are soviet units overrated ?

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Rinco
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Re: are soviet units overrated ?

Post by Rinco »

22sec wrote: Tue Dec 06, 2022 10:42 pm
Rinco wrote: Tue Dec 06, 2022 10:22 pm
22sec wrote: Tue Dec 06, 2022 10:17 pm Who's not trying to study and understand the Russians? I think we could point to a ton of people in the west, from pros to us amateur's that have spent a lifetime fascinated by the world's largest country and its vast array of people. I think the LTC is a little presumptuous.
Based on the western coverage of this war...I disagree with you...besides that, this was a post for a reflexion Sir. Not me neither the LTC is pointing the finger to any one here in particular.

"I think folks today are possibly a bit prejudiced by what we are seeing as a complete failure of the Russian mission in Ukraine."

Thats my point and the LTC's...This is presumptuous.
8-) You know what really has grown for me watching this war unlike any other. As an American I think we often picture the average Russian (and Ukrainians) looking European. I know better now. The influence of Asia on the Russian people and culture is now so obvious. It's truly fascinates me and generates lots more thoughts about what else was missing in my perception of Russia and the USSR.
Interesting point 22sec.
byzantine1990
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Re: are soviet units overrated ?

Post by byzantine1990 »

cobexlaw888 wrote: Tue Dec 06, 2022 10:00 pm interesting post, but I was posting about technical issues. 2 years after, operation desert storm, soviet hardware was annihilated by us hardware. Lebanon before that, same thing. There is not a single exemple in history where soviet weapons outmatched us weapons (mays SAMs in vietnam). And corruption, bad motivation, bad management, existed in the time of USSR too.
The simple AKM beat the US in Vietnam and Afghanistan.
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Rinco
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Re: are soviet units overrated ?

Post by Rinco »

byzantine1990 wrote: Tue Dec 06, 2022 11:08 pm
cobexlaw888 wrote: Tue Dec 06, 2022 10:00 pm interesting post, but I was posting about technical issues. 2 years after, operation desert storm, soviet hardware was annihilated by us hardware. Lebanon before that, same thing. There is not a single exemple in history where soviet weapons outmatched us weapons (mays SAMs in vietnam). And corruption, bad motivation, bad management, existed in the time of USSR too.
The simple AKM beat the US in Vietnam and Afghanistan.
Good point.... besises Vietnam, I don't know how many hundreds of billions of dollars and 2 decades in Afghanistan and the final result was that caos we saw of US army leaving the country and the Taliban back to power...so what? Should we apply the same reasoning here?...US forces in the game are too strong...just something to think about.
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Rinco
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Re: are soviet units overrated ?

Post by Rinco »

22sec wrote: Tue Dec 06, 2022 10:42 pm
Rinco wrote: Tue Dec 06, 2022 10:22 pm
22sec wrote: Tue Dec 06, 2022 10:17 pm Who's not trying to study and understand the Russians? I think we could point to a ton of people in the west, from pros to us amateur's that have spent a lifetime fascinated by the world's largest country and its vast array of people. I think the LTC is a little presumptuous.
Based on the western coverage of this war...I disagree with you...besides that, this was a post for a reflexion Sir. Not me neither the LTC is pointing the finger to any one here in particular.

"I think folks today are possibly a bit prejudiced by what we are seeing as a complete failure of the Russian mission in Ukraine."

Thats my point and the LTC's...This is presumptuous.
8-) You know what really has grown for me watching this war unlike any other. As an American I think we often picture the average Russian (and Ukrainians) looking European. I know better now. The influence of Asia on the Russian people and culture is now so obvious. It's truly fascinates me and generates lots more thoughts about what else was missing in my perception of Russia and the USSR.
There are some really nice and enlightening analysis if you are open to different perspectives and point of views. Just have to dig a bit. For example, I suggest some readings from Prof. John J. Mearsheimer (American political scientist and international relations scholar), Col McGreggor (retired U.S. Army Colonel), Jacques Baud (ex-member of the Swiss strategic intelligence) just to name a few. There is a lot to learn and it gives a whole new perception of things. No need to agree, but it does not hurt be a bit open minded, specially nowadays with so much deception around. Cheers
Last edited by Rinco on Wed Dec 07, 2022 12:41 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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CapnDarwin
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Re: are soviet units overrated ?

Post by CapnDarwin »

No plans to "nerf" anything. Folks can adjust things if they want when we drop the mod guides. We do the best job we can to take the available data and information of the units of the time and run with it. Folks like to jump to Desert Storm with export equipment, but fail to look at the Mid-East war of 67 and 73 and the damage done to Israeli forces (arguably the best trained in the world) by proxy Soviet allies with export-like kit as well. Either way, we offer a means for players to do their own thing with the game engine.
OTS is looking forward to Southern Storm getting released!

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On Target Simulations LLC
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Rinco
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Re: are soviet units overrated ?

Post by Rinco »

Capn, the fact that I, as a red player mostly (yes, I am evil, sorry, there is nothing I can do about it...a BMP, Shilka, T-80, Hind or a Su-25 silluettes and power are too sexy for me to resist...I feel compelled to try to reach the Rhine river... :lol: ), feel the game as the opposite way at what folks are posting here, just assure to me that you guys have done a great job and a great simulation.

Since Red Storm, I lost track on time on countless hours sweating and screaming at my pixalated troops tying to find and knock out that pesky Abrams shooting at me that I can just guess at where the hell it is... Can't say how satisfying is to successfully knocking them out...or successfully shooting down that A-10 harassing my mighty 72 tanks...or taking out a whole Challenger group by surprise using terrain mask...well, you got the idea... :twisted:

I am glad that you guys try as hard as possible to be unbiased. Finding info is not an easy task...avoid the cheerleading either...

Thanks for your input,

Cheers,
Rosseau
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Re: are soviet units overrated ?

Post by Rosseau »

Rinco wrote: Wed Dec 07, 2022 1:23 am
22sec wrote: Tue Dec 06, 2022 10:42 pm
Rinco wrote: Tue Dec 06, 2022 10:22 pm

Based on the western coverage of this war...I disagree with you...besides that, this was a post for a reflexion Sir. Not me neither the LTC is pointing the finger to any one here in particular.

"I think folks today are possibly a bit prejudiced by what we are seeing as a complete failure of the Russian mission in Ukraine."

Thats my point and the LTC's...This is presumptuous.
8-) You know what really has grown for me watching this war unlike any other. As an American I think we often picture the average Russian (and Ukrainians) looking European. I know better now. The influence of Asia on the Russian people and culture is now so obvious. It's truly fascinates me and generates lots more thoughts about what else was missing in my perception of Russia and the USSR.
There are some really nice and enlightening analysis if you are open to different perspectives and point of views. Just have to dig a bit. For example, I suggest some readings from Prof. John J. Mearsheimer (American political scientist and international relations scholar), Col McGreggor (retired U.S. Army Colonel), Jacques Baud (ex-member of the Swiss strategic intelligence) just to name a few. There is a lot to learn and it gives a whole new perception of things. No need to agree, but it does not hurt be a bit open minded, specially nowadays with so much deception around. Cheers

NOVEMBER 29, 2022 BY M. K. BHADRAKUMAR
What to expect in Russia’s winter offensive in Ukraine

https://www.indianpunchline.com/what-to ... n-ukraine/
At the very least, the link to the above article needs to be removed by moderators, as it goes way over the line drawn by Matrix on the prohibition of political discussions. The article also has nothing to do with the topic under discussion.
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Re: are soviet units overrated ?

Post by Stimpak »

The modern Ukrainian conflict and our hypothetical WW3 happening 30-odd years ago are apples and oranges. On the surface they look similar, but there is actually little in common. Things like geopolitical and economic circumstances, advance warning, who strikes first, troop morale, reforms, technological developments, the list goes on... look what 8 years of preparation did for the Ukrainians. Or rather compare the 'hollow force' of the late 70's, to the low confidence of the early 80's, suddenly to 1989 where NATO thought that they could throw the Soviets back over the IGB without even having to resort to nukes. What a difference a few years make!
It also is worth noting that Flashpoint Campaigns is throwing the worst case scenario at NATO - a "bolt from the blue" attack with little to no warning. The political turmoil in the warsaw pact countries is absent. Not even the 48-hour GDPs or timely mobilization could take place.

I must echo Rosseau's concerns. The article reads like a propaganda piece.
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Re: are soviet units overrated ?

Post by Searry »

I wouldn't say Soviet kit is overrated. If used properly it's good, if not it's really really bad.
It excels at optimal situations and at knife fighting due to numerical superiority but it suffers badly from poor optics.

This games scenario is completely fictional, how could the WP suddenly attack when the whole thing was already unraveling?

Comparing the modern Russian army to the Soviet one isn't really constructive. The Ukrainian army uses lots of Soviet kit as well.
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Re: are soviet units overrated ?

Post by jmlima »

Searry wrote: Wed Dec 07, 2022 8:44 am ...
This games scenario is completely fictional, how could the WP suddenly attack when the whole thing was already unraveling?
...
Think there's a couple of considerations needing to to be done:
1) Cannot compare the Iraqui army and equipment to what would be a warsaw pact confident enough to attack nato, quite simply, export versions of equipment are not the same equipment and the iraqui army had so many structural issues that render the comparison, even with the historical gsfg, moot
2) In the above the key thing is 'warsaw pact confident enough'. we cannot assume historical patterns remains the same and we have ww3 for the simple fact that the historical patterns did not fortunately result in ww3
3) from 2) we can take that the warsaw pact needed to be very different to go on the attack against nato, it needed better training, better maintenance, better political cohesion, better social cohesion, a casus belli, etc, etc in short, it needs an alternate reality and in that alternate reality, pact equipment, doctrine, training, competence needed to be far different than historically , but so did the political unity of the pact and the social cohesion of the countries involved

TL;DR: this is an alternate reality, every single ww3 game is.
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Re: are soviet units overrated ?

Post by Searry »

jmlima wrote: Wed Dec 07, 2022 10:00 am
Searry wrote: Wed Dec 07, 2022 8:44 am ...
This games scenario is completely fictional, how could the WP suddenly attack when the whole thing was already unraveling?
...
TL;DR: this is an alternate reality, every single ww3 game is.
Exactly.
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Re: are soviet units overrated ?

Post by Rinco »

Rosseau, Stimpak, I disagree, but as we are here in a comunity I will respect your point of view and from the majority here. I took off the link from my post, but I wont regarding the authors I have suggested. I will respect and obey any decision from the moderators, no problem. Those names are just good ref suggestions if anyone is interested to dig in beyond western propaganda (there are of course propaganda from both sides). There are a lot of nice detailed military information from those authors, specially regarding the russian military operations in ukraine, ultimately giving a differente perspective on the so called complete military failure...used by many as good arguments to question russian hardware performance in the simulation...this is my whole point in general. Cheers
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Re: are soviet units overrated ?

Post by Rinco »

I hope it is in line with the whole discussion here. I have the following article that I find it quite interesting. It might have it flaws, but it gives lots of things to talk about and new perspectives. I have unfortunately lost the link and more reference data due to a recent HD failure... have been trying to find the source again since...there was a prt I that I lost as well...

"This article originally appeared in the Marine Corps Gazette August 2022 issue. Authored by an apparently frequent anonymous contributor ("Marinus") to the Gazette, it has since raised quite a ruckus among the United States military community in various online debates."

The Russian Invasion of Ukraine
Maneuverist Paper No. 22:
Part II: The mental and moral realms
by Marinus

When considered as purely physical phenomena, the operations conducted by Russian ground forces in Ukraine in 2022 present a puzzling picture. In the north of Ukraine, Russian battalion tactical groups overran a great deal of territory but made no attempts to convert temporary occupation into permanent possession. Indeed, after spending five weeks in that region, they left as rapidly as they had arrived. In the south, the similarly rapid entry of Russian ground forces led to the establishment of Russian garrisons and the planting of Russian political, economic, and cultural institutions. In the third theater of the war, rapid movements of the type that characterized Russian operations on the northern and southern fronts rarely occurred. Instead, Russian formations in eastern Ukraine conducted artillery-intensive assaults to capture relatively small pieces of ground.

One way to shed a little light upon this conundrum is to treat Russian operations on each of the three major fronts of the war as a distinct campaign. Further illumination is provided by the realization that each of these campaigns followed a model that had been part of the Russian operational repertoire for a very long time. Such a scheme, however, fails to explain why the Russian leadership applied particular models to particular sets of operations. Resolving that question requires an examination of the mental and moral purposes served by each of these three campaigns.

Raids in the North

American Marines have long used the term “raid” to describe an enterprise in which a small force moves swiftly to a particular location, completes a discrete mission, and withdraws as quickly as it can. To Russian soldiers, however, the linguistic cousin of that word (reyd) carries a somewhat different meaning. Where the travel performed by the team conducting a raid is nothing more than a means of reaching particular points on the map, the movement of the frequently larger forces conducting a reyd creates significant operational effects. That is, in the course of moving along various highways and byways, they confuse enemy commanders, disrupt enemy logistics, and deprive enemy governments of the legitimacy that comes from uncontested control of their own territory. Similarly, where each phase of a present-day American raid necessarily follows a detailed script, a reyd is a more open-ended enterprise that can be adjusted to exploit new opportunities, avoid new dangers, or serve new purposes.

The term reyd found its way into the Russian military lexicon in the late 19th century by theorists who noted the similarities between the independent cavalry operations of the American Civil War and the already well-established Russian practice of sending mobile columns, often composed of Cossacks, on extended excursions through enemy territory. An early example of such excursions is provided by the exploits of the column led by Alexander Chernyshev during the Napoleonic Wars. In September of 1813, this force of some 2,300 horsemen and two light field guns made a 400-mile circuit through enemy territory. At the middle point of this bold enterprise, this column occupied, for two days, the city of Kassel, then serving as the capital of one of the satellite states of the French Empire. Fear of a repetition of this embarrassment convinced Napoleon to detail two army corps to garrison Dresden, then the seat of government of another one of his dependencies. As a result, when Napoleon encountered the combined forces of his enemies at the Battle of Leipzig, his already outnumbered Grande Armée was much smaller than it would otherwise have been.

In 2022, the many battalion tactical groups that moved deeply into northern Ukraine during the first few days of the Russian invasion made no attempt to re-enact the occupation of Leipzig. Rather, they bypassed all of the larger cities in their path and, on the rare occasions when they found themselves in a smaller city, occupation rarely lasted for more than a few hours. Nonetheless, the fast-moving Russian columns created, on a much a larger scale, an effect similar to the one that resulted from Chernyshev’s raid of 1813. That is, they convinced the Ukrainians to weaken their main field army, then fighting in the Donbass region, to bolster the defenses of distant cities.

Rapid Occupation in the South

In terms of speed and distance traveled, Russian operations in the area between the southern seacoast of Ukraine and the Dnipro River resembled the raids conducted in the north. They differed, however, in the handling of cities. Where Russian columns on either side of Kyiv avoided large urban areas whenever they could, their counterparts in the south took permanent possession of comparable cities. In some instances, such as the ship-to-objective maneuver that began in the Sea of Azov and ended in Melitopol, the conquest of cities took place during the first few days of the Russian invasion. In others, such as the town of Skadovsk, the Russians waited several weeks before seizing areas and engaging local defense forces they had ignored during their initial advance.

In the immediate aftermath of their arrival, the Russian commanders who took charge of urban areas in the south followed the same policy as their counterparts in the north. That is, they allowed the local representatives of the Ukrainian state to perform their duties and, in many instances, to continue to fly the flag of their country on public buildings. It was not long, however, before Russian civil servants took control of the local government, replaced the flags on buildings, and set in motion the replacement of Ukrainian institutions, whether banks or cell phone companies, with Russian ones.

Like the model of the reyd, the paradigm of campaigns that combined rapid military occupation with thoroughgoing political transformation, had been part of the Russian military culture for quite some time. Thus, when explaining the concept for operations on the southern front, Russian commanders were able to point to any one of a number of similar enterprises conducted by the Soviet state in the four decades that followed Soviet occupation of eastern Poland in 1939. (These included the conquest of the countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1940; the suppression of reformist governments in Hungary and Czechoslovakia during the Cold War, and the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

While some Russian formations in the south consolidated control over conquered territory, others conducted raids in the vicinity of the city of Mykolaiv. Like their larger counter-parts on the northern front, these encouraged the Ukrainian leadership to devote to the defense of cities forces that might otherwise have been used in the fight for the Donbass region. (In this instance, the cities in question included the ports of Mykolaiv and Odessa.) At the same time, the raids in the northern portion of the southern front created a broad “no man’s land” between areas that had been occupied by Russian forces and those entirely under the control of the Ukrainian government.

Stalingrad in the East

Russian operations in the north and south of Ukraine made very little use of field artillery. This was partially a matter of logistics. (Whether raiding in the north or rapidly occupying in the south, the Russian columns lacked the means to bring up large numbers of shells and rockets.) The absence of cannonades in those campaigns, however, had more to do with ends than means. In the north, Russian reluctance to conduct bombardments stemmed from a desire to avoid antagonizing the local people, nearly all of whom, for reasons of language and ethnicity, tended to support the Ukrainian state. In the south, the Russian policy of avoiding the use of field artillery served a similarly political purpose of preserving the lives and property of communities in which many people identified as “Russian” and many more spoke Russian as their native language.

In the east, however, the Russians conducted bombardments that, in terms of both duration and intensity, rivaled those of the great artillery contests of the world wars of the twentieth century. Made possible by short, secure, and extraordinarily redundant supply lines, these bombardments served three purposes. First, they confined Ukrainian troops into their fortifications, depriving them of the ability to do anything other than remain in place. Second, they inflicted a large number of casualties, whether physical or caused by the psychological effects of imprisonment, impotence, and proximity to large numbers of earth-shaking explosions. Third, when conducted for a sufficient period of time, which was often measured in weeks, the bombardment of a given fortification invariably resulted in either the withdrawal of its defenders or their surrender.

We can glean some sense of the scale of the Russian bombardments in the east of Ukraine by comparing the struggle for the town of Popasna (18 March – 7 May 2022) with the battle of Iwo Jima (19 February – 26 March 1945.) At Iwo Jima, American Marines fought for five weeks to annihilate the defenders of eight square miles of skillfully fortified ground. At Popasna, Russian gunners bombarded trench systems built into the ridges and ravines of a comparable area for eight weeks before the Ukrainian leadership decided to withdraw its forces from the town.

The capture of real estate by artillery, in turn, contributed to the creation of the encirclements that Russians call “cauldrons” (kotly). Like so much in Russian military theory, this concept builds upon an idea borrowed from the German tradition of maneuver warfare: the “battle cauldron” (Schlachtkessel). However, where the Germans sought to create and exploit their cauldrons as quickly as possible, Russian cauldrons could be either rapid and surprising or slow and seemingly inevitable. Indeed, the successful Soviet offensives of the Second World War, such as the one that resulted in the destruction of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, made extensive use of cauldrons of both types.

Freedom from the desire to create cauldrons as quickly as possible relieved the Russians fighting in eastern Ukraine from the need to hold any particular piece of ground. Thus, when faced with a determined Ukrainian attack, the Russians often withdrew their tank and infantry units from the contested terrain. In this way, they both reduced danger to their own troops and created situations, however brief, in which the Ukrainian attackers faced Russian shells and rockets without the benefit of shelter. To put things another way, the Russians viewed such “encore bombardments” not merely as an acceptable use of ordnance but also as opportunities to inflict additional casualties while engaging in “conspicuous consumption” of artillery ammunition.

In the spring of 1917, German forces on the Western Front used comparable tactics to create situations in which French troops advancing down the rear slopes of recently captured ridges were caught in the open by the fire of field artillery and machine guns. The effect of this experience on French morale was such that infantrymen in fifty French divisions engaged in acts of “collective indiscipline,” the motto for which was, “we will hold, but we refuse to attack.” (In May of 2022, several videos appeared on the internet in which people claiming to be Ukrainian soldiers fighting in the Donbass region explained that, while they were willing to defend their positions, they had resolved to disobey any orders that called for them to advance.)

Resolving the Paradox

In the early days of the maneuver warfare debate, maneuverists often presented their preferred philosophy as the logical opposite of “firepower/attrition warfare.” Indeed, as late as 2013, the anonymous authors of the “Attritionist Letters” used this dichotomy as a framework for their critique of practices at odds with the spirit of maneuver warfare. In the Russian campaigns in Ukraine, however, a set of operations made mostly of movement complemented one composed chiefly of cannonades.

One way to resolve this apparent paradox is to characterize the raids of the first five weeks of the war as a grand deception that, while working little in the way of direct destruction, made possible the subsequent attrition of the Ukrainian armed forces. In particular, the threat posed by the raids delayed the movement of Ukrainian forces in the main theater of the war until the Russians had deployed the artillery units, secured the transporting network, and accumulated the stocks of ammunition needed to conduct a long series of big bombardments. This delay also ensured that, when the Ukrainians did deploy additional formations to the Donbass region, the movement of such forces, and the supplies needed to sustain them, had been rendered much more difficult by the ruin wrought upon the Ukrainian rail network by long-range guided missiles. In other words, the Russians conducted a brief campaign of maneuver in the north in order to set the stage for a longer, and, ultimately, more important campaign of attrition in the east.

The stark contrast between the types of warfare waged by Russian forces in different parts of Ukraine reinforced the message at the heart of Russian information operations. From the start, Russian propaganda insisted that the “special military operation” in Ukraine served three purposes: the protection of the two pro-Russian proto-states,
“demilitarization,” and “denazification.” All three of these goals required the infliction of heavy losses upon Ukrainian formations fighting in the Donbass. None, however, depended upon the occupation of parts of Ukraine where the vast majority of people spoke the Ukrainian language, embraced a Ukrainian ethnic identity, and supported the Ukrainian state. Indeed, the sustained occupation of such places by Russian forces would have supported the proposition that Russia was trying to conquer all of Ukraine.

Guided Missiles

The Russian program of guided missile strikes, conducted in parallel to the three ground campaigns, created a number of moral effects favorable to the Russian war effort. The most important of these resulted from the avoidance of collateral damage that resulted, not only from the extraordinary precision of the weapons used, but also from the judicious choice of targets. Thus, Russia’s enemies found it hard to characterize strikes against fuel and ammunition depots, which were necessarily located at some distance from places where civilians lived and worked, as anything other than attacks on military installations.

Likewise, the Russian effort to disrupt traffic on the Ukrainian rail system could have included attacks against the power generating stations that provide electricity to both civilian communities and trains. Such attacks, however, would have resulted in much loss of life among the people working in those plants as well as a great deal of suffering in places deprived of power. Instead, the Russians chose to direct their missiles at traction substations, the remotely located transformers that converted electricity from the general grid into forms used to move trains.

There were times, however, when missile strikes against “dual use” facilities gave the impression that the Russians had, in fact, targeted purely civilian facilities. The most egregious example of such a mistake was the attack, carried out on 1 March 2022, upon the main television tower in Kyiv. Whether or not there was any truth in the Russian claim that the tower had been used for military purposes, the attack on an iconic structure that had long been associated with a purely civilian purpose did much to reduce the advantages achieved by the overall Russian policy of limiting missile strikes to obvious military targets.

The Challenge

The three ground campaigns conducted by the Russians in Ukraine in 2022 owed much to traditional models. At the same time, the program of missile strikes exploited a capability that was nothing short of revolutionary. Whether new or old, however, these component efforts were conducted in a way that demonstrated profound appreciation of all three realms in which wars are waged. That is, the Russians rarely forgot that, in addition to being a physical struggle, war is both a mental contest and a moral argument.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine may mark the start of a new cold war, a “long twilight struggle” comparable to the one that ended with the collapse of the Soviet Empire more than three decades ago. If that is the case, then we will face an adversary who, while drawing much of value from the Soviet military tradition, has been liberated from both the brutality inherent in the legacy of Lenin and the blinders imposed by Marxism. What would be even worse, we may find ourselves fighting disciples of John R. Boyd."
Rosseau
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Re: are soviet units overrated ?

Post by Rosseau »

Definitely an interesting article, Rinco.

My reference library is full of U.S. Army field manuals, but nothing even close for the Soviet/WP forces' Cold War tactics. Wondering if you could direct me to an online or reference books on that topic. Unless I missed something the FC game manuals did not come with bibliographies.

The only catch is they would have to be in English. ;)

Best wishes!
byzantine1990
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Re: are soviet units overrated ?

Post by byzantine1990 »

Rosseau wrote: Fri Dec 09, 2022 1:20 am Definitely an interesting article, Rinco.

My reference library is full of U.S. Army field manuals, but nothing even close for the Soviet/WP forces' Cold War tactics. Wondering if you could direct me to an online or reference books on that topic. Unless I missed something the FC game manuals did not come with bibliographies.

The only catch is they would have to be in English. ;)

Best wishes!
Look up field manual for heavy opfor tactics. Should have everything you need for Soviet doctrine.
choppinlt
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Re: are soviet units overrated ?

Post by choppinlt »

Look up FM 100-2-1 on Soviet Operations and Tactics
Rosseau
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Re: are soviet units overrated ?

Post by Rosseau »

Thank you! That's a nice, 200+ page resource on the "Red" side of the game for that era. Any other references are greatly appreciated. The internet is certainly good for something, anyway. ;)
choppinlt
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Re: are soviet units overrated ?

Post by choppinlt »

You're welcome, I hope you find it useful! I'm old enough that I remember seeing it in hard print while it still looked kinda new. So seeing it again brought back some memories. :lol: I will add that there are many others on different aspects available. For instance FM 100-2-3 450+ pages of TOE. Happy hunting!
sfbaytf
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Re: are soviet units overrated ?

Post by sfbaytf »

Some of the Russian equipment is very good. Small arms comes to mind. Many Russian designed tanks including some in the game do have a very serious design flaw-the way the ammo is stored. Time and time again it’s been shown how deadly this is.

It might be wise to keep in mind one of the main reasons why the Israelis suffered so heavily in the initial phase of the 73 war. They became a heavy tank centric force as opposed to a combined arms force. The tank became the dominant force at the expense of mech infantry and artillery to support tanks. Once that mistake was corrected the fortunes on the battlefield changed.

Ukraine is going to be and has already been analyzed and in the day of instant communications been analyzed by non government and military sources and imo very well done.

Corruption was as bad in the Ukrainian military years ago and it was based on the Russian model, but western militaries came in and changed to a more western style approach. Corruption was dealt with to a degree where it’s not as bad a problem as it is with the Russian military. Years ago I worked with a Russian who lived in Moscow and he said we vastly overestimate the Russian military as we don’t seem to grasp just how deeply corruption is rooted in the system….

IMO the real game changer in Ukraine is something the West implemented once they changed the Ukrainian model-C4ISR systems. In order to have that work down to lower levels you need to be able to implement and maintain secure functioning communication networks, something the Ukrainians have shown an ability to do.

Weapon systems like the Javelin got all the attention but knowing where your enemy is and being at the right place at the right time is more important. Also once you have a secure functional C4ISR system in place you have access to the wide array of western intelligence assets.

The microchip industry that runs these systems is concentrated in a couple of companies one of which is located in…Taiwan who is the only one capable of making the most sophisticated chips.

Knowing this and given the current geopolitical climate ground was recently broken on new manufacturing facilities in the US in a massive joint venture.
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Re: are soviet units overrated ?

Post by kevinkins »

I agree that the huge advantage in C4IRS, and western training in general, provided a game changer to the much smaller UA. Yet another factor is quality of the people up and down the Russian military. Moscow's invasion this year is an unmitigated disaster. Putin turned an ill-led, untrained, ill-equipped and unmotivated army into an un-led, conscript army with no equipment, hungry and freezing. Russia's logistics are in shambles. They are now dependent on the likes of Iran and NK. Two new members of NATO will join soon (a disaster in itself). Talk of food rationing (in Gomel) has been reported. They can't pay their troops while the UA considers just killing Russians as ample compensation. And there are reports of Putin buying land in South America to flee to. It's only Russia's WMDs that are keeping him in power, when the majority of Russians suffer. Little if any of this is the focus of the new wargame. During the Cold War, years went by with the Soviets having superior man power, solid technology and professionally led armed forces. Their army was a competent deterrent. This situation disappeared with the fall of the USSR. Putin has not been able to keep up with Western technology and the benefits of fielding well trained volunteers. I think the game is too new to determine if the Soviets are overrated. With a few scenarios under the belt, they might not appear as supermen. But something to keep an eye on.
Last edited by kevinkins on Sun Dec 11, 2022 2:23 am, edited 1 time in total.
“The study of history lies at the foundation of all sound military conclusions and practice.”
Alfred Thayer Mahan
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