How does the game model use of Russian RRs in the first 3 weeks of the campaign, when the destruction of RRs was minimal? The first Russian train got through to Minsk on 7/3/1941 (see e.g., https://www.hgwdavie.com/blog/2018/3/9/the-influence-of-railways-on-military-operations-in-the-russo-german-war-19411945 ) and Riga was comparable.
Pre war planning ( wargames) gave how many Divs they needed to create.https://history.army.mil/html/books/104 ... 104-21.pdf
Pre war logistical planning showed that after 20 days logistical effort, to support an operational bound of 300 miles in which Russian forced were to be destroyed and the war won) supplies would drop to 10-20% of requirments and an operational pause would result, so as to build up supplies for any further offensives.
Maths shows an average of 70 tons per day per formation was all that could be delivered.
If priority was given to the Panzer forces, then 33 formations daily requirements could be meet, leaving nothing for any other formations.
To go beyond the 300 operational bound ment resupply from the RR, first bound ended at Smolensk, RR conversion to German gauge took till August to convert, so 30 days after getting there, the logistical ability to go on from there became present.
The logistics branch of the OKH was blunt in its prediction for another advance from Smolensk to Moscow: ( supply branch of the OKH warned Brauchitsch, Halder and Bock) 'if the intensity of fighting and the operational rythm was to be similar to that of the summer campaign, the supply system would be able to cover a bit over 50% of AGC's needs for a space of time of two weeks. More than that, and the system would collapse and the it would be able to deliver just between 10-20% of the total load of supplies needed'.
The 1941 munition supplies reaching the front by month.Source:Germany and WWII Tome
June :23077 tons
Which yields per Div per day.
German Munitions production by year.
German ammunition expenditure on the Eastern Front in 1941 (22.06-31.12) from KTB OKW Vol.I
37-mm AT gun - 2778000*1.5=4167000
50-mm AT gun - 303000*4.5=1363500
50-mm mortar - 2977000*2.2=6549400
81-mm mortar - 3119000*7.7=24016300
75-mm light infantry gun - 2673000*12=32076000
150-mm heavy infantry guns - 457000*84=38388000
75-mm mountain gun 36 - 83000*6=498000
105-mm light field howitzer - 8297000*33=273801000
150-mm heavy field howitzer - 2441000*96=234336000
105-mm gun - 684000*33=22572000
150-mm gun - 55000*96=5280000
210-mm Morser (heavy howitzer) - 137000*250=34250000
Yes there is a range of AP HE shell weight, but we dont have that data.
Total weight 677297200 lbs, is 338648 tons.
Time frame 192 days, 1763.8 tons a day expended.
Number of Div 146. 12 tons per day per Div.
From Halder diary we find the following:
Germany in the East required 32,000 tonnes a day, thats 24 train loads a day each AG.This represented only fuel, ammunition, and limited food/fodder, making no allowance for replacement men, horses, or equipment. POL to munition was a 2:1 ratio.
Halder diary, page 203 6th July AGC requires 21 trains a day. Page 242 Wagner gaurentes 14 @6300 tons. Page 246 what that translates into combat loads. "To meet all supply requirements we have available: As of 18 July, 14 trains; 22 trains are necessary to catch up with the three Armies into the areas newly occupied".
Ie between 6th and 18th July 14*12=168 promised, 146 deliverd.
So 6th AGC requires 21*12 days.
QM promises 14 a day, 14*12=168
QM delivers 146/12= 12 a day, =146.
AGC 21*12 =252*1333=335916 tons.
QM promises 168*1333=223944 tons
QM delivers=146*1333= 194618 tons.
AGC requires 335916
QM delivers 194618
58% of requirement met.
Pre war ,logistical planning and actual outcomes were pretty close.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.