Matrix Games Forums

Roughly when do American carriers no longer have a negative modifier when in task forces of more than 1 carrier? Or is my information wrong, and Americans do not have a negative modifier?

it is not the # of carriers, it is the # of aircraft
from the manual:

The coordination of air strikes is affected by how many Carrier aircraft are based in
the TF launching a strike. The chance of uncoordination is doubled under the following
circumstances:
» Allied TF in 1942 and the number of aircraft in the
TF is greater than 100 + rnd (100).
» Allied TF in 1943 and the number of aircraft in the
TF is greater than 150 + rnd (150).
» Allied TF in 1944 or later or a Japanese TF at any time and the
number of aircraft in the TF is greater than 200 + rnd (200).

ORIGINAL: Remenents

Roughly when do American carriers no longer have a negative modifier when in task forces of more than 1 carrier? Or is my information wrong, and Americans do not have a negative modifier?

Roughly January 1943.

Thx for this info, it was on my list of 'things I need to look up in the manual.'
I had forgotten that it's the # of aircraft, not the # of carriers, that controls the situation.

To be more roughly precise,

With two fleet carriers in 1943 with a load of say 180 planes you are looking at roughly around 20% prospect of coordination penalties;

With 2 Essex, and 2 Indies in 1944 you are looking roughly at a full load* of 90+90+32+32= 244 air frames, with a 22% chance of coordination penalties.

* scenario dependent.

The latter does not of course take into account that maxing your CV groups to get 115% capacity on your carriers is so attractive,
that you will do it - until you work out that it is better to have a 15% smaller, properly coordinated strike.

Edit: % calculation

ORIGINAL: Ian R

To be more roughly precise,

With two fleet carriers in 1943 with a load of say 180 planes you are looking at roughly around 20% prospect of coordination penalties;

With 2 Essex, and 2 Indies in 1944 you are looking roughly at a full load* of 90+90+32+32= 244 air frames, with a 26% chance of coordination penalties.

* scenario dependent.

The latter does not of course take into account that maxing your CV groups to get 115% capacity on your carriers is so attractive,
that you will do it - until you work out that it is better to have a 15% smaller, properly coordinated strike.

The question to ask and it may be very important is this one: "Does the coordination penalty to the entire number of carrier aircraft carried or is the coordination penalty only applying to the number of carrier aircraft being sent on the mission." So if it is the latter, the aircraft kept back on CAP, the Naval Search, the ASW Search, and/or any other mission does not count against the aircraft coordination penalty.

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe

ORIGINAL: Ian R

To be more roughly precise,

With two fleet carriers in 1943 with a load of say 180 planes you are looking at roughly around 20% prospect of coordination penalties;

With 2 Essex, and 2 Indies in 1944 you are looking roughly at a full load* of 90+90+32+32= 244 air frames, with a 26% chance of coordination penalties.

* scenario dependent.

The latter does not of course take into account that maxing your CV groups to get 115% capacity on your carriers is so attractive,
that you will do it - until you work out that it is better to have a 15% smaller, properly coordinated strike.

The question to ask and it may be very important is this one: "Does the coordination penalty to the entire number of carrier aircraft carried or is the coordination penalty only applying to the number of carrier aircraft being sent on the mission." So if it is the latter, the aircraft kept back on CAP, the Naval Search, the ASW Search, and/or any other mission does not count against the aircraft coordination penalty.

It counts all aircraft in the TF, but applies the penalty to the strikes. CAP, Nav Search, ASW etc. are unaffected.

ORIGINAL: Admiral DadMan

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe

ORIGINAL: Ian R

To be more roughly precise,

With two fleet carriers in 1943 with a load of say 180 planes you are looking at roughly around 20% prospect of coordination penalties;

With 2 Essex, and 2 Indies in 1944 you are looking roughly at a full load* of 90+90+32+32= 244 air frames, with a 26% chance of coordination penalties.

* scenario dependent.

The latter does not of course take into account that maxing your CV groups to get 115% capacity on your carriers is so attractive,
that you will do it - until you work out that it is better to have a 15% smaller, properly coordinated strike.

The question to ask and it may be very important is this one: "Does the coordination penalty to the entire number of carrier aircraft carried or is the coordination penalty only applying to the number of carrier aircraft being sent on the mission." So if it is the latter, the aircraft kept back on CAP, the Naval Search, the ASW Search, and/or any other mission does not count against the aircraft coordination penalty.

It counts all aircraft in the TF, but applies the penalty to the strikes. CAP, Nav Search, ASW etc. are unaffected.

Thank you.

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe

ORIGINAL: Admiral DadMan

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe



The question to ask and it may be very important is this one: "Does the coordination penalty to the entire number of carrier aircraft carried or is the coordination penalty only applying to the number of carrier aircraft being sent on the mission." So if it is the latter, the aircraft kept back on CAP, the Naval Search, the ASW Search, and/or any other mission does not count against the aircraft coordination penalty.

It counts all aircraft in the TF, but applies the penalty to the strikes. CAP, Nav Search, ASW etc. are unaffected.

Thank you.

You're welcome. To clarify: all CARRIER based aircraft. Float planes not included.

If I recall properly, it's only a chance for a coordination penalty, not an automatic lack of coordination, though.

ORIGINAL: Ambassador

If I recall properly, it's only a chance for a coordination penalty, not an automatic lack of coordination, though.

You are correct. "The chance of uncoordination is doubled"

This is the whole section on coordination:

7.2.1.11 COORDINATING STRIKES
Each base or ship containing an air unit is considered a unique entity for purposes of determining
offensive Missions and Escorts. Under certain circumstances planes flying different Missions
and planes flying from different starting points will coordinate their attacks. Coordination of
attack is determined by several factors. Type of Aircraft, altitude selection, and point of origin all
help discriminate coordination such that it is more difficult to mount massive raids of several
different types of aircraft. The result is a smaller, more selective raid formation.

During the Resolution Phase the computer forms up air strikes from each base/ship depending
on the orders the air units have been given and the information those units have about the
enemy’s forces. Planes that are performing offensive Missions and their accompanying Escorts,
all flying from the same base/ship to the same target hex, will not necessarily fly together
if they have different Missions.

For example, you could have 3 bomber units flying together from the same airfield, with 1 each
to bomb an airfield, a port and a ground unit within the same target hex. 2 fighter groups flying
escort and another fighter group flying a Sweep Mission could accompany these bombers. A
plane flying a Recon Mission could also accompany them.

If the Bomber groups were the same type (Medium bomber for example) they would stand a
greater chance of coordinating than if they were 1 Dive Bomber group, 1 Attack Bomber Group,
and 1 Light Bomber Group.

Air strikes from different bases/ships flying to the same target hex will approach the Target
together if the range to the target hex is the same. This allows aircraft carriers to coordinate
their attacks. However, before the attacks are made, there is a chance that some of the units
will become separated from each other and this may result in piecemeal attacks on the target.
In addition, a unit may escort attacks originating at another base/ship if the escorting unit has
a Target that matches the target being attacked, and the escorting fighter is closer to the target
than the aircraft being escorted. Occasionally this can occur even if no priority target is set for
the escorting unit.

(Additional Aircraft Carrier coordination considerations:)
The coordination of air strikes is affected by how many Carrier aircraft are based in
the TF launching a strike. The chance of uncoordination is doubled under the following
circumstances:

»» Allied TF in 1942 and the number of aircraft in the TF is greater than 100 + rnd (100).

»» Allied TF in 1943 and the number of aircraft in the TF is greater than 150 + rnd (150).

»» Allied TF in 1944 or later or a Japanese TF at any time and the number of aircraft in the TF is greater than 200 + rnd (200).

Well, this quote may be appropriate here, I will quote the entire thing from the article:

One day he won the training squadron emblem for stupidity: the Flying Jackass, a large aluminum likeness of a donkey, awarded to anyone who broke a safety regulation. He wore it for two weeks until another student pilot won it away from him. Beut he insisted on keeping that particular badge. When he took command of the Saratoga, he said, he would hang it on the bulkhead of his cabin. Any time he got ready to raise hell with some pilot for an infraction of rules, he was going to look at that Flying Jackass and think twice.

Such tales began the legend of Bill Halsey, the only really flying commander of a carrier, and the true aviators got to love him. When he took over his carrier, he continued to add to bits to the legend. From the Saratoga he went to the Enterprise, one of the new carriers of the fleet, as commander of Carrier Division Two [COMCARDIV Two] and he was promoted to admiral. One day a young officer made an error that delayed the launch of planes. Admiral King was present at the time, and King was a noted disciplinarian (who put an end to the advancement of one naval captain because he ran a cruiser aground in a fog trying to get King back to Washington to make an appointment).

'Who was responsible for the delay?' King demanded by signal, and on the bridge of the Enterprise souls quaked as the message was taken to Admiral Halsey's bridge.

'COMCARDIVE Two', was the reply.

There was no further word from the flagship. But on board the Enterprise the story went from keel to masthead. Admiral Halsey was the sort of officer who protected his men, it said
Edwin Hoyt, Closing the Circle

https://leadandgold.blogspot.com/2016/0 ... lliam.html

So the problems could be anywhere in the system and it takes awhile to train up the efficacy which the Japanese had already apparently done.

He was a Navy Captain in flight school so he could get his wings so he could command the Saratoga.

they would stand greater chance of coordinating

That word almost invariably means die rolls.

The "chance of uncoordination is doubled" indicates to me that the default condition is 'co-ordinated', although it would I think be naive to think the chance of uncoordination is ever zero%

There is, however, a possibility that if there are enough other factors elevating the % chance uncoordination, doubling might push it over 100$.

As the precise formula will remain undisclosed, it's best just to stay within limits - or if you go over, go way over. Maybe some DBs will sneak in after the CAP is fatigued.

ORIGINAL: Ian R

they would stand greater chance of coordinating

That word almost invariably means die rolls.

The "chance of uncoordination is doubled" indicates to me that the default condition is 'co-ordinated', although it would I think be naive to think the chance of uncoordination is ever zero%

There is, however, a possibility that if there are enough other factors elevating the % chance uncoordination, doubling might push it over 100$.

As the precise formula will remain undisclosed, it's best just to stay within limits - or if you go over, go way over. Maybe some DBs will sneak in after the CAP is fatigued.

Hey, don't complain about that - it worked at Midway!

ORIGINAL: Ian R

they would stand greater chance of coordinating

That word almost invariably means die rolls.

The "chance of uncoordination is doubled" indicates to me that the default condition is 'co-ordinated', although it would I think be naive to think the chance of uncoordination is ever zero%

There is, however, a possibility that if there are enough other factors elevating the % chance uncoordination, doubling might push it over 100$.

As the precise formula will remain undisclosed, it's best just to stay within limits - or if you go over, go way over. Maybe some DBs will sneak in after the CAP is fatigued.

And in this case it does mean a die roll.

ORIGINAL: Admiral DadMan

ORIGINAL: RangerJoe

ORIGINAL: Ian R

To be more roughly precise,

With two fleet carriers in 1943 with a load of say 180 planes you are looking at roughly around 20% prospect of coordination penalties;

With 2 Essex, and 2 Indies in 1944 you are looking roughly at a full load* of 90+90+32+32= 244 air frames, with a 26% chance of coordination penalties.

* scenario dependent.

The latter does not of course take into account that maxing your CV groups to get 115% capacity on your carriers is so attractive,
that you will do it - until you work out that it is better to have a 15% smaller, properly coordinated strike.

The question to ask and it may be very important is this one: "Does the coordination penalty to the entire number of carrier aircraft carried or is the coordination penalty only applying to the number of carrier aircraft being sent on the mission." So if it is the latter, the aircraft kept back on CAP, the Naval Search, the ASW Search, and/or any other mission does not count against the aircraft coordination penalty.

It counts all aircraft in the TF, but applies the penalty to the strikes. CAP, Nav Search, ASW etc. are unaffected.

This is why I try to concentrate Allied CVs early. If they have a target of opportunity, go for it. but I want as many Cats/Buffs on CAP as possible.

And the more I learn about Midway, the more I realize how close the US got to a really bad outcome. The land based planes did the best they (not really well trained in naval attack). One CAG completely missed the plot. And Dick Best changing his attack onto the Akagi last minute put her away. Hiryu soldiered on, if Akagi had been with her - who knows. Ytown showed amazing damage control. If the captain had not abandoned ship as quickly as he did, I think she would have made it.

One dogs thoughts.

Each CIC needs to come up with their own answer to this question, depending on the tactical scenario.
Q: is it worth having more aircraft available for defensive CAP duty at higher risk of a coordination penalty for the offensive team?
Most of the time I’d say yes.

The 25 ship limit in a CV task force is another consideration.
Too high a proportion of CVs compared to DDs and the risk probably increases for a submarine attack, and I believe there is a limit to how many ships in the TF add to the close AA umbrella around the CVs.
I read somewhere (I think from an interview with Halsey) that by late war the number of BB+CA+DD that the allies liked having as AA escorts for a 3-4 ship CV Div would be a little over 25. Something like 4CV 2BB 4CA then 16-20 DDs. I remember thinking when I read it “that wouldn’t be possible in WITPAE!” but dropping to 15x DDs would be in the same ballpark.

The manual indicates that each "ship" (i.e. CV) is treated as a "unit" for determining coordination: not each TF. Therefore, I assume that the penalty is doubled for each CV in the TF. 2 or more CV TFs operating in the same hex will quite often have their CVs coordinate their strikes very well. It seems to me that doubling the chance for each CV to coordinate is not a happy thing and that having multiple CV TFs in the same hex is preferable (although having 2 or more oversized CV TFs seems to be the worst-case scenario). The risk, however, is that one will react while the other will not, separating the 2, their CAP, and strikes, or that a more aggressive CV TF commander will have the CVs in his TF launch an attack, while a less aggressive commander will not: again producing a piecemeal strike. (I have seen whom I suspect is Halsey do this several times resulting in bad things for the allies).

Another thing to consider are the other penalties to large TFs. AA is reduced in TFs above 15 ships, a very important consideration for CV TFs, and the chance of collisions increases with more ships. Literally, every time I create a TF with more than 15 ships, it seems, there is a collision at some point.

You can change the CD TF to an escort TF and keep it that way by not having a ship there that can in be a CV TF. The aircraft still fly.