Darwin, the importance of being Earnest!

[dr.hal]

Folks, I know this has been discussed before in other threads but NOT unto itself that I know of. It appears to me that due to many factors including location on the map board, Darwin has an importance within the game FAR exceeding its actual role in the real Pacific war. From reading much about the real events of the Pacific, with the exception of a few attacks (and one in particular) Darwin was a backwater. Do others agree? Or not? Hal

[CT Grognard]

Hi dr. hal,

My understanding of Japanese strategy after they secured the Southern Resource Area - or "Stage Two" - are as follows:

1) There was a strong push by elements of the IJ Navy for an invasion of northern Australia for a number of reasons:
a) It was lightly defended and geographically removed from major Australian population centres (and as a consequence difficult to reinforce);
b) As a consequence you would need a small Japanese landing force to secure it;
c) Securing it would deny northern Australia as a base from which the Allies could launch a counter-offensive to liberate the Dutch East Indies.

Notably, Yamamoto was firmly opposed to such an invasion.

The IJ Army, who would need to provide the bulk of the troops for such an operation, were very much opposed to it. There were a number of reasons for this:

1) IJ Army doctrine was to defend the perimeter of Japanese conquests, and they believed they would be over-extending their supply lines and expanding the perimeter to a level where it was stretched too thin;
2) The IJ Army was always focused on China and Manchuria, where the top leadership always felt the main threat was Russia. As a result there was a supreme reluctance on the part of the IJ Army to consider stripping any troops from China or Kwantung for such an operation.
3) The IJ Army believed it was not feasible to only occupy north Australia given likely Allied counteroffensives there. It was their contention that an invasion of Australia would need to involve an attempt to conquer the ENTIRE Australian continent, which was simply not possible.

The IJ Navy thought they would only need 60,000 men to secure north Australia. The IJ Army estimated they would need far more - more than 200,000.

As a result the Army felt that such an invasion simply required too many resources - troops and shipping - for relatively little value, i.e. in their opinion the risk-reward was out of kilter.

Finally the decision was taken to isolate Australia by cutting them off from the United States by securing Fiji, Samoa and New Caledonia and denying the South Pacific link.

A further leg was to advance through the Central Pacific to capture Midway Island.

Then came the Battle of Midway, and the rest is history.

Ultimately Darwin and north Australia became backwaters in the real war because of these strategic considerations. I believe WITP-AE, however, allows for a number of "what if" scenarios and one of these is for Japan to attempt the strategy of invading northern Australia that was very strongly considered up until February 1942.

[CT Grognard]

In fact, the only Japanese landing in Australia that occurred took place on 19 January 1944 when four Japanese officers on a small fishing boat departed Kupang in Timor and went ashore for a day in the York Sound region (closest base in WITP-AE would be Broome) to investigate reports that the Allies were building large bases in the area. [8D]

[CT Grognard]

It was interesting reading the house rules that Fletcher and cantona2 set up for their "AE Historical Game Project".

To reflect the extreme IJ Army opposition to an invasion of northern Australia, they had a house rule if I recall stating that the Japanese player had to have accumulated a total of 3,000 (or something of the sort) political points "held in reserve" and any IJ Army units landing there had to have at least 80 preparation points.

[dr.hal]

Ct, thanks, good stuff... I didn't know about those house rules, in my game we have nothing like that! As for the real thing, I agree, circumstances of strategy seem to have put Darwin in the background YET I can't help but see that Darwin would be a front line player in any strategy within the game let alone a push on Northern Australia. Hal

[CT Grognard]

I'll try to find Fletcher's historical house rules. They certainly do tie the Japanese and Allied player significantly in terms of game flexibility, but make for an extremely interesting game!

[CT Grognard]

Hi dr.hal, here is the link to Fletcher's AAR.

Makes for great reading!

tm.asp?m=2440843&mpage=1&key=

[dr.hal]

Thanks Ct, that's going to be a long read, but INTERESTING.... one heck of a set of rules... but it would have to be to recreate the political atmosphere in any of the waring parties.... Hal

[Disco Duck]

ORIGINAL: CT Grognard

Hi dr.hal, here is the link to Fletcher's AAR.

Makes for great reading!

tm.asp?m=2440843&mpage=1&key=

Wow, very interesting set of House Rules. Thanks for the link[8D]

[CT Grognard]

Indeed they are.

I've been using most of them for a game I'm playing as Japan against the AI, I find it adds to the enjoyment of the game immensely.

[adsoul64]

My feeling is that Darwin is over important in the game due to the plain fact that many players are going for it. Maybe because it's so easy to capture, indeed for the Allies Darwin is nearly indefensible bacause it's more like an island than a part of the Continent due to his awful roadnet. But I can't imagine the advantage in invading Darwin. Maybe to build some bombardment campaign? Because as starting point for Australia conquest it just doesn't work.

[Q-Ball]

The main point in taking it is to deny it to the Allies. As the Japanese, if you could, I would sink Darwin into the ocean.

If you leave it alone, it can become a major pain the rear, literally. Though the road net stinks, the Allies can spend 1942 marching base units up there, and pull supply overland, making it a big base. Getting there via ship can't happen until the Torres Strait or Timor are cleared, but it can still be a problem.

It's better to chase away the Aussie into the desert

[adsoul64]

OK, but in order to effectively deny it to the Allies you need to set a strong garrison and I mean troops and A/C. Otherwise Alies will take it back just after clearing Torres Strait that they would make anyway. Just my two cents

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: dr.hal

Folks, I know this has been discussed before in other threads but NOT unto itself that I know of. It appears to me that due to many factors including location on the map board, Darwin has an importance within the game FAR exceeding its actual role in the real Pacific war. From reading much about the real events of the Pacific, with the exception of a few attacks (and one in particular) Darwin was a backwater. Do others agree? Or not? Hal

Yes. Darwin and the entire SRA area around it are overimportant in the game because of the way the abstracted logistics work and the overgenerous SPS values therein. When MacArthur was traveling through Northern Oz to where he'd end up in Brisbane, he saw for himself the logistical nightmare that would have been trying to stage a major offensive through Northern Australia into the SRA which is why the SWPac theater eventually opted to strike Japan through New Guniea.

In addition to being sparcely populated with few developed industries, even the rail gauge between N. Oz and SouthE. Oz was different. The situation in AE was improved recently by map changes which make Darwin hard to supply overland but this can be easily solved with a few big supply convoys. After that one just needs to land at any of a dozen SRA points, all with generous SPS values and quickly turn them into major air and/or sea bases.

Some people (including myself and Treespider) try to further represent the logistical and geographical difficulties of this Theater by greatly lowering SPS values for Darwin as well as the surrounding bases.

As for real life. The Australian government was set to cede all of N. Oz to the Japanese if they had too. The heart of the country was S. Oz in terms of economic and people resources. The "Brisbane Line" may have had some hysterial to it, but it also represented a realistic plan by a government with a limited size military to concentrate on the most important areas. Oz being as immense as it is, the loss of Darwin would have been a major morale blow and further secured the SRA but would have changed little in the SW Pacific Theater other than to drain away some land forces which might have slowed down the buildup to offensive power a bit.

[vettim89]

Good points, all.

Another point is that various points on the map became important because one or both sides decided it was important. This occured in RL as well as in game. A good example of this would be Guadalcanal. Before the war, probably few military planners on either side knew where the island was, yet it became a focal point of the entire PTO for six months (not entirely as the Buna Campaign ran parallel to it). It became important because both sides decided to fight there. The strength of WITP-AE is that it allows players to explore avenues that the RL commanders chose not to go down. Darwin could have become an important base in WWII if either side decided it should have been.

[Nikademus]

a long held fantasy idea was to create an alternate version of WitP whereby the SPS values of the undeveloped bases (such as Lunga) were randomzed and would have to be scouted/surveyed before said SPS could be determined, but it would have required a rewrite of the entire game. Some also had issues with a map that could be wildy "ahistoric".

Remained an intriging idea though. Unfortunately with rigid "historical" values, hindsight inevitably plays factor. The Solomons/NG axis is one of the best examples. You see it in most AAR's. Port Morosby is important from turn 2 onward when in real life it only became decisive after the Japanese got settled into Rabaul and started making threatening moves toward Oz.

[LoBaron]

ORIGINAL: Q-Ball
The main point in taking it is to deny it to the Allies.

Straight to the point. Welcome back Q-Ball, I missed your comments when you left for WitE...

ORIGINAL: adsoul64
OK, but in order to effectively deny it to the Allies you need to set a strong garrison and I mean troops and A/C. Otherwise Alies will take it back just after clearing Torres Strait that they would make anyway. Just my two cents

Maybe, but in order to effectively defend your Southern flank - with Darwin in Allied hands as staging base for attacks - you need to garrison a lot of potential targets spreading from Timor to Dutch NG,
look at the map, there are a lot of attractive invasion propositions that can originate from a strong Darwin area. It is easy to see what is less cost-intensive.

[Crackaces]

I beleive Mac was hell bent on invading the Solomons mainly because it brought him closer to the PI's.. somehow this forum forgets how the British maintained supply through the Libyan desert . If we wanted to have a contest in Northern Oz we could bring the logistics to bare .. Mac was determined to return to PI .. no matter what the consequinces.

But the IJA felt that all of Northern Oz would have to be secured not just Darwin .. that meant exposure to 4E's in open desert terrain without air cover.. the good news from this would have been more factual data of hitting troops in the open using 4E ground attacks from 5,000 feet ....[;)]

As it is they went for Midway and the rest is history ...

Myself scenario #1 I demonstrated why attacking Darwin was such as bad idea .. the IJA lose 2 full divisions plus and have little to gain from it .. plus while the IJN/IJA are consumed with Darwin I blitzed Burma ..

Maybe in scenario #2 a house rule is needed but I would invite the IJ for tea if they want to come to Darwin for a fight ...

[Nikademus]

Mac was determined to return to the PI no matter what yes. His choice however was not the Solomons, that credit went to King who was looking for a quick way to take the offensive after Midway. Mac's idea was to springboard from the SE and E coast of Oz (where logistical support and resources were the most concentrated....but still a shambles through much of 1942) and drive on Rabaul itself via New Guniea. Thus Port Morosby and later Buna and Lae became important targets.

The northern part of Oz could have been built up to support an offensive into the SRA......eventually, but it would have taken a long time, and massive effort and expense and the strain on shipping would have been that much more given the increased distance. NG and the Coral sea would still need to be secured to prevent flank attacks on the shipping. Japan's whole idea for occupying the lower Solomons was as part of a measure to cut the US-Oz pipeline.

Just mussing here....but the AE map size increase has always made me wonder about that pipeline.

[sandman455]

John Curtin, Prime Minister of Australia, 12/27/41

That reddish veil which o'er the face
Of night-hag East is drawn ...
Flames new disaster for the race?
Or can it be the dawn?

So wrote Bernard O'Dowd. I see 1942 as a year in which we shall know the
answer.

I would, however, that we provide the answer. We can and we will. Therefore I
see 1942 as a year of immense change in Australian life.
The Australian government's policy has been grounded on two facts. One is that
the war with Japan is not a phase of the struggle with the Axis powers, but is a
new war. The second is that Australia must go on a war footing.
Those two facts involve two lines of action - one in the direction of external
policy as to our dealings with Britain, the United States, Russia, the
Netherlands East Indies and China in the higher direction of the war in the
Pacific.

The second is the reshaping, in fact the revolutionising, of the Australian way
of life until a war footing is attained quickly, efficiently and without
question.

Now with equal realism, we take the view that, while the determination of
military policy is the Soviet's business, we should be able to look forward with
reason to aid from Russia against Japan. We look for a solid and impregnable
barrier of the Democracies against the three Axis Powers, and we refuse to
accept the dictum that the Pacific struggle must be treated as a subordinate
segment of the general conflict. By that it is not meant that any one of the
other theatres of war is of less importance than the Pacific, but that Australia
asks for a concerted plan evoking the greatest strength at the Democracies'
disposal, determined upon hurling Japan back.

The Australian Government, therefore, regards the Pacific struggle as primarily
one in which the United States and Australia must have the fullest say in the
direction of the democracies' fighting plan.

Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks
to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the
United Kingdom.

We know the problems that the United Kingdom faces. We know the constant threat
of invasion. We know the dangers of dispersal of strength, but we know too,
that Australia can go and Britain can still hold on.

Summed up, Australian external policy will be shaped toward obtaining Russian
aid, and working out, with the United States, as the major factor, a plan of
Pacific strategy, along with British, Chinese and Dutch forces.

Australian internal policy has undergone striking changes in the past few weeks.
These, and those that will inevitably come before 1942 is far advanced, have
been prompted by several reasons. In the first place, the Commonwealth
Government found it exceedingly difficult to bring Australian people to a
realisation of what, after two years of war, our position had become. Even the
entry of Japan, bringing a direct threat in our own waters, was met with a
subconscious view that the Americans would deal with the short-sighted,
underfed and fanatical Japanese.

The announcement that no further appeals would be made to the Australian people,
and the decisions that followed, were motivated by psychological factors. They
had an arresting effect. They awakened the somewhat lackadaisical Australian
mind the attitude that was imperative if we were to save ourselves, to enter an
all-in effort in the only possible manner.

That experiment in psychology was eminently successful, and we commence 1942
with a better realisation, by a greater number of Australians, of what the war
means than in the whole preceding two years.

The decisions were prompted by other reasons, all related to the necessity of
getting onto a war footing, and the results so far achieved have been most
heartening, especially in respect of production and conservation of stocks.
I make it clear that the experiment undertaken was never intended as one to
awaken Australian patriotism or sense of duty. Those qualities have been ever-
present; but the response to leadership and direction had never been requested
of the people, and desirable talents and untapped resources had lain dormant.
Our task for 1942 is stern ... The position Australia faces internally far
exceeds in potential and sweeping dangers anything that confronted us in 1914-
1918.

The year 1942 will impose supreme tests. These range from resistance to
invasion to deprivation of more and more amenities ...
Australians must realise that to place the nation on a war footing every citizen
must place himself, his private and business affairs, his entire mode of living,
on a war footing. The civilian way of life cannot be any less rigorous, can
contribute no less than that which the fighting men have to follow.
I demand that Australians everywhere realise that Australia is now inside the
firing lines.

Australian governmental policy will be directed strictly on those lines. We
have to regard our country and its 7,000,000 people as though we were a nation
and a people with the enemy hammering at our frontier.

Australians must be perpetually on guard; on guard against the possibility, at
any hour without warning, of raid or invasion; on guard against spending money,
or doing anything that cannot be justified; on guard against hampering by
disputation or idle, irresponsible chatter, the decisions of the Government
taken for the welfare of all.

All Australia is the stake in this war. All Australia must stand together to
hold that stake. We face a powerful, ably led and unbelievably courageous foe.
We must watch the enemy accordingly. We shall watch him accordingly.


The remarks bolded is the only instance I can recall of a national leader referring to his country in a past tense. The underlined part is a rather unusual remark about a hated enemy. Read on for an interesting story and some food for thought.

In college I took a simple course on WWII history that I fully expected get an “A” by just enlighten the masses with my presence. It was pretty much true, but there was a paper or two that I had to do. I’m not sure what I did them on, but do remember a quick and dirty on the Doolittle Raid that I pretty much pulled from my head and ass. After all, I had been playing the largest and most detail war games about WWII since my early teens. Such a background was more than enough to float by in this class.

Even the professor, who was of British decent seemed to be a little lost in the material. The guy was nice enough and genuinely sincere but his specialty was clearly not military history. I was more than happy to earn college credit hours, on some sugar coated course of WWII, but don’t make me actually pay attention. Besides, this instructor had a terrible tendency to drift off into stories about his childhood experiences that revolved around his father’s diplomatic duties serving as a British diplomat in the USA in the 30’s and 40’s.

Anyway I typed a 10 page paper on Doolittle and his raid while drinking beer or something. A superior grade was expected and deserved. Yet, to my surprise, the paper was returned covered in red pen comments in the margins. How? No matter, there was an “A” on the cover page and I wasn’t in school to learn anymore. Working 40 hour weeks, while being a full time college student had worn me out. I was ready to graduate and leave.

After a week or two, the professor asked me if I had any ideas about his comments he made on my paper. I was stunned. I kind of gave one of those “oh yeah, well I was thinking hard on it. . . “ reply that made it clear I hadn’t even read them. He kind of laughed and said “here read this paper, It was one I wrote 30 years ago.” I thanked him and was off to my next class or work. All I could think about was that I just got handed a reading assignment.

I never really read much of his paper. Towards the end of the semester he hinted that he wanted it back. So as I was walking to class to return it, I flipped through some of it. Heh, he got a C- and his professor was none too impressed. Great, he wanted me to read a C- paper.

As best I can gather from skimming the thing, he spent 30 pages detailing diplomatic maneuvering that was going down in December 1941. Makes sense, since he was kind of there being a son of a British diplomat serving in Washington DC. He actually stated in the paper that the volume of cables between Australia and the US during 12/10 and 12/20 was incredibly high. During this period he claimed that John Curtin and his government made it perfectly clear to Roosevelt that they were terrified. Their best military units were out of the country and they had nothing significant left to defend their shores. The Japanese on the other hand were rolling up Malaysia and had earned a very bad reputation from their atrocities in China. The people of Australia were basically waiting for them - bent over with their pants down.

All of this is pretty much true. And we all know how easily it would have been for Japanese to take much of the northern parts of the continent even with significant US and British assistance. With no help at all, IMHO Japan could have taken the continent at their leisure.

Back to the C- paper from my professor: He claimed that in December 41, John Curtin told Roosevelt that he wasn’t going to stand alone. Either the USA gets jumps into action with their ships and men or he was going to pull a Vichy and negotiate a surrender before his people literally start getting raped. Whoa?! Rather crazy assertion I thought. He went on to state that Roosevelt’s promised he’d do something to stale the Japanese if he would just hold tough for a few months. Help was coming and he would keep the Japanese busy. Curtin’s response was – do it already and like yesterday.

Back then, I kind of thought the idea had some merit. After all, the planning for Doolittle’s raid started at the insistence of President Roosevelt himself on 12/21/41. By all rights, it was a worthless risk that netted nothing militarily. The text book story that it was for American morale doesn’t hold much water. American civilian morale was never higher in the weeks following Pearl Harbor which was when planning for the raid was started. Roosevelt also need little political capital or national support, he was in his 3 term as president.

So Roosevelt was knee deep in the Doolittle raid. What about Coral Sea? Again we have a rather risky operation for what? To check the Japanese in the Solomons or New Guinea? Why? And then you get to Midway. Stake all of our naval striking force for a worthless rock in the middle of the Pacific? We know all about the risks – a thunderstorm could have changed the outcome. I most certainly believe they knew risks as well. You lose your carriers at Midway you’d think it would be pretty bad news for the allies? Or would it?

We don’t play WitP/AE like Roosevelt and Nimitz. But then we don’t have HR’s that have AU pushing away from the table either. Today, if you factor in the speech by John Curtin on 12/27/41, I seriously wonder if my professor’s had hit the nail on the head. The further you look the more it seems to make sense. And it would go a long way in explaining USN aggressiveness in early 1942. Perhaps Roosevelt told Nimitz/Navy to get out there and fight; not caring at all about any consequences since he knew that they would all be replaced come 1943-44 anyway. What he need was to buy time which would be accomplished with either victories or defeats. We know from our WitP/AE play that battle damage and air losses can push out our time tables. Was Roosevelt betting that no matter what the outcome of these early battles, the US would be keeping Japan busy and telegraphing to the Aussies that they must stand firm for everyone’s sake?

BTW, if you run with that idea, you can easily see why there was no effort to do much with Darwin. Nobody wanted to give Japanese any reason to invade the place.

AFB’s try this HR for something different –
John Curtin Home Rule: If the allies can’t sink major IJN units or don’t come out and contest IJN operations during the first six months of the war, the moment a Japanese lands on Australia, the continent surrenders and is off limits to everything but AU units. All AU units stop playing