From: Manchester, UK
Another idea would be to have interdiction centered on road or rail. In other words, units are far more likely to be hit when travelling down a road than they are when travelling through the countryside.
I have a feeling the game engine does this, Paul, increasing the likelihood of interdiction of "obvious" hexes.
Interdiction in WWII often consisted of simply cruising up and down highways and key roads waiting for the enemy to make an appearance.
Yes, but it would often be in conjunction with operations, so those roads would be reinforcement routes into the battle area rather than any roads the fighter-Bomberts chanced upon.
May I ask what effects interdiction can have in your engine? The question may sound a bit strange, but I have noticed that many games seem unable to agree on what it is interdiction actually accomplished in WWII.
Losses and delay. In certain circumstances, the units will stop altogether.
BTW, for some interesting reading on the subject of interdiction (of all types) check-out "Das Reich" by Max Hastings. It is the story of the 2nd SS Panzer Division's trek from Southern France to Normandy in 1944. Fascinating read. Clearly illustrates the difficulties of moving under enemy air superiority.
I think interdiction becomes the main reason for Allied air power in the end. Rockets and bombs simply aren't accurate enough for battlefield support, not without exposing the pilot to more trouble than it is possibly worth. The Allies tried hard with FBs in the ground support role, but they don't seem to have been as effective as received wisdom would have us believe. This wasn't just an Allied thing, the Greman air attacks at Sedan in 1940 kept the French heads down, but killed hardly anyone despite lasting for several hours. Once the German troops were across, the German planes moved on to support the ground effort through interdiction, sealing off the battlefield by hitting anything moving along the roads towards it.
p.s. Also, after a month or two of fighting in Normandy, the Germans had succeeded in lining most major roads with slit trenches. Seems incredible, but they pulled it off. Of course, you can't drive a truck into a slit trench, but at the very least you save a lot of manpower.
Actual human casualties seem to have been fairly light so I can well believe this. Soft skinned vehicles seemed to have been the most vulnerable so this would fit with the picture you paint of vehicles being abandoned where they stopped whilst the crews headed for the trenches.
Quesada, once angered by Leigh-Mallory's proposed redistribution of Allied airpower, had a couple of planes take pictures of the road network on both sides of the front at the same time of day. On the German side the roads were empty, while on the Allied side the roads were overflowing with material. Leigh-Mallory, upon viewing the pictures, cancelled his planned changes and left Quesada to continue his work.
I think I've heard this story, although in the version I heard, Quesada was called up by Bradley complainig about German air activity. He had the recon runs done and Bradley took the point after seeing the Allied rear areas inundated with vehicles sat out in the open, and the area behind the German front lines completely deserted.
In a related story, Quesada was called up by Bradley who was angry about rather hysterical reports he was getting from the 29th Division Commander about German air attacks. The two men went to see the 29th's Commander (Gerhardt) and after complaining about German air activity, Gerhardt agreed to get Quesada and Bradley the precise details of what his subordinates were complaining to him about.
It turned out that one of the 29th Regimental HQs had been strafed by a couple of German fighters. The attack had set a halftrack on fire and wounded a Regimental cook. This had been an isolated incident. Embarrassed by the source and nature of the complaint, the 29th's Commander said no more, and Bradley penned a memo to his Commanders suggesting that they should not consider themselves immune to air attack.
Allied Commanders were rather spoiled at times. If you see footage of Allied troops in Normandy, and then compare it to footage of German troops, the Germans are invariably looking upwards.