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RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/18/2004 1:30:53 AM   
Von Rom


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DP

< Message edited by Von Rom -- 7/19/2004 6:04:01 AM >


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RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/18/2004 1:54:37 AM   
Von Rom


Posts: 1705
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Von Rom, I apologise for calling you a liar. I've realised that it is just that you haven't got a clue what you are talking about. The Leibstandarte (or Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler to give it its full title) is the name of 1st SS Panzer Division, historians use them interchangeably. All of the first twelve divisions had names like this, the 2nd SS Panzer was entitled Das Reich, the 3rd SS Panzer was entitled Totenkopf and so on. If you didn't know the names of the other divisions that would be understandable but anyone who has studied the German armies and their battles on the East Front or West Front should know of the Leibstandarte and the Das Reich divisions and the divisional numbers they refer to. I'm sorry, but it really is that basic, and not only for their battle honours but also for the atrocities they were responsible for. It calls into question every post you have made because it is such a fundamental gap in your knowledge. If I had known about this I wouldn't have called you a liar so again please accept my apologies.

Regarding the 'Official History', if it was that comprehensive and accurate historians really wouldn't have much to do except re-gurgitate its text. 'Personal memoirs', first-hand accounts and the like are very useful 'primary sources' of information for the historian but human memory is fallible, which is why a group of witnesses to an event will each relate it quite differently. Add to this the stress of being under fire and you can see why a military historian will not take documents such as these at face value. I'm not belittling the collection or the men who contributed to it, I'm sure that for them their recollections are true, but without extensive corroboration all those stories are little more than just 'stories'. 'Context' is everything here, I should know, I was heavily criticised by one of my History Professors for not doing this in an early draft of my MA thesis on 'Women and the Home Front in WW2'.


Kevinugly:

I know full well there are full names for the SS Panzer Divisions. So does Ironduke.

It's been a long time since I used the FULL names for Panzer Divisions. And when I'm busying writing, they may not be remembered on the spur of the moment.

If you knew what I was talking about - since the 1SS Panzer is ALSO the Leibstandarte - then what on earth were you arguing about?

If you thought you were being clever by using a different name for the same unit, then think again. Anyone can pull that garbage. It just goes to show how immature you are.


As to the OFFICIAL HISTORY:

This is what it says about the Ardennes Battle:


"This volume represents the most exhaustive collection of personal memoirs by leading participants ever attempted for a general staff history of a major campaign. The memoirs take two forms: interviews with American participants shortly after the action described, and written accounts prepared immediately after the end of World War II by the German officers who took part in the Ardennes Campaign. The use of the combat interview in the European Theater of Operations was organized by Col. William A. Ganoe, theater historian, but the specific initiation of an intensive effort to cover the Ardennes story while the battle itself was in progress must be credited to Col. S. L. A. Marshall. The enlistment of the German participants in the Ardennes, first as involuntary then as voluntary historians, was begun by Colonel Marshall and Capt. Kenneth Hechler, then developed into a fully organized research program by Col. Harold Potter, who was assisted by a very able group of young officers, notably Captains Howard Hudson, Frank Mahin, and James Scoggins."

Further: here are just some of the personal accounts included.

Sources:

The German sources contributing most directly to this chapter are MSS # B-23, 5th Parachute Division, 1 December 1944-12 January 1945 (Generalmajor Ludwig Heilmann); # B-041, 167th Volks Grenadier Division, 24 December 1944-February 1945, Corps Hoecker, 2-10 March 1945 and 59th Infantry Division, 20 March-24 April 1945 (Generalleutnant Hans Hoecker); # B-068, 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, Ardennes (Generalmajor Walter Denkert); # B-151, Fifth Panzer Army, Ardennes Offensive (General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel); # B-151a, sequel to MS # B-151 (General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel); # B-235, Fifth Panzer Army, 2 November 1944-16 January 1945 (Generalmajor Carl Wagener); # B465, 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, 16-28 December 1944 (Generalmajor Walter Denkert); # B-592, Fuehrer Begleit Brigade, 16 December 1944-26 January 1945 (Generalmajor Otto Remer); # B-701, Army Group B, 15 October 1944-1945 (Col Guenther Reichhelm); # B-799, LXXXIX Corps, 24 January-8 March 1945 (Lt Col Kurt Reschke).

See MSS # A-932 (Gersdorff); B-041 (Hoecker); and B-799 (Reschke).


While I agree that more evidence is better, this all represents primary evidence - or the BEST evidence - for what happened, especially, when such interviews are cross-checked with unit histories, etc.

Most later historians interpret this information the way they want to present it, UNLESS new evidence comes to light.

In the official history it is presented without interpretation.

This Official History runs over 900 pages just on the Ardennes Battle alone. What I posted is just a trickle of what is available.

You truly have to wonder why more historians don't use it.

In particular, D'Este's account of the Ardennes Battle is quite brief, and yet here is a wealth of info for the historian to use about Patton and Third Army at the Ardennes.

I would also imagine that the authors of this history checked on the info they were given, since many are also historians. And remember, they are getting hundreds of accounts of the same events, so clearly a consensus can be reached if several eyewitnesses agree on seeing the SAME event: ie 10 US soldiers see two PzIVs coming over a ridge at sunset. . .

I wouldn't just use this Official History by itself. I would read other accounts. But still, when I read through some of Third Army's activities in the Ardennes, it was truly the most exhaustive account I had ever read on the subject, including by well known historians. . .

< Message edited by Von Rom -- 7/18/2004 12:28:06 AM >


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RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/18/2004 2:44:32 PM   
Golf33

 

Posts: 1962
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From: Canberra, Australia
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quote:

ORIGINAL: freeboy

"The strategic aim in Normandy was for Montgomery to hold the line in the east and allow the Americans to break out in the west. In general, that's how it played. He had many problems. He created a rod for his own back by assigning Caen as a target for the first day. It was 10 miles inland, and never on bearing in mind what stood before Sword beach in the city." IronDuke

I don't see this as true, and you also did not justify your claim that Monty won... and didn't Patton in this same light win?
Monty was threatened by Ike with removal, read Ambrose... at Normandy for sitting on his ass. And Goodwood, sorry about Godwin mistake was hardly a victory...

So please answer the ?, Where did monty win? I can accept you don't want to credit Patton, but really stating Monty won anything after a North Africa is absurd... again what victories are you refering too?


The entire victory in Normandy belongs to Montgomery as it was his plan that was followed, with modifications made by him, from D-Day to the Seine. The fighting around Caen, like the breakout at St Lo, were battles fought by Army Commanders - Dempsey and Bradley - I note with interest the curious absence of Dempsey from this thread. Those who talk about "Montgomery at Caen" and "Bradley at St Lo" are missing the point that Monty had the exact same relationship to COBRA that he had to EPSOM, GOODWOOD and the other battles of 2nd Army. I also fail to see how you could describe the continuous heavy fighting by 2nd Army against by far the strongest enemy forces in the area - including almost continuous, major attacks - could be described as 'sitting on his ass'.

Eisenhower's threat to remove Montgomery suggests more that Eisenhower failed to grasp the operational plan rather than that Montgomery was failing. Not to mention the intrigues of various RAF officers at SHEAF (IMO this verged on treason) who were responding to Monty's appalling personal character rather than his operational performance.

Regards
33

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Post #: 363
RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/18/2004 3:43:41 PM   
Hertston


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362 posts now. Surely that alone is vindication of Patton's greatness - who else would get such a response !

(in reply to Von Rom)
Post #: 364
RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/18/2004 5:38:18 PM   
Kevinugly

 

Posts: 438
Joined: 4/2/2003
From: Colchester, UK
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quote:

If you knew what I was talking about - since the 1SS Panzer is ALSO the Leibstandarte - then what on earth were you arguing about?


Not sure why you've posted this, you were the one who started referring to 1st SS and the Leibstandarte as if they were seperate units. If you read histories of battles involving the division you'll find the authors using the terms interchangeably since it avoids rather tedious repetition. It's like referring to the US 2nd Armoured Division as 'Hell on Wheels' - just makes for better reading that's all.

quote:

If you thought you were being clever by using a different name for the same unit, then think again. Anyone can pull that garbage. It just goes to show how immature you are.




Just using standard terminology that any historian worth his salt would use. If you'd taken a little time to read something you would have realised this. I mean, what did you think I was referring to, especially here when I wrote on p.12

quote:

quote:

I never said the Liebstandarte fought at Bastogne - get your facts straight.

Read your own post from page 10

quote:

When elements of Third Army (which had many GREEN troops, and had been travelling non-stop for 2 days and nights in severe winter weather, without proper sleep, food or rest) attacked to relieve Bastogne, they were attacked by the 352nd (in concealment), the 5th parachute Division, and the elite 1SS Panzer Division.


Here


quote:

quote:

Let the reader be witness - I have stood my ground against all attacks, even when I was all alone for days, and even when the opposition numbered several individuals

Hahahahahahahahaha

I doubt too many will get to here, they'll be bored by your constant repetition.

Hahahahahahahahaha



I felt you being pompous. When you responded with.


quote:

This is about the level of mentality I expected from you.

I wasn't disappointed
.

I knew that you were.



Anyway, this distracts from the issue at hand which is Patton. I thought I would 'sum-up' my opinion of Patton analysing his good points and bad.

He is shown at his best in the 'Cobra' breakout that finally broke the stalemate in Normandy. Ruthlessly exploiting the German weakness in the line (Kluge was convinced that the main attack would be around Caen) he was able to drive his Third Army through central France and was an important contributor to the near destruction of the German armies at Falaise. Additionally, switching Third Army's axis of advance at the 'Bulge' was a textbook example of how to disengage on one front to attack on another. The last not necessarily a mark of genius but nevertheless it's above criticism. In applying the principle of Blitzkrieg he was probably the equal of any commander in WW2.

However, those commanders we wish to elevate to 'greatness' need to show they apply other principles too. At Metz and the Siegfried Line he showed little imagination, preferring to batter away with tactics more reminiscent of WW1 trench warfare allowing his troops to incur excessive casualties. He also showed a tendancy to hunt personal glory - his obsession for taking Trier and the fiasco of the Hammelburg raid (and claiming that he wasn't aware that his brother-in-law was being held prisoner there when the troops sent on the mission evidently did does him no credit whatsoever). Finally, he showed an inability to recognise the 'big picture' - needlessly burning precious fuel driving into Brittany following the 'Cobra' breakout, allowing the evacuation of the German army from Sicily by trying to race Montgomery to Messina, and obsessing on the 'chimera' of the 'Nazi Redoubt' in Bavaria thereby denying resources that would have been better used in a strike through Northern Germany to Berlin.

Finally, Patton never fought a battle where he didn't have materiel superiority on the ground and the air, where he was fighting a battle where he had to hold ground rather than take it. It's very difficult to make a case for him to be compared with WW2 commanders like Manstein and Slim who showed their capacity to successfully apply all of the principles of warfare even in the most adverse of situations. It's even more difficult to place him with the greats of all military history.

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RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/18/2004 5:40:30 PM   
Kevinugly

 

Posts: 438
Joined: 4/2/2003
From: Colchester, UK
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Hertston

362 posts now. Surely that alone is vindication of Patton's greatness - who else would get such a response !


I can think of several criminals who would

Seriously though, it shows what a controversial figure he is and long may the controversy continue.

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RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/18/2004 8:00:54 PM   
Von Rom


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Kevinugly:

quote:

Not sure why you've posted this, you were the one who started referring to 1st SS and the Leibstandarte as if they were seperate units. If you read histories of battles involving the division you'll find the authors using the terms interchangeably since it avoids rather tedious repetition. It's like referring to the US 2nd Armoured Division as 'Hell on Wheels' - just makes for better reading that's all.


Nobody likes a smart-a$$ - get it?

Not only did you state that the 1SS Panzer was NOT at Bastogne (despite all the evidence I had provided), but you were also aware of my mistake.

You knew what I was referrring to, and yet, you called me a derogatory remark.

Anybody can pull that type of shell game - get it?

Not everyone reads books about the Waffen SS on a daily basis, and so the FULL names of all SS units are not immediately at their beck and call - get it?

Even then you still claimed the 1SS was NOT at Bastogne, based on those books you read.

And I did stand alone in this thread against all attacks.

As to your assessment of Patton, I will deal with that in a separate post.

< Message edited by Von Rom -- 7/18/2004 6:03:15 PM >


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RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/18/2004 9:01:44 PM   
Kevinugly

 

Posts: 438
Joined: 4/2/2003
From: Colchester, UK
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Kevinugly:

quote:

Not sure why you've posted this, you were the one who started referring to 1st SS and the Leibstandarte as if they were seperate units. If you read histories of battles involving the division you'll find the authors using the terms interchangeably since it avoids rather tedious repetition. It's like referring to the US 2nd Armoured Division as 'Hell on Wheels' - just makes for better reading that's all.


Nobody likes a smart-a$$ - get it?

Not only did you state that the 1SS Panzer was NOT at Bastogne (despite all the evidence I had provided), but you were also aware of my mistake.

You knew what I was referrring to, and yet, you called me a derogatory remark.

Anybody can pull that type of shell game - get it?

Not everyone reads books about the Waffen SS on a daily basis, and so the FULL names of all SS units are not immediately at their beck and call - get it?

Even then you still claimed the 1SS was NOT at Bastogne, based on those books you read.

And I did stand alone in this thread against all attacks.

As to your assessment of Patton, I will deal with that in a separate post.


Ahh, poor Von Rom, sooooo misunderstood

I never said you should know the name of every SS unit, in fact I said that only 'Leibstandarte' and 'Das Reich' should come to mind immediately due to their fame/notoriety. I also provided the evidence to prove that very few, if any, of 1st SS Pz fought against 3rd Army in the vicinity of Bastogne and that if any did they would have been ineffective. I even provided a quote from Patton regarding the quality of those SS (who would probably have come from II SS Pz Corps) who actually made it to Bastogne.

'Shell game' Not familier with that.

Come on Rom, lighten up, you'll do yourself an injury

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Post #: 368
RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/18/2004 11:40:58 PM   
IronDuke_slith

 

Posts: 1595
Joined: 6/30/2002
From: Manchester, UK
Status: offline
quote:

Kevinugly said
Anyway, this distracts from the issue at hand which is Patton. I thought I would 'sum-up' my opinion of Patton analysing his good points and bad.

He is shown at his best in the 'Cobra' breakout that finally broke the stalemate in Normandy. Ruthlessly exploiting the German weakness in the line (Kluge was convinced that the main attack would be around Caen) he was able to drive his Third Army through central France and was an important contributor to the near destruction of the German armies at Falaise. Additionally, switching Third Army's axis of advance at the 'Bulge' was a textbook example of how to disengage on one front to attack on another. The last not necessarily a mark of genius but nevertheless it's above criticism. In applying the principle of Blitzkrieg he was probably the equal of any commander in WW2.

However, those commanders we wish to elevate to 'greatness' need to show they apply other principles too. At Metz and the Siegfried Line he showed little imagination, preferring to batter away with tactics more reminiscent of WW1 trench warfare allowing his troops to incur excessive casualties. He also showed a tendancy to hunt personal glory - his obsession for taking Trier and the fiasco of the Hammelburg raid (and claiming that he wasn't aware that his brother-in-law was being held prisoner there when the troops sent on the mission evidently did does him no credit whatsoever). Finally, he showed an inability to recognise the 'big picture' - needlessly burning precious fuel driving into Brittany following the 'Cobra' breakout, allowing the evacuation of the German army from Sicily by trying to race Montgomery to Messina, and obsessing on the 'chimera' of the 'Nazi Redoubt' in Bavaria thereby denying resources that would have been better used in a strike through Northern Germany to Berlin.

Finally, Patton never fought a battle where he didn't have materiel superiority on the ground and the air, where he was fighting a battle where he had to hold ground rather than take it. It's very difficult to make a case for him to be compared with WW2 commanders like Manstein and Slim who showed their capacity to successfully apply all of the principles of warfare even in the most adverse of situations. It's even more difficult to place him with the greats of all military history.


I think most of what you've said is a perfectly reasonable precis, and you might have saved me having to do my final post, because I can live with most of it! The only bit I'd disagree with is:

quote:

In applying the principle of Blitzkrieg he was probably the equal of any commander in WW2.


The Germans didn't invent the phrase Blitzkrieg, if memory serves. Their method of warfare only essentially differed from WWI in that the stormtroops at the tip of the spearhead had perhaps been replaced by the Tank. Therefore, they saw nothing new in what they did, it was merely updated to take account of aircraft and armour. They didn't need a new term, therefore.

However, if the Blitzkrieg is used to describe what the Germans did, then Patton is only halfway there. The German breakthrough battle had several distinct phases, but of the main and key crucial phases, he would not have had the skills to manage them all. If we hone the Blitzkrieg down to just two phases, Breakthrough and exploitation, then whilst Patton has some aptitude for the exploitation phase (albeit preferably under rein from above, as his attacks could spray a little, and firm direction would have been necessary) I don't see too much evidence he had the necessary operational skills to break down the door.

I think the Bulge drive and Metz etc really show that fixed defences presented him with problems he did not seek to overcome like a true Blitzkrieg exponent. In Cobra, the breakthrough phase of the battle was conducted by First Army, so he had no problems. There was no breakthrough phase in Sicily. Both places though, do provide evidence of some aptitude in the exploitation phase of the battle. I also think his general manner and conduct about the Battlefield (visiting and cajoling forward units, constantly on the move) indicate he could have driven men deep in this phase, provided someone got him through the first stage of the battle, opening a hole in the enemy line.

It was not a failing just of his. Anyone studying the Goodwood operation can see the German operational method was not something Monty was expert at either. Three tank divisions on a relatively narrow front sounds like the classic Blitzkrieg myth, but is far removed from the way the Germans practised it, or even the Soviets once their operational method had evolved by late 1943.

The Bulge drive has received enough attention as it is, but by dispersing his three divisions across a three divisional front of 25 miles, against three enemy divisions, Patton set up an attritional struggle, because he had no chance of amassing overwhelming strength in any one stretch of the front. The American formations would have had more combat strength than the German formations they opposed, but it would have been difficult for them to achieve the 3:1 ratio generally reckoned to be required for attackers to succeed, and if the infantry formations did succeed, it would have been difficult for them to advance fast enough in the aftermath (in ground and weather conditions that were prevalent) to prevent the Germans setting up a new line behind the old one. The armour may have had more luck pouring through the hole, but they were operating on a stretch of frontage all of their own, and not available to exploit.

It is what I perceive to be this lack of ability in the face of fixed defences that would have let him down. He might have fared better as a Divisional or Corp Commander where he would have been given a series of objectives to achieve a breakthrough, but not a breakthrough to plan.

I wholeheartedly agree with the comments about Metz and Hammelburg.

Focusing on hammelburg, I can think of examples where political leaders have launched operations for less than military reasons, but never commanders in the field. Hammelburg is simply inexcusable. 304 men killed or taken prisoner. I haven't seen figures suggesting how many of the 304 MIAs were later found to have been killed, but since some of the prisoners involved were wounded as well, we can assume a number of men lost their lives in this. Patton then began the cover up that saw the brave men of the Task Force erased from history. He continues the cover up in War as I knew it which should make us very cautious when using this as a primary source of information. He should have been removed from command after Hammelburg, and D'Este suggests he was partially saved by the death of Roosevelt that suddenly moved the raid from the news. That Bradley seems to have guessed what it was all about counts against him as well. He knew and did nothing. For me, the slapping incidents are very small fare indeed when placed against this. They were seen as a big deal, though. This wasn't, for reasons I am not sure I understand. I can't think of a comparable incident on any side during the war. If anyone has one, I'd be interested. However, since the prison camp was liberated shortly thereafter by normal operational methods, you can only despair at the waste of it all.

Regards,
IronDuke

(in reply to Kevinugly)
Post #: 369
RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/19/2004 12:07:28 AM   
Von Rom


Posts: 1705
Joined: 5/12/2000
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Kevinugly:

quote:

Not sure why you've posted this, you were the one who started referring to 1st SS and the Leibstandarte as if they were seperate units. If you read histories of battles involving the division you'll find the authors using the terms interchangeably since it avoids rather tedious repetition. It's like referring to the US 2nd Armoured Division as 'Hell on Wheels' - just makes for better reading that's all.


Nobody likes a smart-a$$ - get it?

Not only did you state that the 1SS Panzer was NOT at Bastogne (despite all the evidence I had provided), but you were also aware of my mistake.

You knew what I was referrring to, and yet, you called me a derogatory remark.

Anybody can pull that type of shell game - get it?

Not everyone reads books about the Waffen SS on a daily basis, and so the FULL names of all SS units are not immediately at their beck and call - get it?

Even then you still claimed the 1SS was NOT at Bastogne, based on those books you read.

And I did stand alone in this thread against all attacks.

As to your assessment of Patton, I will deal with that in a separate post.


Ahh, poor Von Rom, sooooo misunderstood

I never said you should know the name of every SS unit, in fact I said that only 'Leibstandarte' and 'Das Reich' should come to mind immediately due to their fame/notoriety. I also provided the evidence to prove that very few, if any, of 1st SS Pz fought against 3rd Army in the vicinity of Bastogne and that if any did they would have been ineffective. I even provided a quote from Patton regarding the quality of those SS (who would probably have come from II SS Pz Corps) who actually made it to Bastogne.

'Shell game' Not familier with that.

Come on Rom, lighten up, you'll do yourself an injury


Well, you claim to have a master's degree, but somehow you fail to use the good sense God gave geese.

By using different names for the same unit, people can cause unnecessary confusion. Imagine 12 people in a debate all using different names referring to the same thing. It would be a mass of unnecessary confusion. Understand now?

Also, I am sure there are a great many people who read this thread who might be confused in following an argument, if we suddenly start switching terms for the same thing. Understand now?

Just the fact that we have spent several posts on this very subject should clue you into that.

Do you really think you are the only person who can pull this sort of juvenile thing?

As to the 1SS - you have proved NOTHING. The official history of this period of time alone contains much more evidence on this than the book you refer to.

< Message edited by Von Rom -- 7/18/2004 10:09:21 PM >


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Post #: 370
RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/19/2004 12:17:02 AM   
Von Rom


Posts: 1705
Joined: 5/12/2000
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Anyway, this distracts from the issue at hand which is Patton. I thought I would 'sum-up' my opinion of Patton analysing his good points and bad.

He is shown at his best in the 'Cobra' breakout that finally broke the stalemate in Normandy. Ruthlessly exploiting the German weakness in the line (Kluge was convinced that the main attack would be around Caen) he was able to drive his Third Army through central France and was an important contributor to the near destruction of the German armies at Falaise. Additionally, switching Third Army's axis of advance at the 'Bulge' was a textbook example of how to disengage on one front to attack on another. The last not necessarily a mark of genius but nevertheless it's above criticism. In applying the principle of Blitzkrieg he was probably the equal of any commander in WW2.

However, those commanders we wish to elevate to 'greatness' need to show they apply other principles too. At Metz and the Siegfried Line he showed little imagination, preferring to batter away with tactics more reminiscent of WW1 trench warfare allowing his troops to incur excessive casualties. He also showed a tendancy to hunt personal glory - his obsession for taking Trier and the fiasco of the Hammelburg raid (and claiming that he wasn't aware that his brother-in-law was being held prisoner there when the troops sent on the mission evidently did does him no credit whatsoever). Finally, he showed an inability to recognise the 'big picture' - needlessly burning precious fuel driving into Brittany following the 'Cobra' breakout, allowing the evacuation of the German army from Sicily by trying to race Montgomery to Messina, and obsessing on the 'chimera' of the 'Nazi Redoubt' in Bavaria thereby denying resources that would have been better used in a strike through Northern Germany to Berlin.

Finally, Patton never fought a battle where he didn't have materiel superiority on the ground and the air, where he was fighting a battle where he had to hold ground rather than take it. It's very difficult to make a case for him to be compared with WW2 commanders like Manstein and Slim who showed their capacity to successfully apply all of the principles of warfare even in the most adverse of situations. It's even more difficult to place him with the greats of all military history.


Well, I see you have ridden on Ironduke's coat tails.

This is no assessment. It is merely you stringing a few unsubstantiated words together.

Some people, it seems, like to jump on Patton about Metz. So for argument's sake, let's confine our discussion to JUST Metz, OK?

Now then, give me YOUR assessment of Patton's actions at Metz. Please provide proof for those assessments. If you use Whiting, then provide his quote and what he used for sources for that quote.

Now, the ball is in your park. . .

< Message edited by Von Rom -- 7/18/2004 10:20:18 PM >


_____________________________


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Post #: 371
RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/19/2004 1:07:30 AM   
Kevinugly

 

Posts: 438
Joined: 4/2/2003
From: Colchester, UK
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Well, you claim to have a master's degree, but somehow you fail to use the good sense God gave geese.

By using different names for the same unit, people can cause unnecessary confusion. Imagine 12 people in a debate all using different names referring to the same thing. It would be a mass of unnecessary confusion. Understand now?

Also, I am sure there are a great many people who read this thread who might be confused in following an argument, if we suddenly start switching terms for the same thing. Understand now?

Just the fact that we have spent several posts on this very subject should clue you into that.

Do you really think you are the only person who can pull this sort of juvenile thing?

As to the 1SS - you have proved NOTHING. The official history of this period of time alone contains much more evidence on this than the book you refer to.


Go to page four of this very thread. On it you posted a map of the Battle of the Bulge. Note the location of Bastogne and the axis of attack of 1st SS. The two are nowhere near each other. I rest my case.

Regarding 'switching terms', one has to assume a modicum of knowledge both for those who post and those who merely read. If this was a forum for political discussion I would expect to be able to interchange 'Yasser Arafat' and 'Palestinian leader' or 'Tony Blair' and 'The British Prime-Minister'. Same with '1st SS Panzer Division' and 'Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler'. If this is too difficult for you to grasp then I'm sorry.

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Post #: 372
RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/19/2004 1:17:06 AM   
Kevinugly

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

Anyway, this distracts from the issue at hand which is Patton. I thought I would 'sum-up' my opinion of Patton analysing his good points and bad.

He is shown at his best in the 'Cobra' breakout that finally broke the stalemate in Normandy. Ruthlessly exploiting the German weakness in the line (Kluge was convinced that the main attack would be around Caen) he was able to drive his Third Army through central France and was an important contributor to the near destruction of the German armies at Falaise. Additionally, switching Third Army's axis of advance at the 'Bulge' was a textbook example of how to disengage on one front to attack on another. The last not necessarily a mark of genius but nevertheless it's above criticism. In applying the principle of Blitzkrieg he was probably the equal of any commander in WW2.

However, those commanders we wish to elevate to 'greatness' need to show they apply other principles too. At Metz and the Siegfried Line he showed little imagination, preferring to batter away with tactics more reminiscent of WW1 trench warfare allowing his troops to incur excessive casualties. He also showed a tendancy to hunt personal glory - his obsession for taking Trier and the fiasco of the Hammelburg raid (and claiming that he wasn't aware that his brother-in-law was being held prisoner there when the troops sent on the mission evidently did does him no credit whatsoever). Finally, he showed an inability to recognise the 'big picture' - needlessly burning precious fuel driving into Brittany following the 'Cobra' breakout, allowing the evacuation of the German army from Sicily by trying to race Montgomery to Messina, and obsessing on the 'chimera' of the 'Nazi Redoubt' in Bavaria thereby denying resources that would have been better used in a strike through Northern Germany to Berlin.

Finally, Patton never fought a battle where he didn't have materiel superiority on the ground and the air, where he was fighting a battle where he had to hold ground rather than take it. It's very difficult to make a case for him to be compared with WW2 commanders like Manstein and Slim who showed their capacity to successfully apply all of the principles of warfare even in the most adverse of situations. It's even more difficult to place him with the greats of all military history.


Well, I see you have ridden on Ironduke's coat tails.

This is no assessment. It is merely you stringing a few unsubstantiated words together.

Some people, it seems, like to jump on Patton about Metz. So for argument's sake, let's confine our discussion to JUST Metz, OK?

Now then, give me YOUR assessment of Patton's actions at Metz. Please provide proof for those assessments. If you use Whiting, then provide his quote and what he used for sources for that quote.

Now, the ball is in your park. . .



'...stringing a few unsubstantiated words together'

You've spent thirteen pages of this thread doing that.

quote:

As to your assessment of Patton, I will deal with that in a separate post


... and this is the best you can do!

Regarding Iron Duke, I can't think of better coat tails to ride on here

It's a shame though that you couldn't acknowledge the positive comments I made about Patton but I shan't withdraw them since I believe them to be right.

I'll be back

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Post #: 373
RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/19/2004 1:33:10 AM   
Von Rom


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Well, you claim to have a master's degree, but somehow you fail to use the good sense God gave geese.

By using different names for the same unit, people can cause unnecessary confusion. Imagine 12 people in a debate all using different names referring to the same thing. It would be a mass of unnecessary confusion. Understand now?

Also, I am sure there are a great many people who read this thread who might be confused in following an argument, if we suddenly start switching terms for the same thing. Understand now?

Just the fact that we have spent several posts on this very subject should clue you into that.

Do you really think you are the only person who can pull this sort of juvenile thing?

As to the 1SS - you have proved NOTHING. The official history of this period of time alone contains much more evidence on this than the book you refer to.


Go to page four of this very thread. On it you posted a map of the Battle of the Bulge. Note the location of Bastogne and the axis of attack of 1st SS. The two are nowhere near each other. I rest my case.

Regarding 'switching terms', one has to assume a modicum of knowledge both for those who post and those who merely read. If this was a forum for political discussion I would expect to be able to interchange 'Yasser Arafat' and 'Palestinian leader' or 'Tony Blair' and 'The British Prime-Minister'. Same with '1st SS Panzer Division' and 'Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler'. If this is too difficult for you to grasp then I'm sorry.



Kevinugly:

quote:

Go to page four of this very thread. On it you posted a map of the Battle of the Bulge. Note the location of Bastogne and the axis of attack of 1st SS. The two are nowhere near each other. I rest my case.


Oh, brother

If this is your level of analysis, then I can see why you believe the things you do.

That map displays the location of 1SS Panzer during the initial phase of the Battle of the Bulge (up to Dec 25/44).

At the end of December (about one week later), once Third Army had broken through to Bastogne, the 1SS was then ordered to move south to Bastogne to engage the lead elements of Third Army.

quote:

Regarding 'switching terms', one has to assume a modicum of knowledge both for those who post and those who merely read. If this was a forum for political discussion I would expect to be able to interchange 'Yasser Arafat' and 'Palestinian leader' or 'Tony Blair' and 'The British Prime-Minister'. Same with '1st SS Panzer Division' and 'Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler'. If this is too difficult for you to grasp then I'm sorry.




Like I said, you don't have the common sense God gave geese. . .

Anyway, enough discussion about this particular topic. . .

Let's stick to discussing the capital of Moselle Department, shall we?

< Message edited by Von Rom -- 7/18/2004 11:50:42 PM >


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Post #: 374
RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/19/2004 1:48:47 AM   
Kevinugly

 

Posts: 438
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom


quote:

Go to page four of this very thread. On it you posted a map of the Battle of the Bulge. Note the location of Bastogne and the axis of attack of 1st SS. The two are nowhere near each other. I rest my case.


Oh, brother

If this is your level of analysis, then I can see why you believe the things you do.

That map displays the location of 1SS Panzer during the initial phase of the Battle of the Bulge.

At the end of December (one week later), once Third Army had broken through to Bastogne, the 1SS was then ordered to move south to Bastogne to engage the lead elements of Third Army.

quote:

Regarding 'switching terms', one has to assume a modicum of knowledge both for those who post and those who merely read. If this was a forum for political discussion I would expect to be able to interchange 'Yasser Arafat' and 'Palestinian leader' or 'Tony Blair' and 'The British Prime-Minister'. Same with '1st SS Panzer Division' and 'Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler'. If this is too difficult for you to grasp then I'm sorry.




Like I said, you don't have the common sense God gave geese. . .


No, you just lack the knowledge and a resorting to this kind of thing to cover it.

Re: Bastogne, we've already been over this twice. Look at the map, look at where the Leibstandarte ends up, without tanks, without any heavy weapons, tired and hungry. They are withdrawn on 25th December 1944, broken as a fighting force, Patton reaches Bastogne on 26th, they are removed entirely from the Western Front on 1st January 1945. Use that common sense you seem to believe you have, this is hardly rocket science.

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Post #: 375
RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/19/2004 1:53:22 AM   
Von Rom


Posts: 1705
Joined: 5/12/2000
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom


quote:

Go to page four of this very thread. On it you posted a map of the Battle of the Bulge. Note the location of Bastogne and the axis of attack of 1st SS. The two are nowhere near each other. I rest my case.


Oh, brother

If this is your level of analysis, then I can see why you believe the things you do.

That map displays the location of 1SS Panzer during the initial phase of the Battle of the Bulge.

At the end of December (one week later), once Third Army had broken through to Bastogne, the 1SS was then ordered to move south to Bastogne to engage the lead elements of Third Army.

quote:

Regarding 'switching terms', one has to assume a modicum of knowledge both for those who post and those who merely read. If this was a forum for political discussion I would expect to be able to interchange 'Yasser Arafat' and 'Palestinian leader' or 'Tony Blair' and 'The British Prime-Minister'. Same with '1st SS Panzer Division' and 'Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler'. If this is too difficult for you to grasp then I'm sorry.




Like I said, you don't have the common sense God gave geese. . .


No, you just lack the knowledge and a resorting to this kind of thing to cover it.

Re: Bastogne, we've already been over this twice. Look at the map, look at where the Leibstandarte ends up, without tanks, without any heavy weapons, tired and hungry. They are withdrawn on 25th December 1944, broken as a fighting force, Patton reaches Bastogne on 26th, they are removed entirely from the Western Front on 1st January 1945. Use that common sense you seem to believe you have, this is hardly rocket science.


Re: Bastogne:



Cite your sources with page numbers.

And then, let's get on with discussing what happned at the capital of Moselle Department, shall we?

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Post #: 376
RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/19/2004 1:58:03 AM   
Kevinugly

 

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No, I don't intend to keep on repeating myself. I've already listed enough sources.

Stick with Metz.

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Post #: 377
RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/19/2004 2:09:38 AM   
Kevinugly

 

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When they arrived in Belgium, this coincided with the occupation of the Allies, and they had to bash through their lines again. Large groups broke through at Jodoigne, Tirlemont, Hasselt and Diest, into the area Bree-Neerpelt-Lommel Mol. On 4 September 1944 they recieved orders to withdraw to Germany, area of Bitburg.

SS-Obersturmführer Rink reports the following:
"And we, who had come depleted and exhausted from the inferno of Caen, through the breakout from the pocket of Falaise, through the nerve wracking retreat across France and partizan plagued Belgium, we had gathered our strenght and rebuilt our confidence."

Leibstandarte's daughter unit, the Hitlerjugend suffered even more from the retreat through Belgium. Kurt Meyer, that gallant SS officer, was captured by a Belgian farmer and his son who carried an old hunting rifle, and Hans Waldmüller (I./SS-Pz.Reg. 25, later Kampfgruppe Waldmüller, Ritterkreuz 27 August) was tricked into an ambush, killed and horribly mutilated by Belgian partizans on 8 september. He finds rest at the Heroes' cemetary in Düren.

With the Allies halted north by II. SS-Panzerkorps and south by a determined defence from 11. Panzerdivision and several Volksgrenadier divisions, Hitler felt that is was time for a large offensive again. This was not without ground. The Allies would pick up momentum again as soon as their supply lines were brought up, and if he could wound them bad enough before that, he would have enough time and resources to deal with the Russians.

Before the Leibstandarte would participate in the last great offense, they were raced to help the bombed population of Düren (see Waldmüller). The city had just suffered from an extensive American bombing raid, there were dead women and children everywhere. Jochen Peiper reported:

"We had to scrape them off the walls, it was that bad! I could have castrated the swine who did that to those people with a blunt piece of glass!"

By now the Leibstandarte wasn't it former self anymore, many recruits with hardly any training were to fill the gaps and munition and fuel were scarce. But the core of the Leibstandarte was made up of elite veterans who quickly passed on their knowledge to the younger ones. LAH was divided into 4 Kampfgruppen for the December 16 attack:

- SS-Kampfgruppe Peiper (SS-Obersturmbannführer Jochen Peiper)
- I./SS-Panzerregiment 1 (gemischt; 72 Panthers and IVH's, Werner Poetschke, attached was 9.(Pi.)/SS-Pz.Reg. 1 and 10.Kp.SS-Panzerflak, 3 Wirbelwind)
- s.SS-Panzerabteilung 501 ( 45 Königstiger, SS-Sturmbannführer Hein von Westernhagen)
- III./SS-Panzergrenadierregiment 2 (5 Kp., 5.Kp. - SP 150mm, SS-Sturmbannführer Jupp Diefenthal)
- II./SS-Panzerartillerieregiment 1 (geschleppt)
- Luftwaffe Flaksturmabteilung 84 (20mm, 37mm)

- SS-Kampfgruppe Sandig
- SS-Panzergrenadierregiment 2

- SS-Kampfgruppe Hansen
- SS-Panzergrenadierregiment 1
- SS-Panzerjägerabteilung (21 Jagdpanzer IV, 11 75mm PaK)
- Artillerieabteilung (105mm, geschleppt)
- 24 Nebelwerfers

- SS-Kampfgruppe Knittel
- SS-Aufklärungsabteilung 1
- 1 Batterie 105mm (geschleppt)
- 1 Kompanie SS-Panzerpioniere

Kampfgruppe Peiper (4800 men, 600 vehicles including some 150 SPW's) was given Rollbahn (highway) D, with Kamfgruppe Sandig following closely. Rollbahn E was followed by Kampfgruppe Hanssen, with Kampfgruppe Knittel behind him. Knittel wasn't bound to a Rollbahn, he had freedom of movement.

SS-Panzerregiment 1 is placed on alert by the end of nov. 44, regio of Stadtkyll, 13 km E of the Belgian border. Vehicles are carefully camouflaged.

14 december: Jochen Peiper, Rudi Sandig, Max Hansen, Gustave Knittel and Otto Skorzeny attend a meeting at Mohnke’s HK at Tondorf.

15 december : During the night, assault forces are placed into position.

16 december: 05:15 : order n°10697/44 (signed by v. Rundstedt) gives the order to attack, orders are given through the radio.

05:35 : assault commences, some 620 artillery pieces, 32.Gr.Werf. open up on the American lines.

08:00 : SS-Kampfgruppe Peiper is still waiting behind 12. Volksgrenadier, which should have achieved a breakthrought at Losheim and Losheimgraben by 07:00 : Peiper’s tanks are cought in traffic on the Blankenheim-Schnied road.

14:00 : Peiper is at HK of 12. Volksgrenadierdivision (General Engel)

16:30 : Peiper gives order to move out. At Scheid, the Pioniere of 12. VG proved themselves unable to repair the bridge, Peiper’s entire column dashes across an slope next to it, ignore the destroyed bridge.

Composition of Peiper’s Spitze:
SS-Obersturmbannführer Werner Sternebeck (commander), Panther
- SS-Untersturmführer Hans-Jürgen Bahrendt (1.Pz.Kp.), Panther
- SS-Untersturmführer Herbert Junker, SS-Oberscharführer August Wien (5.Pz.Kp), Mk.IVH
- SS-Unterstumführer Karl-Heinz Asmussen, SS-Hauptscharführer August Tonk (6.Pz.Kp.), Mk.IVH
- SS-Scharführer Horst Rempel (8.Pz.Kp.), Mk.IVH
- 2 Schützenpanzerwagen from 9.Pi.Kp./SS-Pz.Reg. 1, SS-Oberscharführer Dörr en SS-Rottenführer Wemmel
- In other terms; 2 Pz.V, 5 Pz.IVH and 2 SPW.

Behind them came Oskar Klingelhöfer’s 6.Pz.Kp., in Mk. IVH.

21:30 : Losheim reached. Korps orders a detour, Peiper is to move to the west of Lanzerath. Fallschirmjägerregiment 9, 3. Fallschirmjägerdivision, reports heavy resistance from the woods near Büllingen. Forward two Pz. IVH drive on German mines when entering Hüllscheid. SS-Obersturmführer Erich Rumpf’s Pioniere clear minefield, but Sternebeck’s Panzer jumps on another mine SE of Merscheidt, he switches to Asmussen’s Panzer. After finding his Kommando-Panther 001 having engine trouble, Jochen Peiper switches to the command SPW of Jupp Diefenthal, commanding Peiper’s old III.Bat.

22:00 : Königstiger of s.SS-Pz.Abt. 501 catch up with the column.

24:00 : SS-Kampfgruppe Peiper reaches Lanzerath, losses amounted to 3 Panzer and 2 SPW. Peiper meets with Oberst Hoffmann (Fallschirmjägerreg. 9) at his HK at Café Palm. In a bad mood, he demands to know why he halted. He said he heard that Battalion reported a strong opposition. Peiper knows it is just gossip, mad at Hoffman, demands a Fallschirmjägerabteilung to be placed under his command. Attack is delayed, Fallschirmjäger do not wish to attack, the Waffen-SS Panzer suffer loss of time, again.

Peiper re-arranges his Spitze: 2 Panther take the lead, followed by a Zug from 10.Kp./SS-Pz.Gren.Reg 2 (SS-Hauptsturmführer Georg Preuss), followed by 2 Flak-Vierlinge (SS-Obersturmführer Vögler).

17 december: 04:00 : assault on the Büllingen woods, II./FJÄ.Reg. 9 (Major Taubert) takes the lead. The Panzer commanders communicate by radio, the Fallschirmjäger lead with white hankerchiefs. No opposition encountered near the woods, Jochen mad about the loss of time. Americans fleeing at the other side of the woods, at Buchholz railway station. The Vierlinge follow the tracks of the Panzer in the snow, are taken under fire by American MG and AT, but suffer no damage, open fire and silence the enemy fire.

04:30 : Peiper’s Spitze rushes Honsfeld, GI’s are taken by surprise, AT guns and halftracks are unmanned, surprise is complete. Around this time, SS-Kampfgruppe Hansen starts entering the offensive.

05:40 : Bulk of the SS-Kampfgruppe rumbles through Honsfeld. The leading 2 Wirbelwinds are taken out by American AT guns. The third Vierlinge opens up and silences the cannons. When they reach the middle of the town, they are taken under fire again from the windows of the surrounding houses. The fire is answered, and soon the Americans surrender. Many dead and wounded on both sides. The Kp.Fhr. for the FlaK units, SS-Obersturmführer Vögler, who was in the first vehicle, was slightly wounded. Panther 232 and 235 are also taken out by AT gunfire when riding through Honsfeld. A Königstiger who rumbled along, carrying Fallschirmjäger, took four hits but destroyed the two firing AT guns without taking any damage itself whatsoever. The Fallschirmjäger pass on captured food, drinks and cigarettes to the passing Königstiger crews.

The bulk of Fallschirmjägerregiment 9 remains at Honsfeld, one Kompanie joins the SS-Kampgruppe. When he drives out of Honsfeld, Jochen realizes he has little fuel left, and the roads to the west of Honsfeld aren’t in a suitable condition. He did not hear any sound around him, so he took the guess that 12. SS-Panzerdivision wasn’t following. Therefore he took Rollbahn C, given to 12. SS, and drove as fast to Büllingen as fast as he could, hoping to capture the fuel depot there.

06:00 : Peiper moves out of Honsfeld, on to Büllingen. 2 km S of the city, 12 spotter planes were destroyed on the ground, a 13th got away.

08:05 : SS-Kampfgrupe Peiper drives into Büllingen, loss of one Pz. IVH outside the city, crew shot down while attempting to leave the vehicle. Sternebeck and Georg Preuss break trough the defence, despite heavy AA and MG fire. After house-to-house fighting, the Americans stop the fight and surrender. They find the Fuel depot on the market, and some US POW’s are made to refuel the Panzer. Preuss is put forward by Peiper for the Ritterkreuz, altough he didn’t like him.

10:00 : The Panzerspizte, rested and refueled, roars out of Büllingen and continues SW towards Möderscheid and Amel, not N towards Elsenborn as the Americans anticipate. Sternebeck did not notice he took the wrong turn, and went N of Büllingen towards Wirtzfeld. When, 1 km outside Büllingen, a Pz. IVH was hit in the tower, killing the commander, he realised he had taken the wrong turn. He detoured, and drove direction Bütgenbach. He ran into American doctors, who offered him the surrender of Fieldhospital 47, but Sternebeck wasn’t interested and drove on. He, his own Pz. IVH together with SS-Hauptscharführer August Tonk’s Pz. IVH and the 2 SPW from 9.Pz.Pio.Kp. linked up with Peiper again at the crossroads NO of Amel, near point 616.

Following Möderscheid, the Spitze continued towards Schoppen. Because of the bad condition of the roads, they advance very slowly. After the capture of a US Lt.Colonel just outside Thirimont, Jochen learns that General Timberlake had set up the HQ of the 49th AA-Art. at Ligneuville, and orders his Panzerspitze to push on hard. This radio-message is recieved by Sternebeck, who is located at the Baugnez crossroads.

11:00 : The Kampfgruppe drives through Thirimont. 10.Kp./SS-Pz.Gren.Reg. 2, with Peiper right behind them, drives on to Ligneuville through very difficult terrain, several detours have to be be taken.

13:00 : Panzerspitze (Sternebeck) reaches Ligneuville. They find no American units in the centre of the town, so they halt in front of the bridge over the Ambléve. Peiper ordered to seize the brigde intact. The Pioniere crawl forwards and check the bridge for explosives. A machinegun opens up, several men get wounded. The enemy machineguns are silenced. The Americans left in such a hurry, that the SS men found their meals at the Hotel Moulin still on table, the cigarettes still smoking and the glasses half-empty. Within ten minutes, the bulk of Peiper’s forces will arive. The Spitze witnesses how a battalion of US Sherman tanks (Captain Green), from 9th Armoured Division, prepares itself for combat outside the town.

13:10 : SS-Kampfgruppe arrives at Lignueville, fierce combat breaks out between the German and American tanks. The Shermans are all knocked out, and Green was captured. Preuß’ 10.Kp. entered combat with US Armoured battalion 14. Arndt Fisher remembers how

“My Panther arrived at Ligneuville ten minutes after the Panzerspitze, and was knocked out there from behind, it was an ambush. Peiper gave us cover fire when we left our tank from his SPW, we were taken under fire by small arms. I was terribly burned, we had spilled oil on our uniforms at Büllingen. Peiper, who give me first aid, was so irritated that he put on the bandage backwards.”

A Schützenpanzerwagen from 11.(gep.)Kp. was also taken out. Peiper wanted to destroy the Sherman A3 with a Panzerfaust, but a soldier from 11.Kp. beat him to it.

17:00 : SS-Kampfgruppe Peiper continues W, through Pont, Beaumont et Lodomez towards Stavelot and spends the night at Vaulx-Richard. Wilhelm Monhke, divisional commander of the Leibstandarte, set up his HK at Ligneuville (Hotel Moulin), and Peiper stays at Ligneuville to discuss the situation with him. SS-Sturmbannführer Werner Pötschke takes over command in the meantime.

3 Mk.IVH and 3 Mk.V had been knocked out sofar. 4 IVH and 8 V were having technical difficulties, along with several VIB.

Mrs. Willems de Spa comments:

“In december ’44, I lived in Ligneuville with my brother,in the bakery, right across the post officer.I saw Peiper several times. He himself was very friendly, something I can’t say of all his soldiers. He said that we should best stay in the cellar, because of the danger and the situation. He and some of his Unteroffiziere slept several hours during the night of 17/18 december, in a barn behind the bakery on field matrasses.”

18 december : 01:00 : Peiper and his group are located in the western partof Vaulx-Richard. SS-Obersturmfüher Kremser’s 1.Pz.Kp. is send to the front to prepare for the attack on Stavelot, at the front is Pantherzug 1 under SS-Untersturmführer Hans Hennecke. SS-Obersturmführer Christ’s 2.Pz.Kp. and Diefenthal’s III. are right behind them. This replaced the Sternebeck Panzerspizte, and 6. and 7.Pz.Kp, along with 3.(gep.)Pi.Kp. were held back. Pötsche had, with his communicationsofficer, scouted the area the night before the attack.

02:00 : 11.(gep.)Kp./III., SS-Obersturmführer Heinz Tomhardt attacks Stokeu, outskirts of Stavelot, with Zug 1 (SS-Untersturmführer Wille Horn) and 4 (SS-Oberscharführer Rudi Rayer) who engaged the Americans without the support of the SPW’s. They managed to seize the brigde, but were attacked by American tanks and taken under fire by machineguns. Tomhardt was wounded and Horn was killed, Rayer took over command. 9.(Pio.)Kp./SS-Pz.Reg.1 checked the brigde for explosives; it was clear. Immediatly afterwards came the Panther of 1.Pz.Kp. (the leading tank was that of SS-Oberscharführer Erich Strelow), who saw 2 American 57mm AT guns blocking his path, appearantly the SS-Panzergrenadiere has missed these. He drove on hard, rode over the first two guns and crossed the bridge where he drove over another AT gun. Hennecke’s 111 was taken out in front of the the bridge, but he switched to Kremser’s Panzer and took over command of 1.Pz.Kp.

Hennecke wasted no time and rode over the bridge, two Panther (SS-Untersturmführer
Heubeck and SS-Oberscharführer Thomas) of his Kp. following him. Outside Stavelot, the rest of SS-Kampfgruppe Peiper’s Panzer and Schützenpanzewagen were lined up, waiting on a steep road. The Americans attacked the left flank of the column, but this was repulsed by Diefenthal, who afterwards, at the head of his Batallion attacked Stavelot and kept the bridge open. He recieved the Ritterkreuz for this. Belgian Zivillisten (civilians, thus partisans) and American soldiers alike fired at Diefenthal’s III.Abt. at Stavelot. Peiper did not know that, N of Stavelot, there was a huge fuel depot at Francorchamps. The Panzer did not go further than they had to, and turned left at the market, heading W towards Trois Ponts following the N23.

12:00 : Right before the 2 important railway bridges in Trois Ponts, the Americans had laid down a minefield of some 20-25 mines. Strelow, in the forward Panther, climbed out of his tank, cleared all the mines while his gunner took out an AT gun and a MG nest. When the attack started, the left bridge (over the Amblève) exploded. Jochen Peiper and Pötschke came to watch the situation on foot. Peiper wanted to go south towards Werbomont, but because the two bridges over the Amel and the Salm rivers were already blown up, he took the road to the north, following the N33.

13:00 : The Panzerspitze (1.Pz.Kp.- Hennecke) reaches La Gleize, after having passed through Coo. There, it turned SW towards Cheneux to get back on the N23, Rollbahn D. Second bridge at Trois Ponts, over the Salm is also blown up.

13:30 : Panzerspitze passed the undamaged bridge over the Amel at Cheneux.

13:35 : With the weather clearing up for the first time since the offensive, 4 P47 (Thunderbolts) spot the column and attack.

14:40 : 16 P47’s attack the strung out SS column all the back to Lodomez, before Stavelot. Pötschke takes cover under a tank, Peiper takes cover in a ditch.

16:10 : Attacks end. A total of 3 Panzer, two Pz.V and one Pz.IVH and 5 Schützenpanzer were destroyed, some 40 men are wounded. A Wirbelwind shot down one P47, several other are damaged. The medical treatment and the towing of the damaged vehicles took hours.

16:30 : SS-Kampfgruppe Knittel drives to Stavelot, Knittel rides ahead and meets with Peiper at the Cheneux bridge. Along with Knittel’s command, 6 Mk.IVH, 2 Zuge Pioniere in SPW and 3 Königstiger drive through Stavelot. The fourth is damaged and blocks the bridge.

20:00 : The Spitze continued, and reached Chauveheid. Peiper gives Diefenthal the order to cross the bridge over the Lienne at Neufmoulin. When Diefenthal arrived, the bridge was blown up by a small group of men from the 291st US Engineer battalion. Peiper heard the explosion and arrived with his communications officer and some SPW’s. Peiper had to change routes again, and ordered 10. and 11.Kp. to scout for bridges across the Lienne that can carry his tanks. It had gotten dark by now.

11.Kp. (Heinz Tomhardt) finds a small bridge near Les Forges and passed it, driving further south to the destroyed bridge at Neufmoulin. They could not locate the N23 and drove to Trou de Bras but were ordered by radio to return.

10.Kp. (SS-Obersturmführer Preuß) found a bridge 4 km NE of Neufmoulin at Moulin Rahier but it could not support any tanks. He drove on towards Chervon and Habiemont but was halted by 4 M10’s and 3 57mm AT guns from 823st US TD battalion. He lost three SPW’s and 15 SS-Panzergrenadiere. He was recalled by Peiper over the radio.

Jochen got his Kampfgruppe together again, and drove back to La Gleize since he did not have the needed bridge equipment to construct bridges during the night. He would try an attack towards the West next day direction Stoumont. LW-FlaK.Abt. 84 stays at Cheneux to observe the other side of the Lienne river.

23:00 : SS-Kampfgruppe Peiper rests between La Gleize and Stoumont. Only 5 Pz.IVH of 6.Pz.Kp. manage to reach Peiper’s group at around midnight, the rest doesn’t have enough fuel.

24:00 : SS-Kampfgruppe Knittel links up with Peiper, he has been ordered N by Mohnke because Hansen’s Kampfgruppe did not advance far enough to aide Peiper. A small supply group manages to provide Peiper with enough fuel for his attack towards Stoumont. At this point, 22 Mk.IVH, 9. Mk.IVH and 27 Mk.VIB did even attain Stavelot because of fuel shortages or mechanical breakdown.

19 december : 08:00 : Peiper attacks Stoumont with 7 Panther from 2.Pz.kp. (Christ), several Mk.IVH, Diefenthal’s Battalion, Rumpf’s 9.Pi.Kp. and the remaining Fallshirmjäger.

10:00 : Stoumont captured by the SS, but Peiper’s group has no more fuel left to continue. The MK.IVH along with Rumpf’s SS Pioniere were sent back to La Gleize. Diefenthal was ordered to defend Stoumont with his unit. Peiper now only possed of 7 Panther, 2 Wirbelwind, 11.Kp (SPW) and one Zug from Sievers 3. Pioniere.

Peiper pressed on with these units.

12:00 : The first attack on Stoumont failed, they came under tremendous artillery fire, and Peiper pulled back to just before La Gleize.

Pötschke ordered a second assault sometime later, but the artillery was still raining down. He ordered Christ (2.Pz.Kp.) to advance, but he simply shook his head. Pötschke grabbed a Panzerfaust and pointed it to Christ and told him again to advance. He refused again. Pötschke positioned himself in front of the first Panther, aimed the Panzerfaust at the vehicle and ordered forwards, into the hail of artillery. The engine started, and the Panther moved towards the village, with shells raining down left and right. It entered the village, even made it to the church, but 200 m from the station a blast from the 90 mm AA stopped it. The 11.Kp. attacked from the south, on foot, while the other Panther attacked from the road. Some Americans surrendered, others retreated and the village was taken, at the cost of one damaged Panther. The Americans had disabled the 90mm gun before they fled. Peiper chased the fleeing Americans immediatly with 5 Panther.

13:00 : Stavelot was recaptured during the night by the Americans, they had found almost no opposition. Stavelot was vital to the offensive, as it was in the route of the supply line. Americans were on the northren side, Germans on the southren egde. A counterattack was launched. The first Königstiger who approached the southren side of the village was immobilised. I.Bat. from SS-Kampfgruppe Sandig’s Panzergrenadiere rushed for the bridge to reclaim it, but are stopped by intense machinegun and mortar fire, and suffer heavy losses. Knittel, who has been send back by Peiper so secure his supply line through Stavelot, attacks from the west supported by 2 Königstiger. But the area was mined, so the 2 Tiger could not participate, and Knittel only managed to reach the western outskirts of the city. Sandig leaves I.Bat. where it is, and sends II.Bat. (SS-Sturmbannführer Herbert Schnelle) towards Wanne. When they arrive, Mohnke orders them to join Peiper.

15:00 : Peiper runs into a numerically superior enemy, 3rd battalion from 119th US inf.reg., with 12 Shermans and 4 M10 TD’s. They were holding an exellent defensive position, namely there were the Amblève river, the N33 and the railroad run next to the each other, a valley of only 300 m wide. The Shermans opened up and 2 Panther were damaged, a third immobilised (caught fire) by an AT gun. Peiper withdrew to Stoumont. At this point, he had penetrated 100 km in the American lines, but he had no fuel left. He left Hennecke’s 1.Pz.Kp. to guard the station at Stoumont with III.Abt., Christ’s 2.Pz.Kp. to guard La Gleize from the NE.

Peiper set up his HK at La Gleize, at the gardener’s house of the Froid Cour castle. The castle served as POW camp for the Americans.

19:30 : The Americans, under pressure by the Waffen-SS who are eager to retake the bridge, blow up the bridge over the Ambléve at Stavelot during a pause in the fighting. This ment that SS-Kampfgruppe Peiper was now trapped.

23 december: Bulk of SS-Kampfgruppe Hansen arrives at Petit Spai, but a Pz.Jgr. IV destroys the bridge accidentally by driving over it. That bridge was now blocked as well.


from http://www.geocities.com/wolfram55/ardennes.html

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(in reply to Kevinugly)
Post #: 378
RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/19/2004 2:29:51 AM   
Von Rom


Posts: 1705
Joined: 5/12/2000
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

No, I don't intend to keep on repeating myself. I've already listed enough sources.

Stick with Metz.



Not yet.

Let's look at 1SS Panzer at Bastogne.

If you won't list your books and the sources they use, then here is the Official History of the United States Army version - The Ardennes: The Battle of the Bugle. This source, uses thousands of first hand interviews of both German and American Generals and other officers of all ranks, plus soldiers, plus official unit histories, etc.

This source places the 1SS Panzer at Bastogne at the end of December. Do you really want to place your sources head-to-head against the Official History version?

1SS Panzer

On the afternoon of 29 December, General Manteuffel called his commanders together. Here were the generals who had carried the Bastogne fight thus far and generals of the divisions moving into the area, now including three SS commanders.

Manteuffel, it is related, began the conference with some critical remarks about the original failure to apprehend the importance of Bastogne. He then proceeded to tell the assemblage that the Ardennes offensive, as planned, was at an end, that Bastogne had become the "central problem," and that the German High Command viewed the forthcoming battle as an "opportunity," an opportunity to win a striking victory or at the least to chew up the enemy divisions which would be poured into the fight. The operation would be in three phases: first, close the ring once again around Bastogne; second, push the Americans back to the south; third, with reinforcements now on the way, take Bastogne in a final assault.

Army Group Luettwitz would conduct the fight to restore the German circle with the XXXIX and XLVII Panzer Corps, the first attacking east to west, the second striking west to east. The eastern assault force comprised the under-strength 1st SS Panzer and the 167th Volks Grenadier Divisions; its drive was to be made via Lutrebois toward Assenois.

The 1st SS Panzer was still licking its wounds after the fight as advance guard of the Sixth Panzer Army, when Model ordered the division to move south, beginning 26 December. The 167th Volks Grenadier Division (Generalleutnant Hans-Kurt Hoecker), was ordered to join the 1st SS Panzer in the attack,

The 35th Infantry Division (one of Third Army's Divisions) stood directly in the path of the German attack, having gradually turned from a column of regiments to face northeast.

During the night of 29 December the tank column of the 1st SS Panzer moved up along the road linking Tarchamps and Lutremange. The usable road net was very sparse in this sector. Once through Lutremange, however, the German column could deploy in two armored assault forces, one moving through Villers-la-Bonne-Eau, the other angling northwest through Lutrebois. Before dawn the leading tank companies rumbled toward these two villages. At Villers-la-Bonne-Eau Companies K and L, 137th Infantry, came under attack by seven tanks heavily supported by infantry. The panzers moved in close, blasting the stone houses and setting the village ablaze. At 0845 a radio message reached the command post of the 137th asking for the artillery to lay down a barrage of smoke and high explosive, but before the gunners could get a sensing the radio went dead. Only one of the 169 men inside the village got out, Sgt. Webster Phillips, who earlier had run through the rifle fire to warn the reserve company of the battalion west of Villers.

The American use of the combined arms in this action was so outstanding as to merit careful analysis by the professional soldier and student. The 4th Armored Division artillery, for example, simultaneously engaged the 1st SS Panzer in the east and the 3d Panzer Grenadier in the west The main body of the 1st SS Panzer kampfgruppe appeared an hour or so before noon moving along the Lutremange-Lutrebois road; some twenty-five tanks were counted in all. It took two hours to bring the fighterbombers into the fray, but they arrived just in time to cripple or destroy seven tanks and turn back the bulk of the panzers. Companies I and K still were in their foxholes along the road during the air bombing and would recall that, lacking bazookas, the green soldiers "popped off" at the tanks with their rifles and that some of the German tanks turned aside into the woods. Later the two companies came back across the valley, on orders, and jointed the defense line forming near the chateau.

Thirteen German tanks, which may have debouched from the road before the air attack, reached the woods southwest of Lutrebois, but a 4th Armored artillery observer in a cub plane spotted them and dropped a message to Company B of the 35th Tank Battalion. Lt. John A. Kingsley, the company commander, who had six Sherman tanks and a platoon from the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, formed an ambush near a slight ridge that provided his own tanks with hull defilade and waited. The leading German company (or platoon), which had six panzers, happened to see Company A of the 35th as the fog briefly lifted, and turned, with flank exposed, in that direction. The first shot from Kingsley's covert put away the German commander's tank and the other tanks milled about until all had been knocked out. Six more German tanks came along and all were destroyed or disabled. In the meantime the American tank destroyers took on some accompanying assault guns, shot up three of them, and dispersed the neighboring grenadiers.

Sources:

The German sources contributing most directly to this chapter are MSS # B-23, 5th Parachute Division, 1 December 1944-12 January 1945 (Generalmajor Ludwig Heilmann); # B-041, 167th Volks Grenadier Division, 24 December 1944-February 1945, Corps Hoecker, 2-10 March 1945 and 59th Infantry Division, 20 March-24 April 1945 (Generalleutnant Hans Hoecker); # B-068, 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, Ardennes (Generalmajor Walter Denkert); # B-151, Fifth Panzer Army, Ardennes Offensive (General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel); # B-151a, sequel to MS # B-151 (General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel); # B-235, Fifth Panzer Army, 2 November 1944-16 January 1945 (Generalmajor Carl Wagener); # B465, 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, 16-28 December 1944 (Generalmajor Walter Denkert); # B-592, Fuehrer Begleit Brigade, 16 December 1944-26 January 1945 (Generalmajor Otto Remer); # B-701, Army Group B, 15 October 1944-1945 (Col Guenther Reichhelm); # B-799, LXXXIX Corps, 24 January-8 March 1945 (Lt Col Kurt Reschke).

See MSS # A-932 (Gersdorff); B-041 (Hoecker); and B-799 (Reschke).

http://www.35thinfdivassoc.com/Ardennes/Ardennes-Story-1.shtml

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(in reply to Kevinugly)
Post #: 379
RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/19/2004 2:43:28 AM   
Von Rom


Posts: 1705
Joined: 5/12/2000
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

When they arrived in Belgium, this coincided with the occupation of the Allies, and they had to bash through their lines again. Large groups broke through at Jodoigne, Tirlemont, Hasselt and Diest, into the area Bree-Neerpelt-Lommel Mol. On 4 September 1944 they recieved orders to withdraw to Germany, area of Bitburg.

SS-Obersturmführer Rink reports the following:
"And we, who had come depleted and exhausted from the inferno of Caen, through the breakout from the pocket of Falaise, through the nerve wracking retreat across France and partizan plagued Belgium, we had gathered our strenght and rebuilt our confidence."

Leibstandarte's daughter unit, the Hitlerjugend suffered even more from the retreat through Belgium. Kurt Meyer, that gallant SS officer, was captured by a Belgian farmer and his son who carried an old hunting rifle, and Hans Waldmüller (I./SS-Pz.Reg. 25, later Kampfgruppe Waldmüller, Ritterkreuz 27 August) was tricked into an ambush, killed and horribly mutilated by Belgian partizans on 8 september. He finds rest at the Heroes' cemetary in Düren.

With the Allies halted north by II. SS-Panzerkorps and south by a determined defence from 11. Panzerdivision and several Volksgrenadier divisions, Hitler felt that is was time for a large offensive again. This was not without ground. The Allies would pick up momentum again as soon as their supply lines were brought up, and if he could wound them bad enough before that, he would have enough time and resources to deal with the Russians.

Before the Leibstandarte would participate in the last great offense, they were raced to help the bombed population of Düren (see Waldmüller). The city had just suffered from an extensive American bombing raid, there were dead women and children everywhere. Jochen Peiper reported:

"We had to scrape them off the walls, it was that bad! I could have castrated the swine who did that to those people with a blunt piece of glass!"

By now the Leibstandarte wasn't it former self anymore, many recruits with hardly any training were to fill the gaps and munition and fuel were scarce. But the core of the Leibstandarte was made up of elite veterans who quickly passed on their knowledge to the younger ones. LAH was divided into 4 Kampfgruppen for the December 16 attack:

- SS-Kampfgruppe Peiper (SS-Obersturmbannführer Jochen Peiper)
- I./SS-Panzerregiment 1 (gemischt; 72 Panthers and IVH's, Werner Poetschke, attached was 9.(Pi.)/SS-Pz.Reg. 1 and 10.Kp.SS-Panzerflak, 3 Wirbelwind)
- s.SS-Panzerabteilung 501 ( 45 Königstiger, SS-Sturmbannführer Hein von Westernhagen)
- III./SS-Panzergrenadierregiment 2 (5 Kp., 5.Kp. - SP 150mm, SS-Sturmbannführer Jupp Diefenthal)
- II./SS-Panzerartillerieregiment 1 (geschleppt)
- Luftwaffe Flaksturmabteilung 84 (20mm, 37mm)

- SS-Kampfgruppe Sandig
- SS-Panzergrenadierregiment 2

- SS-Kampfgruppe Hansen
- SS-Panzergrenadierregiment 1
- SS-Panzerjägerabteilung (21 Jagdpanzer IV, 11 75mm PaK)
- Artillerieabteilung (105mm, geschleppt)
- 24 Nebelwerfers

- SS-Kampfgruppe Knittel
- SS-Aufklärungsabteilung 1
- 1 Batterie 105mm (geschleppt)
- 1 Kompanie SS-Panzerpioniere

Kampfgruppe Peiper (4800 men, 600 vehicles including some 150 SPW's) was given Rollbahn (highway) D, with Kamfgruppe Sandig following closely. Rollbahn E was followed by Kampfgruppe Hanssen, with Kampfgruppe Knittel behind him. Knittel wasn't bound to a Rollbahn, he had freedom of movement.

SS-Panzerregiment 1 is placed on alert by the end of nov. 44, regio of Stadtkyll, 13 km E of the Belgian border. Vehicles are carefully camouflaged.

14 december: Jochen Peiper, Rudi Sandig, Max Hansen, Gustave Knittel and Otto Skorzeny attend a meeting at Mohnke’s HK at Tondorf.

15 december : During the night, assault forces are placed into position.

16 december: 05:15 : order n°10697/44 (signed by v. Rundstedt) gives the order to attack, orders are given through the radio.

05:35 : assault commences, some 620 artillery pieces, 32.Gr.Werf. open up on the American lines.

08:00 : SS-Kampfgruppe Peiper is still waiting behind 12. Volksgrenadier, which should have achieved a breakthrought at Losheim and Losheimgraben by 07:00 : Peiper’s tanks are cought in traffic on the Blankenheim-Schnied road.

14:00 : Peiper is at HK of 12. Volksgrenadierdivision (General Engel)

16:30 : Peiper gives order to move out. At Scheid, the Pioniere of 12. VG proved themselves unable to repair the bridge, Peiper’s entire column dashes across an slope next to it, ignore the destroyed bridge.

Composition of Peiper’s Spitze:
SS-Obersturmbannführer Werner Sternebeck (commander), Panther
- SS-Untersturmführer Hans-Jürgen Bahrendt (1.Pz.Kp.), Panther
- SS-Untersturmführer Herbert Junker, SS-Oberscharführer August Wien (5.Pz.Kp), Mk.IVH
- SS-Unterstumführer Karl-Heinz Asmussen, SS-Hauptscharführer August Tonk (6.Pz.Kp.), Mk.IVH
- SS-Scharführer Horst Rempel (8.Pz.Kp.), Mk.IVH
- 2 Schützenpanzerwagen from 9.Pi.Kp./SS-Pz.Reg. 1, SS-Oberscharführer Dörr en SS-Rottenführer Wemmel
- In other terms; 2 Pz.V, 5 Pz.IVH and 2 SPW.

Behind them came Oskar Klingelhöfer’s 6.Pz.Kp., in Mk. IVH.

21:30 : Losheim reached. Korps orders a detour, Peiper is to move to the west of Lanzerath. Fallschirmjägerregiment 9, 3. Fallschirmjägerdivision, reports heavy resistance from the woods near Büllingen. Forward two Pz. IVH drive on German mines when entering Hüllscheid. SS-Obersturmführer Erich Rumpf’s Pioniere clear minefield, but Sternebeck’s Panzer jumps on another mine SE of Merscheidt, he switches to Asmussen’s Panzer. After finding his Kommando-Panther 001 having engine trouble, Jochen Peiper switches to the command SPW of Jupp Diefenthal, commanding Peiper’s old III.Bat.

22:00 : Königstiger of s.SS-Pz.Abt. 501 catch up with the column.

24:00 : SS-Kampfgruppe Peiper reaches Lanzerath, losses amounted to 3 Panzer and 2 SPW. Peiper meets with Oberst Hoffmann (Fallschirmjägerreg. 9) at his HK at Café Palm. In a bad mood, he demands to know why he halted. He said he heard that Battalion reported a strong opposition. Peiper knows it is just gossip, mad at Hoffman, demands a Fallschirmjägerabteilung to be placed under his command. Attack is delayed, Fallschirmjäger do not wish to attack, the Waffen-SS Panzer suffer loss of time, again.

Peiper re-arranges his Spitze: 2 Panther take the lead, followed by a Zug from 10.Kp./SS-Pz.Gren.Reg 2 (SS-Hauptsturmführer Georg Preuss), followed by 2 Flak-Vierlinge (SS-Obersturmführer Vögler).

17 december: 04:00 : assault on the Büllingen woods, II./FJÄ.Reg. 9 (Major Taubert) takes the lead. The Panzer commanders communicate by radio, the Fallschirmjäger lead with white hankerchiefs. No opposition encountered near the woods, Jochen mad about the loss of time. Americans fleeing at the other side of the woods, at Buchholz railway station. The Vierlinge follow the tracks of the Panzer in the snow, are taken under fire by American MG and AT, but suffer no damage, open fire and silence the enemy fire.

04:30 : Peiper’s Spitze rushes Honsfeld, GI’s are taken by surprise, AT guns and halftracks are unmanned, surprise is complete. Around this time, SS-Kampfgruppe Hansen starts entering the offensive.

05:40 : Bulk of the SS-Kampfgruppe rumbles through Honsfeld. The leading 2 Wirbelwinds are taken out by American AT guns. The third Vierlinge opens up and silences the cannons. When they reach the middle of the town, they are taken under fire again from the windows of the surrounding houses. The fire is answered, and soon the Americans surrender. Many dead and wounded on both sides. The Kp.Fhr. for the FlaK units, SS-Obersturmführer Vögler, who was in the first vehicle, was slightly wounded. Panther 232 and 235 are also taken out by AT gunfire when riding through Honsfeld. A Königstiger who rumbled along, carrying Fallschirmjäger, took four hits but destroyed the two firing AT guns without taking any damage itself whatsoever. The Fallschirmjäger pass on captured food, drinks and cigarettes to the passing Königstiger crews.

The bulk of Fallschirmjägerregiment 9 remains at Honsfeld, one Kompanie joins the SS-Kampgruppe. When he drives out of Honsfeld, Jochen realizes he has little fuel left, and the roads to the west of Honsfeld aren’t in a suitable condition. He did not hear any sound around him, so he took the guess that 12. SS-Panzerdivision wasn’t following. Therefore he took Rollbahn C, given to 12. SS, and drove as fast to Büllingen as fast as he could, hoping to capture the fuel depot there.

06:00 : Peiper moves out of Honsfeld, on to Büllingen. 2 km S of the city, 12 spotter planes were destroyed on the ground, a 13th got away.

08:05 : SS-Kampfgrupe Peiper drives into Büllingen, loss of one Pz. IVH outside the city, crew shot down while attempting to leave the vehicle. Sternebeck and Georg Preuss break trough the defence, despite heavy AA and MG fire. After house-to-house fighting, the Americans stop the fight and surrender. They find the Fuel depot on the market, and some US POW’s are made to refuel the Panzer. Preuss is put forward by Peiper for the Ritterkreuz, altough he didn’t like him.

10:00 : The Panzerspizte, rested and refueled, roars out of Büllingen and continues SW towards Möderscheid and Amel, not N towards Elsenborn as the Americans anticipate. Sternebeck did not notice he took the wrong turn, and went N of Büllingen towards Wirtzfeld. When, 1 km outside Büllingen, a Pz. IVH was hit in the tower, killing the commander, he realised he had taken the wrong turn. He detoured, and drove direction Bütgenbach. He ran into American doctors, who offered him the surrender of Fieldhospital 47, but Sternebeck wasn’t interested and drove on. He, his own Pz. IVH together with SS-Hauptscharführer August Tonk’s Pz. IVH and the 2 SPW from 9.Pz.Pio.Kp. linked up with Peiper again at the crossroads NO of Amel, near point 616.

Following Möderscheid, the Spitze continued towards Schoppen. Because of the bad condition of the roads, they advance very slowly. After the capture of a US Lt.Colonel just outside Thirimont, Jochen learns that General Timberlake had set up the HQ of the 49th AA-Art. at Ligneuville, and orders his Panzerspitze to push on hard. This radio-message is recieved by Sternebeck, who is located at the Baugnez crossroads.

11:00 : The Kampfgruppe drives through Thirimont. 10.Kp./SS-Pz.Gren.Reg. 2, with Peiper right behind them, drives on to Ligneuville through very difficult terrain, several detours have to be be taken.

13:00 : Panzerspitze (Sternebeck) reaches Ligneuville. They find no American units in the centre of the town, so they halt in front of the bridge over the Ambléve. Peiper ordered to seize the brigde intact. The Pioniere crawl forwards and check the bridge for explosives. A machinegun opens up, several men get wounded. The enemy machineguns are silenced. The Americans left in such a hurry, that the SS men found their meals at the Hotel Moulin still on table, the cigarettes still smoking and the glasses half-empty. Within ten minutes, the bulk of Peiper’s forces will arive. The Spitze witnesses how a battalion of US Sherman tanks (Captain Green), from 9th Armoured Division, prepares itself for combat outside the town.

13:10 : SS-Kampfgruppe arrives at Lignueville, fierce combat breaks out between the German and American tanks. The Shermans are all knocked out, and Green was captured. Preuß’ 10.Kp. entered combat with US Armoured battalion 14. Arndt Fisher remembers how

“My Panther arrived at Ligneuville ten minutes after the Panzerspitze, and was knocked out there from behind, it was an ambush. Peiper gave us cover fire when we left our tank from his SPW, we were taken under fire by small arms. I was terribly burned, we had spilled oil on our uniforms at Büllingen. Peiper, who give me first aid, was so irritated that he put on the bandage backwards.”

A Schützenpanzerwagen from 11.(gep.)Kp. was also taken out. Peiper wanted to destroy the Sherman A3 with a Panzerfaust, but a soldier from 11.Kp. beat him to it.

17:00 : SS-Kampfgruppe Peiper continues W, through Pont, Beaumont et Lodomez towards Stavelot and spends the night at Vaulx-Richard. Wilhelm Monhke, divisional commander of the Leibstandarte, set up his HK at Ligneuville (Hotel Moulin), and Peiper stays at Ligneuville to discuss the situation with him. SS-Sturmbannführer Werner Pötschke takes over command in the meantime.

3 Mk.IVH and 3 Mk.V had been knocked out sofar. 4 IVH and 8 V were having technical difficulties, along with several VIB.

Mrs. Willems de Spa comments:

“In december ’44, I lived in Ligneuville with my brother,in the bakery, right across the post officer.I saw Peiper several times. He himself was very friendly, something I can’t say of all his soldiers. He said that we should best stay in the cellar, because of the danger and the situation. He and some of his Unteroffiziere slept several hours during the night of 17/18 december, in a barn behind the bakery on field matrasses.”

18 december : 01:00 : Peiper and his group are located in the western partof Vaulx-Richard. SS-Obersturmfüher Kremser’s 1.Pz.Kp. is send to the front to prepare for the attack on Stavelot, at the front is Pantherzug 1 under SS-Untersturmführer Hans Hennecke. SS-Obersturmführer Christ’s 2.Pz.Kp. and Diefenthal’s III. are right behind them. This replaced the Sternebeck Panzerspizte, and 6. and 7.Pz.Kp, along with 3.(gep.)Pi.Kp. were held back. Pötsche had, with his communicationsofficer, scouted the area the night before the attack.

02:00 : 11.(gep.)Kp./III., SS-Obersturmführer Heinz Tomhardt attacks Stokeu, outskirts of Stavelot, with Zug 1 (SS-Untersturmführer Wille Horn) and 4 (SS-Oberscharführer Rudi Rayer) who engaged the Americans without the support of the SPW’s. They managed to seize the brigde, but were attacked by American tanks and taken under fire by machineguns. Tomhardt was wounded and Horn was killed, Rayer took over command. 9.(Pio.)Kp./SS-Pz.Reg.1 checked the brigde for explosives; it was clear. Immediatly afterwards came the Panther of 1.Pz.Kp. (the leading tank was that of SS-Oberscharführer Erich Strelow), who saw 2 American 57mm AT guns blocking his path, appearantly the SS-Panzergrenadiere has missed these. He drove on hard, rode over the first two guns and crossed the bridge where he drove over another AT gun. Hennecke’s 111 was taken out in front of the the bridge, but he switched to Kremser’s Panzer and took over command of 1.Pz.Kp.

Hennecke wasted no time and rode over the bridge, two Panther (SS-Untersturmführer
Heubeck and SS-Oberscharführer Thomas) of his Kp. following him. Outside Stavelot, the rest of SS-Kampfgruppe Peiper’s Panzer and Schützenpanzewagen were lined up, waiting on a steep road. The Americans attacked the left flank of the column, but this was repulsed by Diefenthal, who afterwards, at the head of his Batallion attacked Stavelot and kept the bridge open. He recieved the Ritterkreuz for this. Belgian Zivillisten (civilians, thus partisans) and American soldiers alike fired at Diefenthal’s III.Abt. at Stavelot. Peiper did not know that, N of Stavelot, there was a huge fuel depot at Francorchamps. The Panzer did not go further than they had to, and turned left at the market, heading W towards Trois Ponts following the N23.

12:00 : Right before the 2 important railway bridges in Trois Ponts, the Americans had laid down a minefield of some 20-25 mines. Strelow, in the forward Panther, climbed out of his tank, cleared all the mines while his gunner took out an AT gun and a MG nest. When the attack started, the left bridge (over the Amblève) exploded. Jochen Peiper and Pötschke came to watch the situation on foot. Peiper wanted to go south towards Werbomont, but because the two bridges over the Amel and the Salm rivers were already blown up, he took the road to the north, following the N33.

13:00 : The Panzerspitze (1.Pz.Kp.- Hennecke) reaches La Gleize, after having passed through Coo. There, it turned SW towards Cheneux to get back on the N23, Rollbahn D. Second bridge at Trois Ponts, over the Salm is also blown up.

13:30 : Panzerspitze passed the undamaged bridge over the Amel at Cheneux.

13:35 : With the weather clearing up for the first time since the offensive, 4 P47 (Thunderbolts) spot the column and attack.

14:40 : 16 P47’s attack the strung out SS column all the back to Lodomez, before Stavelot. Pötschke takes cover under a tank, Peiper takes cover in a ditch.

16:10 : Attacks end. A total of 3 Panzer, two Pz.V and one Pz.IVH and 5 Schützenpanzer were destroyed, some 40 men are wounded. A Wirbelwind shot down one P47, several other are damaged. The medical treatment and the towing of the damaged vehicles took hours.

16:30 : SS-Kampfgruppe Knittel drives to Stavelot, Knittel rides ahead and meets with Peiper at the Cheneux bridge. Along with Knittel’s command, 6 Mk.IVH, 2 Zuge Pioniere in SPW and 3 Königstiger drive through Stavelot. The fourth is damaged and blocks the bridge.

20:00 : The Spitze continued, and reached Chauveheid. Peiper gives Diefenthal the order to cross the bridge over the Lienne at Neufmoulin. When Diefenthal arrived, the bridge was blown up by a small group of men from the 291st US Engineer battalion. Peiper heard the explosion and arrived with his communications officer and some SPW’s. Peiper had to change routes again, and ordered 10. and 11.Kp. to scout for bridges across the Lienne that can carry his tanks. It had gotten dark by now.

11.Kp. (Heinz Tomhardt) finds a small bridge near Les Forges and passed it, driving further south to the destroyed bridge at Neufmoulin. They could not locate the N23 and drove to Trou de Bras but were ordered by radio to return.

10.Kp. (SS-Obersturmführer Preuß) found a bridge 4 km NE of Neufmoulin at Moulin Rahier but it could not support any tanks. He drove on towards Chervon and Habiemont but was halted by 4 M10’s and 3 57mm AT guns from 823st US TD battalion. He lost three SPW’s and 15 SS-Panzergrenadiere. He was recalled by Peiper over the radio.

Jochen got his Kampfgruppe together again, and drove back to La Gleize since he did not have the needed bridge equipment to construct bridges during the night. He would try an attack towards the West next day direction Stoumont. LW-FlaK.Abt. 84 stays at Cheneux to observe the other side of the Lienne river.

23:00 : SS-Kampfgruppe Peiper rests between La Gleize and Stoumont. Only 5 Pz.IVH of 6.Pz.Kp. manage to reach Peiper’s group at around midnight, the rest doesn’t have enough fuel.

24:00 : SS-Kampfgruppe Knittel links up with Peiper, he has been ordered N by Mohnke because Hansen’s Kampfgruppe did not advance far enough to aide Peiper. A small supply group manages to provide Peiper with enough fuel for his attack towards Stoumont. At this point, 22 Mk.IVH, 9. Mk.IVH and 27 Mk.VIB did even attain Stavelot because of fuel shortages or mechanical breakdown.

19 december : 08:00 : Peiper attacks Stoumont with 7 Panther from 2.Pz.kp. (Christ), several Mk.IVH, Diefenthal’s Battalion, Rumpf’s 9.Pi.Kp. and the remaining Fallshirmjäger.

10:00 : Stoumont captured by the SS, but Peiper’s group has no more fuel left to continue. The MK.IVH along with Rumpf’s SS Pioniere were sent back to La Gleize. Diefenthal was ordered to defend Stoumont with his unit. Peiper now only possed of 7 Panther, 2 Wirbelwind, 11.Kp (SPW) and one Zug from Sievers 3. Pioniere.

Peiper pressed on with these units.

12:00 : The first attack on Stoumont failed, they came under tremendous artillery fire, and Peiper pulled back to just before La Gleize.

Pötschke ordered a second assault sometime later, but the artillery was still raining down. He ordered Christ (2.Pz.Kp.) to advance, but he simply shook his head. Pötschke grabbed a Panzerfaust and pointed it to Christ and told him again to advance. He refused again. Pötschke positioned himself in front of the first Panther, aimed the Panzerfaust at the vehicle and ordered forwards, into the hail of artillery. The engine started, and the Panther moved towards the village, with shells raining down left and right. It entered the village, even made it to the church, but 200 m from the station a blast from the 90 mm AA stopped it. The 11.Kp. attacked from the south, on foot, while the other Panther attacked from the road. Some Americans surrendered, others retreated and the village was taken, at the cost of one damaged Panther. The Americans had disabled the 90mm gun before they fled. Peiper chased the fleeing Americans immediatly with 5 Panther.

13:00 : Stavelot was recaptured during the night by the Americans, they had found almost no opposition. Stavelot was vital to the offensive, as it was in the route of the supply line. Americans were on the northren side, Germans on the southren egde. A counterattack was launched. The first Königstiger who approached the southren side of the village was immobilised. I.Bat. from SS-Kampfgruppe Sandig’s Panzergrenadiere rushed for the bridge to reclaim it, but are stopped by intense machinegun and mortar fire, and suffer heavy losses. Knittel, who has been send back by Peiper so secure his supply line through Stavelot, attacks from the west supported by 2 Königstiger. But the area was mined, so the 2 Tiger could not participate, and Knittel only managed to reach the western outskirts of the city. Sandig leaves I.Bat. where it is, and sends II.Bat. (SS-Sturmbannführer Herbert Schnelle) towards Wanne. When they arrive, Mohnke orders them to join Peiper.

15:00 : Peiper runs into a numerically superior enemy, 3rd battalion from 119th US inf.reg., with 12 Shermans and 4 M10 TD’s. They were holding an exellent defensive position, namely there were the Amblève river, the N33 and the railroad run next to the each other, a valley of only 300 m wide. The Shermans opened up and 2 Panther were damaged, a third immobilised (caught fire) by an AT gun. Peiper withdrew to Stoumont. At this point, he had penetrated 100 km in the American lines, but he had no fuel left. He left Hennecke’s 1.Pz.Kp. to guard the station at Stoumont with III.Abt., Christ’s 2.Pz.Kp. to guard La Gleize from the NE.

Peiper set up his HK at La Gleize, at the gardener’s house of the Froid Cour castle. The castle served as POW camp for the Americans.

19:30 : The Americans, under pressure by the Waffen-SS who are eager to retake the bridge, blow up the bridge over the Ambléve at Stavelot during a pause in the fighting. This ment that SS-Kampfgruppe Peiper was now trapped.

23 december: Bulk of SS-Kampfgruppe Hansen arrives at Petit Spai, but a Pz.Jgr. IV destroys the bridge accidentally by driving over it. That bridge was now blocked as well.


from http://www.geocities.com/wolfram55/ardennes.html


See my post above.

Also, is this the best you could do?

OK, so you copied all this info from a website that was put together by some private individual.

He probably has some facts correct.

But he cites NO sources for this info. Where did he get it all from?

It stops at Dec 23. It says NOTHING about the history of 1SS Panzer AFTER Dec. 23.

The Official History said the 1SS Panzer was ordered south on Dec 26. Once it was refueled, got some tanks repaired, etc, it started to move south on Dec 29. Estimates are that it had about 50 tanks: an assortment of PzIVs, Panthers, Tigers. . .

Do you really want to place this website against the Official History (which took years to write and which was last updated in 2000)?

Further: this was included from that website you copied:

quote:

Before the Leibstandarte would participate in the last great offense, they were raced to help the bombed population of Düren (see Waldmüller). The city had just suffered from an extensive American bombing raid, there were dead women and children everywhere. Jochen Peiper reported:

"We had to scrape them off the walls, it was that bad! I could have castrated the swine who did that to those people with a blunt piece of glass!"


In Reply:

I'll bet the innocent people of Warsaw, Rotterdam, Belgrade, London, Coventry, leningrad, etc who were bombed by German planes, would probably feel the same way too, no?



And these from the Official History of the Ardennes Battle:


Malmedy Massacre:

quote:

It was between noon and one o'clock of 17 December, on the road between Modersheid and Ligneuville, that the German advance guard ran into an American truck convoy moving south from Malmedy. This was ill-fated Battery B of the 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion. The convoy was shot up and the advance guard rolled on, leaving the troops to the rear to deal with the Americans who had taken to the woods and ditches. About two hours after, or so the dazed survivors later recalled, the Americans who had been rounded up were marched into a field where, at a signal, they were shot down by machine gun and pistol fire. A few escaped by feigning death, but the wounded who moved or screamed were sought out and shot through the head. At least eighty-six Americans were massacred here. This was not the first killing of unarmed prisoners chargeable to Kampfgruppe Peiper on 17 December. Irrefutable evidence shows that nineteen unarmed Americans were shot down at Honsfeld and fifty at Bullingen.



AND THIS:


quote:

The commander of the Sixth SS Panzer Army took oath in the trials of 1946 that, acting on Hitler's orders, he issued a directive stating that the German troops should be preceded "by a wave of terror and fright and that no human inhibitions should be shown." There is conflicting testimony as to whether the orders finally reaching Peiper specifically enjoined the shooting of prisoners.

There is no question, however, that some of Peiper's subordinates accepted the killing of prisoners as a command and that on at least one occasion Peiper himself gave such an order. Why Peiper's command gained the bestial distinction of being the only unit to kill prisoners in the course of the Ardennes is a subject of surmise.

Peiper had been an adjutant to Heinrich Himmler and as a battalion commander in Russia is alleged to have burned two villages and killed all the inhabitants. The veteran SS troops he led in the Ardennes had long experience on the Eastern Front where brutality toward prisoners of war was a common-place. On the other hand Peiper's formation was well in the van of the German attack and was thus in position to carry out the orders for the "wave of terror" tactic-which might be excused, or so Peiper claimed, by the rapid movement of his kampfgruppe and its inability to retain prisoners under guard.

[4] Hitler's order to take no prisoners probably had wide circulation. Lt. Col. George Mabry, commander of the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, has stated that his unit captured a German colonel from the Seventh Army who had such an order. Ltr, Gen Barton to author, 17 Nov 59.

Page 263




So please, in the future, remove sensational items from things you post, before you copy and post them, OK? Otherwise I will post similar items in return. And these are NOT the subject under discussion.

< Message edited by Von Rom -- 7/19/2004 1:43:00 AM >


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RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/19/2004 5:58:59 AM   
Von Rom


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Further Regarding the 1SS Panzer at Bastogne


The following is from the Offical Site of the 35th Infantry Division, Third Army:

"To secure the corridor, the 35th Division was ordered out of Metz on the same day and at 8 a.m. on December 27th, we attacked through knee deep snow to the East of the Arlon Road, with the 137th Regiment on the left, the 320th Regiment to the right, followed the next day by the 134th Regiment which went into line to the left and West of the 137th Regiment. To our right was the 26th Division.

Our line of departure was about nine miles from Bastogne and for the next two weeks we learned the meaning of freezing in hell for we ran into some of the bitterest and most difficult fighting of the war, the most wintry with temperatures dipping below zero, and the costliest in terms of casualties.

We attacked and so did the Germans, from assault to stalemate, from defense to counter-attack. Casualties were heavy on both sides, and men would be hit and fall and freeze to death before they could be gotten out. Corps men would have to keep blood plasma under their arms to keep it from freezing. Trench feet, frozen feet put men incapable of moving.

We did not know that Hitler had ordered some of his best remaining troops to cut off the Third Army’s relief of Bastogne at all costs. Now across our front from our right came the elite 1st S.S. Panzer “Der Fuhrer” Division, sent down from the German Sixth Army to break us – the 167th Volksgrenadier Division, and the 5th Parachute Division from the Seventh German Army.

Fighting see-sawed in and around towns like Lutrebois where we lost two companies of the 134th Regiment, Marvie, where we at last broke through to the 101st Airborne, Surre, Villers La Bonne where the 137th lost companies K and L, cut off and hit by the Germans with flame throwers, the survivors captured and marched into Germany to a prison camp, Boulaide, whose grateful citizens would welcome returning veterans in later years as tour groups, Tarchamps, and Harlange where a single farm, fortified, stopped the 320th Regiment.

Frostbite, illness and exhaustion, the freezing waters of the Sure River, waste deep, waded across by the 320th soldiers. Deep snow which slowed attack and bogged down G.I.s who were unable to move fast enough to evade the lethal fire of enemy machine guns, mortars and artillery shells, tree bursts and craters. The fields and woods became graveyards littered with dozens of destroyed tanks and assault guns, half tracks, trucks, equipment, and corpses. We saw the Adolph Hitler Division die before us. . .

Our casualties had rapidly mounted. For example, the bitter combat in and around the little village of Lutrebois, just four miles from Bastogne, cost the Third Battalion of the 134th Infantry Regiment 400 casualties alone, with 32 of these K.I.A.s. Grave registration teams reported a ratio of eight German dead for each American killed. Most rifle companies were reduced to one third normal strength. Our 100,000 artillery shells were fired into the woods just East of Lutrebois, only one small area of many similar sectors. . .

In our somewhat more than three weeks of fighting at Bastogne, the 35th Division counted 1,034 German prisoners and many more Germans killed and wounded. No G.I. could ever doubt the commitment, the courage, and the determination of the German soldier whom we met in the Ardennes."


http://www.35thinfdivassoc.com/Ardennes/Ardennes-Story-1.shtml

< Message edited by Von Rom -- 7/19/2004 4:05:47 AM >


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RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/19/2004 6:24:25 AM   
Von Rom


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More Information Regarding the 1SS Panzer at Bastogne and the Fierce Fighting that Occurred at the Bulge

From:


Presenting the 35th Infantry Division in World War II
1941 - 1945

The Beginning of the End

Ardennes Campaign, 16 Dec 44 - 25 Jan 45

Chapter 10

Bastogne


At 0800 on 27 December, the [35th] Division attacked in snow six inches deep. The 137th moved by truck along a road in the 4th Armored sector to a point southwest of Tintange in order to cross the river in friendly territory. Considerable gains were made until the town of Surre was reached. There the 137th met bitter resistance and only after a hard struggle was it able to capture the town.

The 320th ran into considerable difficulty in crossing the Sure River, but by wading in icy water waist deep, the 3rd Battalion got a company across in the afternoon. By dark the 2nd Battalion had captured the towns of Boulaide and Baaschleiden.

Next day little gain was made in any sector. The 3rd Battalion of the 137th drove to a hill southwest of Villers-la-Bonne-Eau where severe small arms, mortar, and artillery fire was encountered. The 320th took an important road junction. The 3rd Battalion of the 134th was brought up from reserve and relieved the 1st Battalion of the 318th Infantry Regiment, 80th Division.

On 29 December, the division continued to attack. The 137th made no gain. The 320th was locked in bitter battle for a farm southeast of the town of Harlange.

Then the division reserve, the 134th, was committed into cold, bleak, battle. Colonel Miltonberger attacked in column of battalions in order to give depth to his effort. The regiment fought with its usual tenacious Santa Fe spirit and soon the 1st Battalion moved into Marvie, three kilometers southeast of Bastogne, making contact with the 101st Airborne Division. This effort, coupled with that of the gallant 4th Armored, made certain that Bastogne was relieved of all encirclement.

The Germans launched a powerful counter-attack against the 134th and 137th on 30 December. Much credit for destroying the German armor around Lutrebois was due to the Santa Fe's 654th Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion of the 4th Armored Division. In all they destroyed 11 tanks during this attack. The attacking forces were the 1st SS Panzer "Adolph Hitler" Division and the 167th Volksgrenadier Division. It was a brutal counter-attack and elements of Companies K and L of the 137th were cut off in Villers-la-Bonne-Eau.

The German objective in their counter-attack was to cut, at all costs, the Arlon-Bastogne Highway. All day and night the battle raged, finally with the assistance of the air corps and close proximity fuzed artillery, it was broken, and the elite 1st SS Panzer Division lay lifeless, broken and destroyed upon the field of battle.

On the last day of December, attempts to relieve the situation of K and L Companies, 137th, were in vain. They were finally given up for lost when it was learned from German prisoners that they had either been killed or captured. The Nazis blasted holes in the walls of the houses from which the men fought and then turned flame throwers on the men inside. This was a blow that the Division vowed to avenge. The majority of the 235 men missing from the regiment that day were believed lost in this action. Their bravery and intense devotion to duty gave impetus to the Santa Fe spirit and determination to finish the war quickly as possible.

The division was attacked again and again. Neither side gave quarter. But the Santa Fe did not budge. In the opinion of many veteran 35th Division soldiers the Battle of the Ardennes was even more fierce than St. Lo. From 3 to 7 January, Division artillery under the command of Brigadier General T. L. Futch fired 41,385 rounds into enemy positions.

Even in zero weather and waist-deep snow the Nazis fought with the most tenacity. The 1st SS Division committed many atrocities. Some of their soldiers were captured in complete American uniform and using American weapons and vehicles. Bottles of acid were also found on them, with instructions that the wax tops be broken and the contents thrown into the face of their capt[ors].

The Germans were fighting in excellent defensive terrain and good road networks. The entire area was filled with towns and villages and every house was transformed into a miniature fortress. Every hill and every small woods had to be taken separately. The 137th fought for 13 days before it battered down the defenses of Villers-la-Bonne-Eau. It took five days of constant assault by the 134th to capture Lutrebois. Harlange was held by the Nazis even though the 320th put extreme pressure on it.

Units identified on the 134th Infantry front alone were the 901st Regiment of the 130th Panzer Lehr Division; the 2nd Regiment of the 1st SS Panzer Division, and the 401st Artillery Brigade. Further identification were made of the 331st Regiment, 167th Volksgrenadier Division, and the 167th Division Artillery Brigade. Roughly, four German Divisions had attacked the Santa Fe and had been beaten off.

From 27 December to 17 January, the 35th took 1,034 prisoners and killed and wounded as many more. The Santa Fe, fighting in freezing and bitter cold against a ruthless enemy, had performed admirably and the Battle of Bastogne was closed. Now the enemy's Ardennes penetration was reduced to a defensive bulge from which the Germans could only continue to retire under pressure.

http://www.coulthart.com/134/35chapter_10.htm

< Message edited by Von Rom -- 7/19/2004 4:39:58 AM >


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RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/19/2004 6:47:22 AM   
Von Rom


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More Information Regarding 1SS Panzer at Bastogne



[January] 1945 began with the Leibstandarte operating in the area to the Southeast of Bastogne, in the Ardennes, in Belgium. At this time the Leibstandarte was organized into two Kampfgruppen; KG Poetschke and KG Hansen. From January 1st to January 9th these formations were engaged in combat in the Lutremange -Lutrebois - Villers La Bonne Eau area. The Leibstandarte saw action against elements of both the U.S. 35th Infantry Division and U.S. 4th Armoured Division. On January 10th the Leibstandarte was ordered to withdraw from all engagements and the Division was in a new assembly area to the Southwest of St. Vith by January 15th.

By the 12th of February the Leibstandarte was in a staging area around Nove-Zamky in Hungary. During the time from the 12th of February to the 16th of February the Division was organized into a Panzer Kampfgruppe under Peiper and a Panzergrenadier Kampfgruppe under Hansen. On February 17th the Leibstandarte began it’s involvement in Operation Southwind, along with the Hitlerjugend Division in I SS Panzer Korps, an operation to destroy a Soviet bridgehead on the Gran River. By the 24th the bridgehead had been eliminated and the Leibstandarte had been withdrawn from the front to prepare for another offensive.

This is a compilation of notes taken from information contained in the books Men Of Steel by Michael Reynolds and The Leibstandarte Volume IV/2 by Ralf Tiemann.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=43871&start=0

< Message edited by Von Rom -- 7/19/2004 4:52:31 AM >


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RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/19/2004 8:22:09 AM   
Von Rom


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Kevinugly:

So as you can see from the above posts, Sabre George and Lucky Forward did indeed tangle with the Adolf Hitler at Bastogne.

Soooo. . . .

Where are your sources disputing the contrary?

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RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/19/2004 10:26:14 AM   
Culiacan Mexico

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly
… those commanders we wish to elevate to 'greatness' need to show they apply other principles too…

Finally, Patton never fought a battle where he didn't have materiel superiority on the ground and the air, where he was fighting a battle where he had to hold ground rather than take it. It's very difficult to make a case for him to be compared with WW2 commanders like Manstein and Slim who showed their capacity to successfully apply all of the principles of warfare even in the most adverse of situations. It's even more difficult to place him with the greats of all military history.
Interesting. I disagree in some areas.

The Germans did well when they had air superiority and numerical/qualitative superiority, and when they didn’t they faired poorly. So what? Should the accomplishment of the Germans in 1940 against France be dismissed because they attacked second rate troops with overwhelming force, while having air superiority?

In my opinion, German commanders as a group are overrated by most people, and Erich von Manstein is no acceptation. He understood the nature of armored warfare during this period, a rarity among German commanders, but was not a miracle worker. When in a tactically disadvantages situation he achieve no radical victories, and while his handling of Panzer forces was very good, his command of infantry forces was adequate. That doesn’t mean he wasn’t brilliant, just that his victories were achieved under similar circumstances you dismiss so easily in your post.



1. He did well with 56th Panzer Corps in 1941 with a superior force and air superiority, against a surprised and poorly lead Soviet troops.

2. His handling of 11th Army in the Crimea can best be described as adequate, but before Sevastopol fell his Army was spent.

3. His action while commanding forces attacking Leningrad can hardly be called brilliant.

4. His command of Army Group Don was not successful.

5. The counter attack in the winter of 1942/43 was excellent, but it was concentrated German armor against an exhausted, strung out and poorly supplied Soviet force.

6. His commander of Army Group South consisted of a failed offense and endless retreat.



"Field-Marshal von Manstein had proved the ablest commander in the German Army. He had a superb sense of operational possibilities and an equal mastery in the conduct of operations, together with a greater grasp of the potentialities of mechanised forces than any of the other commanders not trained in the tank army. In sum, he had military genius."

Captain B.H. Liddell Hart


PS. I am not comparing the abilities of any general, just pointing out that the “circumstances” that are dismissed when helping an Allied victory were also used by the Germans.



Stirring the pot.

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RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/19/2004 1:58:36 PM   
Rune Iversen


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Culiacan Mexico]
Stirring the pot.


Trolling again I see

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RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/19/2004 3:55:27 PM   
Kevinugly

 

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Von Rom wrote

quote:

So please, in the future, remove sensational items from things you post, before you copy and post them, OK? Otherwise I will post similar items in return. And these are NOT the subject under discussion.


Correct. Thay are not the subject of discussion. So why make them so! Stop changing the subject. I posted the article as a timeline. It tallies with Williamson, MacDonald, Parker and Pimlott. In any case I thought you wanted to discuss Metz! We've already discussed the SS and the 'Bulge' into the ground and frankly the level of repetition is becoming excrutiatingly boring. Get over it, let's move on

quote:

[January] 1945 began with the Leibstandarte operating in the area to the Southeast of Bastogne, in the Ardennes, in Belgium. At this time the Leibstandarte was organized into two Kampfgruppen; KG Poetschke and KG Hansen. From January 1st to January 9th these formations were engaged in combat in the Lutremange -Lutrebois - Villers La Bonne Eau area. The Leibstandarte saw action against elements of both the U.S. 35th Infantry Division and U.S. 4th Armoured Division. On January 10th the Leibstandarte was ordered to withdraw from all engagements and the Division was in a new assembly area to the Southwest of St. Vith by January 15th.

By the 12th of February the Leibstandarte was in a staging area around Nove-Zamky in Hungary. During the time from the 12th of February to the 16th of February the Division was organized into a Panzer Kampfgruppe under Peiper and a Panzergrenadier Kampfgruppe under Hansen. On February 17th the Leibstandarte began it’s involvement in Operation Southwind, along with the Hitlerjugend Division in I SS Panzer Korps, an operation to destroy a Soviet bridgehead on the Gran River. By the 24th the bridgehead had been eliminated and the Leibstandarte had been withdrawn from the front to prepare for another offensive.

This is a compilation of notes taken from information contained in the books Men Of Steel by Michael Reynolds and The Leibstandarte Volume IV/2 by Ralf Tiemann.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=43871&start=0


This is from a forum discussion. You 'copy and paste' this and then dare to criticise my sources. You jest sir! It would be like me citing one of Iron Duke's posts as evidence! How can we have a meaningful discussion about anything if this is how you are going to treat the subject? No wonder the 'Duke bailed in frustration.

quote:

We did not know that Hitler had ordered some of his best remaining troops to cut off the Third Army’s relief of Bastogne at all costs. Now across our front from our right came the elite 1st S.S. Panzer “Der Fuhrer” Division, sent down from the German Sixth Army to break us – the 167th Volksgrenadier Division, and the 5th Parachute Division from the Seventh German Army.


Since this and the next post obviously derive from the same source (the author of the second has just changed the SS name) I can deal with this easily. There is no 'Der Fuhrer' division, if the source cannot correctly identify the attacking unit then its accuracy can be called into question. This is just another 'personal memoir' and we've already agreed that these cannot be taken at face value. In deference to your feelings I don't post from Whiting (not that I need to here), so kindly refrain from using 'personal memoirs'.

< Message edited by Kevinugly -- 7/19/2004 2:21:48 PM >


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RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/19/2004 4:03:01 PM   
Kevinugly

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Culiacan Mexico

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly
… those commanders we wish to elevate to 'greatness' need to show they apply other principles too…

Finally, Patton never fought a battle where he didn't have materiel superiority on the ground and the air, where he was fighting a battle where he had to hold ground rather than take it. It's very difficult to make a case for him to be compared with WW2 commanders like Manstein and Slim who showed their capacity to successfully apply all of the principles of warfare even in the most adverse of situations. It's even more difficult to place him with the greats of all military history.
Interesting. I disagree in some areas.

The Germans did well when they had air superiority and numerical/qualitative superiority, and when they didn’t they faired poorly. So what? Should the accomplishment of the Germans in 1940 against France be dismissed because they attacked second rate troops with overwhelming force, while having air superiority?

In my opinion, German commanders as a group are overrated by most people, and Erich von Manstein is no acceptation. He understood the nature of armored warfare during this period, a rarity among German commanders, but was not a miracle worker. When in a tactically disadvantages situation he achieve no radical victories, and while his handling of Panzer forces was very good, his command of infantry forces was adequate. That doesn’t mean he wasn’t brilliant, just that his victories were achieved under similar circumstances you dismiss so easily in your post.



1. He did well with 56th Panzer Corps in 1941 with a superior force and air superiority, against a surprised and poorly lead Soviet troops.

2. His handling of 11th Army in the Crimea can best be described as adequate, but before Sevastopol fell his Army was spent.

3. His action while commanding forces attacking Leningrad can hardly be called brilliant.

4. His command of Army Group Don was not successful.

5. The counter attack in the winter of 1942/43 was excellent, but it was concentrated German armor against an exhausted, strung out and poorly supplied Soviet force.

6. His commander of Army Group South consisted of a failed offense and endless retreat.



"Field-Marshal von Manstein had proved the ablest commander in the German Army. He had a superb sense of operational possibilities and an equal mastery in the conduct of operations, together with a greater grasp of the potentialities of mechanised forces than any of the other commanders not trained in the tank army. In sum, he had military genius."

Captain B.H. Liddell Hart


PS. I am not comparing the abilities of any general, just pointing out that the “circumstances” that are dismissed when helping an Allied victory were also used by the Germans.



Stirring the pot.




Can't I tell.


Might be worth taking this to another thread. It is an interesting subject and one I'm sure several members here would like to debate but I fear it's going to be 'swept up' in Von Roms endless quest to prove Pattons brilliance

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Post #: 388
RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/19/2004 4:30:19 PM   
VicKevlar

 

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How about we see the temperature on this thread drop a little hmmmm? Also, knock off all the personal shots.

Now back to your regularly scheduled thread.

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Post #: 389
RE: Why was Patton so great? - 7/19/2004 5:02:55 PM   
riverbravo


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You guys that are argueing over the 1st SS panzer and what they did and where they did it can go in circles all day.

We all know that often KG's were pieced together from a company from here and platoon from there etc etc.

So it can seem that a division is "all over the place" but it is actualy just a few units pieced together and under the command of a SS officer.

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