From: De Eye-lands, Mon
Yep. And that’s what Operational Analysis is all about. Glen did a magnificent job in determining the ways and means necessary to invade the HI. But buried in the analysis is the recognition that there’s no PI Operation, and the DEI Operation is to be truncated for the time being.
That is the basis of Op Analysis: What can be done with the troops at our disposal, and what must be foregone as a result thereof? It takes many months (sometimes years) to develop a decent O-Plan.
The tribulations of the 17th Army in the Solomons and New Guinea prove the point. It had divergent objectives across a divergent front, a pitifully small assault force, a non-responsive intelligence organization, a lack of identified reinforcement units, and an utter dearth of planned shipping and sea movement capability for reinforcement; in short, a hand-to-mouth, opportunistic, I have a bigger winkie so bend over, kind of approach.
Solomons had no O-Plan. There was nothing there but some junior officers bring tea and giving adviice about brushing with the iron sleeve. IJ had no backup, it had no transport, it had nothing in the box to pull-up. It was on the back-end of the power curve, which the Allies controlled. Initiative, initiative (l’audace, l’audace, et encore l’audace).
We basically hit them where they weren’t, and where they weren’t prepared to do anything about it. Took major balls at that time of the war, but …
Nous n'avons pas peur! Vive la liberté! Moi aussi je suis Charlie!
Yippy Ki Yay.