U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, defines reconnaissance as "a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area." (1) Used properly, reconnaissance can be the difference between winning and losing the battle, which was apparent during the Battle of Gettysburg in July 1863. General George Meade, using his cavalry in a proper reconnaissance role, exhibited modern-day fundamentals of reconnaissance, allowing his Army of the Potomac to gain the advantage at Gettysburg, while General Robert E. Lee used his cavalry in a disruption role, denying his Army of Northern Virginia an ideal battlefield position to engage and defeat Lee's army.
No doubt Lee should have handled his recon better before Gettysburg, as there obviously was a lot on stake on this invasion. I have never quite understood though that Stuart did not maintain comms with Lee. Lee did not know the whereabouts of Stuart, but Stuart must have had a general idea of the position of Lee?
Concerning use of recon in an observing versus disruptive role, this must be decided by priorities, as neither is generally bad. But I think the observing role must be given highest priority in most cases. Knowing your enemys dispositions must always be a prime concern of a commander, and disruption seems more of a 'luxury'.
At Gettysburg Buford did not only screen and observe, but also held an important battlefield objective. This I think presents a problem for recon units in general. If we assume that speed is essential for recon units to do their job, then we must also assume that combat power would be inversely proportional to speed. More power less speed. We need speed to maintain contact and observe, but to screen and hold objectives we possibly need combat power.
Another concern around holding objectives by recon units is the tactical capabilities of the recon unit commander. Is he really capable of deciding whether or not this objective is worth holding? That is a question that must be in the mind of an Army commander in this situation.
I am not aware of if Buford actually did get permission to defend Cemetery Ridge or he did it on his own initiative. The outcome proved him right I gues, but he may just as well had gotten a lot of his unit killed for nothing.
Looking at the four principles:
1. Priority of recon.
2. Continuos recon.
3. Gaining and maintaining recon.
4. Reporting rapidly and accurately.
1. and 4 makes sense, but I think 2. and 3. are inseparable and hard to distinguish, so they really should be one.
I also find the mix between speed and combat power in COTA to be a challenge. You want to recon the enemy positions, but you also want to hold that bridge so your Pz div. might cross if need be. Not always easy to compose such a force.
This I think presents a problem for recon units in general. If we assume that speed is essential for recon units to do their job, then we must also assume that combat power would be inversely proportional to speed. More power less speed. We need speed to maintain contact and observe, but to screen and hold objectives we possibly need combat power.
How did you feel commanding a German reconnaissance battalion? If you imagine the scenarios being part of a bigger picture: do you think the battalion had enough combat power?
Yes, I definately had the feeling that this force was not meant for observing only. In scenario 2 against the British Armor I was doubtful at first, but they aquitted themselves very well, even better if use of terrain is added and they have the speed to do just that.
In scenario First Clean Break I remember using the recon unit of LSSAH for not only recon purposes, but forceful flanking maneuver as well.
Well, that's great. I found the Recon Bn in the PWC scenarios a bit lacking in the fire support area. But that could be just me.
Once my recon units have delivered their information, I often use them to maintain contact with the enemy in order to develop a target portfolio for my guns.
Or I may use them in a defensive role as early warning pickets to alert me to the arrival of the enemy in a distant area of interest.
Of course, in that manner they are not very disruptive, but the big guns certainly are.
2021 - Resigned in writing as a 20+ year Matrix Beta and never looked back ...
