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AFTER the attack, was Pearl Harbor important in prosecuting the war effort??

 
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AFTER the attack, was Pearl Harbor important in prosecu... - 11/6/2020 7:11:18 PM   
gwgardner

 

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Did Pearl Harbor or Hawaii play any significant role in the war effort, from '42 on through to the end?

< Message edited by gwgardner -- 11/6/2020 7:12:18 PM >
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RE: AFTER the attack, was Pearl Harbor important in pro... - 11/6/2020 7:22:10 PM   
ncc1701e


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The oil stockpile there did I think.

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RE: AFTER the attack, was Pearl Harbor important in pro... - 11/6/2020 10:14:59 PM   
Shellshock


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Pearl Harbor was the staging area for most of the central Pacific offensives that took place in 1943-44. It was also the base for those submarines that operated in Japanese home island waters. It also had the best ship repair facilities outside the continental US. Oahu itself was garrisoned by two Army divisions. The only important military base in Hawaii outside of Oahu was the alternate fleet anchorage at Lahaina

By 1941, the harbor had extensive facilities, including dry docks, machine shops, and oil storage equal to that of the entire Japanese Empire (563,000 tons in 54 tanks) The shipyard alone had an area of 498 acres (371 hectares). It only grew as the war went on. The harbor was still in the process of being dredged, but there was enough deep anchorage for a hundred warships, so long as there was no objection to anchoring them in close clusters.

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RE: AFTER the attack, was Pearl Harbor important in pro... - 11/7/2020 3:57:44 AM   
Lobster


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If the Japanese had destroyed the logistic infrastructure instead of a few old battleships they would have been better off.

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RE: AFTER the attack, was Pearl Harbor important in pro... - 11/7/2020 1:40:00 PM   
Bo Rearguard


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Pearl Harbor's shining post-attack moment was probably the quick emergency repair of the damaged carrier Yorktown after the Coral Sea battle thus making her available for the Battle of Midway.

After the Coral Sea clash, Yorktown was so badly damaged that full repairs were estimated to require ninety days. In the three days that were available for repair, the fuel tanks were welded closed, damaged equipment was replaced, and watertight integrity was restored as much as possible, but there was not time for the three inoperable boilers to be repaired and Yorktown went into battle with her maximum speed reduced to 27 knots. However, her damaged counterpart at Coral Sea, the Japanese carrier Shokaku was in port for weeks for assessment and repair.


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RE: AFTER the attack, was Pearl Harbor important in pro... - 11/7/2020 2:55:11 PM   
MrsWargamer


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I have always been surprised how the Japanese navy balked at key moments. They should have hit Pearl again, trashed the oil. But they failed to press the attack, odd for their culture of dying for the Emporer being a route to heaven. Seemed oddly timid. The last dash of the Yamato, same thing, they didn't press home, and ran, odd for a samurai mentality.

Loss of the oil at Hawaii would have likely cost the US a LOT. Likely would have still won, but it wouldn't have been pretty. By the end of the war in the Pacific, the wallet was getting dangerously low. They didn't necessarily have time to waste. Loss of that oil would have mattered.

So much of that war was so incredibly changed by so little a thing that mattered so much.

It's why I think wargame design is such a challenge to simulate above the operational level. How do you recreate historical blunders, errors and total stupidity?

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RE: AFTER the attack, was Pearl Harbor important in pro... - 11/7/2020 4:14:51 PM   
Grognerd_INC


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quote:

ORIGINAL: MrsWargamer

I have always been surprised how the Japanese navy balked at key moments. They should have hit Pearl again, trashed the oil. But they failed to press the attack, odd for their culture of dying for the Emporer being a route to heaven. Seemed oddly timid. The last dash of the Yamato, same thing, they didn't press home, and ran, odd for a samurai mentality.

Loss of the oil at Hawaii would have likely cost the US a LOT. Likely would have still won, but it wouldn't have been pretty. By the end of the war in the Pacific, the wallet was getting dangerously low. They didn't necessarily have time to waste. Loss of that oil would have mattered.

So much of that war was so incredibly changed by so little a thing that mattered so much.

It's why I think wargame design is such a challenge to simulate above the operational level. How do you recreate historical blunders, errors and total stupidity?

You make a excellent point (one that has always nagged me), one of the biggest weakness in any historical wargame is all human players have historic hindsight. Something you can't get around without stringent rules to force you to follow history.

Edit to answer the OP's question, simply is yes.

< Message edited by Grognerd_INC -- 11/7/2020 4:15:59 PM >


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RE: AFTER the attack, was Pearl Harbor important in pro... - 11/7/2020 4:48:48 PM   
Shellshock


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quote:

ORIGINAL: MrsWargamer
The last dash of the Yamato, same thing, they didn't press home, and ran, odd for a samurai mentality.




Actually, the remaining destroyer captains in the Ten-go operation wanted to push on with the mission even after the Yamato was sunk but were overruled by Combined Fleet ashore after they heard she had gone down. Frankly, without the Yamato the mission was even more pointless than it had been.

I think the epitome of Japanese naval timidity probably took place in 1944 at Leyte Gulf where Admiral Kurita's fleet of Japan's remaining battleships and heavy cruisers took flight after tangling for a few hours with a task force of US escort carriers and their destroyer escorts.

Called Taffy 3, this CVE group found itself under assault by one of the most powerful battle squadrons in the world. Yet, Kurita and his captains fatalistically assumed they faced defeat. It remains a mystery how by October 1944 the fighting seamen of the Japanese navy had been reduce to such poverty of thought, will and action that they couldn't win this engagement. This was a proud force which had conceived the Pearl harbor attack and sunk the mighty British warships Prince of Wales and Repulse and performed miracles of skill and daring during the first years of the war. Yet in this battle with the odds overwhelmingly in their favor, their ship recognition was inept, their tactics were primitive, their gunnery woefully bad, and their spirit feeble. Taking out of proportion losses from this puny force, confused or fatigued they just turned and ran. Admiral Kurita offered some poor excuses later, but none stand up to scrutiny. It does invite the puzzlement of history.



< Message edited by Shellshock -- 11/7/2020 4:52:47 PM >

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RE: AFTER the attack, was Pearl Harbor important in pro... - 11/7/2020 6:24:45 PM   
zakblood


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quote:

How do you recreate historical blunders, errors and total stupidity?


Easy just put men in charge


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RE: AFTER the attack, was Pearl Harbor important in pro... - 11/7/2020 6:39:02 PM   
Capt. Harlock


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quote:

ORIGINAL: MrsWargamer

I have always been surprised how the Japanese navy balked at key moments. They should have hit Pearl again, trashed the oil. But they failed to press the attack, odd for their culture of dying for the Emporer being a route to heaven. Seemed oddly timid. The last dash of the Yamato, same thing, they didn't press home, and ran, odd for a samurai mentality.

Loss of the oil at Hawaii would have likely cost the US a LOT. Likely would have still won, but it wouldn't have been pretty. By the end of the war in the Pacific, the wallet was getting dangerously low. They didn't necessarily have time to waste. Loss of that oil would have mattered.

So much of that war was so incredibly changed by so little a thing that mattered so much.

It's why I think wargame design is such a challenge to simulate above the operational level. How do you recreate historical blunders, errors and total stupidity?


In terms of grand strategy, it is not easy to think how the Pearl Harbor attack could have turned out WORSE for the Japanese. They didn't destroy the oil and repair facilities, they didn't so much as scratch an aircraft carrier, and the eight battleships they did knock out of action were basically gun barges. (even slower than the British 'R" class, whose lack of speed relegated them to the second string.)

Most of all, the political effects were catastrophic for the Axis. From 1942-1945 the U.S. government essentially took over the economy, and turned out jaw-dropping numbers of tanks, planes, and ships -- and managed to maintain or even slightly increase the overall standard of living. I continue to be immensely disappointed that no game I'm aware of has a scenario where the Pearl harbor raid doesn't happen, but in return U. S. industrial production is greatly curtailed.

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RE: AFTER the attack, was Pearl Harbor important in pro... - 11/7/2020 7:43:58 PM   
MrsWargamer


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock


quote:

ORIGINAL: MrsWargamer

I have always been surprised how the Japanese navy balked at key moments. They should have hit Pearl again, trashed the oil. But they failed to press the attack, odd for their culture of dying for the Emporer being a route to heaven. Seemed oddly timid. The last dash of the Yamato, same thing, they didn't press home, and ran, odd for a samurai mentality.

Loss of the oil at Hawaii would have likely cost the US a LOT. Likely would have still won, but it wouldn't have been pretty. By the end of the war in the Pacific, the wallet was getting dangerously low. They didn't necessarily have time to waste. Loss of that oil would have mattered.

So much of that war was so incredibly changed by so little a thing that mattered so much.

It's why I think wargame design is such a challenge to simulate above the operational level. How do you recreate historical blunders, errors and total stupidity?


In terms of grand strategy, it is not easy to think how the Pearl Harbor attack could have turned out WORSE for the Japanese. They didn't destroy the oil and repair facilities, they didn't so much as scratch an aircraft carrier, and the eight battleships they did knock out of action were basically gun barges. (even slower than the British 'R" class, whose lack of speed relegated them to the second string.)

Most of all, the political effects were catastrophic for the Axis. From 1942-1945 the U.S. government essentially took over the economy, and turned out jaw-dropping numbers of tanks, planes, and ships -- and managed to maintain or even slightly increase the overall standard of living. I continue to be immensely disappointed that no game I'm aware of has a scenario where the Pearl harbor raid doesn't happen, but in return U. S. industrial production is greatly curtailed.


Very good comment.


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RE: AFTER the attack, was Pearl Harbor important in pro... - 11/7/2020 7:51:33 PM   
Grognerd_INC


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock


quote:

ORIGINAL: MrsWargamer

I have always been surprised how the Japanese navy balked at key moments. They should have hit Pearl again, trashed the oil. But they failed to press the attack, odd for their culture of dying for the Emporer being a route to heaven. Seemed oddly timid. The last dash of the Yamato, same thing, they didn't press home, and ran, odd for a samurai mentality.

Loss of the oil at Hawaii would have likely cost the US a LOT. Likely would have still won, but it wouldn't have been pretty. By the end of the war in the Pacific, the wallet was getting dangerously low. They didn't necessarily have time to waste. Loss of that oil would have mattered.

So much of that war was so incredibly changed by so little a thing that mattered so much.

It's why I think wargame design is such a challenge to simulate above the operational level. How do you recreate historical blunders, errors and total stupidity?


In terms of grand strategy, it is not easy to think how the Pearl Harbor attack could have turned out WORSE for the Japanese. They didn't destroy the oil and repair facilities, they didn't so much as scratch an aircraft carrier, and the eight battleships they did knock out of action were basically gun barges. (even slower than the British 'R" class, whose lack of speed relegated them to the second string.)

Most of all, the political effects were catastrophic for the Axis. From 1942-1945 the U.S. government essentially took over the economy, and turned out jaw-dropping numbers of tanks, planes, and ships -- and managed to maintain or even slightly increase the overall standard of living. I continue to be immensely disappointed that no game I'm aware of has a scenario where the Pearl harbor raid doesn't happen, but in return U. S. industrial production is greatly curtailed.

Truth is always stranger than fiction.

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RE: AFTER the attack, was Pearl Harbor important in pro... - 11/7/2020 8:16:21 PM   
Platoonist


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I often think the benefits of a second strike on Pearl harbor are vastly overstated. Japanese Admiral Nagumo has often been made the target of historical scapegoating in part to avoid taking the shine off Yamamoto. However, Nagumo's retirement from the Pearl Harbor raid makes excellent sense given the data available to him on the spot.

In Operation Z, the Japanese targeting priorities for the attack were: land-based air power, carriers, battleships, cruisers, port facilities, and then land installations. In other words, fuel tanks were the last item on the list and during their first two waves the Japanese had barely begun to chewing their way into item number three on that list. If Nagumo had actually launched a third strike, as he was with 20/20 hindsight supposed to, chances are good or better that the war would have been prolonged somewhat. However, a second strike also had a very good chance of suffering considerably greater attrition. The second wave of the actual first strike was respectably chewed up, and elite Japanese navy pilots were a limited commodity. Plus, there just weren't many good targets in Pearl harbor that could have justified a second raid.







< Message edited by Platoonist -- 11/22/2020 2:31:30 PM >

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RE: AFTER the attack, was Pearl Harbor important in pro... - 11/7/2020 9:51:42 PM   
Lobster


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Shellshock

Taffy 3





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RE: AFTER the attack, was Pearl Harbor important in pro... - 11/7/2020 9:57:08 PM   
Lobster


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Platoonist
To burn it, you need to heat it to about 150-250F to produce volatile vapor. It's not the sort of stuff that is going to ignite merely by having high explosive go off in the middle and start sympathetic detonations.


Even harder to put it out once it's burning. Dry docks can't function without cranes. Pearl is a good distance away from the infrastructure to repair it, unlike Continental Europe. Apples and oranges.

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RE: AFTER the attack, was Pearl Harbor important in pro... - 11/7/2020 10:26:28 PM   
RFalvo69


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Shellshock
This was a proud force which had conceived the Pearl harbor attack and sunk the mighty British warships Prince of Wales and Repulse and performed miracles of skill and daring during the first years of the war. Yet in this battle with the odds overwhelmingly in their favor, their ship recognition was inept, their tactics were primitive, their gunnery woefully bad, and their spirit feeble. Taking out of proportion losses from this puny force, confused or fatigued they just turned and ran. Admiral Kurita offered some poor excuses later, but none stand up to scrutiny. It does invite the puzzlement of history.

A strategic problem for the Japanese was their "ethos": even the best (or, at least, the veteran) commanders often choose to gurgle down with their ships, thus creating an experience vacuum. For example, at Midway the captain of the Hiryu, Tamon Yamaguchi was considered one of the very best among the Japanese officers (and had his planes not attacked the Yorktown twice by mistake, and gone for the Enterprise or the Hornet instead, no one could say how the battle could have ended). When he refused to leave the doomed Hiryu, Japan lost both his intellect, his carrier warfare training and his years of experience. The US commanders, at least, were torpedoed for incompetence.

[Speaking about US commanders, a mystery to me is why Jack Fletcher is so underrated. He fought in three carrier battles and won all three, but one would think that Halsey and Spruance were the only US admirals in the whole Pacific Fleet. True, at Midway he transferred his command to Spruance when the Yorktown was hit, but this is too a proof of good leadership. And Fletcher never behaved as stupidly as Halsey did at Leyte Gulf.]

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RE: AFTER the attack, was Pearl Harbor important in pro... - 11/7/2020 10:43:47 PM   
Shellshock


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quote:

ORIGINAL: RFalvo69


Speaking about US commanders, a mystery to me is why Jack Fletcher is so underrated. He fought in three carrier battles and won all three, but one would think that Halsey and Spruance were the only US admirals in the whole Pacific Fleet. True, at Midway he transferred his command to Spruance when the Yorktown was hit, but this is too a proof of good leadership. And Fletcher never behaved as stupidly as Halsey did at Leyte Gulf.]


Blame Admiral Ernest King, a hard man not known for sentimentality. King had lost all confidence in Fletcher after the Eastern Solomons carrier battle in which Fletcher dispatched the carrier Wasp south to refuel at a critical moment. The premature withdrawal of his carrier task force after the Guadalcanal landings probably was a big factor too. King found an excuse to retire Fletcher from combat command when an opening came up for a new commandant for 13th Naval District. Contrary to some accounts, Fletcher was not relieved on account of his minor wound he received when Saratoga was hit by a Japanese submarine torpedo.

Unfortunately, because of King's enmity, Fletcher was never able to get back to the carriers. By the time he had recovered, he was the odd man out, with only the stalwart support of Nimitz keeping him in the picture. From late 1943 to the end of the war, he commanded the North Pacific Force and orchestrated attacks on the Kuriles. He had the satisfaction of participating in the occupation of Japan.

History has come down hard against Frank Jack Fletcher's competence as a carrier commander. Yet once his decisions are studied in light of what he himself knew at the time, a far different picture emerges.

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RE: AFTER the attack, was Pearl Harbor important in pro... - 11/7/2020 11:09:40 PM   
Shellshock


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Platoonist

I often think the benefits of a second strike on Pearl harbor are vastly overstated. Japanese Admiral Nagumo has often been made the target of historical scapegoating in part to avoid taking the shine off Yamamoto.






That pretty jibes with the book Navy veteran Alan Zimm wrote called: Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions. He pretty much takes the tack that Admiral Nagumo, commanding the First Air Fleet, was the prudent executor of a plan he had wisely opposed, not the timid figure depicted by historians.

He also takes on that tenet of assumed wisdom that the Japanese should have mounted a second attack on Pearl Harbor, targeting the port facilities and oil storage tanks at Pearl Harbor. Admirals Nimitz and Kimmel and the Navy’s official historian, Samuel Eliot Morison, believed such an action would have seriously impaired the US Navy’s operations in the South Pacific during the first year of the war. But Zimm persuasively shows that such an attack would have achieved only transitory results. Moreover, the First Air Fleet lacked the proper munitions to inflict serious damage on the Pearl Harbor infrastructure, a target set that had never figured seriously in Japanese planning in the first place.

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RE: AFTER the attack, was Pearl Harbor important in pro... - 11/7/2020 11:41:24 PM   
RangerJoe


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But if you were to get the oil burning:

quote:

THE GREAT PRESIDIO OIL FIRE
OF 1924

At 1000 hours on September 14, 1924, the 11th Cavalry once again found itself in a fight. However, this time there were no bullets involved. The Presidio of Monterey was located right next to the Tidewater-Associated Marine Terminal, an oil storage facility. One of the oil storage tanks had been struck by lightning and set on fire. The fires in the wooden oil storage tanks were soon found to be almost impossible to control and the fire spread. Those warehouses closest to the fire contained grain and hay for the horses of the Regiment. The Army began to evacuate these warehouses and the work was completed just 10 minutes before the first oil tank exploded, covering the buildings with burning oil. As the burning tanks collapsed, rivers of burning oil flowed down the streets towards Monterey Bay. The heat from the fires became so intense that people several hundred feet away were burned.

Troopers fought the fires from behind sections of wooden fencing used as shields against the heat. Ladders were placed up against the sides of the burning tanks and troopers were ordered up them to spray water directly into the tanks. Many of these troopers died when the tanks collapsed and they were thrown into the burning oil.

Five days later, when the fire had finally burning itself out, it was found that 26 men were missing from the rolls and several hundred were injured. (Through the Army Memorial Program, many streets of Monterey, California, bear the names of the men who died fighting the fire. The bravery of these troopers is still remembered today, for if the oil had been allowed to flow down onto the town of Monterey and the many wooden structures, a greater number of loss of life and property would have most certainly been greater if it was not for the 11th Cavalry.

LESSONS LEARNED: With this and other similar above ground oil storage tanks fires, lessons were learned, that have affected the oil storage procedures industry wide.

That is, due to the fixed roofing and with repeated drainage/refilling; would naturally generate spacing between the oil and roofing unit. Vapors would develop and it is this, that most believed actually ignited, when the lighting struck. Lighting rods are of little value in these situations. When rainwater or the fire extinguishing water would land on top of the oil, this in time would descend as oil being lighting then water. With the tempter of the burring oil began reaching 212 degrees, the water converts to vapor expanding rapidly thus causing eruption of hot boiling burning oil.

This was not a familiar concept to the troopers who were working in good faith they treated the fire as a “wood burning fire” and continued to spray water onto the tanks hoping to cool the metal/wood casing enough to contain the oil. As the heat would transfer from one tank unit across to an adjacent unit that too would reach a tempter causing that unit to likewise explode, which lead to more loss of life.

Any water accumulated from previous rains that became covered with repeated “drainage/refilling of oil” generated a layering of oil-water-oil etc., when heated, expands and explodes or in this case, oil boiled up and over the sides of the containers. There are several accounts of the storage tank casings becoming too hot and collapsing inward tossing the troopers into the vat of burning oil.

Major lesson learned is that now the “tops” of these oil storage units are a floating top that does not allow the collection of vapors, distance between tanks has extended, a massive earth works have been constructed to contain the total oil within the storage unit in a designated area thus preventing expansion of the burning oil over to other units.

NOTE: Presidio Fire Station

While Brigadier General John J. “Black Jack” Pershing (along with the 11th Cav)
was withdrawing from Mexico and the conclusion of the Punitive Expedition a
tragic fire that took the lives of Pershing’s wife and three of his four children. The Presidio Fire Department was the first military fire department to be established in the United States and was staffed by a civilian fire crew. The Fire Station was one of the first Army stations equipped with automotive fire engines.


https://www.blackhorse.org/11th-armored-cavalry-regiment-history/

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RE: AFTER the attack, was Pearl Harbor important in pro... - 11/8/2020 12:17:58 AM   
RFalvo69


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Shellshock

Blame Admiral Ernest King, a hard man not known for sentimentality. King had lost all confidence in Fletcher after the Eastern Solomons carrier battle in which Fletcher dispatched the carrier Wasp south to refuel at a critical moment.

I never got the impression that King was a particularly intelligent man. The fact that Fletcher won anyway the Eastern Solomons battle - his third in a row - was not really too hard to grasp.
quote:


The premature withdrawal of his carrier task force after the Guadalcanal landings probably was a big factor too.

Also here, too. Even after Midway the Japanese carrier and land-based menace was scary, while the USN had to operate with a bunch of "happy scrappy hero carriers" (brownie points if you know the quote ) and Henderson Field. Having them operating by day and retreating by night was a good compromise - until Captains Crutchley, Bode and their merry men totally fumbled the action at Savo and showed that it wasn't. It turned out that the Japanese were masters of night fighting while the USN lived under a different delusion. I still fail to see how the presence of the US carriers, in bad weather and at night, could have changed things. But I guess that King was not the kind of guy who would come out to pipe "Yo! The USN training under my watch is not up to par! Well, live and learn...!"

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RE: AFTER the attack, was Pearl Harbor important in pro... - 11/8/2020 2:00:22 AM   
Shellshock


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I assume "happy scrappy hero carriers" refers to that classic scene in the movie Clerks? A convenience store is an awkward place to rent a video.

No doubt, Admiral Ernest J. King was vulgar, arrogant, ambitious and possessed a terrible temper. There is the famous quote by his daughter that, "He is the most even-tempered person in the United States Navy. He is always in a rage" He was not the sort of man to suffer anyone who didn't might his exceedingly stringent standards. King also resented the chummy atmosphere atmosphere generated among Annapolis graduates. He felt it led to too many incompetent and indolent admirals keeping their jobs and he made it his personal mission in life to root them out.

However, in spite of his faults, he was an exceedingly capable organizer and administrator with a first class mind and made a great contribution towards winning the war. He had a knack for technology, a remarkable memory, and the versatility to qualify in both submarines, destroyers, and aircraft. I think the term we would use for him nowadays would be "hard but fair". He used his considerable influence to get officers who did their job well promoted even if he didn't like them personally. Unlike the PR-conscious General MacArthur he avoided publicity and hated reporters. He doubtless made an effective counterweight to MacArthur, who would have loved to have had overall command of the Pacific Theater.

One manifestation of his merciless, unforgiving nature was his pledge that no naval officer who lost his ship would ever be given another ship to command, regardless of circumstances. One of the few exceptions was Admiral Fletcher who had two sunk under him, Lexington and Yorktown. I guess that was one of the few examples where King was lenient and it didn't last long.

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Post #: 21
RE: AFTER the attack, was Pearl Harbor important in pro... - 11/9/2020 1:28:12 AM   
gwgardner

 

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Thanks everyone for a very informative discussion.

(in reply to gwgardner)
Post #: 22
RE: AFTER the attack, was Pearl Harbor important in pro... - 11/9/2020 7:39:15 AM   
burbigo

 

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Thanks to y'all for the explanations and the answers !

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Post #: 23
RE: AFTER the attack, was Pearl Harbor important in pro... - 11/10/2020 2:34:01 AM   
CaptBeefheart


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From: Seoul, Korea
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quote:

ORIGINAL: RFalvo69

[Speaking about US commanders, a mystery to me is why Jack Fletcher is so underrated. He fought in three carrier battles and won all three, but one would think that Halsey and Spruance were the only US admirals in the whole Pacific Fleet. True, at Midway he transferred his command to Spruance when the Yorktown was hit, but this is too a proof of good leadership. And Fletcher never behaved as stupidly as Halsey did at Leyte Gulf.]


Fletcher pissed off the Marines at Guadalcanal, and we all know the Marines have the best PR.

Cheers,
CB

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Beer, because barley makes lousy bread.

(in reply to RFalvo69)
Post #: 24
RE: AFTER the attack, was Pearl Harbor important in pro... - 11/10/2020 3:01:55 AM   
RangerJoe


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Kinkaid pissed off Halsey. That did not help the situation with the 7th Fleet and the 3rd Fleet at Leyte Gulf.

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I'm not a complete idiot, some parts are missing!

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(in reply to CaptBeefheart)
Post #: 25
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