support forces required to execute amphibious assaults is in order. Just because you have a transport and an expendable unit of marines doesn't mean you have enough assault worthy landing craft to bring them ashore in the face of resistance.

Exactly. In PW the problem was that the Japanese had too many ways of getting to too many objectives simultaneously. Here's where the alleged "political point limitation on Allied redployment capacity in the PI" comes in. By limiting Allied flexibility in USAFFE, the design (as it has been described) seems to tell the Japanese player that it is "ok to divert assets to implausible land grabs in the outlying margins of the defensive perimiter and hold back on the conquest of the SRA because the Allies can't react or evacuate. They are required to wait there, in arguably indefensible positions, for you to kill them at your convenience." If the game gives the Japanese so much sealift capacity that they are capable of taking the SRA "on time" with respect to history, and also grab all these outlying regions, then the game has given the Japanese too much sealift capacity.

[mogami]

Hi, Even without PP restrictions USAFFE has nothing that can be moved on turn 1. While it was legal to move PI units outside PI areas they are all pretty much where the Allied player wants them. The regular US Army and USMC units are not in locations where transports are present. And I would advise against any transports being in range of Formosa trying to load men or material. In the entire SRA there are no units that by relocation can alter Japanese plans. (That can't relocate by normal land movement costing no PP) The units of the correct size are all in Malaya where no restrictions exist. (as well as Central Pacific)

The Allied player is wasting PP if he is trying to relocate units in SRA. (use them to change leaders and move airgroups)

[Jaypea]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Keeping in mind that we both agree it would be nice if the PPs were an option, what is it you believe to be out of balance? Is it the limited number of units the Allies can redeploy early in the game (this limit dictated more by lack of PPs than on actual prohibitions placed on certain units)? Or is it that you believe Allied units are prohibited from redeploying to particular places?

Frag has identified a problem. There exists a gamey tactic that is exploitable solely because the IJN player knows that which the real Japanese did not at start, and also (the "and" is crucial) knows that the underlying game mechanics prevent destroyed base units from coming back rapidly, and can use this knowledge to stall Allied build up and eployments to outlying bases. If anything, the Japanese at the time understood that attacking US strategic assets in re people and supplies, as an objective independent of the ground on which they stood, was largely a waste of time because anything that they could destroy the US could replace quickly. The only notable exception being heavily armored capital ships.

I would like to see the Allied player given the capacity, in a historical game, to shift the positions of a limited number of units, during the set-up, before the game starts. Since the Allied player will have no particular knowledge of what the Japanese player intends to attack, this does not obviate any notion of "surprise" nor would it reduce the effectiveness of any initial "surprise attacks." It just means that there is a certain fog of war and realistic sense of doubt in the mind of the Japanese player. He can slam Pearl Harbor, interidict for a week by hovering along the Oahu-Canton line, and try to grab Canton in a hasty, weak invasion. He may succeed. Canton may be empty. There may only be a "base unit" with a bunch of armed cooks and civilian contractors. Or there may be a highly trained, dug-in USMC regiment, resulting in a horrid and bloody repulse akin to the one in the first Japanese attempt on Wake Island.

If the USA wanted to make these islands (in question) defensible, they had their chance (and could have, look at defenses in Hawaii on 12/7/41).

Non-sequitur. Your statement presumes that in an alternate-history game the Allied player is incapable of pursuing an alternative strategy. One could as equally object to any Japanese player's attempt to attack these islands because the real Japanese had the opportunity and turned it down.

Boerwar says

Early war amphibious assualts were a dicey proposition. Seems to me some discussion about the support forces required to execute amphibious assaults is in order. Just because you have a transport and an expendable unit of marines doesn't mean you have enough assault worthy landing craft to bring them ashore in the face of resistance.

Exactly. In PW the problem was that the Japanese had too many ways of getting to too many objectives simultaneously. Here's where the alleged "political point limitation on Allied redployment capacity in the PI" comes in. By limiting Allied flexibility in USAFFE, the design (as it has been described) seems to tell the Japanese player that it is "ok to divert assets to implausible land grabs in the outlying margins of the defensive perimiter and hold back on the conquest of the SRA because the Allies can't react or evacuate. They are required to wait there, in arguably indefensible positions, for you to kill them at your convenience." If the game gives the Japanese so much sealift capacity that they are capable of taking the SRA "on time" with respect to history, and also grab all these outlying regions, then the game has given the Japanese too much sealift capacity.

Frag has identified a problem. There exists a gamey tactic that is exploitable solely because the IJN player knows that which the real Japanese did not at start, and also (the "and" is crucial) knows that the underlying game mechanics prevent destroyed base units from coming back rapidly, and can use this knowledge to stall Allied build up and eployments to outlying bases. If anything, the Japanese at the time understood that attacking US strategic assets in re people and supplies, as an objective independent of the ground on which they stood, was largely a waste of time because anything that they could destroy the US could replace quickly. The only notable exception being heavily armored capital ships.

I would like to see the Allied player given the capacity, in a historical game, to shift the positions of a limited number of units, during the set-up, before the game starts. Since the Allied player will have no particular knowledge of what the Japanese player intends to attack, this does not obviate any notion of "surprise" nor would it reduce the effectiveness of any initial "surprise attacks." It just means that there is a certain fog of war and realistic sense of doubt in the mind of the Japanese player. He can slam Pearl Harbor, interidict for a week by hovering along the Oahu-Canton line, and try to grab Canton in a hasty, weak invasion. He may succeed. Canton may be empty. There may only be a "base unit" with a bunch of armed cooks and civilian contractors. Or there may be a highly trained, dug-in USMC regiment, resulting in a horrid and bloody repulse akin to the one in the first Japanese attempt on Wake Island.

I agree with Mdiehl on this 100%. I think the fact that turn 1 gives the Japanese the long movement is what is causing the problem. This means that these new attacks took shape weeks in advance (assembling the ships and loading them plus moving them in position) which one could argue would have exposed *all* of the japanese plans in advance. This *could* have caused the Allies to move units that were not moved historically. In game, you could restrict all Allied relocation in turn one to only those movements that could have happend in two weeks or something like this. Again, only limited units move within their HQ zone.

Sounds like fun[:D]
JP

[Mr.Frag]

I would like to see the Allied player given the capacity, in a historical game, to shift the positions of a limited number of units, during the set-up, before the game starts.

That option exists, it is known as "Operation Outfield". You have a 25% chance of it being the one picked with VARY enabled. What you are *really* asking for is some mythical ability to move troops that do not exist to different locations *in* case the Japan player decides to alter their December 7th opening.

You have a navy. Use it for what is it intended for: Interception of hostile ships to prevent these landings.

Out of all those bases, there is only 1 that can not be protected. If that was *not* the case, I would not even be debating this with you. You don't get *both* a navy and troops to make sure every Japanese landing fails. You get one. Should you choose to not risk your ships, you don't get troops to make up for your cowardice. This is what you are basically asking for and why I am being stubborn about it. The only reason you need the troops is because you don't want to risk your ships. That is a cop out. Risk for Reward. No Risk, no reward.

For Japan to take on this high risk mission, she is sacrificing a fair amount of shipping that will basically be limping home with virtually no fuel (speed of 1 hex) and get completely mauled by your two separate CV groups. None of these ships will survive. KB does not have the fuel to race into a protection position quickly enough as the USN CV's start with a 1 or 2 day head start.

[brisd]

This lack of FOW works for both sides. It is inherant in the game design. All I have to do is play either side to learn of their deployments, strengths, weaknesses and then play the other side to exploit them. Is that gamey? Sure, but nothing can be done to stop it really. The editor is there for people who want a free deployment option.

[Mr.Frag]

This lack of FOW works for both sides. It is inherant in the game design. All I have to do is play either side to learn of their deployments, strengths, weaknesses and then play the other side to exploit them. Is that gamey? Sure, but nothing can be done to stop it really. The editor is there for people who want a free deployment option.

All schedules are hidden from player view on turn #1 for both players. You have to commit to the game before you get to see the results.

[kaleun]

OT perhaps, but: Would anybody playing Japan, on the non historic 1st turn, NOT attack PH?

[brisd]

ORIGINAL: Pascal

OK, a few of my own additions to the opinions here:

3. Remember about ANY open options in this game: the US is going to defeat Japan almost no matter what the latter does, it is just a question of time. That is also why the victory conditions for the Japanese are only about WHEN he LOSES the war. Japan lost the war the day they decided to attack US forces/territory. They knew it was a matter of time, thus their whole objective was to get to the negotiating table ASAP after they grabbed the territory they wanted. They totally misunderstood American willingness for unconditional surrender (what would you have thought reading all the isolationist politics in the late 1930's?).

This is off topic but that brought up an interesting alternative history I just read last night, from "Rising Sun Victorious". The chapter is called "Be Careful What You Wish For, the Plan Orange Disaster". It supposes that prior to 1940 US presidential elections, details of the Rainbow 4 war plan were leaked to the public and the uproar of 'abandoning the Philippines" caused FDR to publically declare that the US Navy would relieve PI in case of attack. Once Yamamoto learns this, he abandons his PH gambit and instead goes with battle of attrition and ambush of US Fleet in PI waters. Kimmel remained as CINCPAC and split the US CV's into scouting forces where they were overwelmed by IJN CV's. The remaining US BB's are lost near Luzon. The US loses the will to fight a victorious Japan and sues for peace a month later to pursue war against Hitler. So there is one proposal for a victorious Japanese outcome to the war. I'll definately be curious to do a war plan using WITP and see how badly the US would lose (the initial battles) using those outdated tactics.

[Mr.Frag]

OT perhaps, but: Would anybody playing Japan, on the non historic 1st turn, NOT attack PH?

*YES*

PH is a waste of time. I'd much rather split KB and bag both of the Allied CV's [;)]

Remember, PH was a failure, the plan was to kill CV's, not a bunch of useless slow BB's. The slow BB's are far better left to torpedoes from Nell's and Betty's due to their speed.

[kaleun]

Note to self: 'Must play this version as US"[:)]

Additional note to self : "Buy lottery ticket, must retire early"[:(]

Additional question (rethorical) WHEN IS THE DOWNLOAD!

[ZOOMIE1980]

ORIGINAL: kaleun

OT perhaps, but: Would anybody playing Japan, on the non historic 1st turn, NOT attack PH?

I'd split the PH attack force and try and find the carriers. I could care less about a bunch of obsolete old battle wagons and few P40's, B17's, and host of other, mostly relics, lieing around Hawaii.

If I can't find them in two or three days, then, maybe a take two day swipe at PH on the way back. PH was a waste of time for Japan, at least they way they did it. Should have at least tried to destroy the dry-docks, the only real valuable, STRATEGIC, target in Hawaii at the time.....

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: kaleun

OT perhaps, but: Would anybody playing Japan, on the non historic 1st turn, NOT attack PH?

A few might, but i doubt it. PH attack is IMO an important piece for Japan in her opening moves. As in real life....damage to the US Fleet (and the USAAF) is essential to ensuring Japan has a (mostly ) free hand in her operations in the SRA. It aint like PacWar.....conquoring that region takes both time and effort.

The fleet tends to get the press, but another very important effect of the attack is the damage/destruction you can do to the airforce at Oahu. Badly weakening this forces the Allied player to horde his aircraft and attempt to quickly build back up his force levels in order to prevent a reoccurance. Otherwise, well an overly aggressive Allied player could transfer those fighter and bomber groups south or westward and immediately start bolstering up forward areas. Finally, replacing all that destroyed air power takes time.

Eliminating the battleships helps protect your outer defence bases from getting hit with bombardments. If your lucky you may take out a few CA's as well.

[Svar]

ORIGINAL: kaleun
Additional note to self : "Buy lottery ticket, must retire early"[:(]

My retirement date is 2 Aug 04 but I doubt that I will play WitP all day. Once you are in the position to do something like that you realize you can play anytime you want so playing time isn't as precious.

[Hoplosternum]

For those of you interested in VPs and the timing of the Japanese surrender (based on VP ratios I believe) there is another reason. You bag a lot more VPs than you lose. Even if the attacks cost 100 planes - that's only 100 VPs. Each US BB is about double that. Plus plenty of destroyed US aircraft (1VP each) and sundry smaller vessels sunk. They all count and push back the day when the VP ratio results in your surrender. Even an average Pearl harbour is likely to get you the best part of 1000 points [X(]

Of course you may think you will get more VPs by hunting down transports in the SRA. But you will need a lot to make up the points missed here and you'll get many of them with the CVLs, Subs, Surface forces and Nells anyway.

[ZOOMIE1980]

ORIGINAL: Hoplosternum

For those of you interested in VPs and the timing of the Japanese surrender (based on VP ratios I believe) there is another reason. You bag a lot more VPs than you lose. Even if the attacks cost 100 planes - that's only 100 VPs. Each US BB is about double that. Plus plenty of destroyed US aircraft (1VP each) and sundry smaller vessels sunk. They all count and push back the day when the VP ratio results in your surrender. Even an average Pearl harbour is likely to get you the best part of 1000 points [X(]

Of course you may think you will get more VPs by hunting down transports in the SRA. But you will need a lot to make up the points missed here and you'll get many of them with the CVLs, Subs, Surface forces and Nells anyway.

I'd prefer to turn the entire VP system off if I could. I wan't to play the thing until it ends on Mar 31, 1946 or last enemy base/unit is eliminated, whichever comes first, regardless of the numerical score.... Or at least not have the game simply end, just tell me I lost or won and then let me play the scenario out.

[dwesolick]

I'd prefer to turn the entire VP system off if I could. I wan't to play the thing until it ends on Mar 31, 1946 or last enemy base/unit is eliminated, whichever comes first, regardless of the numerical score.... Or at least not have the game simply end, just tell me I lost or won and then let me play the scenario out.

[&o][&o][&o][&o][&o][&o][&o][&o][&o][&o][&o][&o]

[Nikademus]

VP's are important for determining the level of spanking....but i agree with those whose preference is for the game to be able to be played to conclusion. It has nothing to do with being bloodthirsty and wanting to bomb every last PG of the IJN out of existance.....I just believe in being thorough......

there goes an MSW!!!!!! TF 58 launches full attack!!!! [:'(]

[ZOOMIE1980]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

VP's are important for determining the level of spanking....but i agree with those whose preference is for the game to be able to be played to conclusion. It has nothing to do with being bloodthirsty and wanting to bomb every last PG of the IJN out of existance.....I just believe in being thorough......

there goes an MSW!!!!!! TF 58 launches full attack!!!! [:'(]

VP's are kind of fun to play with once the game gets old and you've started to figure things out vs the AI. In most wargames, you can master the thing and beat the AI fair regularly. After that, I then start paying attention to just how badly I'm beating it and try to set "personal bests" using the VP's as the measuring stick. But when the game is still fresh and I haven't figured most of the angles out, I could care less about VP's. And for this game, I may never get to the end of the major scenario for literally YEARS. Hell, in three years, I've only gotten to the end of scenario 17 in UV twice. I usually just tire, get off on something else, or just desire to start over again..... In this one, I imagine I will play the first 6-9 months several times before I bother go beyond and if I want to play the middle or late years, I'll just find a shorter scenario that covers that period or make one up in the editor.....