ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940

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RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940

Post by warspite1 »

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

ORIGINAL: Barb

There was a wargame at Sandhurst Military Academy after the war - its short summary can be found here:
http://mr-home.staff.shef.ac.uk/hobbies/seelowe.txt

What's more, they assumed that the Germans didn't yet have control of the airspace, which is a fairly big assumption concerning the topic. There are various other issues that you can nickpick (like the Royal Navy not commiting major surface ships - the RN destroyers are just going to beat the KM heavy surface units on their own?), but that's the main issue.
warspite1

Sorry I missed the above points.

I do not understand the reference to assumption and air superiority? What do you mean? At the time the invasion takes place, there is no assumption - only fact. Goering completely mucked up the BoB - German losses of aircrew and planes was already becoming critical by September. There is no assumption here.

KM heavy surface units. Which heavy surface units are you talking about? The RN would have commited cruisers in addition to destroyers, MTB's etc etc.

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RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940

Post by mind_messing »

ORIGINAL: warspite1
ORIGINAL: mind_messing

ORIGINAL: Barb

There was a wargame at Sandhurst Military Academy after the war - its short summary can be found here:
http://mr-home.staff.shef.ac.uk/hobbies/seelowe.txt

I think Sandhurst might be just a little bit of a biased source in regard to Sealion.

Was it likely to suceed? That would depend on who won control of the airspace.

@ Warspite: while the odds were stacked against the Germans, the British were far from in the best position to repell an invasion
warspite1

Re your first point above - it may be better to read the summary before commenting. Yes those at Sandhurst may be a little biased - if they were all British. The study was HELD at Sandhurst - the panel of umpires were German and British and the results were unanimously agreed.

My point was more that the premise was biased - with the Luftwaffe not already having won control of the air.
Re the second point, no sorry. Firstly its is almost certain that even WITH air superiority (let alone just contested) Sealion would still have been a disaster for the Germans. The excruciatingly slow, poorly protected, low in the water, river barges would have been torn to shreds - nothing bigger than a cruiser required. However, even if you chose to believe that air superiority was the only important element, there is still rather a big problem..... The Germans have to gain it. Given that this was something they had been trying to do for many weeks - and utterly failing to achieve - why would it suddenly be possible?

So, what do the crusiers of the Royal Navy do when they're confronted with the heavy units of the Kreigsmarine and the Luftwaffe in the narrow confines of the Channel?

Air superiority is the key element regarding Sealion. With it, the Germans stand a good chance, otherwise they don't.

As for the Germans actually getting air superiority - they were very close to achiving it. The RAF was digging deep into it's reserves, and the bottom of the barrel was in sight. The Luftwaffe failing to gain control of the air was not a done deal.
Repel a properly planned, co-ordinated and executed invasion? I quite agree - in no way were the remnants of the BEF, some green Commonwealth troops + whatever else we could throw together - in an ideal position against the cream of the Wehrmacht. Only problem for the Germans was that was not what the British would be facing. Those "lucky" sods that managed to get onto the beaches would have been disorganised, lacking in heavy weapons and have little to no chance of re-supply. Relief at landing would quickly turn to fire, frying-pan type territory......

Heavy equipment? The staff study posted seems to suggest that the 7th Panzer Div gets enough across.

I'm really not sure what you're looking for in this discussion. You've evidently watched the Battle of Britain just too many times for you to consider anything contrary to what that film depicted as being plausible.

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RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940

Post by mind_messing »

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

ORIGINAL: Barb

There was a wargame at Sandhurst Military Academy after the war - its short summary can be found here:
http://mr-home.staff.shef.ac.uk/hobbies/seelowe.txt

What's more, they assumed that the Germans didn't yet have control of the airspace, which is a fairly big assumption concerning the topic. There are various other issues that you can nickpick (like the Royal Navy not commiting major surface ships - the RN destroyers are just going to beat the KM heavy surface units on their own?), but that's the main issue.
warspite1

Sorry I missed the above points.

I do not understand the reference to assumption and air superiority? What do you mean? At the time the invasion takes place, there is no assumption - only fact. Goering completely mucked up the BoB - German losses of aircrew and planes was already becoming critical by September.

...and the RAF was exhausted and running out of trailed pilots.

Hardly a done deal.
KM heavy surface units. Which heavy surface units are you talking about? The RN would have commited cruisers in addition to destroyers, MTB's etc etc.

The Scharnhorst's and the Bismarck's would just sit on the side-lines and watch while the rest of the KM supports the invasion?
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RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940

Post by warspite1 »

What am I looking for in this discussion? Same as any discussion. To get my view across just as I am sure do you.... Your point that is, not mine[;)]
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RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940

Post by warspite1 »

The Bismarcks and the Scharnhorsts - seriously? Sorry mate - have a look at when these were ready for action (in the case of the former) and have a look at Weserubung (in the case of the latter).

As for the "rest of the KM" - have a look at Weserubung.....

I believe the KM was something like:

Admiral Scheer (Pocket Battleship/Heavy Cruiser)
Admiral Hipper (Heavy Cruiser)
Leipzig, Koln and Nurnberg (light cruisers) These are the only 3 I believe that were ready for action
10 destroyers
20-30 submarines.
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RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940

Post by warspite1 »

ORIGINAL: mind_messing
ORIGINAL: warspite1
ORIGINAL: mind_messing




I think Sandhurst might be just a little bit of a biased source in regard to Sealion.

Was it likely to suceed? That would depend on who won control of the airspace.

@ Warspite: while the odds were stacked against the Germans, the British were far from in the best position to repell an invasion
warspite1

Re your first point above - it may be better to read the summary before commenting. Yes those at Sandhurst may be a little biased - if they were all British. The study was HELD at Sandhurst - the panel of umpires were German and British and the results were unanimously agreed.

My point was more that the premise was biased - with the Luftwaffe not already having won control of the air.
Re the second point, no sorry. Firstly its is almost certain that even WITH air superiority (let alone just contested) Sealion would still have been a disaster for the Germans. The excruciatingly slow, poorly protected, low in the water, river barges would have been torn to shreds - nothing bigger than a cruiser required. However, even if you chose to believe that air superiority was the only important element, there is still rather a big problem..... The Germans have to gain it. Given that this was something they had been trying to do for many weeks - and utterly failing to achieve - why would it suddenly be possible?

So, what do the crusiers of the Royal Navy do when they're confronted with the heavy units of the Kreigsmarine and the Luftwaffe in the narrow confines of the Channel?

Air superiority is the key element regarding Sealion. With it, the Germans stand a good chance, otherwise they don't.

As for the Germans actually getting air superiority - they were very close to achiving it. The RAF was digging deep into it's reserves, and the bottom of the barrel was in sight. The Luftwaffe failing to gain control of the air was not a done deal.
Repel a properly planned, co-ordinated and executed invasion? I quite agree - in no way were the remnants of the BEF, some green Commonwealth troops + whatever else we could throw together - in an ideal position against the cream of the Wehrmacht. Only problem for the Germans was that was not what the British would be facing. Those "lucky" sods that managed to get onto the beaches would have been disorganised, lacking in heavy weapons and have little to no chance of re-supply. Relief at landing would quickly turn to fire, frying-pan type territory......

You've evidently watched the Battle of Britain just too many times for you to consider anything contrary to what that film depicted as being plausible.

Warspite1

That last remark was disappointingly cheap [:(] oh well.......
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RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940

Post by warspite1 »

...and the RAF was exhausted and running out of trailed pilots.

Hardly a done deal

By the end of October 1940 (so within the timeframe of the invasion) the Luftwaffe had lost 3,701 aircraft. It had begun the summer with 3,578. Losses of over 100%, but these had at least been made good in aircraft (if not trained pilots). But worse for the Germans was that production was by then no longer keeping up with losses.

The Luftwaffe's actual combat strength in October was only 75% of that at the start of the battle. Reduction in morale, combat fatigue and exhaustion were not the sole preserve of the RAF.

Furthermore, by now Britain was outstripping the Germans in aircraft production.

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RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940

Post by mind_messing »

ORIGINAL: warspite1
...and the RAF was exhausted and running out of trailed pilots.

Hardly a done deal

By the end of October 1940 (so within the timeframe of the invasion) the Luftwaffe had lost 3,701 aircraft. It had begun the summer with 3,578. Losses of over 100%, but these had at least been made good in aircraft (if not trained pilots). But worse for the Germans was that production was by then no longer keeping up with losses.

The Luftwaffe's actual combat strength in October was only 75% of that at the start of the battle. Reductions in morale, combat fatigue and exhaustion were not the sole preserve of the RAF.

Furthermore, by now Britain was outstripping the Germans in aircraft production.


The RAF's problem wasn't airframes: it could keep ahead of losses (or at worst break even). It was pilots: in the 24 August to 6 September period it lost 103 pilots KIA/MIA and 128 wounded. Richards gives the losses of pilots from 8th-18th of August as 154, with only 63 replacement pilots put into the frontline.

When you're barely replacing 1/3 of your pilot losses, it's far from a done deal.

It's also worth noting that the production of British aircraft didn't really get ahead of losses till Sept 7th, which was when the Germans made the mistake of attacking urban areas instead.
Of course, the RAF could have went down the Japanese route and threw rookies into fighters, but I doubt that would have worked out well.
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RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940

Post by warspite1 »

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

ORIGINAL: warspite1
...and the RAF was exhausted and running out of trailed pilots.

Hardly a done deal

By the end of October 1940 (so within the timeframe of the invasion) the Luftwaffe had lost 3,701 aircraft. It had begun the summer with 3,578. Losses of over 100%, but these had at least been made good in aircraft (if not trained pilots). But worse for the Germans was that production was by then no longer keeping up with losses.

The Luftwaffe's actual combat strength in October was only 75% of that at the start of the battle. Reductions in morale, combat fatigue and exhaustion were not the sole preserve of the RAF.

Furthermore, by now Britain was outstripping the Germans in aircraft production.


The RAF's problem wasn't airframes: it could keep ahead of losses (or at worst break even). It was pilots: in the 24 August to 6 September period it lost 103 pilots KIA/MIA and 128 wounded. Richards gives the losses of pilots from 8th-18th of August as 154, with only 63 replacement pilots put into the frontline.

When you're barely replacing 1/3 of your pilot losses, it's far from a done deal.

It's also worth noting that the production of British aircraft didn't really get ahead of losses till Sept 7th, which was when the Germans made the mistake of attacking urban areas instead.
Of course, the RAF could have went down the Japanese route and threw rookies into fighters, but I doubt that would have worked out well.
warspite1

Whereas the German problem was BOTH airframes AND pilots. British Pilots were likely to be recovered - not so for the Germans. Also the German process for repairing damaged aircraft was woeful. All German Gruppen were operating at depleted strength and this was getting worse each day. If the British had scraped the bottom of the barrel why were those losses not starting to come back for the Germans? Why were things getting worse not better?

The problems the Luftwaffe faced at the start of the BoB were about to get even worse.

With the launch of Sealion, the Luftwaffe are now artillery for the army, they need to pummel the airfields, they are defenders of the river barges and - if they want to throw away the remnants of the KM - their ships too. They are also ordered to attack RN shipping and of course - provide air superiority for the troops that did manage to land. Achieving air superiority was not achieved by the Luftwaffe up to the time of the planned invasion - there was even less chance of that being achieved once the invasion started and the sitting duck barges crept along the channel at 2-3 knots....

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RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940

Post by warspite1 »

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

ORIGINAL: warspite1



By the end of October 1940 (so within the timeframe of the invasion) the Luftwaffe had lost 3,701 aircraft. It had begun the summer with 3,578. Losses of over 100%, but these had at least been made good in aircraft (if not trained pilots). But worse for the Germans was that production was by then no longer keeping up with losses.

The Luftwaffe's actual combat strength in October was only 75% of that at the start of the battle. Reductions in morale, combat fatigue and exhaustion were not the sole preserve of the RAF.

Furthermore, by now Britain was outstripping the Germans in aircraft production.


The RAF's problem wasn't airframes: it could keep ahead of losses (or at worst break even). It was pilots: in the 24 August to 6 September period it lost 103 pilots KIA/MIA and 128 wounded. Richards gives the losses of pilots from 8th-18th of August as 154, with only 63 replacement pilots put into the frontline.

When you're barely replacing 1/3 of your pilot losses, it's far from a done deal.

It's also worth noting that the production of British aircraft didn't really get ahead of losses till Sept 7th, which was when the Germans made the mistake of attacking urban areas instead.
Of course, the RAF could have went down the Japanese route and threw rookies into fighters, but I doubt that would have worked out well.
warspite1

Whereas the German problem was BOTH airframes AND pilots. British Pilots were likely to be recovered - not so for the Germans. Also the German process for repairing damaged aircraft was woeful. All German Gruppen were operating at depleted strength and this was getting worse each day. If the British had scraped the bottom of the barrel why were those losses not starting to come back for the Germans? Why were things getting worse not better?

The problems the Luftwaffe faced at the start of the BoB were about to get even worse.

With the launch of Sealion, the Luftwaffe are now artillery for the army, they need to pummel the airfields, they are defenders of the river barges and - if they want to throw away the remnants of the KM - their ships too. They are also ordered to attack RN shipping and of course - provide air superiority for the troops that did manage to land. Achieving air superiority was not achieved by the Luftwaffe up to the time of the planned invasion - there was even less chance of that being achieved once the invasion started and the sitting duck barges crept along the channel at 2-3 knots....

warspite1

Here is stat for the 6th September 1940 - shortly before the proposed invasion.

Fighter Command had over 750 serviceable fighters and 1,381 pilots - 950 of which flew the Spitfire or Hurricane.

This was 200 more pilots and 150 more aircraft than they had in July....

.....and here's another.

At the end of the battle Fighter Command had 40% more pilots than it began July with - 1,796 vs 1,259.

The Luftwaffe? I cannot see aircrew details but between July and December 1940 their fighter strength fell by 30% and bomber strength by 25%.

Ah, here we go.

Bf109 pilots - losses as a % of those operational for the three months:

July - 11%
August - 15%
September - 23%

as I say, things getting worse and worse for the Germans leading up to Hitler crying ENOUGH! After all he had Barbarossa to think about....
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RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940

Post by warspite1 »

Just some other little - non-aircraft - tidbits.

Did you know the German navy could not provide enough sailors to man the barges? - even if they stripped the KM bare (and thus would not be available to support).

The river barges (which were sufficiently low in the water such that a destroyers wake would flood them) would be at sea in the Channel for 30 hours. The plan was for two to be towed across by each tug. So that's 2-3 knots in a seaway where 5 knot currents is not uncommon (apparently - the sailors amongst you will know if that rings true).

10% of the available barges had been destroyed by bomber command at their berths in northern France.
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RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940

Post by GaryChildress »

Seeing how the invasion of Norway alone was an enormous stress on the KM and Germany's amphibious ability I do sort of get the impression that any real attempt to invade England would have been a disaster. I always get a kick out of Panzer General and the scenarios where Germany invade the US. No way in a thousand years would that have happened. Except of course in the world of my War in the Pacific mod (Plan 8-8-8 from Outerspace) featuring the KM in the Pacific. [:D]
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RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940

Post by mind_messing »

This discussion is going much as I expected.

Let me consolidate this discussion.

Air superiority was a requirement for the invasion. The Luftwaffe did not gain it, but there is the real possibility that they could have in the August-September period if they had persisted in a war of attrition rather than shifting targets to the cities.

Considering the neutering of the combat effectiveness of the Luftwaffe by the higher leadership, it makes you wonder how the battle would have progressed without the interference from up on high - offensive fighter sweeps and attacks on the radar stations are what I mainly have in mind.

In regards to the naval aspect of the invasion: the KM would have the following capital ships

Battleships:
- Bismarck (commisioned 24 August 1940, would take some effort to be combat ready for the proposed invasion in Sept)
- Schleswig-Holstein
- Schlesien

Heavy crusiers:
- Admiral Hipper
- Prinz Eugen (Commisioned 1 August 1940)

Plus sundry other smaller warships. Hardly overwhelming force, but enough to ensure that the RN would face some significant resistance. .

Against this, they have to fight off the bulk of the Royal Navy, but the RN had no intention of commiting their capital ships to interfere with an invasion. This just leaves the crusiers and destroyers of the RN, so even the older German battleships would significantly out-gun the opposition.

Considering what happened to the Prince of Wales and the Repulse a year later, I wonder of the value of the RN sending big surface combatant ships into the range of the Luftwaffe - if the losses of the RN at Crete are anything to go by, the result wouldn't be favourable to the RN.

The whole point of the barges were to enable the Whermacht to get enough troops ashore that they can capture a major port and start unloading troops through that. If they'd worked well, the Germans wouldn't have needed a port.

The success of Operation Sea Lion depended on three factors:

1. The Luftwaffe maintaining air superiority over south-eastern England prior and during the invasion.
2. Combined efforts of the Luftwaffe and KM limiting the damage that the RN can cause to the invasion flotilla.
3. German ground forces securing sufficent ports to enable reinforcement and resupply of the invasion force.

Now, the original quote that you posted that I took issue of was this:
There is one positive item you can add to that depressing list - a successful Operation Sealion was simply impossible.

None of those three factors were "impossible". They were unlikely to be attained, but none were absolutely unattainable.

There are many examples throughout history of things claimed to be "impossible" when, in fact, they are not. Someone who reads as much history as yourself should not be making that mistake.
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RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940

Post by Miller »

One problem for the Luftwaffe is they had very limited anti ship capability during that period. Yes the Stuka could be an effective ship killer, however against anything bigger than a cruiser it would struggle and the torpedo carrying He111 did not really come into the war until mid 41. Granted the RN may have been reluctant to risk BBs in the early stages of the operation, but I cannot imagine they would keep them out of harms way indefinitely whilst the fate of the entire country was in the balance.....
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RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940

Post by Skyros »

Using Crete as a comparison is a little shaky. The RN will be operating from local bases with the opportunity to have air cover over their task forces which they did not have off of Crete.
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RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940

Post by msieving1 »

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

In regards to the naval aspect of the invasion: the KM would have the following capital ships

Battleships:
- Bismarck (commisioned 24 August 1940, would take some effort to be combat ready for the proposed invasion in Sept)
- Schleswig-Holstein
- Schlesien

Heavy crusiers:
- Admiral Hipper
- Prinz Eugen (Commisioned 1 August 1940)

Plus sundry other smaller warships. Hardly overwhelming force, but enough to ensure that the RN would face some significant resistance. .

Against this, they have to fight off the bulk of the Royal Navy, but the RN had no intention of commiting their capital ships to interfere with an invasion. This just leaves the crusiers and destroyers of the RN, so even the older German battleships would significantly out-gun the opposition.

You simply can't take the commissioning date of a warship as the date the ship is ready for service. The commissioning date is the date the navy takes possession. Fitting out would be uncompleted, no systems would be tested, and the crew would be untrained. There is no possibility that Bismarck or Prinz Eugen would be available in September 1940.

You did forget Admiral Scheer. That leaves two CA and two pre-dreadnought battleships as the KM "heavy units". The old battleships were obsolete in WWI, and their combat use in WWII was limited to shore bombardment where there was no possibility of interference by enemy forces. They would not out-gun the British cruisers, anymore than the Dutch Soerabaja, armed with very similar guns, out-gunned the Japanese cruisers. They would be overwhelmed by 8" and 6" fire and sunk by torpedoes. More likely, the KM would not be so desperately foolish as to commit them to combat in the English Channel.

The "sundry other smaller warships" didn't amount to much. The KM would be able to inflict some losses on the RN, but it's very unlikely that they would be able to protect the troop barges and very likely that the bulk of the KM would be destroyed.

It's probably an exaggeration to say that Operation Sealion in 1940 was impossible, but it's not a large exaggeration. The chance of success was low enough, and the cost of failure high enough, that no rational commander would have made the attempt.


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RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940

Post by warspite1 »

[/quote]warspite1 (in response to mind_messing)

Firstly, let me clear something up. The discussion is not going as expected because you have not read what I have written.

First and foremost my post states quite clearly that Sealion was an impossibility based on the attack being ordered with the historical situation being what it is (see post 9).

If you want to bring in other counterfactuals e.g. Goering adopted a different plan, then fine but it would be helpful to know that.

The problem with a different plan (and there is no guarantee that this would work either of course) is simply who is going to understand the need for a different plan? E.g. we know the German attack on the radar installations were a waste of time because they never realised the significance of radar or the fact that the damage could be repaired. Who is going to advise Goering of this?

Secondly of course is the need for other things to change. The switch of emphasis to the airfields is always brought up as though that was the Luftwaffe’s only error. For example, Goering's use of his fighters was ridiculous. They were ordered to stick with the bombers rather than be used in the hunter role that would have made them more effective.

As per the numbers presented in previous posts, although the RAF were being hit hard, they were NOT scrapping the bottom of the barrel any more - and indeed significantly less - than the Germans - who were in pretty bad shape (hence Hitler calling off the attack).

It is vital to remember the historical context too. Hitler and WWII in Europe was all about Lebensraum. It is unimaginable that Hitler would have allowed the continuation of the BoB – and certainly not the launch of Sealion – if he thought there was a chance it would fail and thus put Barbarossa (his raison d’etre) in doubt.

But let’s assume local air superiority is obtained. Would the invasion succeed?

You have raised a number of points:

- I am really surprised at the Bismarck comment. You assume that Bismarck could be combat ready for Sealion? Granted Hitler COULD have ordered her to sail (but in no way shape or form would Bismarck have been combat ready). Bismarck was a brand new ship with all the problems and niggles associated with such in terms of both machinery and a crew untrained and untested. No time for fire control tests no time for damage control tests? Does the machinery even work? Possible, but not sensible to go from the dockyard to battle....
- I mentioned Admiral Scheer previously - although did not bother mentioning the pre-dreadnoughts. By all means add them to the OOB if you think it helps but please don't place them in the battleship category!!
- Where do you get the idea that the RN would not commit the capital ships? If the operation goes as expected then there is simply no need. But if by some miracle the operation was more troublesome the RN would have held back nothing. Or do you really suggest that with the country at stake - the RN would not be committed? The RN was committed with little or no air cover in Norway, France, Greece, Crete, the Mediterranean etc etc. But you suggest the senior service would not be pressed into action if the fate of the country was in the balance?
- Regardless of how the invasion was going, if the KM were going to send out their remaining surface vessels the RN would welcome the chance to finish off the surface fleet with capital ships and torpedo bombers.
- I am afraid you continue to miss the point re the inability of the Luftwaffe at that stage of the war to hurt the RN sufficiently to stop them making mincemeat of the river barges. Please look at Norway, Dunkirk - largely STATIONARY destroyers (or operating in confined spaces) how few were sunk? The small craft carving up the river barges would not be stationary. Also once the MTB's, destroyers, cruisers and whatever other craft can be mustered are in amongst the river barges, exactly how are the Luftwaffe going to attack those ships without taking out their own vessels?
- And you have not answered any of the points about how the 2-3 knot barges, in the water for 30 hours, are going to get to England, are going to un-load in good order, are going to be able to re-supply on such a large front. Have you seen the German plans for how the river barges were supposed to off-load their cargo??
- D-Day was 2-years in the planning and had one overall HQ for all services with full co-operation between each. There was no such HQ for Sealion. During the "planning" conferences half the time the Luftwaffe - totally key to the operation - were not even present. Raeder did not agree with the broad front landing - but at a conference the KM did not even attend, Hitler agreed with the army that that would be the plan..... Neither Goering nor Raeder believed it stood an earthly. Plans had not stated before July. For such a complex operation, relying on total inter-service co-operation at all times, there was actually very little in evidence of any.

So if the invasion were attempted in September (with the historical BoB to date) then it would have been a total and utter disaster for the Germans – that is the only outcome. But as said such an operations was realistically impossible as Hitler would have cancelled as he did in real life - to allow for Barbarossa in 1941.

IF the Germans had air superiority (and for this to be achieved you need to remove Goering and give the Germans hindsight) then there would be spectacularly small chance of success – and then only provided everything went right for the Germans and wrong for the British for a two week period.

EDIT: Noted Miller, Skyros and msieving1 have made some of these points already.


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Jorge_Stanbury
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RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940

Post by Jorge_Stanbury »

Schleswig-Holstein and Schlesien ... [:D] c'mon they were not that crazy [:D]

And the RN would had of course committed to battle; they might had avoided sending their latest ships; but they had a lot of old battleships, cruisers + hundreds of minor vessels that would had been more than enough to take on the Kriegsmarine, with heavy losses if the Luftwaffe was in support; but losses they could sustain having so big fleet.

Moreover, 30 hours of crossing means they cannot avoid night time; and there won't be any Luftwaffe support then



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Ralzakark
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RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940

Post by Ralzakark »

ORIGINAL: mind_messing
Considering the neutering of the combat effectiveness of the Luftwaffe by the higher leadership, it makes you wonder how the battle would have progressed without the interference from up on high - offensive fighter sweeps and attacks on the radar stations are what I mainly have in mind.

The effect of the Luftwaffe’s leadership on the battle is often overstated. Many poor decisions were made due to faulty intelligence rather than incompetence. The Germans never fully understood either the nature of their opponent or the sort of battle they were fighting.

Much of this was due to strategic blunders. The political leadership of the Third Reich did not advise the Luftwaffe to consider Britain as a possible adversary until 18 months before the battle. In contrast to Luftwaffe intelligence on France and Poland there was little appreciation of potential British targets or military capability. This was not helped by the low status given to intelligence work in the German armed forces as a whole.

The effect of this on the attacks on radar sites is well known. Radar’s importance was not appreciated and the sites could have been hit much harder. But it was lack of understanding of its importance at the time which led to this. The Luftwaffe could not read account of the battle after the event and adjust its targeting accordingly.

Critically the Germans also underestimated the number of new fighters the RAF was receiving and did not realise just how much German air crews were over-claiming by, leading them to constantly believe that Fighter command was on its knees. The Germans always fought the battle as if they were constantly on the verge of winning it, and some new tactical novelty would allow them to finally triumph.

The under-estimation of production is well known. The 16 July 1940 report by 5th Abteilung estimated that Britain could produce 180-300 fighters per month, all of which were believed to be inferior to the Bf 109 and 110, and that this figure would decline due to the effects of air attack and lack of raw materials. The actual average was about 450-500 per month.

Over-claiming is endemic in air warfare and the Luftwaffe was no exception, over-claiming by 300-400% in the critical August to September period. For example on 20 August the Luftwaffe believed it had shot down 644 planes in the period 12-19 August. The actual figure was 141.

Both these factors led to huge difficulties. At one point Kesselring maintained that Fighter Command had been destroyed, while Sperrle claimed it had 1,000 aircraft. Trying to produce a coherent strategy when senior commanders had such widely diverging views was obviously very problematic.

These problems were both long standing and systemic. For the Luftwaffe high command to have made better decisions in 1940 it would have had to go back in time to gather better intelligence, and to significantly change German military culture to give much greater emphasis on and importance to intelligence work as a whole. Its leaders had to fight the battle with what information they had, and as the battle progressed that information became increasingly divorced from reality.
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Yaab
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RE: ot - Kenneth Macksey bok about nazi invazion to uk in 1940

Post by Yaab »

Who knew NSDAP had a plan to invade the UK. Imagine Martin Bormann leading a massive Parteitag rally in Stonehenge at night. Goosebumps!
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