Slitherine

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ORIGINAL: MrsWargamer

I have always been surprised how the Japanese navy balked at key moments. They should have hit Pearl again, trashed the oil. But they failed to press the attack, odd for their culture of dying for the Emporer being a route to heaven. Seemed oddly timid. The last dash of the Yamato, same thing, they didn't press home, and ran, odd for a samurai mentality.

Loss of the oil at Hawaii would have likely cost the US a LOT. Likely would have still won, but it wouldn't have been pretty. By the end of the war in the Pacific, the wallet was getting dangerously low. They didn't necessarily have time to waste. Loss of that oil would have mattered.

So much of that war was so incredibly changed by so little a thing that mattered so much.

It's why I think wargame design is such a challenge to simulate above the operational level. How do you recreate historical blunders, errors and total stupidity?

quote:

ORIGINAL: MrsWargamer
The last dash of the Yamato, same thing, they didn't press home, and ran, odd for a samurai mentality.

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How do you recreate historical blunders, errors and total stupidity?

quote:

ORIGINAL: MrsWargamer

I have always been surprised how the Japanese navy balked at key moments. They should have hit Pearl again, trashed the oil. But they failed to press the attack, odd for their culture of dying for the Emporer being a route to heaven. Seemed oddly timid. The last dash of the Yamato, same thing, they didn't press home, and ran, odd for a samurai mentality.

Loss of the oil at Hawaii would have likely cost the US a LOT. Likely would have still won, but it wouldn't have been pretty. By the end of the war in the Pacific, the wallet was getting dangerously low. They didn't necessarily have time to waste. Loss of that oil would have mattered.

So much of that war was so incredibly changed by so little a thing that mattered so much.

It's why I think wargame design is such a challenge to simulate above the operational level. How do you recreate historical blunders, errors and total stupidity?

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ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock

quote:

ORIGINAL: MrsWargamer

I have always been surprised how the Japanese navy balked at key moments. They should have hit Pearl again, trashed the oil. But they failed to press the attack, odd for their culture of dying for the Emporer being a route to heaven. Seemed oddly timid. The last dash of the Yamato, same thing, they didn't press home, and ran, odd for a samurai mentality.

Loss of the oil at Hawaii would have likely cost the US a LOT. Likely would have still won, but it wouldn't have been pretty. By the end of the war in the Pacific, the wallet was getting dangerously low. They didn't necessarily have time to waste. Loss of that oil would have mattered.

So much of that war was so incredibly changed by so little a thing that mattered so much.

It's why I think wargame design is such a challenge to simulate above the operational level. How do you recreate historical blunders, errors and total stupidity?

In terms of grand strategy, it is not easy to think how the Pearl Harbor attack could have turned out WORSE for the Japanese. They didn't destroy the oil and repair facilities, they didn't so much as scratch an aircraft carrier, and the eight battleships they did knock out of action were basically gun barges. (even slower than the British 'R" class, whose lack of speed relegated them to the second string.)

Most of all, the political effects were catastrophic for the Axis. From 1942-1945 the U.S. government essentially took over the economy, and turned out jaw-dropping numbers of tanks, planes, and ships -- and managed to maintain or even slightly increase the overall standard of living. I continue to be immensely disappointed that no game I'm aware of has a scenario where the Pearl harbor raid doesn't happen, but in return U. S. industrial production is greatly curtailed.

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ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock

quote:

ORIGINAL: MrsWargamer

I have always been surprised how the Japanese navy balked at key moments. They should have hit Pearl again, trashed the oil. But they failed to press the attack, odd for their culture of dying for the Emporer being a route to heaven. Seemed oddly timid. The last dash of the Yamato, same thing, they didn't press home, and ran, odd for a samurai mentality.

Loss of the oil at Hawaii would have likely cost the US a LOT. Likely would have still won, but it wouldn't have been pretty. By the end of the war in the Pacific, the wallet was getting dangerously low. They didn't necessarily have time to waste. Loss of that oil would have mattered.

So much of that war was so incredibly changed by so little a thing that mattered so much.

It's why I think wargame design is such a challenge to simulate above the operational level. How do you recreate historical blunders, errors and total stupidity?

In terms of grand strategy, it is not easy to think how the Pearl Harbor attack could have turned out WORSE for the Japanese. They didn't destroy the oil and repair facilities, they didn't so much as scratch an aircraft carrier, and the eight battleships they did knock out of action were basically gun barges. (even slower than the British 'R" class, whose lack of speed relegated them to the second string.)

Most of all, the political effects were catastrophic for the Axis. From 1942-1945 the U.S. government essentially took over the economy, and turned out jaw-dropping numbers of tanks, planes, and ships -- and managed to maintain or even slightly increase the overall standard of living. I continue to be immensely disappointed that no game I'm aware of has a scenario where the Pearl harbor raid doesn't happen, but in return U. S. industrial production is greatly curtailed.

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ORIGINAL: Shellshock

Taffy 3

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ORIGINAL: Platoonist
To burn it, you need to heat it to about 150-250F to produce volatile vapor. It's not the sort of stuff that is going to ignite merely by having high explosive go off in the middle and start sympathetic detonations.

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ORIGINAL: Shellshock
This was a proud force which had conceived the Pearl harbor attack and sunk the mighty British warships Prince of Wales and Repulse and performed miracles of skill and daring during the first years of the war. Yet in this battle with the odds overwhelmingly in their favor, their ship recognition was inept, their tactics were primitive, their gunnery woefully bad, and their spirit feeble. Taking out of proportion losses from this puny force, confused or fatigued they just turned and ran. Admiral Kurita offered some poor excuses later, but none stand up to scrutiny. It does invite the puzzlement of history.

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ORIGINAL: RFalvo69


Speaking about US commanders, a mystery to me is why Jack Fletcher is so underrated. He fought in three carrier battles and won all three, but one would think that Halsey and Spruance were the only US admirals in the whole Pacific Fleet. True, at Midway he transferred his command to Spruance when the Yorktown was hit, but this is too a proof of good leadership. And Fletcher never behaved as stupidly as Halsey did at Leyte Gulf.]

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ORIGINAL: Platoonist

I often think the benefits of a second strike on Pearl harbor are vastly overstated. Japanese Admiral Nagumo has often been made the target of historical scapegoating in part to avoid taking the shine off Yamamoto.

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THE GREAT PRESIDIO OIL FIRE
OF 1924

At 1000 hours on September 14, 1924, the 11th Cavalry once again found itself in a fight. However, this time there were no bullets involved. The Presidio of Monterey was located right next to the Tidewater-Associated Marine Terminal, an oil storage facility. One of the oil storage tanks had been struck by lightning and set on fire. The fires in the wooden oil storage tanks were soon found to be almost impossible to control and the fire spread. Those warehouses closest to the fire contained grain and hay for the horses of the Regiment. The Army began to evacuate these warehouses and the work was completed just 10 minutes before the first oil tank exploded, covering the buildings with burning oil. As the burning tanks collapsed, rivers of burning oil flowed down the streets towards Monterey Bay. The heat from the fires became so intense that people several hundred feet away were burned.

Troopers fought the fires from behind sections of wooden fencing used as shields against the heat. Ladders were placed up against the sides of the burning tanks and troopers were ordered up them to spray water directly into the tanks. Many of these troopers died when the tanks collapsed and they were thrown into the burning oil.

Five days later, when the fire had finally burning itself out, it was found that 26 men were missing from the rolls and several hundred were injured. (Through the Army Memorial Program, many streets of Monterey, California, bear the names of the men who died fighting the fire. The bravery of these troopers is still remembered today, for if the oil had been allowed to flow down onto the town of Monterey and the many wooden structures, a greater number of loss of life and property would have most certainly been greater if it was not for the 11th Cavalry.

LESSONS LEARNED: With this and other similar above ground oil storage tanks fires, lessons were learned, that have affected the oil storage procedures industry wide.

That is, due to the fixed roofing and with repeated drainage/refilling; would naturally generate spacing between the oil and roofing unit. Vapors would develop and it is this, that most believed actually ignited, when the lighting struck. Lighting rods are of little value in these situations. When rainwater or the fire extinguishing water would land on top of the oil, this in time would descend as oil being lighting then water. With the tempter of the burring oil began reaching 212 degrees, the water converts to vapor expanding rapidly thus causing eruption of hot boiling burning oil.

This was not a familiar concept to the troopers who were working in good faith they treated the fire as a “wood burning fire” and continued to spray water onto the tanks hoping to cool the metal/wood casing enough to contain the oil. As the heat would transfer from one tank unit across to an adjacent unit that too would reach a tempter causing that unit to likewise explode, which lead to more loss of life.

Any water accumulated from previous rains that became covered with repeated “drainage/refilling of oil” generated a layering of oil-water-oil etc., when heated, expands and explodes or in this case, oil boiled up and over the sides of the containers. There are several accounts of the storage tank casings becoming too hot and collapsing inward tossing the troopers into the vat of burning oil.

Major lesson learned is that now the “tops” of these oil storage units are a floating top that does not allow the collection of vapors, distance between tanks has extended, a massive earth works have been constructed to contain the total oil within the storage unit in a designated area thus preventing expansion of the burning oil over to other units.

NOTE: Presidio Fire Station

While Brigadier General John J. “Black Jack” Pershing (along with the 11th Cav)
was withdrawing from Mexico and the conclusion of the Punitive Expedition a
tragic fire that took the lives of Pershing’s wife and three of his four children. The Presidio Fire Department was the first military fire department to be established in the United States and was staffed by a civilian fire crew. The Fire Station was one of the first Army stations equipped with automotive fire engines.

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ORIGINAL: Shellshock

Blame Admiral Ernest King, a hard man not known for sentimentality. King had lost all confidence in Fletcher after the Eastern Solomons carrier battle in which Fletcher dispatched the carrier Wasp south to refuel at a critical moment.

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The premature withdrawal of his carrier task force after the Guadalcanal landings probably was a big factor too.

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ORIGINAL: RFalvo69

[Speaking about US commanders, a mystery to me is why Jack Fletcher is so underrated. He fought in three carrier battles and won all three, but one would think that Halsey and Spruance were the only US admirals in the whole Pacific Fleet. True, at Midway he transferred his command to Spruance when the Yorktown was hit, but this is too a proof of good leadership. And Fletcher never behaved as stupidly as Halsey did at Leyte Gulf.]