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The real Sea of Fire, 1982, was quite different

 
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The real Sea of Fire, 1982, was quite different - 3/25/2016 4:47:35 PM   
Alejo1968


Posts: 101
Joined: 10/22/2006
Status: offline
I´m a little bit frustrated. Basically.

I purchased CMANO because I thought I could finally recreate the events of the Falklands/Malvinas war (beign the rest a very very big bonus). So as soon I got it working I modified and played the scenario "Sea of Fire" to recreate the real events of that what happened in May 25th 1982. The truth is there were not Super Etendards armed with Exocet missiles and the flight which attacked the british ships (FFG Broadsword and DDG Coventry, North of Pebble island) were 4 not six.
I restricted my forces to the real ones involved and was never even close to the outcom the attack made that day. Belive me when I say not even close.

Now a little of data to understand...

Both ships were patrolling north of Pebble Island when they got attacked by 4 A-4Bs armed with iron bombs coming from the south, shadowed by land.
First problem faced by the Coventry: She tried to lock on the argentine a/c´s and fire their Sea Darts, but just couldnt. The clutter caused by the island just prevented her from doing so. She just fired one single missile and almost immediatly lost lock and and it went aimlessly straight into the air. The Sea Dart was not made to shoot down very low level fast targets.

It appearss to me that ground clutter caused by elevations (I´m not speaking of sea skimming targets) is not a factor/modifier considered by the software.

Cmano events: Then, Coventry starts shooting missiles without major problems, and with such a high PK (it assumes lock as a given thing IMO) just kills at least 1 or 2 targets.

In the real history, it was then the turn of the Broadsword to face the threats. The first couple of attacking a/c´s came very close to eachother, and the british radar initiallly saw just one blip. When they spread the formation and two contacts appeared, the defense system of the ship just whent to slip. No lock, no firing.

I understand very close formation is not a factor to deceive missiles in CMANO. And this kind of failures are not modelled (maybe delay lock, at least?).

What happened later was Broadsword tried to aquire the targets with a visual lock, but saw Coventry blocking its line of fire. So no fire came from her except gunfire.
All ended with three bombs exploing in the DDG sunking her in half an hour and the full flight of A-4´s going back to base unharmed.

Is line of sight obstruction between ships modelled in CMANO?

Some more data: On 12 May 1982, Brilliant and HMS Glasgow were in combination and were attacked by a flight of four Argentine A-4 Skyhawk aircraft. Brilliant was able to shoot down two of these and cause a third to crash trying to avoid the missile (Hit efectivness 50%). A second wave of aircraft attacked during a failure of the missile system, which led to the Type 42 Glasgow suffering heavy damage. So, we have another failure and a type 42 unable to defend herself properly.
Sea Wolf suffered from problems with hardware failure causing launches to fail, and broken lock resulting from the extreme sea conditions and the Argentines' low altitude hit-and-run tactics.

Sea Wolf accounted for two confirmed "kills" and three further possible successes from eight launches. Two confirmed kills and Eight launches thrughout all the conflict.

CMANO events: Broadsword always get to fire at least 8 Sea Wolf, which added to the Sea Darts, sistematically kills all 4 A-4B´s before they even get to drop one bomb.
Had I the chance to get with at least 1 or 2 a/c to the ships in one of the many tries I made, then I would be able to obtain a realistic ending.
And my last matter. ROF. In the real events there were shot 8 missiles in total thruout the whole conflict. We have in CMANO at least 8 shots per engagement. This doubles the ROF of the real campaign.

Is it possible to modify ships ROF and introuduce this in ROE to historical values?.

I would expect a ship thousands of kilometers from its country to take care of its ammunition. With such a high probability kill, like the one of the Sea Wolf, fire one or two missiles to the target, and if It doesnt kill it, then make a new 1 or 2 new missiles shot. Not automatically always the full ROF.

Eventhough I had extremely bad luck, or (IMHO) for this conflict (with ultra advanced ships, for the time beign, against antiquated aircrafts with no counter measures of any type) ships are just too lethal. The rate of kills suffered by aircrafts is just plain high.

Some factors I mentioned may be already implemented but I think until all of of them are, I will never get a totally realistic outcome of this engagement nor any other that occured in the Falklands/Malvinas or South Atlantic war.

Please take this post as a constructive one. I think CMANO is wonderfull, and I want it to stay in my SSD literally for ever. Hope the dev team reads this and consider it.

Thanks



Post #: 1
RE: The real Sea of Fire, 1982, was quite different - 3/25/2016 6:24:36 PM   
mikmykWS

 

Posts: 11524
Joined: 3/22/2005
Status: offline
You can modify firing rates

http://www.warfaresims.com/?p=3598

One of our developers fought in the Falklands.

Mike

< Message edited by mikmyk -- 3/25/2016 6:27:29 PM >


_____________________________


(in reply to Alejo1968)
Post #: 2
RE: The real Sea of Fire, 1982, was quite different - 3/25/2016 8:02:06 PM   
ComDev

 

Posts: 5735
Joined: 5/12/2006
Status: offline
Hm the A-4s were supposed to operate below the Sea Dart's min altitude... could be an improvement in the model accidently broke some intended behaviour. I'll take a look...

_____________________________



Developer "Command: Modern Air/Naval Operations" project!

(in reply to mikmykWS)
Post #: 3
RE: The real Sea of Fire, 1982, was quite different - 3/25/2016 8:52:16 PM   
Dimitris


Posts: 11974
Joined: 7/31/2005
Status: online
Hello, and thanks for your feedback.

Others will no doubt post here about tech/tactical details. Radar clutter because of hills behind the target, one ship masking another, minimum altitude of the attacking A-4s as a result of time-of-day, sea state and pilot proficiency, and the critical factor of the brand of coffee that Sir Sandy had that fateful day.

I want to talk about the bigger picture. About what you're really saying/implying: "This simulation does not consistently reproduce the historical result of a specific single, isolated engagement, and this is a defect".

Which is kinda like saying that Pro Evolution is a defective representation of soccer because it does not consistently reproduce goals such as this: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uS2bomiDOko

The matter of massaging models & data in order to closely track historical outcomes, and the dangers of doing so, has in fact already been discussed on this forum. Read here: http://www.warfaresims.com/?p=2793

The attack of the Argentinian A-4s on the Coventry and Broadsword that day had a myriad of possible different final outcomes (to visualize this, imagine a tree starting from a common trunk and branching out), broadly ranging from "All RN ships sunk, all hands lost, not a scratch on the A-4s" all the way to "The RN ships effortlessly blot the A-4s out of the sky". What historically happened was one of those myriad possible endings. Was it the most probable outcome? According to both Arg and RN personnel we've talked with, no. As you yourself described, a number of unlikely things went bad for the RN side and conspired to bring about the loss of the Coventry.

As one of our users pointed out, most people have a built-in bias of considering historical outcomes "after the fact" as the most probable ones, even when in reality they are statistical flukes. Is the RL outcome *possible* in Command? Sure it is; roll a few bad missile endgame rolls and the A-4s end up on top of the RN ships just like in RL. Is it *likely* this will happen? Statistically, no. Is this indicative of a flaw in Command? I don't think so. CMANO, like most wargames, deals in probabilities while also allowing lucky/unlucky events. Did Sherman tanks get lucky against Tigers now and then like in "Fury"? Sure. If you had the ability to time-travel and experience this engagement, say, a hundred times, would the result be the same?

Let's take another fluke event from that same conflict, to better highlight the futility of chasing precise historical outcomes. Early on, an Argie B-707 snooper got too close to the AAW picket line and got fired at by *six* Sea Darts. All of them missed. It didn't outrun them, it didn't evade them, it didn't do anything fancy. They simply missed. (CMANO equivalent: consecutive unlucky missile endgame rolls).

Now imagine someone barging in this here forum and arguing that he cannot reliably reproduce this result in CMANO (no wonder; the odds are really low) and trying to bully us to change (lower significantly) the Sea Dart PoK to match this outcome. And let's say we don't know better and we comply. Congratulations, the Sea Dart (a weapon that historically shot down a number of A-4s and even [in its improved ADIMP version] had the first ever "in anger" ASCM kill in '91) is now completely harmless against anything more capable than a lumbering B-707. We "fixed" one case and broke 99 others. I don't consider that a favorable tradeoff.

Like I said, we can discuss tech & modelling until the cows come home. In a complex simulation like CMANO there are always details to tweak. It's the fundamental "must match RL outcomes or else" viewpoint that I disagree with, and I would wager I am not alone.

Thanks!

< Message edited by Sunburn -- 3/25/2016 8:55:59 PM >


_____________________________


(in reply to ComDev)
Post #: 4
RE: The real Sea of Fire, 1982, was quite different - 3/25/2016 11:17:19 PM   
ComDev

 

Posts: 5735
Joined: 5/12/2006
Status: offline
Have made some mods, incl a couple database adjustments. The updates scen will be released with DB v443, soon.

_____________________________



Developer "Command: Modern Air/Naval Operations" project!

(in reply to Dimitris)
Post #: 5
RE: The real Sea of Fire, 1982, was quite different - 3/26/2016 12:02:54 AM   
Alejo1968


Posts: 101
Joined: 10/22/2006
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: mikmyk

You can modify firing rates

http://www.warfaresims.com/?p=3598

One of our developers fought in the Falklands.

Mike


Thanks for the info.
About the CMANO developer, he must have been a very good source of information, I`m sure and respect that. Now that you mention it, for me, I`ve been in the Argentine Air Force 25 years and retired in 2008. Flew the same combat aircrafts that fought there. In fact, missed the war for a few years... But had countless conversations with the pilots that fought during those tragic days.

I just find the ships more lethal than what I think they should be. But it is just my opinion.

Exreme ambient conditions effect on failures, Rate of fire, ground clutter, line of sight, crossing tragets, very close formation to deceive radar lock, are facts that would be great to be considered.


< Message edited by Abbeville_01 -- 3/26/2016 12:37:21 AM >

(in reply to mikmykWS)
Post #: 6
RE: The real Sea of Fire, 1982, was quite different - 3/26/2016 12:32:28 AM   
Alejo1968


Posts: 101
Joined: 10/22/2006
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Sunburn

Hello, and thanks for your feedback.

Others will no doubt post here about tech/tactical details. Radar clutter because of hills behind the target, one ship masking another, minimum altitude of the attacking A-4s as a result of time-of-day, sea state and pilot proficiency, and the critical factor of the brand of coffee that Sir Sandy had that fateful day.

I want to talk about the bigger picture. About what you're really saying/implying: "This simulation does not consistently reproduce the historical result of a specific single, isolated engagement, and this is a defect".

Which is kinda like saying that Pro Evolution is a defective representation of soccer because it does not consistently reproduce goals such as this: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uS2bomiDOko

The matter of massaging models & data in order to closely track historical outcomes, and the dangers of doing so, has in fact already been discussed on this forum. Read here: http://www.warfaresims.com/?p=2793

The attack of the Argentinian A-4s on the Coventry and Broadsword that day had a myriad of possible different final outcomes (to visualize this, imagine a tree starting from a common trunk and branching out), broadly ranging from "All RN ships sunk, all hands lost, not a scratch on the A-4s" all the way to "The RN ships effortlessly blot the A-4s out of the sky". What historically happened was one of those myriad possible endings. Was it the most probable outcome? According to both Arg and RN personnel we've talked with, no. As you yourself described, a number of unlikely things went bad for the RN side and conspired to bring about the loss of the Coventry.

As one of our users pointed out, most people have a built-in bias of considering historical outcomes "after the fact" as the most probable ones, even when in reality they are statistical flukes. Is the RL outcome *possible* in Command? Sure it is; roll a few bad missile endgame rolls and the A-4s end up on top of the RN ships just like in RL. Is it *likely* this will happen? Statistically, no. Is this indicative of a flaw in Command? I don't think so. CMANO, like most wargames, deals in probabilities while also allowing lucky/unlucky events. Did Sherman tanks get lucky against Tigers now and then like in "Fury"? Sure. If you had the ability to time-travel and experience this engagement, say, a hundred times, would the result be the same?

Let's take another fluke event from that same conflict, to better highlight the futility of chasing precise historical outcomes. Early on, an Argie B-707 snooper got too close to the AAW picket line and got fired at by *six* Sea Darts. All of them missed. It didn't outrun them, it didn't evade them, it didn't do anything fancy. They simply missed. (CMANO equivalent: consecutive unlucky missile endgame rolls).

Now imagine someone barging in this here forum and arguing that he cannot reliably reproduce this result in CMANO (no wonder; the odds are really low) and trying to bully us to change (lower significantly) the Sea Dart PoK to match this outcome. And let's say we don't know better and we comply. Congratulations, the Sea Dart (a weapon that historically shot down a number of A-4s and even [in its improved ADIMP version] had the first ever "in anger" ASCM kill in '91) is now completely harmless against anything more capable than a lumbering B-707. We "fixed" one case and broke 99 others. I don't consider that a favorable tradeoff.

Like I said, we can discuss tech & modelling until the cows come home. In a complex simulation like CMANO there are always details to tweak. It's the fundamental "must match RL outcomes or else" viewpoint that I disagree with, and I would wager I am not alone.

Thanks!


Thanks Sunburn for your detailed answer.
You are right when you say a myriad of things could have happened that day. I would play a hundred times and would not get that same outcome? Maybe.
In my original post, in the end, I refer to any engagement, not just the Coventry sinking. That was a detailed example, but Is the campaign in which I have interest.
I used the editor to refight the San Carlos attacks, also the attack made in May 1st ("Torno" flight of 3 Mirages 5 Dagger against HMS Alacrity, Arrow and Glamorgan, if I remember correctly), the Sheffield attack, etc. In all of them It appeared to me, that ship lethality against air threats was too high, more than I expected.
In Sea of Fire you added 2 Super Etendards armed with Exocet missiles, and two more A-4´s to make the fight balanced...
Would close formation, ambient conditions effect on systems, clutter, line of sight and ROF, change that? Well, it is up to you to decide if you think it deserves to be considered. I`m just giving you my opinion to make this simulation even better.

(in reply to Dimitris)
Post #: 7
RE: The real Sea of Fire, 1982, was quite different - 3/26/2016 12:43:03 AM   
mikmykWS

 

Posts: 11524
Joined: 3/22/2005
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Abbeville_01

quote:

ORIGINAL: mikmyk

You can modify firing rates

http://www.warfaresims.com/?p=3598

One of our developers fought in the Falklands.

Mike


Thanks for the info.
About the CMANO developer, he must have been a very good source of information, I`m sure and respect that. Now that you mention it, for me, I`ve been in the Argentine Air Force 25 years and retired in 2008. Flew the same combat aircrafts that fought there. In fact, missed the war for a few years... But had countless conversations with the pilots that fought during those tragic days.

I just find the ships more lethal than what I think they should be. But it is just my opinion.

Exreme ambient conditions effect on failures, Rate of fire, ground clutter, line of sight, crossing tragets, very close formation to deceive radar lock, are facts that would be great to be considered.



Wow. This is great. Welcome!

Developing software to simulate real life physics is difficult so our approach has been iterative. You keep working with it and testing until you approach what seems to be correct. Please continue passing on what we should be paying attention to. It absolutely helps us.

Thanks!

Mike

_____________________________


(in reply to Alejo1968)
Post #: 8
RE: The real Sea of Fire, 1982, was quite different - 3/26/2016 12:45:11 AM   
Alejo1968


Posts: 101
Joined: 10/22/2006
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: emsoy

Have made some mods, incl a couple database adjustments. The updates scen will be released with DB v443, soon.


Thanks a lot emsoy for taking the time.

(in reply to ComDev)
Post #: 9
RE: The real Sea of Fire, 1982, was quite different - 3/26/2016 12:47:13 AM   
Alejo1968


Posts: 101
Joined: 10/22/2006
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: mikmyk


quote:

ORIGINAL: Abbeville_01

quote:

ORIGINAL: mikmyk

You can modify firing rates

http://www.warfaresims.com/?p=3598

One of our developers fought in the Falklands.

Mike


Thanks for the info.
About the CMANO developer, he must have been a very good source of information, I`m sure and respect that. Now that you mention it, for me, I`ve been in the Argentine Air Force 25 years and retired in 2008. Flew the same combat aircrafts that fought there. In fact, missed the war for a few years... But had countless conversations with the pilots that fought during those tragic days.

I just find the ships more lethal than what I think they should be. But it is just my opinion.

Exreme ambient conditions effect on failures, Rate of fire, ground clutter, line of sight, crossing tragets, very close formation to deceive radar lock, are facts that would be great to be considered.



Wow. This is great. Welcome!

Developing software to simulate real life physics is difficult so our approach has been iterative. You keep working with it and testing until you approach what seems to be correct. Please continue passing on what we should be paying attention to. It absolutely helps us.

Thanks!

Mike


Yoy may count on it, even give you data from those pilots if you ever need it.
Just ask.

(in reply to mikmykWS)
Post #: 10
RE: The real Sea of Fire, 1982, was quite different - 3/26/2016 8:51:34 PM   
.Sirius


Posts: 1268
Joined: 1/18/2013
Status: offline
Hi Abbeville_01,
I served on HMS Plymouth during the Falklands War, the Sea of Fire Scenario is not as it was, this engagement has been enhanced to what it could have been on that day if Super E's had been available at that time, I salute you Sir you Brave Comrades for that period in time, they were very good pilots and brave too.
quote:

ORIGINAL: Abbeville_01


quote:

ORIGINAL: mikmyk


quote:

ORIGINAL: Abbeville_01

quote:

ORIGINAL: mikmyk

You can modify firing rates

http://www.warfaresims.com/?p=3598

One of our developers fought in the Falklands.

Mike


Thanks for the info.
About the CMANO developer, he must have been a very good source of information, I`m sure and respect that. Now that you mention it, for me, I`ve been in the Argentine Air Force 25 years and retired in 2008. Flew the same combat aircrafts that fought there. In fact, missed the war for a few years... But had countless conversations with the pilots that fought during those tragic days.

I just find the ships more lethal than what I think they should be. But it is just my opinion.

Exreme ambient conditions effect on failures, Rate of fire, ground clutter, line of sight, crossing tragets, very close formation to deceive radar lock, are facts that would be great to be considered.



Wow. This is great. Welcome!

Developing software to simulate real life physics is difficult so our approach has been iterative. You keep working with it and testing until you approach what seems to be correct. Please continue passing on what we should be paying attention to. It absolutely helps us.

Thanks!

Mike


Yoy may count on it, even give you data from those pilots if you ever need it.
Just ask.



_____________________________

Paul aka Sirius
Command: Modern Air/Naval Operations
Cold War Data Base 1946-1979 Author

Old radar men never die - Their echoes fade away in accordance with the inverse fourth power law

(in reply to Alejo1968)
Post #: 11
RE: The real Sea of Fire, 1982, was quite different - 3/27/2016 3:18:07 AM   
Alejo1968


Posts: 101
Joined: 10/22/2006
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: .Sirius

Hi Abbeville_01,
I served on HMS Plymouth during the Falklands War, the Sea of Fire Scenario is not as it was, this engagement has been enhanced to what it could have been on that day if Super E's had been available at that time, I salute you Sir you Brave Comrades for that period in time, they were very good pilots and brave too.
quote:

ORIGINAL: Abbeville_01


quote:

ORIGINAL: mikmyk


quote:

ORIGINAL: Abbeville_01

quote:

ORIGINAL: mikmyk

You can modify firing rates

http://www.warfaresims.com/?p=3598

One of our developers fought in the Falklands.

Mike


Thanks for the info.
About the CMANO developer, he must have been a very good source of information, I`m sure and respect that. Now that you mention it, for me, I`ve been in the Argentine Air Force 25 years and retired in 2008. Flew the same combat aircrafts that fought there. In fact, missed the war for a few years... But had countless conversations with the pilots that fought during those tragic days.

I just find the ships more lethal than what I think they should be. But it is just my opinion.

Exreme ambient conditions effect on failures, Rate of fire, ground clutter, line of sight, crossing tragets, very close formation to deceive radar lock, are facts that would be great to be considered.



Wow. This is great. Welcome!

Developing software to simulate real life physics is difficult so our approach has been iterative. You keep working with it and testing until you approach what seems to be correct. Please continue passing on what we should be paying attention to. It absolutely helps us.

Thanks!

Mike


Yoy may count on it, even give you data from those pilots if you ever need it.
Just ask.




Thank you Paul for your words, I can´t but to feel goosebumps writing to you and knowing you were in HMS Plymouth. I don´t want to go into details, but I have to ask... Were you on duty on her that day (june 8th) in San Carlos near Pt Darwin? I talked a couple of times about your ship, with two of the six Dagger pilots that flew there that day. You know, I flew Dagger too (later named Finger) many years. I even owe one to my country as I ejected years ago! :D :D After the war we used to simulate the same type of attacks made in the Islands, with our Armada frigates.
I can´t find the right words, so I´ll only tell you you have all my respect. Were I more fluent in English and I would have said something in a more proper way.

Regards,
Alejandro.

(in reply to .Sirius)
Post #: 12
RE: The real Sea of Fire, 1982, was quite different - 3/27/2016 10:48:43 AM   
.Sirius


Posts: 1268
Joined: 1/18/2013
Status: offline
Hi yes I was duty that day as one of the upper deck gun crews , I was manning one of the port side machine guns at the incoming raids, they came in low and fast over the hillside and bounced us big time
quote:

ORIGINAL: Abbeville_01


quote:

ORIGINAL: .Sirius

Hi Abbeville_01,
I served on HMS Plymouth during the Falklands War, the Sea of Fire Scenario is not as it was, this engagement has been enhanced to what it could have been on that day if Super E's had been available at that time, I salute you Sir you Brave Comrades for that period in time, they were very good pilots and brave too.
quote:

ORIGINAL: Abbeville_01


quote:

ORIGINAL: mikmyk


quote:

ORIGINAL: Abbeville_01

quote:

ORIGINAL: mikmyk

You can modify firing rates

http://www.warfaresims.com/?p=3598

One of our developers fought in the Falklands.

Mike


Thanks for the info.
About the CMANO developer, he must have been a very good source of information, I`m sure and respect that. Now that you mention it, for me, I`ve been in the Argentine Air Force 25 years and retired in 2008. Flew the same combat aircrafts that fought there. In fact, missed the war for a few years... But had countless conversations with the pilots that fought during those tragic days.

I just find the ships more lethal than what I think they should be. But it is just my opinion.

Exreme ambient conditions effect on failures, Rate of fire, ground clutter, line of sight, crossing tragets, very close formation to deceive radar lock, are facts that would be great to be considered.



Wow. This is great. Welcome!

Developing software to simulate real life physics is difficult so our approach has been iterative. You keep working with it and testing until you approach what seems to be correct. Please continue passing on what we should be paying attention to. It absolutely helps us.

Thanks!

Mike


Yoy may count on it, even give you data from those pilots if you ever need it.
Just ask.




Thank you Paul for your words, I can´t but to feel goosebumps writing to you and knowing you were in HMS Plymouth. I don´t want to go into details, but I have to ask... Were you on duty on her that day (june 8th) in San Carlos near Pt Darwin? I talked a couple of times about your ship, with two of the six Dagger pilots that flew there that day. You know, I flew Dagger too (later named Finger) many years. I even owe one to my country as I ejected years ago! :D :D After the war we used to simulate the same type of attacks made in the Islands, with our Armada frigates.
I can´t find the right words, so I´ll only tell you you have all my respect. Were I more fluent in English and I would have said something in a more proper way.

Regards,
Alejandro.



_____________________________

Paul aka Sirius
Command: Modern Air/Naval Operations
Cold War Data Base 1946-1979 Author

Old radar men never die - Their echoes fade away in accordance with the inverse fourth power law

(in reply to Alejo1968)
Post #: 13
RE: The real Sea of Fire, 1982, was quite different - 3/27/2016 3:07:57 PM   
Alejo1968


Posts: 101
Joined: 10/22/2006
Status: offline
Guess words just cannot describe experences like that.

I think CMANO can´t go unnoticed by Armed Forces or Defense Departments. While in the War College we used a software (not as pritty as yours, of course) that basically did the same thing. The important aspect was it could manage logistics. Every part of the assets involved in the campaign simulated had all its part number (EDIT: to some extent), location, availability and on. So based on that, it could also make calculations on failures, delays, etc. before, for example, a package mission was formed and executed. You know, logistic is 75% of the fight.

Thx again, and I´m glad you´re involved with this fabulous simulation.

< Message edited by Abbeville_01 -- 3/27/2016 3:16:46 PM >

(in reply to .Sirius)
Post #: 14
RE: The real Sea of Fire, 1982, was quite different - 3/28/2016 8:19:20 AM   
DerGrenadier


Posts: 106
Joined: 12/11/2011
From: Germania Superior
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Sunburn

Hello, and thanks for your feedback.

Others will no doubt post here about tech/tactical details. Radar clutter because of hills behind the target, one ship masking another, minimum altitude of the attacking A-4s as a result of time-of-day, sea state and pilot proficiency, and the critical factor of the brand of coffee that Sir Sandy had that fateful day.

I want to talk about the bigger picture. About what you're really saying/implying: "This simulation does not consistently reproduce the historical result of a specific single, isolated engagement, and this is a defect".

Which is kinda like saying that Pro Evolution is a defective representation of soccer because it does not consistently reproduce goals such as this: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uS2bomiDOko

The matter of massaging models & data in order to closely track historical outcomes, and the dangers of doing so, has in fact already been discussed on this forum. Read here: http://www.warfaresims.com/?p=2793

The attack of the Argentinian A-4s on the Coventry and Broadsword that day had a myriad of possible different final outcomes (to visualize this, imagine a tree starting from a common trunk and branching out), broadly ranging from "All RN ships sunk, all hands lost, not a scratch on the A-4s" all the way to "The RN ships effortlessly blot the A-4s out of the sky". What historically happened was one of those myriad possible endings. Was it the most probable outcome? According to both Arg and RN personnel we've talked with, no. As you yourself described, a number of unlikely things went bad for the RN side and conspired to bring about the loss of the Coventry.

As one of our users pointed out, most people have a built-in bias of considering historical outcomes "after the fact" as the most probable ones, even when in reality they are statistical flukes. Is the RL outcome *possible* in Command? Sure it is; roll a few bad missile endgame rolls and the A-4s end up on top of the RN ships just like in RL. Is it *likely* this will happen? Statistically, no. Is this indicative of a flaw in Command? I don't think so. CMANO, like most wargames, deals in probabilities while also allowing lucky/unlucky events. Did Sherman tanks get lucky against Tigers now and then like in "Fury"? Sure. If you had the ability to time-travel and experience this engagement, say, a hundred times, would the result be the same?

Let's take another fluke event from that same conflict, to better highlight the futility of chasing precise historical outcomes. Early on, an Argie B-707 snooper got too close to the AAW picket line and got fired at by *six* Sea Darts. All of them missed. It didn't outrun them, it didn't evade them, it didn't do anything fancy. They simply missed. (CMANO equivalent: consecutive unlucky missile endgame rolls).

Now imagine someone barging in this here forum and arguing that he cannot reliably reproduce this result in CMANO (no wonder; the odds are really low) and trying to bully us to change (lower significantly) the Sea Dart PoK to match this outcome. And let's say we don't know better and we comply. Congratulations, the Sea Dart (a weapon that historically shot down a number of A-4s and even [in its improved ADIMP version] had the first ever "in anger" ASCM kill in '91) is now completely harmless against anything more capable than a lumbering B-707. We "fixed" one case and broke 99 others. I don't consider that a favorable tradeoff.

Like I said, we can discuss tech & modelling until the cows come home. In a complex simulation like CMANO there are always details to tweak. It's the fundamental "must match RL outcomes or else" viewpoint that I disagree with, and I would wager I am not alone.

Thanks!


Well said!


_____________________________







(in reply to Dimitris)
Post #: 15
RE: The real Sea of Fire, 1982, was quite different - 3/28/2016 3:20:05 PM   
ultradave


Posts: 1248
Joined: 8/20/2013
Status: offline
Fascinating discussion guys. The level of knowledge of the people who hang out here is always impressive.

_____________________________

----------------
Dave A.
"When the Boogeyman goes to sleep he checks his closet for paratroopers"

(in reply to DerGrenadier)
Post #: 16
RE: The real Sea of Fire, 1982, was quite different - 3/28/2016 9:23:42 PM   
magi

 

Posts: 1430
Joined: 2/1/2014
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Sunburn

Hello, and thanks for your feedback.

Others will no doubt post here about tech/tactical details. Radar clutter because of hills behind the target, one ship masking another, minimum altitude of the attacking A-4s as a result of time-of-day, sea state and pilot proficiency, and the critical factor of the brand of coffee that Sir Sandy had that fateful day.

I want to talk about the bigger picture. About what you're really saying/implying: "This simulation does not consistently reproduce the historical result of a specific single, isolated engagement, and this is a defect".

Which is kinda like saying that Pro Evolution is a defective representation of soccer because it does not consistently reproduce goals such as this: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uS2bomiDOko

The matter of massaging models & data in order to closely track historical outcomes, and the dangers of doing so, has in fact already been discussed on this forum. Read here: http://www.warfaresims.com/?p=2793

The attack of the Argentinian A-4s on the Coventry and Broadsword that day had a myriad of possible different final outcomes (to visualize this, imagine a tree starting from a common trunk and branching out), broadly ranging from "All RN ships sunk, all hands lost, not a scratch on the A-4s" all the way to "The RN ships effortlessly blot the A-4s out of the sky". What historically happened was one of those myriad possible endings. Was it the most probable outcome? According to both Arg and RN personnel we've talked with, no. As you yourself described, a number of unlikely things went bad for the RN side and conspired to bring about the loss of the Coventry.

As one of our users pointed out, most people have a built-in bias of considering historical outcomes "after the fact" as the most probable ones, even when in reality they are statistical flukes. Is the RL outcome *possible* in Command? Sure it is; roll a few bad missile endgame rolls and the A-4s end up on top of the RN ships just like in RL. Is it *likely* this will happen? Statistically, no. Is this indicative of a flaw in Command? I don't think so. CMANO, like most wargames, deals in probabilities while also allowing lucky/unlucky events. Did Sherman tanks get lucky against Tigers now and then like in "Fury"? Sure. If you had the ability to time-travel and experience this engagement, say, a hundred times, would the result be the same?

Let's take another fluke event from that same conflict, to better highlight the futility of chasing precise historical outcomes. Early on, an Argie B-707 snooper got too close to the AAW picket line and got fired at by *six* Sea Darts. All of them missed. It didn't outrun them, it didn't evade them, it didn't do anything fancy. They simply missed. (CMANO equivalent: consecutive unlucky missile endgame rolls).

Now imagine someone barging in this here forum and arguing that he cannot reliably reproduce this result in CMANO (no wonder; the odds are really low) and trying to bully us to change (lower significantly) the Sea Dart PoK to match this outcome. And let's say we don't know better and we comply. Congratulations, the Sea Dart (a weapon that historically shot down a number of A-4s and even [in its improved ADIMP version] had the first ever "in anger" ASCM kill in '91) is now completely harmless against anything more capable than a lumbering B-707. We "fixed" one case and broke 99 others. I don't consider that a favorable tradeoff.

Like I said, we can discuss tech & modelling until the cows come home. In a complex simulation like CMANO there are always details to tweak. It's the fundamental "must match RL outcomes or else" viewpoint that I disagree with, and I would wager I am not alone.

Thanks!

Gezzzz..... This is really well said… I am impressed… It makes wish I was smart to.....

(in reply to Dimitris)
Post #: 17
RE: The real Sea of Fire, 1982, was quite different - 3/28/2016 9:38:00 PM   
magi

 

Posts: 1430
Joined: 2/1/2014
Status: offline
For me… This was the best conversation I have read on this forum..... Extremely interesting and gracious… Good for you guys…… Thank you ....

(in reply to magi)
Post #: 18
RE: The real Sea of Fire, 1982, was quite different - 4/1/2016 3:12:55 AM   
HalfLifeExpert


Posts: 651
Joined: 7/20/2015
From: California, United States
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: magi

For me… This was the best conversation I have read on this forum..... Extremely interesting and gracious… Good for you guys…… Thank you ....


Yes indeed, this is a very good thread. Sunburn's well written statement is among the best I have seen related to CMANO.

Kind of makes me think of what happened to the USS Samuel B Roberts (FFG-58) in the Persian Gulf in 1988. The ship hit what was discovered to be an Iranian naval mine, and blew a 15 ft hole in the bottom of her hull causing extensive damage.

The ship was saved, repaired and ultimately decommissioned less than a year ago.

I read a very interesting book a few months ago which covered this incident as part of an examination of the larger Tanker War, and if I remember correctly, the captain of the ship says that a few years later, he was approached by a physicist who had run a number of simulations on what had happened to his ship. 14 trials were done, and in all of them the ship broke in half and sank within less than 15 mins.

It was nothing short of a miracle, and excellent crew performance, that the Samuel B Roberts survived that mine. My point is, it would be difficult for any simulation to replicate the historical outcome of that incident under realistic circumstances, because odds were all against that ship and her crew. All the data and everything shows that there is no way that ship could have stayed afloat, but it did. You cannot simulate all possibilities.


< Message edited by HalfLifeExpert -- 4/1/2016 3:16:55 AM >

(in reply to magi)
Post #: 19
RE: The real Sea of Fire, 1982, was quite different - 4/1/2016 6:13:23 AM   
Gunner98

 

Posts: 4319
Joined: 4/29/2005
From: The Great White North!
Status: offline
Simulation must be realistic - reality doesn't, it simply becomes fact.

B

(in reply to HalfLifeExpert)
Post #: 20
RE: The real Sea of Fire, 1982, was quite different - 4/6/2016 7:57:01 PM   
venquessa

 

Posts: 11
Joined: 4/4/2016
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Gunner98
Simulation must be realistic - reality doesn't, it simply becomes fact.


How very profound.

(in reply to Gunner98)
Post #: 21
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