From: Bratislava, Slovakia
Destroying fuel tanks at Pearl would not affect PacFleet Submarine operations much.
Single oiler of the Patoka class (e.g. USS Ramapo AO-12) had a capacity of 70,000 barrels, Cimarron class fleet oiler (e.g. USS Neosho AO-23) had 146,000 barrels.
Typical Fleet submarine available in 1942 (Tambor, Sargo, Seadragon, Salmon, Perch, Shark, Porpoise classes) had total bunkerage of about 90,000-109,000 galons. Averaged, rounded up it is some 2400 barrels of diesel oil. Later classes like Gato, Balao and Tench had up to 116,000 galons bunkerage so up to 2800 barrels of diesel oil.
Doing some math here, a single Patoka class oiler would be able to support 25-29 submarines topped up, while Cimarron class ship would support 52-60 submarines topped up.
Of course Fleet oilers would be used elsewhere, but commercial tankers were available. Just one tanker doing WC-PH route once a month would be able to bring enough fuel to support number of submarines operating out of Pearl. Couple of Submarine tenders (AS) would be able to keep subs in operation in case a submarine repair facilities were hit badly. Of course they would have to be taken out from somewhere else, but I presume this would not cause such degradation of submarine patrols in number on efficiency as to make a big difference in the end.