Thach Weave Bonus vs Zero bonus???

[Apollo11]

Hi all,

ORIGINAL: Demosthenes

Olive Branch...

No problem - same here...




Leo "Apollo11"

[pauk]

ORIGINAL: Demosthenes
Croatia's WWII record stands for itself - first Hitler, then Stalin. If these people want to dislike Americans - fine.

Actually Yugoslavia (Croatia was one of federal "units"), broke relations with Stalin in 1948 (but whats the hell why you should know that?). And guess who offer the help - USA. Of course, Tito (leader) accepted this offer and American goods start to flow in communist Yugoslavia....[:D]

[spence]

I used "didn't see" as meaning they didn't fight them. If you hadn't fought them I question whether you would know of their increased difficulty compared to the Nate. In ant event, the AVG was considerably more reactive to any situation that would pop up, as compared to the USN, so they shoudln't have the penaly, even, if, somebody wants to claim the Zero was seen or fought.

ACTUALLY, NO ONE IN THIS THREAD OR IN FACT ANY OF ITS PREDECESSORS HAS DOCUMENTED OR CITED ONE SINGLE INSTANCE WHERE THE ZERO, FLOWN BY IJN CARRIER AVIATORS, DEMONSTRATED A CLEAR SUPERIORITY OR IN FACT ANYTHING OTHER THAN A MERE PARITY WITH F4Fs FLOWN BY USN CARRIER AVIATORS.

THE ONE EXAMPLE OF SUPERIORITY (AS INDICATED BY KILL RATIO) ADVANCED TO DATE IS THE FIGHT BETWEEN KB'S ESCORT AND THE MARINE CAP OVER MIDWAY ON 4 JUNE, 1942. THAT FIGHT FEATURED ONLY 7 F4Fs AMONG THE MARINE DEFENDERS WHO WERE, EVEN INCLUDING THEIR F2A EQUIPPED BRETHEREN, WERE OUTNUMBERED BY A SIGNIFICANT MARGIN JUST BY THE ESCORT AND WERE IN ANY CASE CHARGED WITH ATTACKING THE JAPANESE BOMBERS AS THEIR FIRST PRIORITY AND WHO IN THAT CONTEXT WERE FIGHTING AT A 1 TO 4 RATIO OVERALL.
IMHO THAT FIGHT MOSTLY DEMONSTRATES THAT IF YOU BRING THE MOST GUYS TO THE FIGHT YOU'LL PROBABLY WIN. IT SAYS ABSOLUTELY NOTHING AT ALL ABOUT THE USN's ABILITY TO ENGAGE THE ZERO ON RELATIVELY EQUAL TERMS WITH IT'S F4Fs. IN THE ENCOUNTERS THAT SAME DAY BETWEEN ZEROS AND USN F4Fs THE KILL RATIO WAS PRETTY MUCH EQUAL.

THE FOLLOWING ARE INDISPUTABLE FACTS:

1) THE ZERO WAS UNABLE TO PREVENT USN F4F-ESCORTED SBD'S FROM HITTING SHOKAKU WITH 4 BOMBS AT CORAL SEA WHICH WAS THE FIRST ENCOUNTER BETWEEN THE TYPES. NEITHER WAS THE F4F ABLE TO PREVENT JAPANESE STRIKE AIRCRAFT FROM GETTING THROUGH TO THE USN CARRIERS. THE ATTACK AIRCRAFT FROM EACH SIDE SUFFERED SIGNIFICANT LOSS TO THE CAP THOUGH. PARTLY AS A RESULT OF THE FIGHT BOTH SIDES DECIDED IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA TO PUT MORE FIGHTERS ON THEIR CARRIERS. THE OVERALL NUMBER OF ZEROS AND F4Fs LOST IN THE ACTION IN A2A WAS ROUGHLY EQUAL.

2) THE ZERO WAS UNABLE TO PREVENT EVEN UNESCORTED BOMBERS FROM PENETRATING KB'S SCREEN AND ATTACKING THEIR AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AT MIDWAY. LIKEWISE THE F4Fs COULDN'T KEEP THE JAP STRIKE AIRCRAFT AWAY FROM YORKTOWN OR MIDWAY. ALTHOUGH STRIKE AIRCRAFT PENETRATED THE CAP LOSSES TO THE CAP WERE SIGNIFICANT (EXCEPT FOR THE 1020 USN DIVE-BOMBER STRIKES WHICH WERE NOT INTERCEPTED AT ALL). THE NUMBER OF ZEROS AND F4Fs LOST IN A2A COMBAT WAS ROUGHLY EQUAL.

3) IN SUBSEQUENT CARRIER VS CARRIER ENCOUNTERS IN 1942 NEITHER THE ZERO NOR THE F4F DEMONSTRATED THE ABILITY TO KEEP ENEMY STRIKE AIRCRAFT AWAY FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE CARRIERS AND THE LOSSES OF EACH TYPE IN A2A WERE ROUGHLY EQUAL. EACH SIDES CAP WAS ABLE TO INFLICT SIGNIFICANT LOSSES ON THE OTHER'S STRIKE AIRCRAFT.

4) WHEN 1942 CONCLUDED THE PRE-WAR CADRE OF JAPANESE CARRIER AVIATORS WAS DECIMATED: BOTH FIGHTER AND ATTACK A/C AIRCREW.

IN UV AND WITP IT IS NOT UNCOMMON FOR THE ZERO CAP OF THE KB TO WIPE OUT USN AIRSTRIKES. IT IS ALSO NOT UNCOMMON FOR ZERO ESCORTS TO BLAST A PATH THROUGH A USN CAP SUCH THAT VERY FEW IF ANY STRIKE AIRCRAFT ARE LOST IN A2A. THESE RESULTS ARE DIVORCED FROM THE REALITY OF THE PACIFIC WAR IN 1942. IRL ALL THESE COMBATS TOOK PLACE AFTER THE "ZERO BONUS" EXPIRES SO WE CAN NEVER KNOW WHAT WOULD HAVE HAPPENED HAD RELATIVELY EQUAL ENGAGEMENTS SUCH AS CORAL SEA OR MIDWAY OCCURRED DURING THAT TIME.

SUFFICE IT TO SAY THAT THE ZERO WAS UNABLE TO "SHOCK AND AWE" THE USN'S CARRIER AVIATORS WHEN THEY DID FINALLY MEET IN A2A. IMPRESS THEM AS A DANGEROUS OPPONENT: YES, BUT THAT'S ALL FOLKS.[:)]

[Big B]

Thank you Spence, you have summed up nicely what many of us have been trying to say for a long time[;)]

ORIGINAL: spence


ACTUALLY, NO ONE IN THIS THREAD OR IN FACT ANY OF ITS PREDECESSORS HAS DOCUMENTED OR CITED ONE SINGLE INSTANCE WHERE THE ZERO, FLOWN BY IJN CARRIER AVIATORS, DEMONSTRATED A CLEAR SUPERIORITY OR IN FACT ANYTHING OTHER THAN A MERE PARITY WITH F4Fs FLOWN BY USN CARRIER AVIATORS.

(snip....)

[Drongo]

ORIGINAL: spence

I used "didn't see" as meaning they didn't fight them. If you hadn't fought them I question whether you would know of their increased difficulty compared to the Nate. In ant event, the AVG was considerably more reactive to any situation that would pop up, as compared to the USN, so they shoudln't have the penaly, even, if, somebody wants to claim the Zero was seen or fought.

ACTUALLY, NO ONE IN THIS THREAD OR IN FACT ANY OF ITS PREDECESSORS HAS DOCUMENTED OR CITED ONE SINGLE INSTANCE WHERE THE ZERO, FLOWN BY IJN CARRIER AVIATORS, DEMONSTRATED A CLEAR SUPERIORITY OR IN FACT ANYTHING OTHER THAN A MERE PARITY WITH F4Fs FLOWN BY USN CARRIER AVIATORS.

THE ONE EXAMPLE OF SUPERIORITY (AS INDICATED BY KILL RATIO) ADVANCED TO DATE IS THE FIGHT BETWEEN KB'S ESCORT AND THE MARINE CAP OVER MIDWAY ON 4 JUNE, 1942. THAT FIGHT FEATURED ONLY 7 F4Fs AMONG THE MARINE DEFENDERS WHO WERE, EVEN INCLUDING THEIR F2A EQUIPPED BRETHEREN, WERE OUTNUMBERED BY A SIGNIFICANT MARGIN JUST BY THE ESCORT AND WERE IN ANY CASE CHARGED WITH ATTACKING THE JAPANESE BOMBERS AS THEIR FIRST PRIORITY AND WHO IN THAT CONTEXT WERE FIGHTING AT A 1 TO 4 RATIO OVERALL.
IMHO THAT FIGHT MOSTLY DEMONSTRATES THAT IF YOU BRING THE MOST GUYS TO THE FIGHT YOU'LL PROBABLY WIN. IT SAYS ABSOLUTELY NOTHING AT ALL ABOUT THE USN's ABILITY TO ENGAGE THE ZERO ON RELATIVELY EQUAL TERMS WITH IT'S F4Fs. IN THE ENCOUNTERS THAT SAME DAY BETWEEN ZEROS AND USN F4Fs THE KILL RATIO WAS PRETTY MUCH EQUAL.

THE FOLLOWING ARE INDISPUTABLE FACTS:

1) THE ZERO WAS UNABLE TO PREVENT USN F4F-ESCORTED SBD'S FROM HITTING SHOKAKU WITH 4 BOMBS AT CORAL SEA WHICH WAS THE FIRST ENCOUNTER BETWEEN THE TYPES. NEITHER WAS THE F4F ABLE TO PREVENT JAPANESE STRIKE AIRCRAFT FROM GETTING THROUGH TO THE USN CARRIERS. THE ATTACK AIRCRAFT FROM EACH SIDE SUFFERED SIGNIFICANT LOSS TO THE CAP THOUGH. PARTLY AS A RESULT OF THE FIGHT BOTH SIDES DECIDED IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA TO PUT MORE FIGHTERS ON THEIR CARRIERS. THE OVERALL NUMBER OF ZEROS AND F4Fs LOST IN THE ACTION IN A2A WAS ROUGHLY EQUAL.

2) THE ZERO WAS UNABLE TO PREVENT EVEN UNESCORTED BOMBERS FROM PENETRATING KB'S SCREEN AND ATTACKING THEIR AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AT MIDWAY. LIKEWISE THE F4Fs COULDN'T KEEP THE JAP STRIKE AIRCRAFT AWAY FROM YORKTOWN OR MIDWAY. ALTHOUGH STRIKE AIRCRAFT PENETRATED THE CAP LOSSES TO THE CAP WERE SIGNIFICANT (EXCEPT FOR THE 1020 USN DIVE-BOMBER STRIKES WHICH WERE NOT INTERCEPTED AT ALL). THE NUMBER OF ZEROS AND F4Fs LOST IN A2A COMBAT WAS ROUGHLY EQUAL.

3) IN SUBSEQUENT CARRIER VS CARRIER ENCOUNTERS IN 1942 NEITHER THE ZERO NOR THE F4F DEMONSTRATED THE ABILITY TO KEEP ENEMY STRIKE AIRCRAFT AWAY FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE CARRIERS AND THE LOSSES OF EACH TYPE IN A2A WERE ROUGHLY EQUAL. EACH SIDES CAP WAS ABLE TO INFLICT SIGNIFICANT LOSSES ON THE OTHER'S STRIKE AIRCRAFT.

4) WHEN 1942 CONCLUDED THE PRE-WAR CADRE OF JAPANESE CARRIER AVIATORS WAS DECIMATED: BOTH FIGHTER AND ATTACK A/C AIRCREW.

IN UV AND WITP IT IS NOT UNCOMMON FOR THE ZERO CAP OF THE KB TO WIPE OUT USN AIRSTRIKES. IT IS ALSO NOT UNCOMMON FOR ZERO ESCORTS TO BLAST A PATH THROUGH A USN CAP SUCH THAT VERY FEW IF ANY STRIKE AIRCRAFT ARE LOST IN A2A. THESE RESULTS ARE DIVORCED FROM THE REALITY OF THE PACIFIC WAR IN 1942. IRL ALL THESE COMBATS TOOK PLACE AFTER THE "ZERO BONUS" EXPIRES SO WE CAN NEVER KNOW WHAT WOULD HAVE HAPPENED HAD RELATIVELY EQUAL ENGAGEMENTS SUCH AS CORAL SEA OR MIDWAY OCCURRED DURING THAT TIME.

SUFFICE IT TO SAY THAT THE ZERO WAS UNABLE TO "SHOCK AND AWE" THE USN'S CARRIER AVIATORS WHEN THEY DID FINALLY MEET IN A2A. IMPRESS THEM AS A DANGEROUS OPPONENT: YES, BUT THAT'S ALL FOLKS.[:)]

WTF is this USN vs Zero crap doing in a thread dedicated to discussing the AVG? Take it somewhere appropriate.

[Big B]

ORIGINAL: Drongo

WTF is this USN vs Zero crap doing in a thread dedicated to discussing the AVG? Take it somewhere appropriate.

And not even a laughing face![:D]
Man, you have a dry sense of humor![:D]

[mogami]

Hi, In WITP if the Japanese only put 18xA6M2 up on CAP (like at Midway in RL) The USN strikes will get through.
The Zero bonus is not just for carrier groups (in fact they are the least likely to see combat while it is in effect.)
The Zero bonus in WITP is mostly utilized over Singapore and Java. (and China where the AVG is immune)
The USAAF in PI is hammered on turn 1 and so aircombat is rare in that area. It is gone in time for the historic carrier battles.

Now the aircraft that suffer the most while the "bonus" is in effect are Dutch and Commonwealth. If you add up the number of Allied aircraft used in defense of Java and SRA and compare this total to the available landbased A6M2 you will see that the Allied airforces were never outnumbered at the start of a Japanese operation but were always destroyed by it's end. That is the reason for the "Bonus" IJAAF fighters for the most part are of little use in SRA. They are fine in Indo China and Burma but don't have the range inside the SRA where all the fighter duty falls on A6M2.

It's the landbased A6m2 that fought most of Japans air to air battles not the carrier based groups.

[spence]

In WITP if the Japanese only put 18xA6M2 up on CAP (like at Midway in RL)

I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT AT SOME POINT IN THE MORNING OF JUNE 4, 1942 THE KB HAD A CAP OF 18 ZEROS BUT THE CAP WAS OVER 30 WHEN TORPEDO 8 ATTACKED AND EVEN THEN ENS GAY GOT CLOSE ENOUGH TO LAUNCH AT A CARRIER. THE CAP WAS 41 ZEROS WHEN YORKTOWN'S STRIKE PACKAGE APPROACHED FROM THE SE AND THE ENTERPRISE SBDs APPROACHED FROM THE SW. IN THAT INSTANCE 53 SBDs OUT OF 53 AND 5 TBDs OUT OF 12 PENETRATED THE CAP AND LAUNCHED AT KB'S CARRIERS.

JAPANESE FANBOYS SHOULD REALLY TREAD CAREFULLY WHEN THEY ADDRESS JUST ABOUT ANY QUESTION IN THIS GAME IN TERMS OF REAL LIFE. THE OVERWHELMING SUPERIORITY OF THE ZERO OVER THE WILDCAT AT ANY POINT IN THE WAR BEARS THE SAME RELATIONSHIP TO REALITY AS THE TELEPATHICALLY DIRECTED CAP THAT THE KB ROUTINELY MUSTERS IN THE GAME.

[pauk]

Still don't know why are you scream in forum??????

[Honda]

Yeah, stop it, it'll shoot down my Zeros![:D]

[Ursa MAior]

Hey southern neighbors! Let me steal your for a second from the topic. What do you think of this Gotovina hype? Was he really such an influential commander is he the scapegoat? And the death of the Derick (Milosevic?)

[JeffroK]

Thanks for the interesting stuff Mogami, it means I'll have to get "Bloody Shambles I & II" from the Library again.

[el cid again]

CAP WAS 41 ZEROS WHEN YORKTOWN'S STRIKE PACKAGE APPROACHED FROM THE SE AND THE ENTERPRISE SBDs APPROACHED FROM THE SW. IN THAT INSTANCE 53 SBDs OUT OF 53 AND 5 TBDs OUT OF 12 PENETRATED THE CAP AND LAUNCHED AT KB'S CARRIERS.

Not germane. It was more like zero Zeros!

Do planes

not at altitude

out of ammunition

low on fuel

count as practical CAP? No they don't. So no, they didn't.

We got lucky in timing. Even the AAA guns were depressed and many had no ready ammunition.

This is hardly a normal moment in time.

Game designers may not consider extreme datum points as norms. And this is the most extreme datum point of the entire war - unless the strike at Clark or Pearl Harbor on the opening days are considered to be such. But it is one of the top three.

[el cid again]

THE OVERWHELMING SUPERIORITY OF THE ZERO OVER THE WILDCAT AT ANY POINT IN THE WAR BEARS THE SAME RELATIONSHIP TO REALITY AS THE TELEPATHICALLY DIRECTED CAP THAT THE KB ROUTINELY MUSTERS IN THE GAME.

You need to play more. I have seen ZERO cap fly. I have seen tiny CAP fly - even one or two planes! It is war - things happen - but not always the same things. Grigsby designs this all that way - based on die rolls.

[mdiehl]

We got lucky in timing. Even the AAA guns were depressed and many had no ready ammunition.

The US could hardly have had worse timing. Coral Sea was a good example of what could happen to the Japanese in the face of a coordinated strike. Had all the US CV airgroups arrived concurrently the Japanese would have lost all four carriers without launching a counterstrike.

This is hardly a normal moment in time.

On the contrary. It is typical of what you would expect if you throw an inadequate force at a major land installation and expect your force to pull triple duty defending itself, preparing to strike enemy ships, and trying to suppress a land installation.

And this is the most extreme datum point of the entire war - unless the strike at Clark or Pearl Harbor on the opening days are considered to be such. But it is one of the top three.

None of these were "extreme datum points." Indeed, the allegation suggests that you are merely willing to write off some circumstances without much knowledge of the data at all. Japanese carriers struck Darwin by surprise, sinking ships in the harbor and destroying aircraft on the ground or on their take off rolls. It was a mini PH. And a mini Clark. US CVs struck Truk in much the same fashion. In 1942 they hit Japanese assets on north coastal New Guinea with very successful coordinated strikes. Prior to Coral Sea US CVs pounded Japanese assets near Rennell.

Japanese CAP in 1942 was largely ineffective against coordinated airstrikes and uncoordinated strikes alike. US CAP was likewise prone to deterioration under prolonged stress but in some circumstances (like the early Rabaul Raids where the Japanese could not project enough airpower to wear down the US defenses) CAP did very well.

Anyhow, this whole bussiness "Midway was lucky for the US" is bunk. US luck could not have been worse. That despite the bad luck things turned out well is largely due to US excellence in training its unit commanders and its pilots.

[barbarrossa]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl


The US could hardly have had worse timing (at Midway ---ed.).

Please explain this statement

[mdiehl]

I think I've posted the complete long form of this four times. So I'll give you the short form.

1. At no time during the war did any Japanese CV group demonstrate the capability to stop ANY inbound USN strike, coordinated or not. Contrary to popular mythmaking, there were a couple instances of US coordinated strikes against Japanese carriers (Coral Sea and IIRC Santa Cruz) and numerous instances of US coordinated strikes against land targets (Tarawa, Buka, Rennell) and non-CV shipping in 1942.

2. When US strike aircraft arrived over Japanese carriers with US escorts, the Zeros got beat up by the escorting fighters (to the tune of losses about 1.2:1 favoring the US), got beat up by the defensive fire of SBDs, were unable to prevent a substantial proportion of SBDs from making their attacks. The only aircraft that the Zeroes demonstrated a capability to wipe out en masse were torpedo bombers. And then, only TBDs. This is not a knock against the pilots, it's a knock against the ability of the Japanese to command and control defensive a.c. and the number of a.c. flown defensively. The US had a similar problem in 1942.

3. At Midway, the US plan was to put two coordinated packages over Kido Butai at the right moment. In the face of friction (spotted by observer planes) the plan was changed on the fly to require the strike groups to form up with escorts "on the way to the target." Had coordinated strike packages arrived the result would have been about the same number of bomb hits, more torpedo hits, fewer TBD casualties, more F4F casualties, and more A6M casualties. That's just counting US a.c. who found a target.

4. The IJN executed a northward turn after the first strike of US SBDs was launched. The timing of that turn was incredibly fortuitous for the Japanese in combination with a US decision to avoid breaking radio silence to correct the course of the first US strike. As a result, an entire SBG SB group never even made an attack. Had these SBDs made their attack, none of the Japanese CVs would have been operational. All would have been sunk in the initial strike or follow-up strikes.

The following alternate outcome is that all 3 US CVs remain fully operational. Yorktown survives.

[Big B]

Yep, Mdiehl has mentioned this in detail many times on this forum,
And you did not eevn mention this time how the 'late' search plane that found Yorktown - NEVER would have found the US ships hade the search aircraft been 'on-time/on schedule' (a fact just now getting accepted since the publication of Shattered Sword)

barbarrossa you must not have been reading the forum much in the last several months[:)]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

I think I've posted the complete long form of this four times. So I'll give you the short form.

1. At no time during the war did any Japanese CV group demonstrate the capability to stop ANY inbound USN strike, coordinated or not. Contrary to popular mythmaking, there were a couple instances of US coordinated strikes against Japanese carriers (Coral Sea and IIRC Santa Cruz) and numerous instances of US coordinated strikes against land targets (Tarawa, Buka, Rennell) and non-CV shipping in 1942.

2. When US strike aircraft arrived over Japanese carriers with US escorts, the Zeros got beat up by the escorting fighters (to the tune of losses about 1.2:1 favoring the US), got beat up by the defensive fire of SBDs, were unable to prevent a substantial proportion of SBDs from making their attacks. The only aircraft that the Zeroes demonstrated a capability to wipe out en masse were torpedo bombers. And then, only TBDs. This is not a knock against the pilots, it's a knock against the ability of the Japanese to command and control defensive a.c. and the number of a.c. flown defensively. The US had a similar problem in 1942.

3. At Midway, the US plan was to put two coordinated packages over Kido Butai at the right moment. In the face of friction (spotted by observer planes) the plan was changed on the fly to require the strike groups to form up with escorts "on the way to the target." Had coordinated strike packages arrived the result would have been about the same number of bomb hits, more torpedo hits, fewer TBD casualties, more F4F casualties, and more A6M casualties. That's just counting US a.c. who found a target.

4. The IJN executed a northward turn after the first strike of US SBDs was launched. The timing of that turn was incredibly fortuitous for the Japanese in combination with a US decision to avoid breaking radio silence to correct the course of the first US strike. As a result, an entire SBG SB group never even made an attack. Had these SBDs made their attack, none of the Japanese CVs would have been operational. All would have been sunk in the initial strike or follow-up strikes.

The following alternate outcome is that all 3 US CVs remain fully operational. Yorktown survives.

[barbarrossa]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

I think I've posted the complete long form of this four times. So I'll give you the short form.

1. At no time during the war did any Japanese CV group demonstrate the capability to stop ANY inbound USN strike, coordinated or not. Contrary to popular mythmaking, there were a couple instances of US coordinated strikes against Japanese carriers (Coral Sea and IIRC Santa Cruz) and numerous instances of US coordinated strikes against land targets (Tarawa, Buka, Rennell) and non-CV shipping in 1942.

2. When US strike aircraft arrived over Japanese carriers with US escorts, the Zeros got beat up by the escorting fighters (to the tune of losses about 1.2:1 favoring the US), got beat up by the defensive fire of SBDs, were unable to prevent a substantial proportion of SBDs from making their attacks. The only aircraft that the Zeroes demonstrated a capability to wipe out en masse were torpedo bombers. And then, only TBDs. This is not a knock against the pilots, it's a knock against the ability of the Japanese to command and control defensive a.c. and the number of a.c. flown defensively. The US had a similar problem in 1942.

3. At Midway, the US plan was to put two coordinated packages over Kido Butai at the right moment. In the face of friction (spotted by observer planes) the plan was changed on the fly to require the strike groups to form up with escorts "on the way to the target." Had coordinated strike packages arrived the result would have been about the same number of bomb hits, more torpedo hits, fewer TBD casualties, more F4F casualties, and more A6M casualties. That's just counting US a.c. who found a target.

4. The IJN executed a northward turn after the first strike of US SBDs was launched. The timing of that turn was incredibly fortuitous for the Japanese in combination with a US decision to avoid breaking radio silence to correct the course of the first US strike. As a result, an entire SBG SB group never even made an attack. Had these SBDs made their attack, none of the Japanese CVs would have been operational. All would have been sunk in the initial strike or follow-up strikes.

The following alternate outcome is that all 3 US CVs remain fully operational. Yorktown survives.

If your statement "couldn't have worse timing" is that USN strikes were to be coordinated (which I agree they were) but were not, I can think of a multitude of circumstances that could have made US "timing" worse, (i.e. early spotting by scouting IJN subs, or not having the Japanese plans for Midway in hand in time to ambush them).

The fact that uncoordinated attacks still achieved remarkable results seems to me to render the statement "the US could hardly have had worse timing" kind of irrelevant.

Your point that all 4 carriers would have been sunk at a stroke had the attacks been coordinated undermines the "worse timing " statement even more because the results are the same more or less 3 out of 4. Unless the loss of Yorktown due to Hiryu's momentary survival is your main point in stating "US timing couldn't have been worse".

The laundry list you cite in your post still does not explain your "timing" statement so I have to infer the above, and that was all I was curious about as I was in general agreement with the rest of your initial post.

[barbarrossa]

ORIGINAL: Big B


barbarrossa you must not have been reading the forum much in the last several months[:)]

Yeah that's true. But I don't think mdiehl read what I was asking him to explain specifically "the US couldn't have worse timing".