A successful Case Blue

[Neilster]

Operation Barbarossa famously failed to defeat the Soviet Union in 1941. Case Blue, in 1942, is often portrayed as a desperate gamble that fails in the ruins of Stalingrad but I wanted to open (or perhaps renew) a debate on whether the German 1942 offensive in Russia could have succeeded.

Having wargamed this a few times, my idea is for a concentrated drive on Astrakhan, on the Caspian Sea at the mouth of the Volga. Its capture would prevent any river traffic up the Volga and cut off Russian troops in the Caucasus by land. Obviously this requires convincing Hitler of this and somehow having him stick to the plan, not being tempted into mission creep and not wastefully sending armoured forces hither and thither, but this is alternative history, so let's say this happens. Yes, there would be long flanks but, historically, in the north there was anyway and much of the forces that invaded the Caucasus would now be available to defend the southern one. Anyway, I don't think that during the summer of 1942 the Red Army was in any shape for a major counteroffensive.

Even with Hitler's historical interference German recon units got to within 35 km of Astrakhan, so it's not unreasonable that a focused offensive could have captured it. It also may have forced STAVKA to concentrate forces for its defence, where they may have been encircled and destroyed, rather than trading space for time as historically happened, with the Germans capturing huge amounts of territory but with the Red Army often slipping away.

What are the ramifications for the Russians? How effectively could they have supplied their forces in the Caucasus by sea. Could the Germans then concentrate on capturing the Caucasus against an undersupplied Red Army there? The oil fields would be destroyed and require a long time to produce again but apparently almost 90% of the Soviet Union's oil came from them and they would be denied to the Russian war economy. Even before their capture, how much oil can the Russians ship across the Caspian? From what I've read they had limited tankers, and although they had begun to develop alternative oil reserves, that’s more of a long term thing.

Could the Allies have made up the shortfall? Probably not easily. The Arctic convoys were difficult and huge numbers of rail tankers would have to be shipped to Iran. Possibly across the Trans-Siberian? Whatever they did would’ve affected other Allied initiatives.

I’ve also read that rather than bombing Stalingrad, the Luftwaffe should have concentrated on the oilfields; especially the vital Baku. They could’ve put them out of operation for an extended period. Hitler probably assumed they could be captured intact.

[ncc1701e]

Well the problem I see is the long flanks, as you have noted, but more than all, it's logistics.

Sending a German reconnaissance unit near Astrakhan is one thing, but feeding an entire army is another.

The German army was heavily counting on railroads to supply its army. Even in August 1942, the 6th army stalls in front of Stalingrad because of supplies.

Looking at the map, there is no railroad at all. The line in the north is going through Stalingrad, first problem.
The line in the south is going through Grozny, second problem.

The Germans would never have had enough trucks and gasoline to supply an army for several months. Not to mention the flank attacks of the Red Army.

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[Neilster]

Good point and I'm not arguing that the 6th Army wasn't struggling logistically by the time the got to Stalingrad but did the German blitzkrieg advances rely on railways? I was under the impression that they were supplied by what they had on hand and whatever could be extemporised.

For example, it took time to convert the Russian railways to European gauge, so the long advances at the beginning of Barbarossa didn't rely on them. Wouldn't the same situation apply here? Later, yes, railways would be vital for sustaining supply. A ruthless slave labour program to build a railway to Astrakhan on the heels of the advance would clearly be necessary. The Germans wouldn't have any qualms about that.

I'm not really arguing with you. I suppose I'm playing devil's advocate and looking for ways Case Blue could have succeeded. I mean, in reality, keeping Hitler from disastrously meddling seems impossible from what we know.

[warspite1]

Well the problem I see is the long flanks, as you have noted, but more than all, it's logistics.

warspite1

I agree with this. The bottom line is that the German Army needed to defeat the Red Army within 500 miles of the border (iirc). Logistics was absolutely key and beyond that, if they hadn't destroyed the Red Army, the Germans were in deep doo doo.

The losses being suffered by the Wehrmacht from day 1 were just unsustainable. By 1942 the manpower situation was acute. The German front, and supply line, was growing and they were having to plug the gaps and flanks with Italians, Romanians, Hungarians and weak German units.

Whether the Germans chose to anchor their eastward advance at Stalingrad or Astrakhan, that problem simply wouldn't go away. Too few men and too few resources for the jobs they had to do.

Having failed in 1941 (and I'm not convinced the Germans would have succeeded whatever they did) the Germans could not recover.

My 2 cents

[pzgndr]

What are the ramifications for the Russians? How effectively could they have supplied their forces in the Caucasus by sea. Could the Germans then concentrate on capturing the Caucasus against an undersupplied Red Army there?

Two comments to add. If Astrakhan was cut off, then probably Allied Lend Lease through Persia to Baku would have been increased to help the Red Army forces trapped in the Caucasus. And if the Red Army was not supplying their forces in the Caucasus by sea, then they would have been over-supplying their forces north of the Axis penetration and putting pressure on that long flank. Either way, Old Man Winter would also take its toll on the over-extended German forces and (presumably) 6th Army would likely suffer a similar defeat at Astrakhan as it did at Stalingrad.

Now, if the Germans had managed to reach and destroy the oil fields at Grozny, even with only a reconnaisance in force without an intention of holding them for long, then the adverse economic impact of the oil loss may have delayed the Red Army's 1943 offensives. For a while. Maybe.

[Neilster]

What are the ramifications for the Russians? How effectively could they have supplied their forces in the Caucasus by sea. Could the Germans then concentrate on capturing the Caucasus against an undersupplied Red Army there?

Two comments to add. If Astrakhan was cut off, then probably Allied Lend Lease through Persia to Baku would have been increased to help the Red Army forces trapped in the Caucasus. And if the Red Army was not supplying their forces in the Caucasus by sea, then they would have been over-supplying their forces north of the Axis penetration and putting pressure on that long flank. Either way, Old Man Winter would also take its toll on the over-extended German forces and (presumably) 6th Army would likely suffer a similar defeat at Astrakhan as it did at Stalingrad.

Now, if the Germans had managed to reach and destroy the oil fields at Grozny, even with only a reconnaisance in force without an intention of holding them for long, then the adverse economic impact of the oil loss may have delayed the Red Army's 1943 offensives. For a while. Maybe.

But surely the Allies were pumping as much lend-lease through Iran as they could? Also, they could provide food and fuel but not Russian arms or ammunition. They could ship Western arms, but it would take time to train the Russians to use them and it would probably affect the build-up for Torch.

[warspite1]

Also, they could provide food and fuel but not Russian arms or ammunition. They could ship Western arms, but it would take time to train the Russians to use them and it would probably affect the build-up for Torch.

warspite1


Question: how much arms and ammunition was being produced in the Caucasus? If Astrakhan has been captured so that the Germans can anchor their right flank and push south, the forces that fought at Stalingrad and then Operation Uranus were still available to the Red Army and their production of weapons in the east wouldn’t have been immediately affected (if at all). The Germans still have to push south while holding an even longer line than the one that historically they could not hold - and Stalingrad would be in their hands.

So the bigger German problem, I think, is the Soviets forces to the north. As for the units in the Caucasus, even if under supplied the Red Army showed how they fought for every foot of real estate. Add in the nature of the terrain in the Caucasus and I think it more than likely that the Germans would find it anything but easy going. And to add to German problems, we know just how often, and how successfully, the Red Army conducted amphibious operations to get behind German lines. The Caspian Sea would provide ample opportunity.

[Neilster]

Question: how much arms and ammunition was being produced in the Caucasus?

Dunno, but my guess is five-eighths of eff-all. Stalin didn't trust the Caucasian folk much, and he was one of them.

Tough terrain or not, you can't fight without ammo.

[warspite1]

Question: how much arms and ammunition was being produced in the Caucasus?

Dunno, but my guess is five-eighths of eff-all. Stalin didn't trust the Caucasian folk much, and he was one of them.

Tough terrain or not, you can't fight without ammo.

warspite1

Indeed - but the Caspian is not only a waterway that allows amphibious operations - but also re-supply of forces in the Caucasus. I just think that whatever the Germans try, they are faced with the same problems:

- a defender that doesn't know when to quit and that has proven again and again he is not prepared to yield without extracting a price
- allies of the defender that can supply through Persia and the Caspian
- too much ground for the German forces to cover to defend their ever growing supply lines
- sure they can make Soviet life awkward if they try and use the Caspian and the eastern shores of the Black Sea, but as ever, the removal of specialist units to Russia (in this case aircraft) simply removes those units from elsewhere - the Med and Northern Norway being the obvious.

[RangerJoe]

Ammo and other Soviet items could have been shipped through Iran to the affected area . . .

[ncc1701e]

Having wargamed this a few times, my idea is for a concentrated drive on Astrakhan, on the Caspian Sea at the mouth of the Volga. Its capture would prevent any river traffic up the Volga and cut off Russian troops in the Caucasus by land.

I am curious. Which wargame(s) did you use?

Thanks

[sPzAbt653]

The distance the German's traveled in their move on Grozny [which ended nearby at Orizodkhze, or some such place] was 630km from the rail head at Rostov [the green line below]. If the Germans advance on Astrakhan, they would be using the rail line from Rostov to a point just south of Stalingrad [the gold line]. From there to Astrakhan is 360km [blue line]. So, while I'm not poo-pooing the difficulties, I don't see a reason to consider it to not be possible.

[Neilster]

Having wargamed this a few times, my idea is for a concentrated drive on Astrakhan, on the Caspian Sea at the mouth of the Volga. Its capture would prevent any river traffic up the Volga and cut off Russian troops in the Caucasus by land.

I am curious. Which wargame(s) did you use?

Thanks

Matrix World in Flames (with as close to a historical setup as possible) and TOAW IV's Case Blue scenario. I played one of my friends and we're both quite experienced wargamers of about equal standard. In MWiF I played the Soviets and TOAW the Axis. Both our experiences were similar. The Red Army in the South in June 1942 is a mess. They were driven hard in the winter counteroffensive, taking heavy losses, but the main problem was their disastrous spring "offensive" that left a gaping hole in their line. Historically the Germans got a long way, despite Hitler's wasteful meddling.

We both found that the Summer 1942 Wehrmacht, with a focused objective, is still a nightmare to defend against. We tried the things you've suggested and they didn't work. In TOAW, I even captured Stalingrad anyway because the Red Army was so stretched. There was no possibility of a "Stalingrad" at Astrakhan because the Red Army, especially in the Caucasus, was far too weak to attempt an encirclement. As winter approached, the Germans were not just holding a line NW of Astrakhan but actually advancing. The Caucasus, isolated by land, was captured.

[pzgndr]

As winter approached, the Germans were not just holding a line NW of Astrakhan but actually advancing. The Caucasus, isolated by land, was captured.

Out of curiosity, how did 1943 and the rest of the game go? I cannot imagine it was a game-breaker for the Soviets rather than just a setback to delay their counter-offensives. But maybe not, if the Soviets lost oil production and Persian Lend Lease and the U-boat war was crippling Murmansk Convoys. It's an interesting strategy.

[Neilster]

As winter approached, the Germans were not just holding a line NW of Astrakhan but actually advancing. The Caucasus, isolated by land, was captured.

Out of curiosity, how did 1943 and the rest of the game go? I cannot imagine it was a game-breaker for the Soviets rather than just a setback to delay their counter-offensives. But maybe not, if the Soviets lost oil production and Persian Lend Lease and the U-boat war was crippling Murmansk Convoys. It's an interesting strategy.

It's a TOAW Case Blue scenario, so it ends at the end of 1942. If such a situation had occurred, Hitler would have had to decide what to do next. Threatening Moscow from the west and the south simultaneously might have been possible but that would depend on how the loss of oil affected the Russians. You can produce as many T-34s as you like but they aren't any good without fuel.

[RangerJoe]

Do you really think that the Soviet Union which had military units in Iran would not have sent those and more to the affected areas? Don't you think that the Soviet Union might have tried to cut off the narrow spearhead?

Do you think that the Western Allies and the USA would not have given even more assistance, possibly even using their own military forces to aid the Soviet Union? After all, what would have keep the Axis from going into Iran itself?

[Neilster]

Do you really think that the Soviet Union which had military units in Iran would not have sent those and more to the affected areas? Don't you think that the Soviet Union might have tried to cut off the narrow spearhead?

Do you think that the Western Allies and the USA would not have given even more assistance, possibly even using their own military forces to aid the Soviet Union? After all, what would have keep the Axis from going into Iran itself?

I'm just telling you what happened when I wargamed this scenario. The Soviet units in Iran weren't strong, were busy guarding railways etc and once the Caucasus is cut off that region is very difficult to reinforce.

The Western Allies? In the summer of 1942 the Commonwealth was retreating before Rommel in North Africa, Singapore had just fallen and they were fleeing into India. They had brushfires everywhere and were completely stretched. The U.S. had just lost the Philippines and was desperately trying to build a war economy. They had some naval successes but the army was still small and completely inexperienced, as was demonstrated when they met the Afrika Korps late in the year. The Wallies were giving the Russians all the help they could.

I said that as the Russians, my friend and I tried the things suggested above, including cutting off the spearhead. The Red Army was in a terrible state and the Germans were too strong. Read up on what happened historically. The Red Army basically traded space for time and they were in no position for a counteroffensive until they historically did in late November. The historical situation of a 6th Army worn down from months of street-fighting with dodgy Axis allies protecting their flanks didn't happen in our wargames. The historical result wasn't some inevitable outcome. It was to a large extent the product of Hitler's incompetence.

The Germans got to Stalingrad and deep into the Caucasus despite Hitler's incredibly inefficient switching of armoured forces, which wore out the tanks, wasted fuel and caused logistical chaos. If the panzers had been used logically, it would have been much worse for the Soviets.

Even if they had conquered the Caucasus, I doubt the Germans would have invaded Iran at that stage. It would have been difficult, create enmity in the Arab World (which was quite pro-German) and they have the much higher priority of defeating the Soviet Union. Much better to form a strong defence in the mountainous border region and maximise the forces still fighting the Red Army.

[Lobster]

50% of U.S. Lend Lease arrived in East Asian ports of the Soviet Union sent from West Coast U.S. ports on Soviet ships. They could do that because Japan and the Soviets were not at war. No reason that amount couldn't be increased.

[Neilster]

50% of U.S. Lend Lease arrived in East Asian ports of the Soviet Union sent from West Coast U.S. ports on Soviet ships. They could do that because Japan and the Soviets were not at war. No reason that amount couldn't be increased.

In mid 1942 the U.S. had only been at war for seven months and had multiple theatres competing for arms and resources from a war economy that was still in the process of ramping up. In March 1942, Roosevelt made the Soviet Union the top priority for Lend Lease, so I'd say they were giving about all they could spare. Lend Lease to the Soviet Far East could only be carried on Soviet ships, which is a limiting factor to any big increase, and anyway could not include arms. Spam and telephone cable were handy but won't stop a German offensive.

For the above reasons, I don't think much increased aid to the Soviet Far East is possible.

[Orm]

50% of U.S. Lend Lease arrived in East Asian ports of the Soviet Union sent from West Coast U.S. ports on Soviet ships. They could do that because Japan and the Soviets were not at war. No reason that amount couldn't be increased.

Could the Trans-Siberian railway transport more Lend-Lease west from the East Asian ports to the front than they already did?