el cid again
Comprehensive Update 6.00
This update mainly involves scenario files, but also includes ship art, map art and new as well
as revised documentation files. The maneuverability rating for ships (a copy of which is below)
is also formally defined to insure consistency of data.
Apart from correcting eratta, maneuverability ratings for US, UK and NE submarines, and older Japanese
submarines were reviewed. The (not used) RN design for an SSN (named HMS Conqueror in honor of the sub
which sank Belgrano in 1982) is also redefined. Still classified, I was able to reverse engineer one of
the more important elements of the design. She must have been about 4,000 tons submerged displacement,
and she must have used a natural uranium fueled reactor with a heavy water moderator - one of only three
such projects in nuclear history (the others being Q-244 for France, ultimately completed as a smaller
vessel when the reactor could not fit and Japan's first I-500). I-500 was the C-4 design, usually listed with an "unknown"
propulsion system, and the second atomic powered submarine to be designed in Japan. Like Q-244, the first one,
I-400, was completed to a diesel electric system. I-500, on the other hand, was completed, and sailed to Europe,
being detected by US Army intelligence in 1945. As well, a peculiar non-weapon type Kaiten was captured in Panama
in July 1945 - a vessel converted for delivering agents and 600 kg of cargo - in this case raw silk to sell for
money. Her crew escaped, but had to abandon their cargo when a US beach patrol showed up. This vessel spent decades
in the custody of the US Army Aviation Museum on Oahu, before finally being returned to Japan, where she is on
display. I studied Japanese SSN's in a joint project with JSDF in 1995, when we were allowed to unseal the design
plans (preserved in what looks like thick wax paper inside wooden crates found in collapsed tunnels at Yokosuka).
The RN was the only other navy to begin SSN design in 1942 (although USN did initiate atomic fuel research in 1938!).
The Manhattan Project did a paper study of a SSN in 1945, but there was no suitable reactor designed for it.
Other things include many allied (and one IJA) land units starting with more than zero supplies (a problem inherited
from stock), and adding ship captains to early CVE's (which had duplicated captains!). Also, Dutch and some Philippine
Army LCUs were removed from the 1945 Downfall Scenario (126) which isn't usable except as a test bed - needing
a lot more similar work. Two USN 1945 carrier groups were updated to their late war configuration. A few devices
were fixed with respect to upgrade dates and device types. The single mast schooner has new art and may no longer
have a pink "halo" in combat resolution (not yet confirmed). There are other art updates but I don't remember which.
Naval Unit Maneuverability (M)
Surface Ship Maneuverability:
Very Large Ships with full load displacements over 40,000 tons: M = 90% of full speed in knots
Large Ships with full load displacements between 10,001 and 40,000 tons: M = full speed in knots
Ships with full load displacements between 4,001 and 10,000 tons: M = 150% of full speed in knots
Small ships and boats with displacements less than 4,000 tons:
IF speed is 15 knots or above, M = 200% of full speed in knots
IF speed is 14 knots or less, M = full speed in knots
This is a formula where speed is in knots, depth is in hundreds of feet, and displacement is in thousands of tons rounded up. Full speeds (surfaced and submerged) should be to the nearest tenth of a knot if known. Depth should be divided by 100 feet and expressed to the nearest tenth of 100 feet. (Thus 330 feet = 3.3). Displacements should be in thousands of tons, rounded up to the next highest whole number. [Thus 670 tons = 1, 1230 tons = 2, 2425 tons = 3, etc.]
Constant times (Surface Speed + Submerged Speed + Depth) / Displacement
The constant is 2.
Note that the database lists maximum surface speed and cruising surface speed. The modder must look up the maximum submerged speed for use by the formula.