Personally I think using the term preemptive is incorrect. To call it that implies that an attack by the U.S. against Japan was imminent. It smacks of yet more history editing.
I also bristle at the commentary that the Japanese had no choice other than to attack PH and the PI post-oil embargo. They could have agreed to our terms for a normalized relationship or worked elsewhere for their strategic petroleum needs. They apparently (mis)calculated that to do so was not worth their costs to save face, stop pillaging China and play nice on the international stage. They chose war. They chose their pre-emptive strike.
I always find funny (and by that I mean bloody irritating) the criticism labelled at the British and French for desperately trying to stop another catastrophic war (just a generation after the last one) by appeasement policy - and then the same armchair critics who criticise the Americans for trying to stop Japan by stronger arm tactics.
So basically, to these wise-acres both attempts, despite being diametrically opposed, were both wrong. So easy to bash the democracies regardless of what they did - especially with hindsight ...
IIRC, the reason for appeasement was that the British and French were not ready for war, but thought Germany was. She wasn't either, but they didn't know that. In Chris Crwaford's strategy book on his game Balance of Power, he wrote than when they entered the war when Poland was invaded, Hitler turned to Goebbels and asked "Now what?".
As for a "preemptive strike" on the US, I don't see it. Again, IIRC, US naval theory at the time was that a fleet lost 10% effectiveness for every 1,000 miles from base. Both sides considered battleships worth far more than carriers, According to the book 'The Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions', Yamamoto was quite willing to trade the six carriers for sinking US battleships. But, I ramble.....