Read a little closer next time when you respond to what I post. I made no such claim, I merely asked you to explain why you say "the US could have hardly had worse timing"
You implied it and you intended to. Your only knowledge of the battle seems predisposed to the "US got lucky side of the equation."
You could only make this statement and it hold any water if you are referring to the uncoordinated US strikes raining down on KB from various vectors simply because they were uncoordinated and nothing else.
I can make the statement and have it hold water for a variety of reasons. Let us count the ways.
1. The strikes from the US CVs arrive in an uncoordinated fashion.
2. Two groups of F4Fs and one of SBDs never find the target.
3. #1 and #2 above happen because the Japanese fleet makes a very fortunate sudden northward turn.
4. Tone #4 plane finds a US carrier because she flies a search pattern that was NOT the one the Japanese operational plan called for. Had she flown her planned route, the US CVs would not have been observed.
5. The surviving Japanese CV through a series of maneuvering decisions winds up separated from the rest of the Japanese CVs and is thus not targeted in the initial set of US SBD strikes.
6. Same CV then manages a strike launch that dogs the heels of one of Yorktown's homeward-bound strikes, allowing the Japanese strike to penetrate the US CAP and hit Yorktown.
Despite all of the above, the US basic operational plan succeeds in springing a trap on the exposed Japanese CVs. In this trap, the equivalent of 2 CVs worth of SBDs sink 4 CVs and a CA. So the US operational plan had sufficient force and then some redundancy that allows the plan to succeed despite the operational friction that attends to any battle plan once battle is joined.
The Japanese operational plan was the mother of all bad plans. To begin with, the first major error was in sending 4 CVs to simultask the jobs of 6 CVs (or 8 CVs if you want some redundancy in your plan). The Japanese knew this. Their own pre-operational wargames demonstrated that even one US CV in the area at the wrong moment could give them a real bad day. That is why their operational plan required pre-contact recon at Pearl Harbor and why their battle plan assumed that at most one US CV might show up to oppose them. That the Japanese chose to ignore the failed recon element of their plan just made the whole plan worse when it came to execution of the operation.
Knowing the Japanese invasion plan enabled the US to be in the right place at the right time to ambush....and I would call that good timing.
Yes but this is not what you were referring to when you mentioned US fortunate timing initially. You were referring to the events of the battle. If you want to invoke cracking the Japanese code as a matter of fortunate timing then you could as easily say it was unfortunate timing that the codes weren't more substantially decrypted 8 months earlier. You can "game the argument" all you want but if you do you license anyone else to do the same.
Ridiculous claim. KB was unable to spot, much less launch strike a/c due to the continuous US uncoordinated attacks from the TF's afloat and Midway.
That claim is not substantiated by the facts.
Add the fact that the Midway strike needed to be recovered and struck below before any strike a/c could be spotted much less launched.
That indeed was a matter of good timing but it was not lucky or accidental good timing. The US air strike was deliberately timed to arrive as the Japanese were recovering their depleted shot up air craft from the Midway strike. It was part of the US operational plan to catch the Japanese CVs in a vulnerable tactical position. I submit that when you make the timing work for you it is not "fortune" it is good operational planning.
Add to that the need to recover and the pressing need to launch and recover an ever increasing CAP due to numerous US uncoordinated attacks.
That's what happens when you send an inadequate force to accomplish the mission. A major land installation is difficult to suppress and poses a constant threat to any TF that wants to seize it. That was the way of the Pacific War especially in 1942.
The US uncoordinated attacks were not "lucky" but they were certainly fortuitous. They kept KB from launching it's own strike against the US TF's, plain and simple.
No they did not, plain and simple. For most of the battle these ships did not have an obvious naval target against which to launch. They only received the critical information about US CV position as the US SBDs were starting their pushovers. They might have launched earlier but then had they done so they might have found nothing (and lost a great many more veteran pilots in the process).
It was a case of "bad timing" that turned out a good result because the strikes were numerous, continuous, and came in from a variety of vectors KB couldn't cope with and it eventually caught up with them.
The results would have been substantially the same if all the US a.c. had arrived all at once.
So was it really "bad timing" to have multitudes of uncoordinated attacks?
Yes absolutely.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?