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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

 
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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/7/2011 3:47:38 PM   
FatR

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez
Given that the Philippines, Malaya and the southern SRA must be under Japanese player control before he can embark on any assault against Java or Sumatra,

Not really. Both Singapore and most of the Philippines can be easily bypassed and isolated. In my opinion, the key to Japanese success in the initial phase is speed and preventing the Allies from reinforcing or consolidating their defenses by securing key bases very early. You have only a few weeks of total Allied weakness in the air, so they need to be used to the fullest.





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Post #: 61
RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/7/2011 4:00:22 PM   
USSAmerica


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quote:

ORIGINAL: FatR


quote:

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez
Given that the Philippines, Malaya and the southern SRA must be under Japanese player control before he can embark on any assault against Java or Sumatra,

Not really. Both Singapore and most of the Philippines can be easily bypassed and isolated. In my opinion, the key to Japanese success in the initial phase is speed and preventing the Allies from reinforcing or consolidating their defenses by securing key bases very early. You have only a few weeks of total Allied weakness in the air, so they need to be used to the fullest.






Do not forget the position that Chez is posting from. He is intentionally playing with a "Historical" flavor. In the game, Singers and the PI can easily be bypassed and cleaned up later, but historically this was impossible. Therefore, in Chez' game, it is impossible.

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(in reply to FatR)
Post #: 62
RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/7/2011 5:32:34 PM   
vettim89


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quote:

ORIGINAL: USS America


quote:

ORIGINAL: FatR


quote:

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez
Given that the Philippines, Malaya and the southern SRA must be under Japanese player control before he can embark on any assault against Java or Sumatra,

Not really. Both Singapore and most of the Philippines can be easily bypassed and isolated. In my opinion, the key to Japanese success in the initial phase is speed and preventing the Allies from reinforcing or consolidating their defenses by securing key bases very early. You have only a few weeks of total Allied weakness in the air, so they need to be used to the fullest.






Do not forget the position that Chez is posting from. He is intentionally playing with a "Historical" flavor. In the game, Singers and the PI can easily be bypassed and cleaned up later, but historically this was impossible. Therefore, in Chez' game, it is impossible.


I have to call BS on this. Supposedly Chez is in this position because he plays a more historically based game style. Really? because historically the Japanese did ignore the western SRA while they set off to invade, oh say, Samoa. Chez hasn't played historically because if he had we wouldn't be having this conversation. He would have focused soley on the SRA until it was totally secured. In RL, the Japanese didn't consider expanding their perimeter before the beginning of May. Every action prior to that was soley focused on securing the SRA or Burma

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Post #: 63
RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/7/2011 6:29:35 PM   
Bullwinkle58


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quote:

ORIGINAL: USS America
Do not forget the position that Chez is posting from. He is intentionally playing with a "Historical" flavor. In the game, Singers and the PI can easily be bypassed and cleaned up later, but historically this was impossible. Therefore, in Chez' game, it is impossible.


"You're at your 35-yard-line."

"Okay."

"My team will stand at our 35-yard-line wearing blindfolds."

"Okaaaaaay."

"You kick off to us, but stay at your 35 yard line."

"Huh?"

"Stay there until we find the ball by scrabbling around on all-fours."

"You must be joking . . ."

"Once we run across the 50-yard line we take off the blindfolds and speed up. You can move and try to tackle us, but you have to ride small ponies while doing so. The ponies, who respond only to French commands, can go where they please."

"#%&*!"

"Hey, it's a House Rule."

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Post #: 64
RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/7/2011 7:39:42 PM   
JeffroK


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quote:

ORIGINAL: USS America


quote:

ORIGINAL: FatR


quote:

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez
Given that the Philippines, Malaya and the southern SRA must be under Japanese player control before he can embark on any assault against Java or Sumatra,

Not really. Both Singapore and most of the Philippines can be easily bypassed and isolated. In my opinion, the key to Japanese success in the initial phase is speed and preventing the Allies from reinforcing or consolidating their defenses by securing key bases very early. You have only a few weeks of total Allied weakness in the air, so they need to be used to the fullest.






Do not forget the position that Chez is posting from. He is intentionally playing with a "Historical" flavor. In the game, Singers and the PI can easily be bypassed and cleaned up later, but historically this was impossible. Therefore, in Chez' game, it is impossible.


No, In Chez's mind its impossible.

The only turn a game is historical is 7 Dec 1941, from there on you have to have plans, be flexible and try to beat your opponent. Not to play against some history book.

I'm noy meaning to be rude to Chez but the basis of this thread is ridiculous.

What if CR complained that invading Pago Pago was ahistorical, would never happen in real life and "there should be a HR"

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Post #: 65
RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/7/2011 9:37:45 PM   
Sardaukar


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quote:

ORIGINAL: FatR

My opinion on the Palembang problem.

1)Palembang is an absolutely indispensable for the Japanese war effort. Failure to take it means complete defeat by about early 1943 (not only you lose Palembang's oil, Allies will be within one step from cutting off the shipping from the rest of DEI). Failure to take it with minimal damage is also very crippling and can leave the Japanese unable to sustain both the economy and IJN operations in late 1942.

2)It is practically impossible to completely stop a determined attempt to reinforce it. Maybe one can prevent Fortress Sumatra, but not getting enough troops to Palembang to ensure heavy damgage on capture within a few weeks.

3)Therefore it is vital to capture Palembang within 10 days to, at most, two weeks from the opening of hostilities. A greater delay is basically asking your opponent to have mercy on you. In addition, there is no reason not to. A determined Japanese player can easily ensure naval and air superiority as soon as heavy units from Home Islands reach the theatre, even if Force Z is not destroyed on the first turn. The plan is not without risk, but playing Japan requires taking risks, and in this case you mostly just need to prevent Allied surface units from mauling the invasion convoy.


I'd not go as far as "failure" in 10 days. Failure to do it before end of IJ Amphibious bonus ending (31 March 42) is dire, though.

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Post #: 66
RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/7/2011 10:15:50 PM   
Canoerebel


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There is a wide chasm between the thought processes of the "simulator" and the "gamer."  I don't think it's possible for the one to fully understand the thinking of the other.  As a gamer, though, I do know that the viewpoint of the simulators are ingrained in their psyches, as my viewpoint is ingrained in mine.  Those views are honest and sincerely held.

I hope I am not going too far in suggesting that I think top-notch veteran players like Chez, BradfordKay, and Cuttlefish seem to be simulators.  They are students of World War II and love nothing more than a contest that seems to emulate the war.  

On the flip side, you have players like Nemo, Q-Ball, rader, and John III, who are clearly gamers.  They are students of World War II and love nothing more than to figure out bold and exciting ways to hunt the most intensely exciting game possible - humans.

And, of course, there are plenty of players somewhere in the middle.

Defining what was historically possible is challenging and perhaps impossible.  It's a vaguely defined notion that will vary between every simulator.  But there are also outer limit boundaries that each simulator would recognize.

I know that Chez is sincere in his approach to the game.  I am sure he feels the same way about my approach.  Neither of us faults the other that we have fundamentally different philosophies - we entered the match in good faith and only gradually realized that our philosophies are quite dissimilar.  But we're enjoying the match and there's no acrimony whatsoever.  We're both looking forward to more fighting to come.

In the meantime, I hope we can all avoid getting into a protracted "gamer vs. simulator" debate.  That would be about as satisfying and helpful as the "AI vs. PBEM" debate has been.

(in reply to Sardaukar)
Post #: 67
RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/7/2011 10:48:11 PM   
Nikademus


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quote:

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

quote:

My question is this: What impact on his economy and movement of units will he be subjected to given his failure to secure this vital piece of real estate?


I am in this situation in my game against Canoerebel. He still holds southern Sumatra including Palembang, Padang, Benkolen and Oosthaven. The denial of the oil will hurt but at the moment Tarakan and Balikpapn coupled with numerous smaller oilfileds are meeting my needs. The part I am worried about is the severe restriction these forces have placed on my movements. I am that I am unable to disband any major surface units for repair in any port within 4e range of Oosthaven. I am severely restricted in what units I can operate near Sumatra. Anything larger than a DD generates unwanted attention. Muchof the SRA is denied to the Japanese player becasue of this.

Unfortunately I will never be able to take it because I simply do not have the land forces to overcome the 40+ land units at Palembang and Oosthave without stripping China, the SRA and Burma to the bone. I estimate that I would need upwards of 6000 AV and probably much more than that to dent the defense. Add to that the 400+ allied fighters and 200+ allied bombers that months of recon indicate are parked at Oosthaven and you end up with a fortress Sumatra that could never have existed in real life.

I have never encountered this tactic before and my hat is off to Canoerebel. It was a totally unexpected move. But it is one that I will develop a house rule for in future games. The house rule may either prohibit its use or simply remove any impediment to the Japanese player blitzing Sumatra before the fall of Singapore. This is not a gamey tactic as I do not consider it an exploit of the game mechanics. I do believe that it is so far removed from any historical possibility as to make it's real life WWII use a fantasy.

Chez


Unfortunately a Player One who tries a conventional approach towards conquoring the SRA against a good Player 2 will run into this type of issue every time in AE. The only recourse is to "rush" it as you described.

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Post #: 68
RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/7/2011 11:44:08 PM   
vettim89


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Nikademus


quote:

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

quote:

My question is this: What impact on his economy and movement of units will he be subjected to given his failure to secure this vital piece of real estate?


I am in this situation in my game against Canoerebel. He still holds southern Sumatra including Palembang, Padang, Benkolen and Oosthaven. The denial of the oil will hurt but at the moment Tarakan and Balikpapn coupled with numerous smaller oilfileds are meeting my needs. The part I am worried about is the severe restriction these forces have placed on my movements. I am that I am unable to disband any major surface units for repair in any port within 4e range of Oosthaven. I am severely restricted in what units I can operate near Sumatra. Anything larger than a DD generates unwanted attention. Muchof the SRA is denied to the Japanese player becasue of this.

Unfortunately I will never be able to take it because I simply do not have the land forces to overcome the 40+ land units at Palembang and Oosthave without stripping China, the SRA and Burma to the bone. I estimate that I would need upwards of 6000 AV and probably much more than that to dent the defense. Add to that the 400+ allied fighters and 200+ allied bombers that months of recon indicate are parked at Oosthaven and you end up with a fortress Sumatra that could never have existed in real life.

I have never encountered this tactic before and my hat is off to Canoerebel. It was a totally unexpected move. But it is one that I will develop a house rule for in future games. The house rule may either prohibit its use or simply remove any impediment to the Japanese player blitzing Sumatra before the fall of Singapore. This is not a gamey tactic as I do not consider it an exploit of the game mechanics. I do believe that it is so far removed from any historical possibility as to make it's real life WWII use a fantasy.

Chez


Unfortunately a Player One who tries a conventional approach towards conquoring the SRA against a good Player 2 will run into this type of issue every time in AE. The only recourse is to "rush" it as you described.


I disagree. I do not want to break OpSec but I don't think it would be doing so in saying that CR's position is not based soley upon forces already present in the SRA, but on his ability to move "ahistorical" units into Sumatra. Any player can open the game as the other side and see what the other side has available. A Japan player should know that there are reinforcements on ships at game's start like the 18th UK and over a divsion's worth of Indian Army units. I think a bigger issue is the aforementioned free supply from refineries. I only play DBB so this has been removed from my games which to me is more than enough to slow the build-up in the DEI. Players not playing an economic mod need to consider the effect of free supply. As I said before, if you count on Sir Robin and your opponent does not go that route, a Japan player better realize what is happening quickly or pay a price.

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Post #: 69
RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/8/2011 12:04:41 AM   
Nikademus


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quote:

ORIGINAL: vettim89

I disagree. I do not want to break OpSec but I don't think it would be doing so in saying that CR's position is not based soley upon forces already present in the SRA, but on his ability to move "ahistorical" units into Sumatra.


That is part of the reason why Player one has to "rush". AE allows Player two much more extensive control over not only the units you mention (sans Permanent (R)estricted command assigned units), but also the immediate dec41 reinforcements. Not sure what your disagreeing with. When i said "conventional" approach I mean the basic tennants by which Japan advanced prior to Coral Sea/Midway. Advancing under established air cover with adquate sea assets also available. By the time this slow careful approach is crafted, player two in the game can create these little "Festungs" as referred to in this thread. In my last PBEM experience, it was'nt Sumatra....but rather Timor and Java. Few actual additional units were brought in. In our case it was total concentration and optimization of the LCU's in mountain terrain hexes designed to do only one thing. Buy time.

Hence....to counter these Festung movements you have to "rush" and nab pell mell. KB can only patrol on blockade duty so much and can't be everywhere. I actually did score a healthy bag of merchants (and even one carrier......though that was blind luck) but its like trying to hold grains of sands between your fingers. Had we "rushed" our opponents would never have had the opportunity to dig in so thoroughly. Have to admit too i get puzzled by comments such as "well arn't there other theaters?" Yes.....there are, but since everyone complains they want a "historical" game....naturally there's one theater that is vital to Player One.....as its supposed to be the entire reason why that side went to war in the first place!!! So yes....one has to get Palembang...one has to secure the other oil fields. Ignore it and go 'elsewhere' and you run out of steam....litterally.

Not rocket science. Its the result of ever greater detail control. Its no coincidence WitE is having the exact same issue.



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Post #: 70
RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/8/2011 1:32:37 AM   
Mynok


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Indeed there are some surprising parallels in WitE developments. It's almost like the old UV days.

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Post #: 71
RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/8/2011 1:56:24 AM   
USSAmerica


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What's the Cliff's Notes version of the parallel issue in WitE?

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Post #: 72
RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/8/2011 6:11:42 AM   
ChezDaJez


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

After a sharp naval/air battle at Oosthaven following the 7/7/42 turn, Chez asked via email if I had all my carrier air on Sumatra.  Not wishing to provided classified info, I simply told him that I couldn't say specifically, but that I wouldn't have any problem doing so if I thought it was necessary.  See post # 1540 on page 52 of my AAR (written about two months ago both real time and game time for this discussion).

In actuality, the Allies had just transferred the aircraft from two carriers to Sumatra, because those two flattops were retiring to port to upgrade.

I wouldn't have any problem with employing all my carrier air from Sumatra, though.  The Allies took some really big chances in this game to heavily fortify a very forward base that was subject to isolation and destruction.  The Allies couldn't afford to lose a huge army, so they were naturally prepared to employ all available force to protect that position.  To my way of thinking, that is perfectly reasonable.  However, the Allies have never felt the need to employ that tactic.



And I don't have a problem with offloading carrier aircraft when that carrier is going to be out of action for a while either through damage or upgrade. I was satisifed with your answer. I would have a problem with it if it was being done to avoid risking allied carreirs in battle.

But as you indicated last night, we are two different type players who were both unprepared for the style of play the other uses. You put it quite succintly... I am a simulator and you are a gamer. Having said that I am having fun playing this game. Some turns are definitely more fun than others but it is still fun. It's quite out of the box for me.

Chez

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Post #: 73
RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/8/2011 6:19:14 AM   
ChezDaJez


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quote:

I know that Chez is sincere in his approach to the game. I am sure he feels the same way about my approach. Neither of us faults the other that we have fundamentally different philosophies - we entered the match in good faith and only gradually realized that our philosophies are quite dissimilar. But we're enjoying the match and there's no acrimony whatsoever. We're both looking forward to more fighting to come.


Well said. Being either a gamer or being a simulator is neither good nor bad. There is room for both and I firmly believe one needs the other to ensure that the best wargames are produced. WitP is a classic example. It appeals to folks with all styles of play and more importantly accomodates them pretty well.

Chez

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VP-5, Jacksonville, Fl 1973-78
ASW Ops Center, Rota, Spain 1978-81
VP-40, Mt View, Ca 1981-87
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ASW Ops Center, Adak, Ak 1990-92
NRD Seattle 1992-96
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Post #: 74
RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/8/2011 12:44:28 PM   
oldman45


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After reading this thread, I am confused about where the mini KB was during the allied rush to fortify Sumatra? That and the land based air should have sunk a number of transports. Am I wrong about this?

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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/8/2011 4:13:31 PM   
Lanconic

 

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I dont have any problem with Japan grabbing Palembang early. He isnt gonna be sending tankers down there any time soon.
What is the big deal?


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Post #: 76
RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/8/2011 5:06:13 PM   
obvert


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The Japanese have almost an embarassing number of battle ready units prepped and in some cases loaded onto transports for assaults from day one. The Allied air forces in the DEI until at least Feb 42 are miserable. It is possible to go much faster in game than in the real war, but that is true for each player. The Allies can also move logistics and air support as well as land units into the DEI more quickly than they could have in the war. For one, when we start the game, we know the start date and the units involved on BOTH sides. We know what they can do. Neither side had even this luxury in December 41.

Palembang is a relatively small issue if the Japanese realize its importance. Who knows what the Japanese in the RW would have done if the Allies had begun to reinforce in this manner. They surely would have known it was happening and made some counter. You can't assume conditions to be in any way historical after Dec 7 because each side in reality would have reacted differently in other conditions. Most Allied players don't defend Rangoon or Port Moresby. Most Japanese players isolate areas and move fast in the DEI because they know they can.

If you want to play through the history you would have to have pages of HRs restricting moves until certain dates and certain political conditions and certain kinds of units in certain places. This is fine. But make it known. Work it out beforehand. It would be interesting to try and I'd love to read those AARs.

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Post #: 77
RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/8/2011 5:09:48 PM   
Chickenboy


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quote:

ORIGINAL: obvert

The Japanese have almost an embarassing number of battle ready units prepped and in some cases loaded onto transports for assaults from day one. The Allied air forces in the DEI until at least Feb 42 are miserable. It is possible to go much faster in game than in the real war, but that is true for each player. The Allies can also move logistics and air support as well as land units into the DEI more quickly than they could have in the war. For one, when we start the game, we know the start date and the units involved on BOTH sides. We know what they can do. Neither side had even this luxury in December 41.

Palembang is a relatively small issue if the Japanese realize its importance. Who knows what the Japanese in the RW would have done if the Allies had begun to reinforce in this manner. They surely would have known it was happening and made some counter. You can't assume conditions to be in any way historical after Dec 7 because each side in reality would have reacted differently in other conditions. Most Allied players don't defend Rangoon or Port Moresby. Most Japanese players isolate areas and move fast in the DEI because they know they can.

If you want to play through the history you would have to have pages of HRs restricting moves until certain dates and certain political conditions and certain kinds of units in certain places. This is fine. But make it known. Work it out beforehand. It would be interesting to try and I'd love to read those AARs.

I agree.

The Allied Palembang aggressive defense is a gambit / gimmick in my mind. Doable? Yes. Advisable against an opponent that knows about these gambits? Harder question-it's certainly not without risk to the Allies. Allied troops can be cut off and liquidated in S. Sumatra as easily as they can anywhere else. Japanese players would be well advised to consider this and the opportunities for early war Allied destruction that this gambit-gone-wrong would entail.

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Post #: 78
RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/8/2011 5:29:26 PM   
House Stark

 

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If the Japanese player chooses to let the Allies build up Palembang in order to cut it off later and destroy more troops, wouldn't that risk Palembang being heavily damaged?

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Post #: 79
RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/8/2011 5:33:53 PM   
GreyJoy


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy


quote:

ORIGINAL: obvert

The Japanese have almost an embarassing number of battle ready units prepped and in some cases loaded onto transports for assaults from day one. The Allied air forces in the DEI until at least Feb 42 are miserable. It is possible to go much faster in game than in the real war, but that is true for each player. The Allies can also move logistics and air support as well as land units into the DEI more quickly than they could have in the war. For one, when we start the game, we know the start date and the units involved on BOTH sides. We know what they can do. Neither side had even this luxury in December 41.

Palembang is a relatively small issue if the Japanese realize its importance. Who knows what the Japanese in the RW would have done if the Allies had begun to reinforce in this manner. They surely would have known it was happening and made some counter. You can't assume conditions to be in any way historical after Dec 7 because each side in reality would have reacted differently in other conditions. Most Allied players don't defend Rangoon or Port Moresby. Most Japanese players isolate areas and move fast in the DEI because they know they can.

If you want to play through the history you would have to have pages of HRs restricting moves until certain dates and certain political conditions and certain kinds of units in certain places. This is fine. But make it known. Work it out beforehand. It would be interesting to try and I'd love to read those AARs.

I agree.

The Allied Palembang aggressive defense is a gambit / gimmick in my mind. Doable? Yes. Advisable against an opponent that knows about these gambits? Harder question-it's certainly not without risk to the Allies. Allied troops can be cut off and liquidated in S. Sumatra as easily as they can anywhere else. Japanese players would be well advised to consider this and the opportunities for early war Allied destruction that this gambit-gone-wrong would entail.


Keep in mind that i scenario 2 Japan can mass into a single spot a HUGE amount of troops.
in my game against rader he, in summer 1942, managed to invade India with nearly 14,000 AVs...

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Post #: 80
RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/8/2011 6:33:39 PM   
Mike Solli


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quote:

ORIGINAL: House Stark

If the Japanese player chooses to let the Allies build up Palembang in order to cut it off later and destroy more troops, wouldn't that risk Palembang being heavily damaged?


It depends on the actions of the Japanese player. If he does a lot of preparation of the battlefield (ie. air and/or ground bombardment), he'll increase Allied disruption thus increasing chances of capturing the infrastructure intact. Also, if he brings a lot of engineers to the fight, that will increase the chances of capturing the infrastructure intact as well.

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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/8/2011 7:35:21 PM   
Nikademus


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quote:

ORIGINAL: USS America

What's the Cliff's Notes version of the parallel issue in WitE?



Two parts to it. The first is of course the hindsight problem. Like AE, WiTE provides a serious dose of micromanagement control which allows the defending Player 2 (aka Soviets) to immediately avoid most of the issues/mistakes/directives that contributed to the rout of 41. Since the player "is" Stalin/Stavka there are no consequences or checks in place. Hindsight and detail control continue to be the bane of the modern Grigsby style game. The 2nd part is related to the first.....that being that SO detailed and controllable is the Red Army that crafty and dedicated Player 2's can tailor and build a Red Army structure that is optimized to take maximum advantage of the game's mechanics. Player one is restricted mainly to the historical OOB. In the older game you could just build new divisional units for both sides. Now.....oy. You can litterally build a Russian army from scratch right down to the support units. Sounds great on paper. Not so good in practice in my opinion.

Long and short is that, as shown in a number of AAR's, its nearly impossible for Player one to even match the objectives taken/reached by the historical counterpart. Soviet counter-offensives tend to occur sooner and with more frequency. This leads to complaints and preposals for house rules and fixes. Alot of angst in general.

< Message edited by Nikademus -- 11/8/2011 7:38:59 PM >


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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/8/2011 7:54:37 PM   
USSAmerica


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Thanks, Nik.  I own WitE, but haven't yet spent any time with her.  

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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/8/2011 8:19:31 PM   
Mynok


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Agree with all the Nik said. In addition, I am playing a 43 scenario game which is now in summer of 44. Where the Germans were still pretty deep into Russia and about to lose army group center, my line runs from south of Königsberg to Budapest. Needless to say, a much worse situation.


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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/8/2011 10:25:39 PM   
JeffroK


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Generally speaking,

In wargaming I have found that players do not have to make the same mistakes as in real life, the help of hidsight, the ability to "wargame" the situation (I mean to work out the results outside the game)can dramatically change one side or the other.

Would a gamer put in an effort like japan at Midway, shift the offensive from Moscow to Kiev, attack Alam el Halfa, Medinine, Anzio or try a Market-Garden?????

Unless both players slavishly follow historical lines of approach (or have strictly limited movement capability a la Chess) you are liable to get twisted versions of history.

Might make for a better game, but it isnt a simulation of the conflict. (Used to have a lot of fun with Avalon Hills made up land using WW2 type forces. Blitzkrieg???  Then you have no history to recreate)

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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/8/2011 10:53:49 PM   
Ketza


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Its been fun working through the various changes of WITE and it has come a lomg way since the first version.

The Pacific keeps calling however....

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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/8/2011 10:59:10 PM   
Canoerebel


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I wish Q-Ball would transition back to AE.  I know he's probably a key member of the WitE community, but he's missed here.

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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/8/2011 11:02:23 PM   
Nikademus


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quote:

ORIGINAL: JeffK

Generally speaking,

In wargaming I have found that players do not have to make the same mistakes as in real life, the help of hidsight, the ability to "wargame" the situation (I mean to work out the results outside the game)can dramatically change one side or the other.



Your missing the point. The argument isn't that players either are required to repeat mistakes or repeat exact historical battles. The argument is that the true situation be represented, otherwise it is in fact more game than "simulation" as you've defined it. It would for example, be silly to compare oneself in terms of choice/leadership skills when you have instant nearly unrestricted control of units down to the detail level vs. a real life commander who was constrained by chain of command and/or political considerations.

This same misunderstanding plagues threads like this on the WitE forum too. The old "If i want to replay history exactly, i'll watch a movie" counter-argument. Thats not what's being said. Past wargames have achieved a reasonable amount of variation in different gambits and situations whilst preserving the overall feel of the actual campaign. In this age of powerful home computers, that art is being lost to a degree because so much control and layers of detail can be programmed.



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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/9/2011 2:25:32 AM   
pwarner328

 

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isnt that a tiny bit "crude"??

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RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42 - 11/9/2011 6:20:18 AM   
ChezDaJez


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quote:

I have to call BS on this. Supposedly Chez is in this position because he plays a more historically based game style. Really? because historically the Japanese did ignore the western SRA while they set off to invade, oh say, Samoa. Chez hasn't played historically because if he had we wouldn't be having this conversation. He would have focused soley on the SRA until it was totally secured. In RL, the Japanese didn't consider expanding their perimeter before the beginning of May. Every action prior to that was soley focused on securing the SRA or Burma



Actually, Japan did advance in several Pacific areas while simultaneously advancing through the SRA... Guam, Wake, Tarawa, Rabaul... these are all places that come to mind that Japan took during the first two months. Plus they invaded New Guinea in March capturing Lae and Salamuea.

Let me eplain something about playing a "historical" game. Just because a player restricts himself to historical tactics doesn't mean he must also restrict himself to the historical strategy. And just because he does not follow historical strategy to the letter does not mean that he doesn't recognize the political and military limitations inherent to implementing any strategy. And it is those limitations that I especially will attempt to adhere to within reason. I will admit that I do tend to ignore the political divisions between the IJA and the IJN. I ignore it much like the allied player ignores the bitter disputes between the Nationalist and Communist Chinese leaders.

I believe my strategy pretty much followed the historical Japanese strategy in advancing through the SRA. I don't understand why you think it didn't. My objectives in taking the SRA did follow the historical planning pretty much. I planned on securing the PI reasonably quickly and then advancing with the PI forces in a double pincer movement towards the SW. One prong advancing down Borneo taking Tarakan and Balikpapn, the other advancing towards Kendari and Ambon. These forces would then turn northwards to invade southern Java. This happened IRL.

At the same time, my Malayan forces would move down the eastern side of the peninsula by land and leapfrog by ship down the west coast of Malaya before the final assault on Singapore. Malaya pretty much went as planned though the process took much longer than needed. With the exception of landings at Kauntan and Mersing, I again followed historical strategy. I also sent forces marching towards Burma, just as the Japanese did IRL. Unfortunately Dan had other ideas about Burma and quickly forced a retreat.

The problem with Singapore was that not only did Dan manage to delay its capture but he also greatly whittled down my air forces in doing so. This allowed Dan to move ships in and out of Singapore pretty much as he wanted without much threat of air attack. My surface ships still posed a threat but many of those required significant yard periods before long.

Where I did not follow historical strategy was in the central Pacific after Rabaul had fallen. I deviated by planning to advance through the Solomons into New Caledonia and then eastward towards Fiji and Pago Pago. I did not use any troops that were assigned to take the SRA to accomplish this. It wasn't until I landed at Pago Pago did I encounter any significant difficulty with securing the place. Dan's stalwart and very aggressive defense ensured that progress would be slow and that I would have to leave enough forces behind to guard the place, a place lesson that required learning a couple of times. But the Central Pacific had nothing to do with the issues encountered in the SRA.



quote:


FatR said:

"Not really. Both Singapore and most of the Philippines can be easily bypassed and isolated. In my opinion, the key to Japanese success in the initial phase is speed and preventing the Allies from reinforcing or consolidating their defenses by securing key bases very early. You have only a few weeks of total Allied weakness in the air, so they need to be used to the fullest."


This is easily the defining difference between a gamer and a simulator. A gamer will look at your statement and say, "Yeah, absolutely, that's what you have to do to win." A simulator looks at your statement and thinks, "What? Are you crazy? That would never work IRL!"

One point to make here about the game mechanics. The Japanese player gets a mega-move for certain preordained TFs on the first turn. Mess with the destinations of those TFs and they revert to normal speed. No mega-move allowed. Good luck getting to Sumatra now before the allies reinforce.

And I believe that anyone who contemplates moving on Sumatra without Singapore and northern Java in his hands has committed a fatal error much worse than my arriving too late to take Palembang. He may be able to prevent Dutch land forces from moving into Sumatra from Java but he can not stop allied reinforcements from landing anywhere they chose on Java, Sumatra or Malaya. Nor can he stop the Dutch air force from redeploying to Sumatra. And if the Japanese player has ignored Java and Malaya, where are all those great air bases going to be located that will allow the Japanese player to interdict allied reinforcements?

Anyways, there is nothing wrong with anyone's style of play. Just because someone doesn't play the way you do dosen't mean the other person is playing a bad game. And when two players of different camps oppose each other, it can actually be fun. And it has been fun to play Dan. In a way, playing Dan helps me understand what the allied generals must have thought in 1940 France. I'm sure they were thinking, "What the hell was that?" as Guderian abd his blitzkrieg went screaming by.

Chez

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