From: Manchester, UK
Hmm as to saving manpower for the British...he sure engaged in some extremely costly/attritional style attacks in Normandy if he was trying to conserve British manpower.
The fact they were attritional, doesn't mean it was intentional. Heavy use of firepower, airpower and phased advances was all designed to reduce casualties. He also tended to shut battles down as soon as it became clear casualties were being incurred with little prospect of success.
Also by normandy not so sure Monty was the best for British Morale for troops on the line many units were starting to have an attitude of we have done our part its someone elses turn.
This is overplayed slightly, poor morale or not, British casualties were high throughout these campaigns, that doesn't happen if people aren't fighting. But the fact was Britain had been hard at it for over two years before the USA joined the fight. Nothing Monty could have done would have affected that sort of war weariness. He demonstrated his ability to lift and an Army at El Alamein.
From what i have read on most of the Generals of WW2 I dont feel Monty really grasped WW2 tactics.
What were WW2 tactics? Each Army fights according to its own doctrinal make up. This sort of comment usually implies there was something better about German operational method, but fact was Monty accepted their surrender, not the other way round.
If you look at almost all of his battles he really just relied on superior logistics and material build-ups to achieve results over any great plan or outside the box thinking.
What he did was play to his strengths. This is war, if you have the ability to overwhelm the enemy with superior firepower, why would you adopt any other approach? The object is to win, not get lauded like Rommel. The Germans were weak in logistics and lacked the Allied industrial base to field more material than they did. As a result, they played to their strengths of operational nous and tempo of operations. However, both sides were doing the same thing in essence, fighting in the manner that best suited their particular strengths and hid their individual weaknesses.
quote: But he won. War is about imposing your mode of warmaking upon the enemy, shaping the battlefield tio suit your style. The Germans did that unil 1942, the Allies generally did it thereafter.
More like WW1 thinking/tactics with WW2 equipment and capabilities.
Which IMO is probably why he failed repeatedly in Normandy and again at Market Garden. He had a way of thinking the enemy was what he wanted and wouldnt operate outside the box he put them in.
I disagree. Monty's entire operational method was based on a deep understanding of what the Germans would do. He knew German Operational Method was manoeuvre based and getting into open field meeting engagements with them was playing to their strengths. He knew he had air supremacy, bags of artillery and good logistics. So, he blasted his way forward. All nations left WW1 looking for ways to win without huge loss of life. The British (and American) solution was to save lives with firepower.
Even in North Africa it was mainly logistics and a build-up of material started by his predecesor that gave him the success there....might even could be said that he got the glory for someone elses early hard work. When you have 3:1+ superiority in almost all assets and the enemy is out of fuel and ammo hard not to win is kinda how I see his "victory" in North Africa. The big question might be how did he fail to destroy Africa Corps when he had all the advantages? So was it really a big win or yet another failure due to lack of initiative/thinking in modern warfare terms?
There is more traction here. He certainly built on some good work of his predecessors and I've always felt if there was a time to take a risk, it was in the pursuit after Alamein. However, don't underestimate his achievement at alamein. He prepared properly, trained the men, built up his material, improved morale, and then planned and fought a set piece battle against a strong defensive position in depth. And won.