I don’t know how accurately the game models the economy and effects of bombing. Then again there is a whole historical debate as to whether the German economy could be “halted” by aerial bombing and if so, how? I have seen oil, transport and power (electricity) mentioned in RL debates.
Part of the problem is that the Allies underestimated just how many bombers were needed to truly knock out a target, had troubles correctly estimating the damage done in raids, underestimated the importance of long-range fighter escorts, and left some targets off the target lists (the German electrical supply was particularly vulnerable but never substantially attacked).
All that said, the bombing did effectively collapse the German economy — its war production index as recorded by Speer's armaments ministry peaked in July 1944 and began falling rapidly after that. Its railway system was almost completely shut down by early 1945, which made it nearly impossible to move goods, supplies, and armaments within Germany.
Although the popular conception is that Bomber Command did little more than incendiary area raids on German cities, that isn't the case. Roughly half the RAF's effort was against a variety of targets other than area raids, hitting railway centres, airfield, V-weapon sites, ports, oil refineries, steel mills, and more.
Indeed, according to Adam Tooze's The Wages of Destruction, the second Battle of the Ruhr waged in the first half of 1943, had a huge effect on the German war economy. That production had been increasing at a substantial pace over fifteen months; the RAF attacks on the Ruhr resulted in an effective stagnation of German war production over the subsequent nine months, with a particular shortage of vital subcomponents, according to the German's own records. It wasn't until March 1944 that a major increase in the German military production index was next recorded. The main issue with Bomber Command's effort rested with Sir Arthur Harris, who was firmly wedded to the prewar ideas of air power, and had disdain for the 'precision' attacks preferred by the USAAF. Harris called the supporters of such raids as 'panacea merchants'. Right at the point the Ruhr offensive might have had a decisive effect, he called off the effort in favour of area attacks on German cities, starting with the July 1943 raid on Hamburg.
While the effects of area raids are hard to measure in terms of direct effect on the German war economy, there were unquestionably indirect effects which contributed to the Allied victory. Perhaps the most important of these was the allocation of artillery. From 1942 to 1944, some 83% of the dual purpose artillery produced by Germany was used in the anti-air role. That's a whole lot less artillery firing at Allied tanks and troops. The effects of the more specifically targeted attacks are easier to quantify.
The dams raid was stunningly good at showing this. It was sold as war winning and could never have been this so is usually not regarded well because of it.
Part of the issue with that raid was that one of the dams targeted was not, in fact, a vital target; it had been misidentified by British intelligence. Another issue was the failure to follow up the raid with similar attacks on other installations, and to complete the destruction of the damaged installations. This error in prematurely assuming a target had been effectively taken out was to be repeated numerous times during the war. (The heavy losses suffered on the raid were another reason why follow up attacks were not conducted.)