From: Somewhere deep in appalachian valley in PA
There was a tendency of Italian military leadership, above all but not only that of the Army, to create a number of units and divisions hardly sustainable by the effectively available national resources (Italian Cold War Army was actually larger than any peacetime army in the Italian history, including under Fascism). This tendency was strengthened by the flow of auxiliary resources activated by the Italian membership in NATO and by the massive US aid. However once such aid ended, it left Italy with the heritage of a excessively large military system, above all unbalanced, which proved prohibitively expensive to modernize until it was downscaled at the end of the Cold War. I found a note that "several thousand" M72 LAW were acquired, but never issued, probably because they were too few in numbers to be effective. In the 1970s military appropriations were approved only after long, contentious parliamentary debates. A series of ten-year modernization programs were approved, but much of the funding was delayed because of domestic inflation. APILAS was an urgent stop-gap measure (only 500 were bought) to equip rapid reaction force. They mostly relied on terrain, fortifications and battalion level assets like large calibre RCL and ATGMs to provide AT protection.
I was only able to find out that APFSDS were purchased in 1985, but the type is unknown (likely Israeli-German design, so DM-33). I was under impression military was trying to hide their purchases from Parliament (judging by parliamentary sessions on MILAN and cluster ammunition) in order to secure at least something.
You best bet is to maximise combined arms approach, including jeep mounted weapons.
As for Yugoslavia, it was geographically situated between a NATO anvil and the Soviet hammer, so the prospect of invasion would permanently dominate Yugoslav strategic plans. According to Yugoslav thinking, the final goal of the global powers was to overthrow the socialist state and its self-managed political system and that is why stockpiling and self-reliance was meticulously enforced. Particularly since witnessing the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, Yugoslav military doctrine focused on combining its large field army with the guerrilla experience of the Partisans in World War II. In planning, this would entail the armed forces forces to conduct conventional warfare along a nationwide front, buying time for reserves and the general population to mobilize. Small Territorial Defence units would engage alongside beside regular troops in their local areas, emphasizing mobility and light anti-personnel and anti-armor weapons. Because armament parity with likely opponents, both in quality and quantity, was hard to achieve, Yugoslavs tried to use limited national defense resources in the most efficient way, rarely if ever squandering even the most obsolete weapons. And while the center of gravity of the Yugoslav Army were the infantry formations that were highly varied, logistically undemanding and survivable, armoured and mechanized were certainly capable of making it tough for any adversary.
While this proved to be a successful deterrence to outside attack, it also created the conditions for demise of Yugoslavia itself, and unknowingly endorsed tactics and strategies that would cause untold suffering among its own people in brutal civil war that ensued after the end of Cold War.
Thanks for the detailed behind stories! This gave me more immersion.