Panzers vs The Bear: A WitE2 MP AAR (Soviet Perspective)

[Elessar2]

Is that what essentially happened to the Germans in 1943-45? Too many units understrength, too many Russian attacks, not enough time/manpower/supply capacity to get them back to full strength, until the Russians were in Berlin?

[loki100]

yes, worth playing Stal-Berlin, in the end the Soviets overwhelm your capacity to refit and replace, but you can make them pay a too high a price

[malyhin1517]

ORIGINAL: loki100

yes, worth playing Stal-Berlin, in the end the Soviets overwhelm your capacity to refit and replace, but you can make them pay a too high a price

And so it was! The Soviet Union paid dearly for the victory over Hitler! Officially more than 25 million people! Of these, the army is about 10 million, and the rest are civilians. In fact, it was not only genocide of Jews, but also of Slavs! Hundreds of villages were completely destroyed, the population was driven into churches or sheds and burned alive! There were dead relatives in almost every family! Therefore, we still remember this! Therefore, it is still a huge holiday for us!

[erikbengtsson]

Indeed, the price was all too high. The death, murder and destruction that Hitler's war led to in large parts of the world, but in particular in eastern Europe, was totally without precedent.

But there was also no other choice. Not crushing the Nazi regime could never be an option.

[GloriousRuse]

A series of WITE2 features that really made a difference.

The next few posts are going to be concerned with just how certain gameplay mechanics translated into the outcome of the game. If you’re new, hopefully they provide some small degree of insight, and if you’re a WITE1 hand maybe it’ll encourage you to relook some assumptions. Without further ado:

The Geometry of Supply

As most everyone knows, WITE2 has friction on the supply lines, both in terms of increasing rail costs and a limited delivery capability by railyards. As I suspect most people also know, this leads to geometric supply difficulties as you advance - railyards become a series of shuttle stops, becoming every more consumed in the process of receiving and pushing onward as the chain lengthens, particularly as networks converge and redisperse. As Loki alluded to above, a hundred miles at the start of the chain is a non issue, but the exponential difference of 100 miles at the end of a chain can break a supply network.

Now, players generally try to get around this by using super depots at the end of a longer chain. This creates a threefold dynamic. One, the further you go, the more effort that has to go into making a long network rather than a broad one, so supply along a thrust naturally narrows down and thereby narrows the frontage the of thrust that is powerful. Two, those required super depots to keep up the pace mean that this natural narrowness does not have a chance to broaden, as the primary tool is spent pulling supply. Finally, the SDs suck capacity away from other lines, reinforcing the concentration of local supply in a narrow area. Of course, if you don’t use SDs then the geometric delivery problems catch you earlier. It is certainly a dilemma.

But you knew all that. What is harder to perceive is that in many cases this supply geometry is creating a salient that doesn’t look like a salient. The units all form a rough line after all, with perhaps a couple major turns at apparently natural junctures. This is a lie. In reality the constant narrowing of the supply base means you can end up with a strong “center” supplied by a single extended rail line, while the flanks are starving. And those flanks in turn allow access to the rail line supplying the center. If you’re going west, this is bad enough, but going east under incredible time pressure and with ever expanding frontage naturally exacerbates all of it.

If you look at the offensive near Orel-Tula-Kaluga, you can see this dynamic play out. The strong defense near the SD is holding or slowly being forced back, but the apparently secure flanks collapse much faster and the rails get threatened. This in turn forces another displacement, with the need for a new SD to recoup the damage, recreating that dynamic until the point where the supply net is both short and broad enough to sustain cohesive resistance across a wide area - AKA Bryansk. And while it’s tempting to say the open terrain from Kharkov to Tula is the cause of a lot of this, it’s worth remembering the same dynamic plays out near Vyazama while bypassing Borodino to much the same effect, going through heavy woods and swamps.

This is obviously not just a new numbers came from WitE1 where “oh my rails aren’t infinite, I’ll adapt” it also strongly implies that the WITE1 definition of success - endless Blitzkrieg swallowing up ground as fast and far as possible - probably isn’t the ideal paradigm. At the very least it comes with a set of brand new, harder to perceive, you can kill yourself without knowing it feedback loops.

And that’s a really good thing for a game. As players (and as Axis players especially, having been on that side as well) we tend to think that clearly the side we’re on could have done so much better, and by god our counter shuffling proves it! It is useful to have mechanics like this that remind you “oh, right, the Germans actually did really extraordinarily well despite the strategic issues, and even when I think I’m doing better, I might be falling into a trap they avoided.” As a final thought on that line, if you take all the ‘41 targets, and Moscow and Leningrad, there is only one small part of the map where this “invisible salient” dynamic occurs, and it’s opposite a similar soviet problem set. Perhaps those General Staff knew better than us after all…

[loki100]

ORIGINAL: GloriousRuse

....

But you knew all that. What is harder to perceive is that in many cases this supply geometry is creating a salient that doesn’t look like a salient. The units all form a rough line after all, with perhaps a couple major turns at apparently natural junctures. This is a lie. In reality the constant narrowing of the supply base means you can end up with a strong “center” supplied by a single extended rail line, while the flanks are starving. And those flanks in turn allow access to the rail line supplying the center. If you’re going west, this is bad enough, but going east under incredible time pressure and with ever expanding frontage naturally exacerbates all of it.

...

this reminds me of Gatt's long analysis of the search for the perfect angle of attack in late 18C strategic thought. People were discussing with great enthusiasm what angle should be the apex of your forces to optimise supply, capacity to reinforce and ability to deter being flanked.

As with much of that era, its not a daft idea (although Napoleon did tend to ignore most of it) but that there was a mathematically perfect layout if only it could be identified. Of course, as in WiTE2, its a hugely situational multi-faceted problem with no perfect solution.

But fully concur, to understand the supply problem in WiTE2 you cannot think linearly. This is sort of obvious but was so obscured in #1 with the infinite rails that it takes some relearning.

A typical German line for Nov-Dec 41 is going to feature these hidden salients (no matter how good your supply network), typically into the Valdai, around Orel and often in the Dombas.

[GloriousRuse]

I think you’re on to something there. The 18c theorists are in many ways were solving for the same problem - how to go ever further along a line of depots while constrained by an increasing burn-deliver rate, and requiring a volume of supply that they couldn’t pull from the land. Sure, trains per day versus oxen feed required per day of travel, but the same basic problem. Maybe ROP 2 will incorporate some of this…but I digress.

Of course, for our Frederick era friends, it’s all still a Strategy of the Point (might as well use the soviet name for it given the forum) where that angle of attack is all about bringing the decisive force to bear either for the field battle that buys operational freedom, or at the minimum cause the other side to back off while proceeding to one objective or another. With the evolution to Linear Strategy or eventually Deep/Front Strategy (more soviet names) the 18th century equations start to face the dual problems of how do you manage to keep things going off of the optimal angle of attack - or how to make the possible optimal angles suit the operational needs given the big Russian observer lesson from the 1918 west front was that attacking based on tactical possibilities rather than operational goals is pointless - and how to ensure the system is capable of sustaining continuous combat along the front as opposed to just generating a single decisive force.

And that’s really a problem the German player is trying hard to solve in ‘41 once they’re over the Dnepr. How can I attack along an axis that is sufficiently operationally valuable, force density optimal, and doesn’t in following that angle create a situation where the flanks are so vulnerable that they’re guaranteed to collapse. To your point, about half of that would look pretty familiar to those 18C theorists. Heh, to go a little later, Jomini would probably hold it up as evidence that he was right all along

[loki100]

ORIGINAL: GloriousRuse

..., Jomini would probably hold it up as evidence that he was right all along

I think Jomini would have taken any evidence that he was right all along, only read his stuff indirectly but like a few such theorists he really was convinces of his own genius

[GloriousRuse]

Touché.

[loki100]

ORIGINAL: GloriousRuse

Touché.

now can we be rude about Liddel-Hart? Now that is fun for all the family regardless of your politics, nationality or view on military decision making [8D]

[GloriousRuse]

That will probably have to wait for deep battle…

[GloriousRuse]

Unit Readiness

As has been touted, CPP, admin movement, recovery variation based on exposure, and the logistics system create a much more dynamic understanding of a unit’s relative strength and value. Whereas in many other games - WitE1 included a panzer division is a panzer division and a rifle division is a rifle division, perhaps existing in various states of attrition - in WITE2 units can exist in a vast array of states; strong but unready, weak and ready, experienced and weak but just had a recovery week, etc - all of which adjust the relative value. All sorts of options for finding opportunities and dangers arise.

It also far more accurately reflects exhaustion and over extension of a force, and is largely responsible for refuting the otherwise Ego-boosting Endless Blitzkrieg that crops up so often in games. It certainly smashes flat the old WitE1 version of it.

But, you knew all that.

What is less visible is that it is possible to cross lines, geographic and otherwise, that are akin to Isserson’s prediction that an attacker might “carelessly approach this strategic rubicon.” There are points where the exhaustion and extension of units cannot be recovered with simple means. Pretty much all players ensure they have an effective rotation of recovering units, a few refits, operational pauses, and deliberate recovery and preparation of key units as a matter of course. However after a point (I tend to think about 3-5 turns “in contact” or past what I’m now calling the first Loki line centered on Bryansk) these routine actions are no longer sufficient to recover. Entire segments of the operation have to be dedicated to deliberately recovering or you may never gain that strength back.

Crazy as it may sound, the difference between pushing for 4 weeks or 5 may be the difference between being able to recover with a short rest, perhaps a refit , and having a unit that might take a month or more - or a winter in some cases - to be anything more than a shell. And it is very rare to notice you’re doing it to yourself unless you look for it in a disciplined manner. Since everyone is thinking Germans, I’ll use a soviet example:

I was conducting an attack sometime in the winter. I opened up a middling CV looking rifle division because I wanted to make sure it had an attachment. Imagine my surprise when I saw the unit was at 48% TOE, low on ammo, and fatigued. I was pretty shocked because I thought I had been making sure units were freshening up, I had rarely extended more than 50 miles from a depot, and even committed to super depots in support of the big axes of attack. How did it come to this? Well, a post mortem showed I’d pushed the army too hard. 3 major attacks in 4 turns, and while they’d had a rest, it’d been a week where the depots were catching up.

And now I didn’t have a one week “well, keep them back, refit the worst of them” problem. I had a “send things to the SR, pull an entire army out of the line for three weeks, re-shuffle attachments, bring up an assault echelon army to cover a gap in the line, and rethink the next month of offensives” problem. And it wasn’t caused by something I saw coming. That was one army. Imagine what you can do to a theater.

I think that is an excellent thing: in so many games, the decision not to overextend is cleanly presented, a deliberate clear and easy decision. Here you can see how history came to be…

In terms of operations, it also creates a very new dynamic: imitative is often a matter of who can maintain readiness. A side that can keep the other side low on readiness can basically dictate the stance of the campaign. Even apparently strong and valuable units can become much less capable - and in the case of mobile units, have a lot of potential energy sucked out - through continuous applied pressure.

More importantly, this creates a new operational dynamic. A key imperative is keeping the enemy in a state of low readiness, limiting his options to make decisions, throw off your plans, or even just stop you. Essentially you want to push him - and if he helps you, great - into a position where there is no easy recovery and he has to make major alterations. The only real recourse to being put in that position is to bring up an operational reserve of ready units to allow a major recovery. That in turn creates strategic opportunities when your opponent has committed his reserve. Either he’ll be unable to recover until you finally exhaust yourself (which might be a moment), or he’ll have to concede cities, terrain, force density, and/or initiative somewhere else.

[erikbengtsson]

Very well written and interesting analyses! Thank you for them!

[GloriousRuse]

Thank you! I’m always concerned I’ve gone full on pretentious

[GloriousRuse]

Its an operational game

There are very few games that are actually operational in nature. There’s a lot of very big tactical games. There’s more strategic games than you can shake a stick at. And there’s WITE1 which was a very odd mix of grand scale tactics interlaced with occasional somewhat disconnected strategic impacts and decisions.

WITE2 however is firmly operational. You aren’t Stalin and Hitler, and Guderian dreams will only get you so far. Your tactical acumen will eventually fall subject to operational constraints. Your resources available will not substantially change, and barring TB ON, will be more or less pre-determined for you, at least within the constraints of winning and losing under the standard VP system.

Now, this can be hard to see at times, particularly as oh so many games start and end in ‘41. The first ten turns of the GC are probably the ones with the single highest premium on tactical ability, and based on the planning done ahead of time by OKH and Stavka, the ten with the least apparent operational decision making. It can fool you into thinking this is WITE1 redux, and you should focus on shuffling your counters to victory. But the only way to do that is with extraordinary player overmatch. Bobo was a much better tactical player of the game than I was. He spent the summer of ‘41 kicking my teeth in and proving just that. But it wasn’t enough for an auto-win, so it’s hard to imagine many other mismatches generating them - it’s pretty clear who had more time in the east.

It’s also not to say that tactical/mechanical ability doesn’t matter. It does. If you can’t reliably succeed on the offensive or put together a defense as either side, well, you’re going to lose against someone who can. But once you cross that line - and for most players, that’ll be in a few games at most - it’s a matter of being able to eke out increasingly thin efficiencies for ever more perfect tactical play. The ROI goes down on skill difference. In WITE1 this wasn’t true. The limited operational inputs meant that better tactical play could create endless miracles of the art of war; here you might get extra juice and extra options out of it, but something is going to pull you down.

And that’s where the operational game begins. You get out of those first ten turns, maybe the first seventeen, and it’s a game as much about force allocation, managing readiness and refit rates, creating a system of victory, and sequencing fights over time for objectives that are no longer perfectly laid out for you. The guy who does this better is probably going to win. And after those initial stunning victories of the summer, beating the enemy army is probably going to involve breaking it at some deep level rather than winning a glorious victory. (In fairness, I’ve seen M60 destroy a full panzer army with a masterful backhanded blow in HvH, but we can’t count on being M60).

Arguably that’s what happened here.

[jubjub]

(In fairness, I’ve seen M60 destroy a full panzer army with a masterful backhanded blow in HvH, but we can’t count on being M60).

I'd love to see this. Was this documented in an AAR?

[loki100]

ORIGINAL: jubjub

(In fairness, I’ve seen M60 destroy a full panzer army with a masterful backhanded blow in HvH, but we can’t count on being M60).

I'd love to see this. Was this documented in an AAR?

its a reference to a beta AAR so unfortunately not in the public domain, but read M60s current AAR to get some idea of how well he manages the Red Army

[AlbertN]

The more I read the more it seems that Master German Player will struggle with basic Soviet player (not newb but basic); so when Master Soviet Player comes into play, the game is brutally one sided.

[loki100]

ORIGINAL: AlbertN

The more I read the more it seems that Master German Player will struggle with basic Soviet player (not newb but basic); so when Master Soviet Player comes into play, the game is brutally one sided.

maybe, I think the issue is that German players have to unlearn WiTE1 and that will take a while. Esp as some will basically just play T1-T10 and if they aren't on the point of a clear victory, vanish from the game.

Soviet players will have to as well, but its a bit less clear cut in 1941 and will really only become obvious 1943+

[jubjub]

its a reference to a beta AAR so unfortunately not in the public domain, but read M60s current AAR to get some idea of how well he manages the Red Army

That's a shame.. His latest is truly exceptional, I think everyone can learn something from it. Hopefully we get to see some real fireworks by late '42.