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RE: October 1944 - 8/16/2017 2:04:50 AM   
Bif1961


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Joined: 6/26/2008
From: Phenix City, Alabama
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Colonel Hans Von Luck, in his book "PANZER COMMANDER'" related what one of his subordinate commander's Lt Rosen of his 4th company of 503rd Tiger BN stated, that the air bombardment of early morning 18 July was the worst air bombardment of the war, although we were in foxholes under the 62 ton Tiger VI tanks, we had a lot of casualties. Some of the 62 ton tanks were blow in the air like playing cards landing on their sides and backs with craters 30 feet across, it was so bad that two soldiers committed suicide during the attack because of the psychological effects. Of my 14 Tiger VI none operational after the air bombardment. all were covered with earth, some had their engines clogged and others their mainguns disadjusted, however by the afternoon a few were operational." The bombardment affect other elements of Col Von Lucks' Kampf Group, His 1st, 2nd Infantry Battalion were heavily affected and all contact was cutoff, though he doesn't give exact casualty figures it was clear that major portions of his Kampf Group were heavily hit and major portions were combat ineffective. This from a well dug in and dispersed target and in this game the units were not dug in or prepared for the attack.

< Message edited by Bif1961 -- 8/16/2017 2:05:40 AM >

(in reply to ny59giants)
Post #: 5071
RE: October 1944 - 8/16/2017 6:57:35 AM   
Walloc

 

Posts: 3144
Joined: 10/30/2006
From: Denmark
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: John 3rd
You may have something there Kitakami. Have JAPAN develop a small but effective 4EB force and see the reverse take effect!

Not really...but it does sound good.

Have had a very busy couple of days and haven't been able to Post very much. Hadn't seen this massive discussion until just now. I do love the reading, thinking, and arguing. Keep at it gang!



As John3 doesnt seem to mind that i've for a brief periode, highjacks his thread. ill respond to some of the posts.

Rasmus

(in reply to John 3rd)
Post #: 5072
RE: October 1944 - 8/16/2017 8:14:51 AM   
Walloc

 

Posts: 3144
Joined: 10/30/2006
From: Denmark
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Bif1961

Colonel Hans Von Luck, in his book "PANZER COMMANDER'" related what one of his subordinate commander's Lt Rosen of his 4th company of 503rd Tiger BN stated, that the air bombardment of early morning 18 July was the worst air bombardment of the war, although we were in foxholes under the 62 ton Tiger VI tanks, we had a lot of casualties. Some of the 62 ton tanks were blow in the air like playing cards landing on their sides and backs with craters 30 feet across, it was so bad that two soldiers committed suicide during the attack because of the psychological effects. Of my 14 Tiger VI none operational after the air bombardment. all were covered with earth, some had their engines clogged and others their mainguns disadjusted, however by the afternoon a few were operational." The bombardment affect other elements of Col Von Lucks' Kampf Group, His 1st, 2nd Infantry Battalion were heavily affected and all contact was cutoff, though he doesn't give exact casualty figures it was clear that major portions of his Kampf Group were heavily hit and major portions were combat ineffective. This from a well dug in and dispersed target and in this game the units were not dug in or prepared for the attack.


One in general have to be cautious with german commanders memorairs. Why. To give an example. The story of carpet bombings pre Cobra and its effects seen from the german side was based more or less exclusively on the writings and interviews of Fritz Bayerlein in the general history written from 1945 until about 1990.
He was there(in historical terms he is was primary source). So he must know what toke place.

Problem is that in the 1990s a number of historians and writers started to at the statements made by these german commanders. Do we have evidence that support their claims and description of the events that toke place. In many cases u dont have to go futher than to the divisonal records of a given units and compare the data in those to the claims. Further in a number of cases u get that different commanders have written about the same events and the description/ numbers in cases differs sigficantly. Warrenting more investigation. As their was litterally tousins of books and even events descriped there is ofc always a variation in to how closely other evidence support X claim. Laws of average makes that a given.
Does that make every thing ever written by the german commanders invalid, no. It certainly gives an insight into how things are percieved in the situasion. The mind set that follows from given events. Thats is valueble infomation.

When it comes to actual numbers in some cases statements made was ranging from fairly accurate to completely false. Is this necesarrily a blatant lie, no. Memories how ever gets clouded and perception of things get bend to a fit with with a reality which is in line with the reality said person has about a subject. In other words ppl when wrote these memorias it was rarely with the aim of pure truthfinding but things like selfjustification, failing to take credit for failtures, blaming others for issue and this both on a conciously and subconsiosuly level simply crep into these memorias. Simple psychology.

Fritz Bayerlein made a number of claims for example not exclusively to normandy. Most of these has since been debunked. From half truth to not as much truths is the case with a number of these statement when historians/writters tried to varify these. Problem is that history was largely written for 40-50 years based on those and to this day still influence peoples perception of things.
Its an ongoing process. The study i mention in one of the above post into german casulties actually taken at Cobra isnt more than a few years old.


Lastly the quote from Hans Luck you have above is from the carpet bombings pre Goodwood. As i alude too in one of the other posts above, its one the least mentioned in terms of succes of the carpet bombings and to a certain extend unjustifibly so, other things in the battle seems to attracted more attention. Is the one case where u can actually varify and comfirm not inconsequencing losses in particular to material items. Interrestingly enough a number of these comes from bombings that comes from bombing wrong targets, but that happens in war too.
Still the pre Goodwood carpet bombings didnt do more. Yes statictly they rate higher than the other carpet bombings in some areas, but they arent all that different.


If u wana read more throughly about the effects and losses caused(and not) in particular too 503rd Schw. Pz. Abt. I would suggest read some of Wolfgang Schneiders work. In particular has Wolfgang Schneiders: Tigers in Normandy. He has a chapter on it. Incidently it has an interresting chapter on what toke place in Villers-Bocage and what the actual losses was there. Further he just about tracks the loss and survival of each single tiger commited to normandy. Giving a great deal of insight into what actually caused Tiger casulties.

For more comprehensive writings on the Goodwood carpet bombings as a whole i can suggest Ian Daglish: Over the battlefield series. The one on Goodwood in this case.

As to debunking commander claims there is to many to list comprehensively, but i can point out in relationship to Normandy. Nicklas Zetterling has written an excellent book. Normandy 1944, german military organization, combat power and operational effectivness in which he takes to task to look at alot of things that was percieved about germans in normandy up until then in the history written. Are these perceptions some thing that can be backed up or not.


Kind regards,
Rasmus

< Message edited by Walloc -- 8/16/2017 8:19:44 AM >

(in reply to Bif1961)
Post #: 5073
RE: October 1944 - 8/16/2017 9:28:13 AM   
adarbrauner

 

Posts: 1477
Joined: 11/3/2016
From: Zichron Yaaqov, Israel; Before, Treviso, Italy
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Hans

Every time the JFBs start lamenting how overpowered 4Es are I feel compelled to step in an remind them of their own incredibly overpowered tool....Netties.

The effect they have in hindering naval movement behind the front lines for the Allies is incredible.
You can't move anything without air cover or Nettie drivers with 99 experience and 99 skill will put a fish into your ships 100% of the time.
If even one plane leaks through the CAP it is guaranteed to deliver a fish into a hull.

How many JFBs offer to nerf their Netties in compensation for that almost standard request for nerfing 4Es?



Sincerely I still do not well understand the complaints against the efficiency of the Netties;

They were there IRL; in those numbers; they'd been always aggressive and caused endless headache and pain to the allies, from Malay and the Indian Ocean to the Solomons; even in advanced 1943 Allies would have got a guaranteed bombs or torpedo attack from Betties, deadly, more often than not at sea skimming altitude, if not for persistent Allied fighter cover;

Japanese tried hard with them even in 1944 at night and later, only heavy allied fighter cap + AA kept them at bay;

Me personally never have the luxury to have 90% EXP + 90% NTorp crews beyond the first 5 months of war...

quote:

ORIGINAL: Hans
If even one plane leaks through the CAP it is guaranteed to deliver a fish into a hull.


well they were that effective in their happy days, let's say untill the end of Guadalcanal campaign;

Precision and training of Japanese navy air crews at the beginning of the war was extraordinary; even legendary and the prime comparative parameter since;

the precision of Netties attack on Force Z astounded the British, they achieved what, 80 % of hits?

what the hit percentage on the Hornet in Midway? Very high.

And on the Lexington?


If I transfer a group of Netties from a location 800 miles far, I don't have it guaranteed they shall take off the following day;
and the airodrome needs to be good enough;

And I need torpedoes; and supply; and support; it does really not come by itself;

and the training?!?

BTW Allied attackers become that deadly as well not that late;

quote:

ORINAL: Bullwinkle

As has been discussed MANY times, before many posters were in the forum, the abstractions in the game models preclude anything even approaching Allied mastery of the CAS role, especially the use of real anti-armor FBs, napalm, anti-personnel para-frags, and late-war rockets. The Allies can't drop bridges to stop logistics or LCU reinforcements as they did many times in both the PTO and ETO (look at the P-47-led anti-RR campaign pre-Anzio breakout for one example.) In the game the USMC, who became uber-masters of low-altitude, precision CAS in 1944-45 (numerous footage is available on-line), are excluded from this tactic in island warfare.

The Allies are severely restricted in the game as to the ability to surge their air forces. They don't have ground attack from anything BUT 4E and 2E bombers with iron bombs. Critics of this constantly run home to Cobra and 4E while ignoring the massive destruction wreaked by single-engine and dual-engine dedicated FB and fighters in FB configuration. In the game the Mosquito is a meatloaf. Corsairs strafing are laughed at. Put some napalm tanks on the wings and no more laughing. And yeah, you'd get 400 casualties (not KIA) from a division standing in the open against 50 Mosquitos on a low-level run.


I'm 100% for a separate CAS air mission, to be flown at the land combat impulse;

the sturdiness of the Sonias and Idas shall teach something out of Allied contemptousness in China an Luzon fields!




< Message edited by adarbrauner -- 8/16/2017 9:30:00 AM >

(in reply to ny59giants)
Post #: 5074
RE: October 1944 - 8/16/2017 11:07:43 AM   
Walloc

 

Posts: 3144
Joined: 10/30/2006
From: Denmark
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Bif1961

The bombardment affect other elements of Col Von Lucks' Kampf Group, His 1st, 2nd Infantry Battalion were heavily affected and all contact was cutoff, though he doesn't give exact casualty figures it was clear that major portions of his Kampf Group were heavily hit and major portions were combat ineffective. This from a well dug in and dispersed target and in this game the units were not dug in or prepared for the attack.


Issue is here u start to make assumption based on the writtings that are subjective. That in it self is nothing unusual and very human, i do that too.

My question is. Is it really so clear cut. Im not doubting that this is the heavies bombardment that the soldiers in question has been exposed too. Hench if u wanted to find an example of where the feeling among the soldiers feelt the weight of carpet bombings this is where u go.

To make it pefectly clear when it comes to carpet bombings i in no way dispute the disruption they caused and the temporary reduced combat ability. Also casulties DO occure, no doubt. My question is. Are casulties produced by air bombings(Note i use the word air bombing as its a general issue) verifibly in line with what the game gives you within certain amount of belivebility. Or are they skewer and if so by what magnitude and what does that impact wise do to the land campaigns/engine.
Ill repreat it again im looking at the casulties produced im not questioning the other effects. One might keep bringing up other effects but it only clouds the issue.


1. What kinda casulties do KG Von Luck actually take? (one can look at the divisonal/regimental records and compare the strength pre 18th july and the day after or days after. What does that tell you?

2. U say his kampf gruppe was heavily hit and major portions were combat ineffective. (not saying they are per say wrong compared to other experiences the soldiers had. these are undoubtbly the worst experiences they had when it comes to bombardment). My point is, was KG Luck, overun after the bombings, and or how did the actually perform in the combats of the 2 days of the Goodwood operation?
What evidence is there that they preform any where on a scale from very badly to exceptionally well, which we then can attribuate to at leased in some manner from the effects of the bombings. How does that compare too being combat ineffective?

3. "This from a well dug in and dispersed target and in this game the units were not dug in or prepared for the attack".

What does well dug-in mean. Again this is subjective. Case in point when comparing to AE, how many days/time(to dig forts in AE) had the frontlines and area behind as the advance is some 6 7km been prepared?
What is teh difference of being dug in in the sense u can do in a evening and is common for military units to to at the end of a day if they had made an advance into new postion.(or during a day for that matter)
Was i in this case more than just daily digging in, absolutly, but how so to a degree more than that?

Further the german postions tended to be based in villages, Woods other natural covers. The area in which Goodwood occures are in mnay places totally flat. The ability to hide was limited. There were more living hedge in 1944 than there is today, but not remotely bocage. In the sense that the density of troops tended to gravitate higher to those areas and was the main strongpoints. Those are also the most identifiable target when bombing from the air, more so than random field X. Hench they recieved the greatest proportion of bombs. The convergence of these 2 factors actually causes the greatest casulties in the most fortified postions. Do i then say forts creates more casulties or that they are irrelevant, no.
Just pointing out the use of "This from a well dug in and dispersed target" is a subjective statement doesnt necesarrily means less casulty empericially. The most fortified area of the bomb area doesnt seem to corrospond directly into lower casulties. The human and military desire for safety of Woods, villages and the like produce here a counter effect in that those are also the most bombed features.

4. "in this game the units were not dug in or prepared for the attack."

Well in a sense that is correct, but also produce a evidential problem of what can u prove by using empirical data and creates a game vs simulator issue. How many historical examples do we have of 4E bombers being used to interdict/ground moving troops/troops not in the and imidate and "static" frontline?

Does that mean u couldnt do it, no. I just suspect that hitting moving targets and the willingness of those targets not to take counter meassures, avoid discovery being a great negator. Creates a set of problem that the AE engine doesnt take into account.

The closest u haveof 4E being used on target in an interdictive role the cases where the explicity purpose of the rubbling cities that was roadhubs behind the frontline. To slow the pace of advance/retreat and reinforcements. In a number of cases troops "accidently" happens to be in those cities at the time and casulties occur but this is collateral damage that is unintended in the sense of purpose of mission but ofcourse real enough in themselfs.
St. Vith, Houffalize, St Lo comes to mind as examples. St Vith being the example of most casulties actually occuring, but again the purpose of the mission was never to cause casulties but impeed movement.


What u do have. Are a tons of examples of 2E bombers and 1E figther being used in interdiction roles. Normandy again comes to mind as a prime example, but its far from the only one.
Again this is an example of history that up until about 1990 seemed to collectively thought of as german formation being ravaged as they approched the battlefield. Again Old Fritz B. plays his role here too.

This one of the many thing that since has been looked into since. The Zetterling book mentioned in above post has a whole chapter on this. Other have since looked more into this is Nigel Askey, Christopher A Lawrence on the Eastern front/Kursk. Zetterling and Anderson has written several works including a statical analysis on the parts of the Eastern front. When one start to look at actual numbers the numbers they are supprising very low for the day these division advances to the battlefield. The day the arrive the number as they come into contact with the enemy naturally rises. U cant differ in what exactly through this metode what causes what casulty, but u can for the day where they arent in contact enemy troop and casulties would come from enemy air and from accidents/non combat related issues. Then u start by making qualified judgements from that.

If 1E figthers and 2E bombers didnt produce the casulty of unentrenched unit moving to the battlefield that was believed for many years. What is the reasoning behind thinking that 4E bombers trying to do this would have caused excessive casulties. As 4E was never used in this role, neither I nor any one have any data to make conclusion what effect it might or might not have had. Its any one guess.
Just pointing out when other types was used in those roles they didnt create those kinda casulties, so why would 4E. They might have more bombs, but were also were less precise. One can argue ,but that then a game vs simulator question. Was the reason they werent used in that role historicly was because it wasnt feaseble/effective. When u consider the amount of planning it to toke to hit these static targets, what does that say about the ability to moving or newly moved targets. Was it the the reason u never used them in that role.

Could it through training / doctrine have becomed more feasible. Its possible. How ever if casulty rates are skewer for arguments sake by a factor of 100 in AE. Then i can certaintly understand why u would try develop this further in AE. The likelyhood is around 100 times greater. If in AE the casulties for doing this was 1% of current, what are the chances ppl would use them in this role? in that case what is the incentive to develop these doctrines.

Here is a link to Nigel Askeys page, in particular a page about planes caused tank losses.
http://www.operationbarbarossa.net/combat-aircraft-versus-armour-in-wwii/
With one quote as an appeticer: Thus on a single day in August 1944 the RAF claimed 35% more tanks destroyed than the total number of German tanks lost directly to air attack in the entire campaign!

Kind regards,
Rasmus


< Message edited by Walloc -- 8/16/2017 3:12:58 PM >

(in reply to Bif1961)
Post #: 5075
RE: October 1944 - 8/16/2017 11:44:08 AM   
Mike McCreery


Posts: 4227
Joined: 6/29/2013
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quote:

To make it pefectly clear when it comes to carpet bombings i in no way dispute the disruption they caused and the temporary reduced combat ability. Also casulties DO occure, no doubt. My question is. Are casulties produced by air bombings(Note i use the word air bombing as its a general issue) verifibly in line with what the game gives you within certain amount of belivebility. Or are they skewer and if so by what magnitude and what does that impact wise do to the land campaigns/engine.
Ill repreat it again im looking at the casulties produced im not questioning the other effects.


Alfred has already indicated that the game is not as granular as you suggest and the 900+ casualties are not representative of actual deaths.

If you choose to disregard this and continue to argue your point I am not sure what there is to refute.

Why dont you just buy the game and hire some programmers to code it as you deem appropriate?

_____________________________


(in reply to Walloc)
Post #: 5076
RE: October 1944 - 8/16/2017 1:15:59 PM   
John 3rd


Posts: 16853
Joined: 9/8/2005
From: La Salle, Colorado
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Walloc


quote:

ORIGINAL: John 3rd
You may have something there Kitakami. Have JAPAN develop a small but effective 4EB force and see the reverse take effect!

Not really...but it does sound good.

Have had a very busy couple of days and haven't been able to Post very much. Hadn't seen this massive discussion until just now. I do love the reading, thinking, and arguing. Keep at it gang!



As John3 doesnt seem to mind that i've for a brief periode, highjacks his thread. ill respond to some of the posts.

Rasmus


Not a hijack at all. This is serious, good discussion that a lot of people are participating in and a large number are reading. I think it serves a very good purpose. Keep the commentary up and rolling.

I think Adar's Post just above about the Netties is a very solid, reasoned and thoughtful response to that bone ALWAYS being thrown out by AFB. I don't know who Hans has played before but I could only WISH to see some sort of result--just once or twice--in a game as he alludes to!


< Message edited by John 3rd -- 8/16/2017 1:17:49 PM >


_____________________________



Member: Treaty, Reluctant Admiral and Between the Storms Mod Team.

Reluctant Admiral Mod:
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(in reply to Walloc)
Post #: 5077
RE: October 1944 - 8/16/2017 1:23:20 PM   
Walloc

 

Posts: 3144
Joined: 10/30/2006
From: Denmark
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Alfred


quote:

ORIGINAL: Walloc

...Here in game 60 bombers cause 911 casulties. Thats 15 casulties per sortie vs the historic rate at around a more realistic 0.1-0.3 per sortie. Off by a factor of 50-1 to 150-1.

Rasmus


No, the 60 bombers did not cause "911 casualties". Misreading what the game is actually doing and reporting is a standard mistake which is consistently repeated.

The correct metric has always been to look at the devices affected. Which in this case means only 4 destroyed plus 105 temporarily out of action. The real effect of the "60" bombers is 4 destroyed devices plus the unreported disruption/fatigue/morale effect.

The reported #casualties in a Combat Report has never meant what people continuously ascribe to it. This game is not that granular that individual soldiers are taken into account in the land combat algorithms. They only take into account devices.

Alfred


Hi Alfred,

You absolutly correct in that the engine doesnt calculate "the reported casulties in the combat report" and then turns that into deviced damaged/destroyed devices. The engine does the bombing and calculates the effects off damaged/destroyed devices and reports them. Then it come up with a casulty number that is then a sorta corrolation of the device damaged/destroyed.
Am i claiming there is a 100% corrolation, no. Ill even say there is some with a wide margin in that correlation and technicly as said its the other way around.

In other words if u had 4 destroyed plus 105 Devices/squads damaged destroyed the game comes up with an "arbitrary number" for the combat report. It how ever isnt completly arbitrary. U dont see 100 damaged devices/squads and than a casulty report of 1,10, 100, 4000 or 10000 casulties for that in the combat report in the test i've done. Plus reading i'll guess aroud a hundre AARs and playing the game over the years.
So there is a corrolation of the numbers. Repeating again i in no way claim its a 100% to 100% conversion. The range in casulty numbers which is given for 4 destroyed 105 devices/squad have a margin but it excists. If u test this 100 times doing 60 bombers vs the same target and conditions making sure to counter the seed issue of rolls in the game engine is worked around.
A range in which the reported casulties in corrospondance with damaged/destroyed deviced will emerge. Its not totally arbitrary.

How ever looking further into that matter and quoting my self:

quote:

ORIGINAL: Walloc
Not really. If u had a unit with lot of damaged devices those would be permantly destroyed instead of damaged. So that argument comes down to a question of pure chance on what the attacked unit happen to has in number of damaged vs undamaged devices. If the unit in question had alot of damaged devices the number of destroyed(permanent) would be much higher.
As to a disruption effect of airpower is very real and can be/should be reflected in the fatigue and disruption value of an attacked unit.


From now on the use of wording squad vs device is interchangleble
Ill make a stylized example for ease of point.

If u take a unit of 300 undamaged combat squads and 400 undamaged support squads. Then bomb it with the same 60 4E bombers and the same roll and conditions as the original example.

The reported devices damaged and destroyed would have variation for sure wouldnt be unlike the one in the combat report nor the casulty figur in the casulty report. It will be a bit different as there are 4 destroyed squads so in all likelyhood the unit attacked in the original combat did have some damaged squads pre the bombing tho not a huge percentage.

Now what would happen if they the unit instead had 150 undamaged combat squads and 150 damaged combat squads. 200 damaged and 200 undamaged support squads?
Again ofc with exact same roll from the 60 4E and conditions.

Now what would happen if they the unit instead had 300 damaged combat squads and no undamaged ones and 400 damaged support squads and no undamaged ones?
Again ofc with exact same roll from the 60 4E and conditions.

Any affected squads will be destroyed in this case.
Non of this can then be said to be temporarily effects. They are destroyed and doesnt ever come back.
If we say this is up to some debate as squad size indeed vary from nation and time to time. Non the less assuming, im certainly willing to debate the number, a squad size of 9 men per squad.

9*109 = 981. Not terribly far from the 911.

Point being that if u wana examin real life casulties given by in the case 60 4E bombers to what the game gives as casulties. The game does it in squads unlike in real life so at some point u hafta makea conversion to compare. Depending and ill happily admite as i pointed out now a few times, the status of the attacked unit will have a direct impact on how closely u can associate the casulty report number with destroyed/damaged squads. How IMO saying casulty report numnber is completely arbitrary is as incorrect as saying its 100% comparible. It depence on condition of the unit attacked.


There are other ways of doing the math if avoiding the casulty number at is considered totally unrealiable.

If u take a fully equiped divison of either of the nations all undamaged. Then starts to bomb it every day by 60 4E. Again ofc with exact same roll from the 60 4E and conditions.
Checking the condition be of said division after 7 days on continious bombing in terms of damaged/destroyed squads and again after 14 days.

The first day of bombings which will be causing only damaged devices that and as the days goes by on turns into ever more destroyed devices vs damaged ones.
Is this a fairer way of comparing the added casulty report figurs with the number of over time destroyed devices?

Would it then be more fair to say if and this is a thought up example has a weighted number of destroyed squads/devices(ofc turning off reinforcements) that is lets say 80% of the original. Would it be fair to say if u know ToE of that division in men and than take 80% of that number as a correct casulty figur?
Then u in this case add up the casulty report numbers during the 14 days and compare to the number u come up with the 80% of ToE strength.


Kind regards,
Rasmus

< Message edited by Walloc -- 8/16/2017 1:27:22 PM >

(in reply to Alfred)
Post #: 5078
RE: October 1944 - 8/16/2017 2:15:23 PM   
HansBolter


Posts: 7339
Joined: 7/6/2006
From: St. Petersburg, Florida, USA
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: adarbrauner

quote:

ORIGINAL: Hans

Every time the JFBs start lamenting how overpowered 4Es are I feel compelled to step in an remind them of their own incredibly overpowered tool....Netties.

The effect they have in hindering naval movement behind the front lines for the Allies is incredible.
You can't move anything without air cover or Nettie drivers with 99 experience and 99 skill will put a fish into your ships 100% of the time.
If even one plane leaks through the CAP it is guaranteed to deliver a fish into a hull.

How many JFBs offer to nerf their Netties in compensation for that almost standard request for nerfing 4Es?



Sincerely I still do not well understand the complaints against the efficiency of the Netties;

They were there IRL; in those numbers; they'd been always aggressive and caused endless headache and pain to the allies, from Malay and the Indian Ocean to the Solomons; even in advanced 1943 Allies would have got a guaranteed bombs or torpedo attack from Betties, deadly, more often than not at sea skimming altitude, if not for persistent Allied fighter cover;

Japanese tried hard with them even in 1944 at night and later, only heavy allied fighter cap + AA kept them at bay;

Me personally never have the luxury to have 90% EXP + 90% NTorp crews beyond the first 5 months of war...

quote:

ORIGINAL: Hans
If even one plane leaks through the CAP it is guaranteed to deliver a fish into a hull.


well they were that effective in their happy days, let's say untill the end of Guadalcanal campaign;

Precision and training of Japanese navy air crews at the beginning of the war was extraordinary; even legendary and the prime comparative parameter since;

the precision of Netties attack on Force Z astounded the British, they achieved what, 80 % of hits?

what the hit percentage on the Hornet in Midway? Very high.

And on the Lexington?


If I transfer a group of Netties from a location 800 miles far, I don't have it guaranteed they shall take off the following day;
and the airodrome needs to be good enough;

And I need torpedoes; and supply; and support; it does really not come by itself;

and the training?!?

BTW Allied attackers become that deadly as well not that late;

quote:

ORINAL: Bullwinkle

As has been discussed MANY times, before many posters were in the forum, the abstractions in the game models preclude anything even approaching Allied mastery of the CAS role, especially the use of real anti-armor FBs, napalm, anti-personnel para-frags, and late-war rockets. The Allies can't drop bridges to stop logistics or LCU reinforcements as they did many times in both the PTO and ETO (look at the P-47-led anti-RR campaign pre-Anzio breakout for one example.) In the game the USMC, who became uber-masters of low-altitude, precision CAS in 1944-45 (numerous footage is available on-line), are excluded from this tactic in island warfare.

The Allies are severely restricted in the game as to the ability to surge their air forces. They don't have ground attack from anything BUT 4E and 2E bombers with iron bombs. Critics of this constantly run home to Cobra and 4E while ignoring the massive destruction wreaked by single-engine and dual-engine dedicated FB and fighters in FB configuration. In the game the Mosquito is a meatloaf. Corsairs strafing are laughed at. Put some napalm tanks on the wings and no more laughing. And yeah, you'd get 400 casualties (not KIA) from a division standing in the open against 50 Mosquitos on a low-level run.


I'm 100% for a separate CAS air mission, to be flown at the land combat impulse;

the sturdiness of the Sonias and Idas shall teach something out of Allied contemptousness in China an Luzon fields!






First time I have ever seen anyone on these forums attempt to defend overpowered Netties as historically accurate.

I can see you JFBs are firmly in denial that the game provides you with any overpowered tools that compensate for the one overpowered tool the Allies get.

Par for the course.

< Message edited by HansBolter -- 8/16/2017 3:23:21 PM >


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RE: October 1944 - 8/16/2017 2:30:20 PM   
Walloc

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: adarbrauner

Rasmus, by heaven's sake, please, provide the sources; books, articles, web sites etc.



I've tried to include some in the last posts i done on page 170. Ill add some.

No holding back, by Brian A Reid. Its about Totalize and he too has a chapter on the effects, planing and execution of bombings at Totalize.
Also he does one of the better jobs of descriping the evolution of the Canadian army from 1939 until 1944. This is ofc not his main focus but he does a very good job.
U can also see some examples of the problem of using memorias. During his description of the battle, where he among other things uses the memorias of Kurt Meyer, to get both sides of the coin. He some times notes, how when things are going good for 12 SS or Meyer has a personal hand in succeses its always mentioned. Other things Meyer ordered/overwatched that goes less well some how is left out of his memorias.

I've alrdy mentioned Ian Daglish series of books. As they cover indiviual battles in normandy u would have to read those that corroponds to the things discussed here.
Of note he also but doesnt goes that much into it. Both the British, US and german armies made studies into what caused casulties. In order to know how to alter doctrine and how they improve their abilities, military as doctoral wise.

One of these studies is a British study where science/study teams are send to all aid staions 2 specific UK infantry division during the ETO campaign. The purpose was to study casulty causes. Daglish briefly mentions this but doesnt goes into details. I cant recall OTOH which of the book of his its in.
The study in it self is much more interresting if u wana study casulty causes but its not readily avaible. The same is true of the WWII german and US studies of this but they arent necesarrily impossible to get hold of.
Rick Atkinson in his trilogy on the US army in the second book non the less mentions the one made in the MTO by the US army.

Zetterling as mentioned is unavoible if one want to read about the subject.

Then there are stuff like Buckley. In British Armor in normandy he comes into losses both personel and material in the British formation.

Michael Reynolds book on 1 SS pz corps in Normandy provides great insights.

Another is Ritgen memorias. He was the commander of the repair Company in Pz Lehr. His and Fritz Bayerleins version of event isnt always the same.

Angels Eight, the air war diary, by David Clark.

Then you have all the more official papers. Divisional reports, casulty tallies, AARs written too the panzertruppen doctrine section. Studies made by the historical departments from the respetive armies. PH.D dissertions. All that isnt necesarrily paticular avialble in its full from i know. Lots of books also ones not metioned here has excerpts. Non the less if ur interrested i have some things i can send via email.

Kind regards,
Rasmus

< Message edited by Walloc -- 8/16/2017 5:03:59 PM >

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Post #: 5080
RE: October 1944 - 8/16/2017 3:07:55 PM   
Panther Bait


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One other comment for discussion.

Most of the time the discussion about 4EB in ground support goes one of two ways. The first is the comparison to the large carpet bombing raids during Normandy, which were generally area bombing, i.e. you take a large number of bombers and attempt to saturate an area target. The natural follow on argument is that the in-game raids are typically much smaller (number of bombers per raid) and much more effective (no of casualties per raid or sortie) than any of the carpet bombing raids. Most likely true that if hundreds/thousands of planes carpet bombing couldn't generate the in-game casualties rates, than much smaller semi-blind carpet bombing raids wouldn't be able to either.

The second is the idea that 4EBs are being used as close-air-support similar to how the Allies used P-47s and Typhoons (and other planes) in the CAS role. The argument is that these planes are way to large and unmanueverable to perform those kind of duties, particularly relative to 2EBs like the Boston/Havoc/A-20/A-26 or even B-25s. And even though B-17s were used to develop the skip-bombing technique which required some ability to manuever, that argument against CAS-type support is reasonable.

Well, what if the in-game 4EB usage is something different. Could you use 4EB on more of a targeted strike type of operation from mid- to low- altitude with 4EB groups "trained" to do so. Team them up with some kind of ground spotter organization, and it doesn't seem impossible that they would be much more effective than the semi-blind carpet bombing raids. Particularly if they are attacking large numbers of troops in open terrain in view of said spotters and in smaller more-controllable formations, a squadron or two at a time. So was this ever done in real-life, not probably not. Is it still more effective than would have been possible if it was tried, probably.

People also like to mention about the theoretical troop densities of 10K to 20K soldiers in a 40-mile hex, but in reality those troops would concentrated in a much smaller area proximate to the enemy troops in the hex, not to mention concentrated around road/rail networks, etc. In general, in they are in contact with the enemy in open terrain, the Allies are probably going to have a fairly decent idea where the enemy troops and support echelons are located.

Mike

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Post #: 5081
RE: October 1944 - 8/16/2017 3:40:52 PM   
Lowpe


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John is an agent provocateur!

The cynic in me, wonders if John brings up the 4E hobby horse, which has well and truly been beaten to death every few months, simply because he is pulled away from the AAR or the game for a few days and wants to see traffic on his AAR while he is occupied with real life concerns.


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Post #: 5082
RE: October 1944 - 8/16/2017 3:41:36 PM   
John 3rd


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Nice comment Mike.

Are all those books in your library Walloc? What is your specialization? If any...


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RE: October 1944 - 8/16/2017 3:45:55 PM   
adarbrauner

 

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At around 1140, 17 Nell torpedo bombers (two squadrons from the Genzan Air Group) approached the two capital ships. Eight concentrated on Repulse, while nine attacked Prince of Wales, sending eight torpedoes speeding towards the flagship (one plane aborted its run on Prince of Wales and peeled off and attacked Repulse).[36] One Nell was shot down and three more were damaged by the Prince of Wales anti-aircraft fire during this attack. This first wave of torpedo attackers however managed only one, ultimately catastrophic, torpedo hit on Prince of Wales (and none on Repulse), right where her outer port propeller shaft exited the hull

Another torpedo attack was carried out by 26 Betty bombers of the Kanoya Air Group at approximately 1220,[41] and Prince of Wales was hit by another three torpedoes on her starboard side (some historical accounts[37] state four hits, but the 2007 survey of the hull showed there had been only three); one at the very bow, one opposite B main gun turret, and one abaft Y turret which not only punctured the hull but bent the outer starboard propeller shaft inboard and over the inner shaft, stopping it instantly.[42]

At the same time as this last torpedo attack developed against Prince of Wales, planes from the Kanoya Air Group also attacked Repulse from both starboard and port. Repulse, which had dodged 19 torpedoes so far, was caught in this Japanese pincer attack and was hit on the port side by one torpedo. Within minutes, further attacks resulted in at least three more torpedoes striking Repulse.

The Japanese had achieved eight torpedo hits, four each on Prince of Wales[48] and Repulse,[49][50] out of 49 torpedoes, while losing only three aircraft during the attack itself (one Nell torpedo bomber from the Genzan Air Group and two Betty torpedo bombers from the Kanoya Air Group) and a fourth plane was so badly damaged that it crashed on landing.


From Wiki




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Post #: 5084
RE: October 1944 - 8/16/2017 3:49:45 PM   
adarbrauner

 

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Guadalcanal, Betties




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< Message edited by adarbrauner -- 8/16/2017 3:50:08 PM >

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RE: October 1944 - 8/16/2017 4:09:31 PM   
Walloc

 

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Hi John3,

If we talk purely about the books mentioned then, yes. As u can tell my writting skill arent terribly good so i had to walk about collecting the books to make sure i got the names and titles correct. I dont own a caboose tho, guess its a question of prioverties.

As to the offcial papers, studies, AARs and so forth. I have some in photocopies, some in pdf/picture files. Others are found online. Many i dont have acces to peronally right here and now, but its good to know people.
My specialization has nothing to do with military other than a periode a long time ago spend in battlefield Intel in the Danish army.

Kind regards,
Rasmus


< Message edited by Walloc -- 8/16/2017 4:21:45 PM >

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Post #: 5086
RE: October 1944 - 8/16/2017 4:46:20 PM   
MakeeLearn


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quote:

ORIGINAL: adarbrauner

Guadalcanal, Betties






That is a great pic.




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RE: October 1944 - 8/16/2017 4:50:02 PM   
MakeeLearn


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"Slinging!"

- What the pilots called throwing the bomb into the ship



You can see them DUCK!




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November 1944 - 8/16/2017 5:04:50 PM   
John 3rd


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November 2, 1944

A large Tanker Convoy drops anchor at Osaka and begins to unload a whopping 174,000 fuel.

Cannot say that the Home Isles are swimming in oil/fuel but I will say we're in solid shape for at least three months.


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Post #: 5089
RE: November 1944 - 8/16/2017 5:17:20 PM   
Panther Bait


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John, have you started to notice an effect from the strategic bombing on supply or HI generation? Or even fuel usage?

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Post #: 5090
RE: November 1944 - 8/16/2017 6:35:35 PM   
John 3rd


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Supply. My supply levels were headed pretty steadily up but now are so-so. Nothing horrific as of yet but it has my attention.

My HI has stopped rising and is simply staying steady at about 900,000 stockpiled. Thank goodness for his holding off in this area, the initial TK Convoys I brought home added nearly 150,000 HI to the pile prior to seeing it slow down.

November 3, 1944

Yet another Tanker Convoy drops anchor at Tokyo and 88,600 Fuel and 32,400 Oil begin to be unloaded.

This is the last convoy for a while. I have several about to begin loading in Soerabaja but nothing traveling TO the Home Islands presently.

The CVs are no longer even putting up a pretense of escort, LRCAP, and or ASW support. The convoys, for the last two weeks, are sailing under no protection whatsoever. Shhhhhhhh...don't TELL ANYONE that!

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Post #: 5091
RE: November 1944 - 8/16/2017 6:40:31 PM   
John 3rd


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November 3, 1944

Here is the active area of China presently. The Allies are beginning to push harder and harder on the western edge of the lodgement. The dam is showing signs of cracking gang...

Had an Engineer unit move into the Shaoshing hex. FORGOT to to redirect it (DUMB!) and it was--literally--destroyed by about 125 B-24s. Obliterated.

Want to make the China position clear. The LONGER the Allies want to play here the BETTER. WE can bleed the Infantry and Tank units and trade space and cities for TIME. All those units lost in the Philippines and Formosa have been bought back and many are simply sitting in Tokyo/Osaka/Hiroshima rebuilding, updating, and filling out. Time spent in China--such as it is--is my FRIEND.






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RE: November 1944 - 8/16/2017 6:42:49 PM   
John 3rd


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Let November 3, 1944 be the FIRST DAY I have truly noticed the Allied Submarine effort. On this day Allied SS sink 4 AKs and 2 AKLs. It is the best day of the war for them by a long shot. Good, solid testimony to Japanese ASW (Air and Sea), routing convoys, and some simply good luck (as well as bad Allied tactics)!


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Post #: 5093
RE: October 1944 - 8/16/2017 6:47:21 PM   
Walloc

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Panther Bait

One other comment for discussion.

Most of the time the discussion about 4EB in ground support goes one of two ways. The first is the comparison to the large carpet bombing raids during Normandy, which were generally area bombing, i.e. you take a large number of bombers and attempt to saturate an area target. The natural follow on argument is that the in-game raids are typically much smaller (number of bombers per raid) and much more effective (no of casualties per raid or sortie) than any of the carpet bombing raids. Most likely true that if hundreds/thousands of planes carpet bombing couldn't generate the in-game casualties rates, than much smaller semi-blind carpet bombing raids wouldn't be able to either.

The second is the idea that 4EBs are being used as close-air-support similar to how the Allies used P-47s and Typhoons (and other planes) in the CAS role. The argument is that these planes are way to large and unmanueverable to perform those kind of duties, particularly relative to 2EBs like the Boston/Havoc/A-20/A-26 or even B-25s. And even though B-17s were used to develop the skip-bombing technique which required some ability to manuever, that argument against CAS-type support is reasonable.

Well, what if the in-game 4EB usage is something different. Could you use 4EB on more of a targeted strike type of operation from mid- to low- altitude with 4EB groups "trained" to do so. Team them up with some kind of ground spotter organization, and it doesn't seem impossible that they would be much more effective than the semi-blind carpet bombing raids. Particularly if they are attacking large numbers of troops in open terrain in view of said spotters and in smaller more-controllable formations, a squadron or two at a time. So was this ever done in real-life, not probably not. Is it still more effective than would have been possible if it was tried, probably.

People also like to mention about the theoretical troop densities of 10K to 20K soldiers in a 40-mile hex, but in reality those troops would concentrated in a much smaller area proximate to the enemy troops in the hex, not to mention concentrated around road/rail networks, etc. In general, in they are in contact with the enemy in open terrain, the Allies are probably going to have a fairly decent idea where the enemy troops and support echelons are located.

Mike


I like the idea Mike,

3 comments.

1. The safety ranges during the carpet bombings was of such distance that the training and inherent small size of such "small raid group" would have be significantly lowered. As the common distance between the FLOT(forward of own troops) and the FLET(forward line of enemy troops) is normally less than the carpet bombing safety distances. If your able to do that it has a leg to stand on, if not it doesnt.

2. As the idea counts on having ground spotters. The distance to the enemy, that is having large forces in open terrain cant be longer than view ranges, obviously. The question begs how often did u enemy have large forces in open terrain in clear view of the enemy lines and stayed there long enough to call in a raid.

3. Most convincingly to me. If we encountered the conditions as in 2. Why not just use artillery. U alrdy have a trained ground spotter crews that just need to pick up the phone. Call the artillery central and call in a seemigly much more cost effective option in this case. 878 British artillery tubes was directed on to the assembly area of 9.SS as they tried to set up the counter attack at the flanks of Epsom. Welcome to the western front. That was pretty effective use of a force u alrdy had in place for these conditions. Why bother using 4E resources that could be used else where and most likely wasnt any where so cost effective.


Kind regards,
Rasmus

< Message edited by Walloc -- 8/16/2017 6:56:13 PM >

(in reply to Panther Bait)
Post #: 5094
RE: October 1944 - 8/16/2017 7:18:41 PM   
Panther Bait


Posts: 654
Joined: 8/30/2006
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Walloc

quote:

ORIGINAL: Panther Bait

One other comment for discussion.

Most of the time the discussion about 4EB in ground support goes one of two ways. The first is the comparison to the large carpet bombing raids during Normandy, which were generally area bombing, i.e. you take a large number of bombers and attempt to saturate an area target. The natural follow on argument is that the in-game raids are typically much smaller (number of bombers per raid) and much more effective (no of casualties per raid or sortie) than any of the carpet bombing raids. Most likely true that if hundreds/thousands of planes carpet bombing couldn't generate the in-game casualties rates, than much smaller semi-blind carpet bombing raids wouldn't be able to either.

The second is the idea that 4EBs are being used as close-air-support similar to how the Allies used P-47s and Typhoons (and other planes) in the CAS role. The argument is that these planes are way to large and unmanueverable to perform those kind of duties, particularly relative to 2EBs like the Boston/Havoc/A-20/A-26 or even B-25s. And even though B-17s were used to develop the skip-bombing technique which required some ability to manuever, that argument against CAS-type support is reasonable.

Well, what if the in-game 4EB usage is something different. Could you use 4EB on more of a targeted strike type of operation from mid- to low- altitude with 4EB groups "trained" to do so. Team them up with some kind of ground spotter organization, and it doesn't seem impossible that they would be much more effective than the semi-blind carpet bombing raids. Particularly if they are attacking large numbers of troops in open terrain in view of said spotters and in smaller more-controllable formations, a squadron or two at a time. So was this ever done in real-life, not probably not. Is it still more effective than would have been possible if it was tried, probably.

People also like to mention about the theoretical troop densities of 10K to 20K soldiers in a 40-mile hex, but in reality those troops would concentrated in a much smaller area proximate to the enemy troops in the hex, not to mention concentrated around road/rail networks, etc. In general, in they are in contact with the enemy in open terrain, the Allies are probably going to have a fairly decent idea where the enemy troops and support echelons are located.

Mike


I like the idea Mike,

3 comments.

1. The safety ranges during the carpet bombings was of such distance that the training and inherent small size of such "small raid group" would have be significantly lowered. As the common distance between the FLOT(forward of own troops) and the FLET(forward line of enemy troops) is normally less than the carpet bombing safety distances. If your able to do that it has a leg to stand on, if not it doesnt.

2. As the idea counts on having ground spotters. The distance to the enemy, that is having large forces in open terrain cant be longer than view ranges, obviously. The question begs how often did u enemy have large forces in open terrain in clear view of the enemy lines and stayed there long enough to call in a raid.

3. Most convincingly to me. If we encountered the conditions as in 2. Why not just use artillery. U alrdy have a trained ground spotter crews that just need to pick up the phone. Call the artillery central and call in a seemigly much more cost effective option in this case. 878 British artillery tubes was directed on to the assembly area of 9.SS as they tried to set up the counter attack at the flanks of Epsom. Welcome to the western front. That was pretty effective use of a force u alrdy had in place for these conditions. Why bother using 4E resources that could be used else where and most likely wasnt any where so cost effective.


Kind regards,
Rasmus


I know I said ground spotters, but I was more thinking trained Army spotters. I guess in regards to 2 and 3, I was thinking a combination of recon planes, trained aerial spotters, ground spotters when terrain permitted, maybe even RDF to a degree. I agree that the 4EBs would be better used for targets of opportunity at the far end of arty range and further back.

And don't get me wrong, I don't think that the above concept fully explains the bombing results in game, but I think it is a better model of what the game is trying to simulate than either mass carpet bombings or CAS effects.

Mike



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(in reply to Walloc)
Post #: 5095
RE: October 1944 - 8/16/2017 8:09:05 PM   
Bullwinkle58


Posts: 11302
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Panther Bait

The second is the idea that 4EBs are being used as close-air-support similar to how the Allies used P-47s and Typhoons (and other planes) in the CAS role. The argument is that these planes are way to large and unmanueverable to perform those kind of duties, particularly relative to 2EBs like the Boston/Havoc/A-20/A-26 or even B-25s. And even though B-17s were used to develop the skip-bombing technique which required some ability to manuever, that argument against CAS-type support is reasonable.



At least for me this is not my second argument.

My argument is that the game fails to model tactics and weapons (FBs and the roles/weapons I spoke of up-thread) which constituted most of the Allied land air war effort ex-strat bombing cities. CAS simply isn't really in the game, and it was the root of Allied air superiority for at least 1944-45, and somewhat earlier by theater.

So, the devs (really GG, not Henderson), AS COMPENSATION, made 2E and 4E Ground attacks more effective than history (COBRA, etc.) To compete with the ahistorical Japanese air effort, which over time JFBs have learned to make truly monumental, probably in excess of what the devs envisioned. So, any effort to argue AE ground 4E results against history will fail. They weren't intended to be historical. Any more than the ability to see patrolling submarines at 200 NM ranges in daylight, when they were at periscope depth, is historical. It's abstracted, and you can't pull one thread without the whole blanket coming apart.

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Post #: 5096
RE: October 1944 - 8/16/2017 8:57:12 PM   
John 3rd


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The Moose makes a very good point.


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Post #: 5097
RE: October 1944 - 8/17/2017 2:44:14 PM   
Lecivius


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Lowpe

And I will add that there is no greater excitement than the final year of this game playing as Japan, whenever that year occurs. Your back is to wall, limited everything, and a mighty sword hangs over your head on almost every turn by a weakening thread.

What joy!



Seriously, you need to get out more

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Post #: 5098
RE: October 1944 - 8/17/2017 3:09:46 PM   
Panther Bait


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58


quote:

ORIGINAL: Panther Bait

The second is the idea that 4EBs are being used as close-air-support similar to how the Allies used P-47s and Typhoons (and other planes) in the CAS role. The argument is that these planes are way to large and unmanueverable to perform those kind of duties, particularly relative to 2EBs like the Boston/Havoc/A-20/A-26 or even B-25s. And even though B-17s were used to develop the skip-bombing technique which required some ability to manuever, that argument against CAS-type support is reasonable.



At least for me this is not my second argument.

My argument is that the game fails to model tactics and weapons (FBs and the roles/weapons I spoke of up-thread) which constituted most of the Allied land air war effort ex-strat bombing cities. CAS simply isn't really in the game, and it was the root of Allied air superiority for at least 1944-45, and somewhat earlier by theater.

So, the devs (really GG, not Henderson), AS COMPENSATION, made 2E and 4E Ground attacks more effective than history (COBRA, etc.) To compete with the ahistorical Japanese air effort, which over time JFBs have learned to make truly monumental, probably in excess of what the devs envisioned. So, any effort to argue AE ground 4E results against history will fail. They weren't intended to be historical. Any more than the ability to see patrolling submarines at 200 NM ranges in daylight, when they were at periscope depth, is historical. It's abstracted, and you can't pull one thread without the whole blanket coming apart.


I agree. I almost added a side note about FBs and CAS to my last point, but didn't want to seem like I was piling on.

By 1944, most of US fighters, and some of the British, had FB loadouts available that included 2000-3000 lbs of bombs, plus rockets in many cases and of course thousands of rounds of 50 cal. To put that in perspective, the short-range loadout of a B-17 or B-24 was about 8000 lbs of bombs. So about 3 FBs = 1 4EB, and the FBs can sortie more often from closer airfields (in a land campaign) and be more accurate on smaller targets. In reality, the FBs are way more effective than 4EB could ever be in a ground support role.

Mike

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Post #: 5099
RE: October 1944 - 8/17/2017 6:11:10 PM   
Bullwinkle58


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Panther Bait


quote:

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58


quote:

ORIGINAL: Panther Bait

The second is the idea that 4EBs are being used as close-air-support similar to how the Allies used P-47s and Typhoons (and other planes) in the CAS role. The argument is that these planes are way to large and unmanueverable to perform those kind of duties, particularly relative to 2EBs like the Boston/Havoc/A-20/A-26 or even B-25s. And even though B-17s were used to develop the skip-bombing technique which required some ability to manuever, that argument against CAS-type support is reasonable.



At least for me this is not my second argument.

My argument is that the game fails to model tactics and weapons (FBs and the roles/weapons I spoke of up-thread) which constituted most of the Allied land air war effort ex-strat bombing cities. CAS simply isn't really in the game, and it was the root of Allied air superiority for at least 1944-45, and somewhat earlier by theater.

So, the devs (really GG, not Henderson), AS COMPENSATION, made 2E and 4E Ground attacks more effective than history (COBRA, etc.) To compete with the ahistorical Japanese air effort, which over time JFBs have learned to make truly monumental, probably in excess of what the devs envisioned. So, any effort to argue AE ground 4E results against history will fail. They weren't intended to be historical. Any more than the ability to see patrolling submarines at 200 NM ranges in daylight, when they were at periscope depth, is historical. It's abstracted, and you can't pull one thread without the whole blanket coming apart.


I agree. I almost added a side note about FBs and CAS to my last point, but didn't want to seem like I was piling on.

By 1944, most of US fighters, and some of the British, had FB loadouts available that included 2000-3000 lbs of bombs, plus rockets in many cases and of course thousands of rounds of 50 cal. To put that in perspective, the short-range loadout of a B-17 or B-24 was about 8000 lbs of bombs. So about 3 FBs = 1 4EB, and the FBs can sortie more often from closer airfields (in a land campaign) and be more accurate on smaller targets. In reality, the FBs are way more effective than 4EB could ever be in a ground support role.

Mike


All that, plus by 1944 (Tinian was the first use of napalm I think), the US at least had bifurcated FB loads to high-explosives for structures (bridges, command posts, hangars, etc.), and pure anti-personnel loads. Napalm was big, especially in jungle and island overgrowth, and WP was big for more open, grassy terrain as on Okinawa. Neither are in the game overtly. In jungle, as in much of Burma, once the Japanese dig in through local forts, they can laugh at hi-E bombing, and the supply models give them VAST amounts of supply through untenable terrain. The game gives the Allies the historical planes in historic numbers, but no way to use them historically.

I'm just incredibly unimpressed with any JFB who complains about 4E uses on troops in the open. It's a weak tea, second-order benefit for the AFB. Take it away and the Allied air war is truly crippled.

_____________________________

The Moose

(in reply to Panther Bait)
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