ORIGINAL: molchomor
Yes... so basically it is meaningless to do the necessary preparations as axis for an assault against the AI (collecting your precious armor over several turn, HQ buildup etc.) - even if you manage to wrangle free into the empty hinterland you will be swamped by armies appearing both front and rear and left and right the next turn whatever you do.
Sorry. I don't mean to be a thread de-railer as well. I really like the bones of this game and hope to see it continuing to evolve. Great stuff.
However, -- and I'll admit that I have said this before, and I don’t mean to beat a dead horse -- the ability of the Soviet side to conduct extremely rapid & massed redeployment of large numbers of combat units by rail isn't restricted to games vs. the AI. I just wanted to make it clear from my previous posts on the subject that I am referring to rail capacity as related to Head-to-head play. Very-very rapid Massed redeployments of Soviet combat units via strategic rail movement occurs rather frequently in PBEM as well as what we see in games vs. the AI. It’s a standard Soviet approach to the game management. I have two GCs going in which its become routine for me to blow open a rather huge gap in the Soviet lines -- ala what you were experiencing in your 1942 Campaign game that you posted above -- only to have the entire gap covered in depth by the next German movement phase. All the result of the Soviets being able to very-very rapidly redeploy huge numbers of troops by rail movement.
One classic example, which I would be glad to post images for (or send PBEM files): I had almost completely encircled some 30 to 40 Soviet divisions in the Don Basin. Unfortunately I sprang the trap too quickly -- my bad -- and my crafty opponent was able to squeak back into the Crimea through a small hole in my pocket. I just didn’t have enough movement points to close a two hex gap at the back of the pocket. In my planning of the pincer movement, I had really counted on pinning him against the swampy ground around the Dnieper in the vicinity of the Crimea as well as counted on the high movement cost of Dnieper River crossing itself to slow down his escape through this limited gap. Unfortunately for me, my opponent had sufficient movement points to get 90% of his units over the Dnieper River and through the swamp hexes during his following movement phase. I freely admit this was bad planning on my part.
Of particular interest in this whole sequence of events was that the Soviet front line east of the Don Basin was quit literally completely gone as a result of this pocket formation and the subsequent southward pocket collapse and stampede of Soviet units toward the Crimea safe heaven. I did a huge amount of air recon on the expanse of clear terrain to the east on my breakthrough. Absolutely nothing appeared on the radar screen. I pretty much achieved complete strategic surprise. The very next turn my opponent had shifted upwards of 30-divisions via rail movement and established a completely new front line (in depth). Within one to two hexes of my armored spearheads!
Same occurred in two other instances: The first being a big breakthrough I made in front of Veliki Luki. Like the Don Basin example there was absolutely nothing in front of my spearhead but air at the end of my turn. During my opponents turn there was a massive Soviet redeployment via railroad to completely reestablish the shattered front line. It was like one moment there is nothing, than "Presto" there is a completely new line with reserve positions within only one or two hexes of my spearheads.
Same again occurred several turns later. HQ buildup and a turn of Panzer Division refit. I do a series of misdirection attacks for diversion during my previous turn. After a turn of panzer rest\refit and HQ buildup I punch a huge gap in his line northward from Veliki Luki toward Leningrad. I open a 50 mile gap in the soviet line that extends northward 10 to 15 hexes, nothing east or north of the breakthrough at the end of my turn. I have again achieved what I considered both complete operational and strategic surprise with this breakthrough. During the Soviets movement phase this large lateral gap in my opponents line has been was filled in-depth with 20 to 30 divisions that were railed into the area. I am forced to plan and expend Admin Points to conduct this attack. I am also sacrificing very precious good weather time inorder to build up and refit for this attack. I have to make in game decisions and weigh the potential consequences and the potential gains of this activity.
Just my ten cents...Like I say, great game. It just feels like Rail movement capability is...I don't know.. devoid of any consequences for the Soviet Player. Make him think about how and when he can use large amounts of rail capacity. It's an extremely powerful strategic level force multiplier. It's a game changer. Yet its use by the Soviet player feels like a strategic freebee. It's too much of a simple snap of your fingers to move 30 divisions from the front near Tula to a new line in front of Stalino. I just don't see the Soviets being able to tap into huge amounts of their rail capacity required to move enormous amounts of troops, as well as their associated equipment and supplies without there being a ripple effect somewhere.
And maybe this is a mutually exclusive aspect or mutually exclusive argument I am about to use, but in order to motorize an infantry division, the game requires the Germans to expend upwards of 15 to 17 Admin Points. That’s for one division. In addition, huge numbers of trucks are diverted from normal supply\ammunition\fuel hauling activities. And some percentile of these trucks end-up being damaged and destroyed during the infantry division motorization process. And the divisions being motorized can only be employed in movement along interior lines of communication -- i.e. units temporarily motorized can only move in controlled hexes nor impending control hexes and I don’t think they can't enter enemy zones of control(? not sure on this last one). The point being there are numerous implications associated with the use of temporary motorization. The player has to weigh the negatives with the positives before using temp motorization. Why not apply similar logic to strategic movement by rail roads against both the Axis and Soviet sides? Make the rail capacity available, but associate continual use of huge amounts of rail capacity being diverted from other national requirements toward railing large amounts of troops around with some form of negative effects. Make the player think about the positive or negatives associated with continual over use, or abuse of huge amounts of rail capacity in whisking troops around the map.
.
