Matrix Games Forums

Forums  Register  Login  Photo Gallery  Member List  Search  Calendars  FAQ 

My Profile  Inbox  Address Book  My Subscription  My Forums  Log Out

Jap Signal intelligence

 
View related threads: (in this forum | in all forums)

Logged in as: Guest
Users viewing this topic: none
  Printable Version
All Forums >> [New Releases from Matrix Games] >> War in the Pacific: Admiral's Edition >> Jap Signal intelligence Page: [1] 2   next >   >>
Login
Message << Older Topic   Newer Topic >>
Jap Signal intelligence - 2/7/2010 5:59:14 AM   
Admiral Scott


Posts: 625
Joined: 1/8/2001
From: Syracuse, NY USA
Status: offline
I have not tried playing as the Japs, but I was wondering how good is their signal intelligence compared to the allies?
Post #: 1
RE: Jap Signal intelligence - 2/7/2010 7:11:37 AM   
Puhis


Posts: 1737
Joined: 11/30/2008
From: Finland
Status: offline
It's crap. All japanese player ever get is "radio transmission detected" or "heavy radio transmission detected". Usually I don't even bother check it.

(in reply to Admiral Scott)
Post #: 2
RE: Jap Signal intelligence - 2/7/2010 7:23:49 AM   
Torplexed


Posts: 300
Joined: 3/21/2002
From: The Pacific
Status: offline
It's interesting to note that in late July, 1942 Lieutenant Commander Haruki Itoh of the Naval Intelligence Center in Tokyo picked up two new Allied call signs in the Southwest Pacific. Since both stations operated on the commander-in-chief circuit (4205 kc series) and both communicated directly with Pearl, Itoh deduced that either could be headquarters for a new enemy task force. Consequently, he and his staff concluded that the Allies were about to start an offensive in the Solomons or New Guinea. An urgent warning was radioed to Truk and Rabaul but it was ignored in both places. Probably one of those rare occasions where Japanese signal intelligence was on the money. However, even after Midway Japanese over-confidence hadn't been diminished enough by the defeat to grasp it.

(in reply to Puhis)
Post #: 3
RE: Jap Signal intelligence - 2/7/2010 5:27:03 PM   
topeverest


Posts: 3376
Joined: 10/17/2007
From: Houston, TX - USA
Status: offline
Jap intel is poo!

You'll have to rely on good old fashion guile, skill, and intuition.

_____________________________

Andy M

(in reply to Torplexed)
Post #: 4
RE: Jap Signal intelligence - 2/7/2010 5:40:36 PM   
d0mbo

 

Posts: 592
Joined: 8/21/2009
From: Holland
Status: offline
i beg to differ.

in the guadalcanal scenario i was able to interecept a troop transport convoy once that was sailing from cookstown because signal intelligece revealed a crapload of AP's in the harbor there......


i will admit is probably much poorer than allied intelligence, as it should be.


(in reply to topeverest)
Post #: 5
RE: Jap Signal intelligence - 2/7/2010 5:51:14 PM   
topeverest


Posts: 3376
Joined: 10/17/2007
From: Houston, TX - USA
Status: offline
Agreed on both parts. Japs will get a few gems, but dont expect them.

_____________________________

Andy M

(in reply to d0mbo)
Post #: 6
RE: Jap Signal intelligence - 2/7/2010 7:21:48 PM   
Admiral Scott


Posts: 625
Joined: 1/8/2001
From: Syracuse, NY USA
Status: offline
So its historically correct, good.

(in reply to topeverest)
Post #: 7
RE: Jap Signal intelligence - 2/7/2010 7:37:09 PM   
Brady


Posts: 10701
Joined: 10/25/2002
From: Oregon,USA
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Admiral Scott

So its historically correct, good.



The game over does it both ways. Allied Intell is to consistant and to timely, and Japanese intell is while closer to what one would expect, to understated.

Most Japanese signal trafic was not read and what was able to be read was mostly not procesed in a maner that could be construed as actionable.

Also most of what was able to be read was arived at by shear luck, the finding of code books for example on a couple of ocashions.

The game theirfore offers the myth as aposed to the reality of the situation.

Howeaver using this in game is a pain.

_____________________________





Beta Team Member for:

WPO
PC
CF
AE
WiTE

Obi-wan Kenobi said it best: A lot of the reality we perceive depend on our point of view

(in reply to Admiral Scott)
Post #: 8
RE: Jap Signal intelligence - 2/7/2010 8:21:31 PM   
Shark7


Posts: 7934
Joined: 7/24/2007
From: The Big Nowhere
Status: offline
Having played both sides, I agree with Brady on this issue.

The Allies do get more actionable intel than they should, and the Japanese player gets virutally nothing. And while I'm not saying there shouldn't be a big deficit between the two, a tweaking pass might not be a bad thing.

The one Ace the Japanese have are the Glen carrying submarines which can be used to gather intel in rear areas the old fasioned way (IE Mk I Eyeball and Polaroid Camera) IF you can get it in range and keep it alive long enough to make a pass or two with the Glen.

_____________________________

Distant Worlds Fan

'When in doubt...attack!'

(in reply to Brady)
Post #: 9
RE: Jap Signal intelligence - 2/7/2010 8:27:00 PM   
Bradley7735


Posts: 2073
Joined: 7/12/2004
Status: offline
There were large periods of time that the US could read Japanese codes (not all codes, but some of them) quite easily and quickly. Almost all subs sunk by US subs were the result of intelligence. In fact, a good chunk of all ships sunk by the silent service were from tips from intelligence. Not all, by any means, but subs were reguarly routed due to intelligence reports.

To be honest, I'm not sure how the developers could get it better. You can't modify a game to check the brain of your opponent and give information. I suppose games vs the AI could have some good 'ultra', but that's about it.

_____________________________

The older I get, the better I was.

(in reply to Brady)
Post #: 10
RE: Jap Signal intelligence - 2/8/2010 4:35:28 AM   
Feltan


Posts: 1150
Joined: 12/5/2006
From: Kansas
Status: offline
The one point not historical at all: the Japanese had perhaps the best direction finding equipment and procedures in the world in the early 1940's.

While DF will not readily convey intentions like cracking a code -- the Japanese should be getting a lot of position and direction-of-movement of units at sea; more so for merchants, less so for warships.

Regards,
Feltan

_____________________________


(in reply to Bradley7735)
Post #: 11
RE: Jap Signal intelligence - 2/8/2010 5:37:13 AM   
spence

 

Posts: 5373
Joined: 4/20/2003
From: Vancouver, Washington
Status: offline
Allied Signal Intelligence provided location, course, speed and destination of numerous IJN warships; especially in 1943-45. It can't really get any better than that. In the game that information is provided approximately never. Once the war got going Allied Signals Traffic Analysis consistently provided allied commanders with the location (current home port) of major IJN warships and warning that they were going to move (even when destination/target might not be discernable).

(in reply to Feltan)
Post #: 12
RE: Jap Signal intelligence - 2/8/2010 11:39:18 AM   
Chickenboy


Posts: 25326
Joined: 6/29/2002
From: San Antonio, TX
Status: offline
By and large, IJ SigInt is very poor. However, with some deduction, the Japanese player can make some of the data actionable. I've used this on a few occasions to infer activity (and need for a strike) or determine some routings of enemy ships.

_____________________________


(in reply to spence)
Post #: 13
RE: Jap Signal intelligence - 2/8/2010 11:46:45 AM   
GB68

 

Posts: 113
Joined: 8/4/2009
From: Melbourne, Australia
Status: offline
I have always thought this area of the game has been non-historical. I do not mean the Allies should not have an advantage, but I mean the fact we know in game, the intel the allies recieve is 100% correct and the Japanese get basically nothing!

We all know the allies have the "codes", but even then there are always codes within a code. I'm sure there are veteran Intelligence Officers who frequent these forums. I'm sure they will corroborate the fact, that in even the best of circumstances, "decoding" is often made up of part guess work. I have always believed that to be historical, the allies should recieve good intelligence, detailed, but lets' say 75% correct, give or take 10%. The Japanese should recieve some nominal details, but in the area of 40 to 50% correct. Much more though than " Radio tranmissions detected at hex xx,xx "

Just my thoughts as I've always felt it was far too biased to the Allies.


_____________________________

"Are you going to come quietly, or do I have to use earplugs?"
- Spike Milligan

(in reply to spence)
Post #: 14
RE: Jap Signal intelligence - 2/8/2010 12:25:33 PM   
Mike Scholl

 

Posts: 9349
Joined: 1/1/2003
From: Kansas City, MO
Status: offline
I'd say just the opposite of GB68.  The Japanese had some incredibly dumb practices like every merchant ship reporting it's noon position each day back to Tokyo.  The only thing that kept Allied subs from sinking them all was that the navigation was so poor that the reported position was often wrong by a dozen miles or more (leaving the sub to watch smoke on the horizon).

Overall, while Allied intel shouldn't be anything like 100%, it should far outstrip Japanese capabilities in every respect.  I think it's under-rated. 

(in reply to GB68)
Post #: 15
RE: Jap Signal intelligence - 2/8/2010 12:42:13 PM   
d0mbo

 

Posts: 592
Joined: 8/21/2009
From: Holland
Status: offline
Not to be blunt, but: have any of the players here tried to hoover the mousepointer over the base where the radio transmissions were detected? Sometimes you will be able to "see" what type of ships are in port and can act accordingly. Grantd it's not much, but it IS helpfull so i still wouldn't all Japanese intelligence worthless.


(in reply to Mike Scholl)
Post #: 16
RE: Jap Signal intelligence - 2/8/2010 2:57:07 PM   
Shark7


Posts: 7934
Joined: 7/24/2007
From: The Big Nowhere
Status: offline
You do have to remember that Midway was not dumb luck, it was a lot of work over time. How the intel guys finally determined that Midway was the target of an attack was to send false signals themselves about Midway and see if those messages were sent along back to Japan with what they thought was Midways Japanese code signal...in the case of Midway, it was.

So that really tells us:

1. The Allies weren't just getting messages that said 'We're attacking Midway next week'. They had to work to confirm their suspicions. In the case of Midway, it took about 3 months to figure out both the target and date of the attack.

2. The Japanese were obviously intercepting USN transmissions in a way that made it possible to use the intel...granted in the case of Midway the US purposely used radio deception, but that does prove the Japanese were capable of signals intel.

Basically the Allied side is OK, though maybe a randomizer tweak is in order. Japanese side should get a randomizer that allows a very low chance of actually getting good, actionable intel now and then.

_____________________________

Distant Worlds Fan

'When in doubt...attack!'

(in reply to d0mbo)
Post #: 17
RE: Jap Signal intelligence - 2/8/2010 4:30:54 PM   
crsutton


Posts: 9590
Joined: 12/6/2002
From: Maryland
Status: offline

Allied player never gets any information on the location of major warships-especially carriers when they are at sea or leaving port. This is a major gem for Japan as at a good Japanese player can easily hide his ships. KB is much more deadly as a result. So signet is great for the Allies but not so great...as on occasion the Allies did know the location of major ships.

As I recall, most Allied intel came not from code breaking but from intensive interpretation of radio traffic. Lots of hard work.

The Japanese liked to deploy sub picket lines when major offensive and defensive operations were in the works. The Allies got pretty good at finding these and rolling them up with ASW.

_____________________________

I am the Holy Roman Emperor and am above grammar.

Sigismund of Luxemburg

(in reply to Shark7)
Post #: 18
RE: Jap Signal intelligence - 2/8/2010 5:43:51 PM   
Mike Scholl

 

Posts: 9349
Joined: 1/1/2003
From: Kansas City, MO
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Shark7

2. The Japanese were obviously intercepting USN transmissions in a way that made it possible to use the intel...granted in the case of Midway the US purposely used radio deception, but that does prove the Japanese were capable of signals intel.




Actually the only intel the Japanese seem to have gleaned during the Midway Operation was the one message the Allied code-breakers had Midway send "in the clear" (uncoded) to confirm the identity of "AF". You would think a sophisticated intelligence service might be suspicious of a single uncoded message in all their intercepts---but the Japs fell for it hook, line, and sinker. Real intelligent!

(in reply to Shark7)
Post #: 19
RE: Jap Signal intelligence - 2/8/2010 6:25:52 PM   
Bradley7735


Posts: 2073
Joined: 7/12/2004
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl


quote:

ORIGINAL: Shark7

2. The Japanese were obviously intercepting USN transmissions in a way that made it possible to use the intel...granted in the case of Midway the US purposely used radio deception, but that does prove the Japanese were capable of signals intel.




Actually the only intel the Japanese seem to have gleaned during the Midway Operation was the one message the Allied code-breakers had Midway send "in the clear" (uncoded) to confirm the identity of "AF". You would think a sophisticated intelligence service might be suspicious of a single uncoded message in all their intercepts---but the Japs fell for it hook, line, and sinker. Real intelligent!



I was going to say that too. The Midway transmission was not coded. The Japanese just needed to translate from English to Japanese. Mike said it better, though.

_____________________________

The older I get, the better I was.

(in reply to Mike Scholl)
Post #: 20
RE: Jap Signal intelligence - 2/8/2010 6:36:08 PM   
Kull


Posts: 2526
Joined: 7/3/2007
From: El Paso, TX
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

I'd say just the opposite of GB68.  The Japanese had some incredibly dumb practices like every merchant ship reporting it's noon position each day back to Tokyo.  The only thing that kept Allied subs from sinking them all was that the navigation was so poor that the reported position was often wrong by a dozen miles or more (leaving the sub to watch smoke on the horizon).

Overall, while Allied intel shouldn't be anything like 100%, it should far outstrip Japanese capabilities in every respect.  I think it's under-rated. 


Really? But doesn't this "lock in" a paradigm from the war? Why shouldn't the Japanese player have the option of being smarter in the area of code usage and signals practices? If "real life US torpedoes" is an optional switch (based on absolutely nothing but hindsight), why not something similar for Japanese intel practices? I'm not advocating that, but you have a habit of decrying forced Allied ineptitudes. This situation is no different, except now the Japanese player is locked into an extremely detrimental RL behaviour with no ability to change it.

(in reply to Mike Scholl)
Post #: 21
RE: Jap Signal intelligence - 2/8/2010 6:46:05 PM   
Shark7


Posts: 7934
Joined: 7/24/2007
From: The Big Nowhere
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kull

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

I'd say just the opposite of GB68.  The Japanese had some incredibly dumb practices like every merchant ship reporting it's noon position each day back to Tokyo.  The only thing that kept Allied subs from sinking them all was that the navigation was so poor that the reported position was often wrong by a dozen miles or more (leaving the sub to watch smoke on the horizon).

Overall, while Allied intel shouldn't be anything like 100%, it should far outstrip Japanese capabilities in every respect.  I think it's under-rated. 


Really? But doesn't this "lock in" a paradigm from the war? Why shouldn't the Japanese player have the option of being smarter in the area of code usage and signals practices? If "real life US torpedoes" is an optional switch (based on absolutely nothing but hindsight), why not something similar for Japanese intel practices? I'm not advocating that, but you have a habit of decrying forced Allied ineptitudes. This situation is no different, except now the Japanese player is locked into an extremely detrimental RL behaviour with no ability to change it.


Good point. I've been seeing this a lot myself. 'My side shouldn't be locked into historical facts but the other guy should!'

What's good for the goose...

_____________________________

Distant Worlds Fan

'When in doubt...attack!'

(in reply to Kull)
Post #: 22
RE: Jap Signal intelligence - 2/8/2010 7:09:31 PM   
Brady


Posts: 10701
Joined: 10/25/2002
From: Oregon,USA
Status: offline

What Follows are some exceprts from posts I have made in the past on this subject:

...........

Intelligence and Cryptanalytic Activities of the Japanese During WW 2 (Agean Park Press).

This book describes in detail many aspects of Japanese Code breaking and intel gathering during the war some of the things it cover are:

The Japanese Could read Chinese code throught the war.

The Japanese Could read Allied (US) Aircode trafic.

The Japanese Could read Weather Code.

The Japanese Could determine TF movements through intercepts.

The Japanese Had an extensive Spy network in China and the USSR/Manchuko area, that provided intell on Soviet Army disposations, and extensive intill on Chinease Army disposations.

British Air Code was partialy read.

Their is more as well, but it shows that the Intell aspect was not as one sided as one might think.


Summery of the Book:

During the perioud of Japanese expanshion:

Priour to the war, the Japanese put a lot of effort into gathering intel on the areas they intened to move into, or to atack, well know is the Consolate spy in Hawai, less well known are the operatives that worked all over the Japanese sphear of concern to pave the way for the Ocupations. These operatives would later become key figures in the Ocupation forces for their respective ares of expertise.

Types of Intel gathered Included, OOB, Geographic infermation like landing spots, water depth, roads, airfileds exc.. A working knowledge of the local populios was also key and helped the Japanese maintane controle in the ocupied areas.

Pre War and during the war, the Japanese were also, to varying degreas, suxcesfull at the art of disinfermation.

After the perioud of expanshion:

Japanese Intel provided actionable infermation on a number of isues, Thier assesment of the Situation in Siberia through Intel and other sources, alowed them to Move forces from the Kawantung Army to other theaters, that is they felt confortable doing so, because they were in the know...

Intel provided a very clear picture of the situation in China and Burma which greatly help planing.

Intel provided ample warning of the Invashion of Iwo Jima, the Ryikos(Okinawa), and the Philipines.

Intel also provided a fairly clear picture of the situation in the Northern area of operations (Alutions/Kuriles).

Intel also provided them with a general understanding of the forces araid aganst them gloabaly.

Intel also gave them- warning of impending Carrier strikes later in the war.

These acheavements are not as glamiours as the Noted Allied acheavements and in game terms are hard to efect. Also it should be noted that given the defensive nature of the situation for Japan past late 42/early 43 the opertunity to gather infermation from capruted sources was very limited or non existant. Some of the Bigest allied suxcess from Intel were:

MIdway- Eschenialy a result of Monitoring Japanese signals trafic, and getting lucky, their code was not openly broken, they simply were able to point to it as a likley invashion target, the rest as we know was just dumb luck. We also had a lot of lead time on this, this was not a real time scenario.

Yamamoto- This was some good work, and again was something that was know to be in the offing for some time.

Bismark Sea- This stemed in part from infermation that came to pass from a captured set of documents, and had a lot of lead time, but we never knew exactly when they were comming, in fact two convoys had deleavrd troops to New Gunie suxcesfully priour to the noted convoy being intercepted, that were part of the same intel scoop, namely the transfer of Men from the Kawantung Army to the New Gunie area.

Operations in New Gunie after the Bismark sea, Another captured set of code books helped Marcauther to advance up the coast of New gunie since he was able to see whear the Japnese were along the coast through signals intercepts.

The later points above were not a result of code breaking but from dumb luck, these were on the whole isolated suxcess, and not for the most part linked in any way. The Japanese at this stage of the war simply had no way to make similar use of their intell. except to put forces in the way of the advancing allies, like they did with considerable efect at Okinawa and Iwo Jima, and to a lesser degree in the Philipines.

CBI:

In this theater as noted above the Japanese enjoyed considerable suxcess across the board, they could see the map so to speak for the whole war.

In game terms:

Japanese Intel reports should show:

Radio Transmitions from TF's at sea, more or less as it does now.

List the locations of US Air units in the reports as well.

List the locations of Allied HQ units in the reports.(randomanly and with a degree of eror)

Show randomanly and with some degee of eror whear HQ units are preparing for atack.

List Soviet Ground unit locations randomanly and witrh some degree of eror.

List Soviet Naval assests in port.

List British units in Burma with a degree of eror and randomanly.

List Chinese Units(all including air) and note their movements.



................

From: MHQ Autom 2002, in the Article: Secret Key To MacArthur's Success p.18


" Australian, British, and American Cryptanalysts at the central Beuro had attacked the Japanese main administrative army code for nearly two years, but were still unable to penatrate it's intermost secerats. They shared their finindgs and cooperated closly with US Army Counterparts working at signals Intelegance services, located at Arlington Hall Station, Virgina, just across the potamic River from Washington. With Assistance from the Austrailians and British signals units and analyis centers in India, the Centrail Beureau and Artlington Hall had enjoyed magor successes aganst certain Japanese army code syatems,notably the japanese army airforces air-ground code in 1943 and the Japnese army's shiping cypher in Aprial of 1943"

"By Early January 1944, howeaver, no one except the imperial Japanese Army was reading it's most secerate military radio messages."

"Magor Gewneral George V. Strong, US cheif of military intelegance, tesified to the security of Japanese army communications, Strong declaired in January 1944 the imperial armys ciphers were the most difficult of any enemy systems the allies had to solve to that point in the war. In his opinion Japanese army ciphers presented much greater dificulity than originoaly anticapated, and work by the allied cryptanalysts was much more ardious and time consuming than in "any other cryptographic material with which there ha been experance"


Of course in January of 44 the Austrailians found a code book in New Gunie that would change all this, by Spring 44 we were able to read partial messages of this code.

This window of being able to read the Japanese Army code greatly aided macauther in his Campagine in New Gunie and espichaly in the effort at Holliandia.

Howeaver..."On Aprial 8th,1944, the IGHQ changed the encipherment book for all Japanese high leval cryptologic systems."


Later of course they uncoverd yet another code book from the Yoshimo Maru.


Clearly untill well into 43 not much was being read by the Allies about the Japanese army via intel intercepts, and after it that it was Spoty at times.

........................................................................................................

p.424 At DAwn We Slept:

"So Rochefort and his devoted workers in Combat Intelegance strained every nerve to keep track of japanese ship movements. On Novemebr 27th his summery indicated: " No further information on the presence of Carier Divishion Five in the Mandates." The same report advised: "Cariers are still located in home water's,,,," so Japanese deception tactics continued to work effectively. The next day Rochfort had a disturbing development to note: "As has been previously reported the suspected {Japanese} Radio Intelegance net is very active and is becoming more so.... This activaty is interputed to indacate the the R.I. net is operating at full strength upon US Naval comunacations and IS GETTING RESULTS [Rochefort's capital's].
Roheforts report was entirely accurate. From many interceptorstattions the fourth Department of the naval General Staff monitored American Naval radio trafic. It could tell, for instance, when Pearl Harbor Signaled a Battleship, or When Kimmels ships Flashed Pearl Harbor. Somtimes it could estimate aproxamate loacations, but not often. Japanese Radio intelegance was in much the same situation a sRochefort: that it could not decipher the contents of the message it monitored and had to work from call signals alone. The two radio interception nets were like wariours playing a game of blind mans bluff.....The Japanese divided American Naval messages into three catagories, Urgent,Ordinary and meterological. The naval Genearl staff kept a statiscial record of all the messages, grouping them acording to their imporatnace and number. In this way it attempted to judge the scope of American fleat activity. The US changed the call signs from time to time. For several days afterword the Japanese would be confused, but by hard work they solved the new paterns. Howeaver, after Pearl Harbor the US Navy devised systems which made it extreamly dificult for the Japanese even to break the call signals."

JN-25:

"..."We read the occasional small message in JN-25 before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor," he says. "But never did we read JN-25 on a general basis, because we didn't have the staff to do this. Later, during the war, when we were concentrating on JN-25 full blast, we were able to read only five or six percent of the total JN-25 intercepts.".."

From this sight:http://www.corregidor.org/chs_crypto1/jn25_2.htm

This was the more read of the Japanese code syatems, and only half of all Japanese Navel signal trafic actualy used this system, as we can see from other posts and referances above, the rest of the Japanese code's for the various brancehs and organasations were largely unread or spoty at best, particularly dificult to read were the Japanese army codes which were unread for almost half the war, yet we see examples above whear Army Ground units are labled in the intell report...this I find suspect. Also Misderection was a part of all this by both sides, I wounder if this is in anyway represented in the intel report's.

Autom 2002 MHQ, Marcaurthers Greatest Secret, p.16:


"To bypass the 162th Infantry, Hidemitsu took his men into the Jungle-cladd foothills of the rugged Finisterre Range. Faced with a long, tough march, the troops quikly rid themselfs of all but the most essential survivial items that they could carry on their backs.....unnessary supplys and equipment were left behind at sio. Among items deamed unnesential were spare coppys of all the code books belonging to the twentieth Infentry Divishion.The Japanese Army prided itself on its security consciousness, and regulations stipulated taht code clerks had to burn their code parapheralia to enshure that none of the sensitive documents fell into enemy hands..Therin lies one of the most interesting storys of WW2."
The handfullof Japnese army signalmen ordered to destroy the 20th divishions code books had a practile problem. How were they going to burn the dozen or so books outdoors during the monsoon seasion? The code books themselves were compact and practicle documents, not much larger or thicker than a present day quality papper back book. But as anyone who has tried knows buring a bound volume is dificult. The pages have to be torn out a few at a time abd then tosed individualy into the fire to inshure compleate distruction. The Japnese squad had to destroy eight volums of code paraphernalia, including the red bound main Army Adminstrative Code Book, two cipher books, a geographic code book, and a chinese telegrapic code book. They could start a fire, but it would take time to burn all those documents, and during that time the telltale white smoke rising through the green jungle canopy would serve as a homming becone for any Allied fighters passing overhead. Wet Hungry and anxious to get out of Sio ahead of the Australians, the Japanese put all the code books into a small steall trunk. They then tossed in into a deep watter filled pit, expecting that the box would sink to the bottom of it's own weight. That was their first mistake a worse one followed...."


Acording to regulation the Japnese Cypher section tore off the covers of the code books and submited them along with the officer of the sections writen report stating that the books had been destroyed acording to the proper procedure, in fat that had not been destroyed, the Japanese beelaved they were and thought their code still intact.


During the first weeks in January of 44 the Austrailians entered the area of the former Japanese coumpound at Sio, previously home to some 40,000 Japanese troops, it was festooed with booby traps and the Pioners went to work to make it safe, they discovered the Metal box (err ox) and............





_____________________________





Beta Team Member for:

WPO
PC
CF
AE
WiTE

Obi-wan Kenobi said it best: A lot of the reality we perceive depend on our point of view

(in reply to Shark7)
Post #: 23
RE: Jap Signal intelligence - 2/8/2010 7:41:19 PM   
Shark7


Posts: 7934
Joined: 7/24/2007
From: The Big Nowhere
Status: offline
Brady, good work on that...in fact, that is much like the intel gathering we are arguing about. Put in some effort and you find things out.

Intel, since it is an abstract in the game, should probably reflect what you have posted a bit more. It's not just radio transmissions, its an entire network working like gears in an engine...all the gears have to operate at peak performance for the machine to be truly efficient.

_____________________________

Distant Worlds Fan

'When in doubt...attack!'

(in reply to Brady)
Post #: 24
RE: Jap Signal intelligence - 2/8/2010 7:59:05 PM   
Mike Scholl

 

Posts: 9349
Joined: 1/1/2003
From: Kansas City, MO
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kull

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

I'd say just the opposite of GB68.  The Japanese had some incredibly dumb practices like every merchant ship reporting it's noon position each day back to Tokyo.  The only thing that kept Allied subs from sinking them all was that the navigation was so poor that the reported position was often wrong by a dozen miles or more (leaving the sub to watch smoke on the horizon).

Overall, while Allied intel shouldn't be anything like 100%, it should far outstrip Japanese capabilities in every respect.  I think it's under-rated. 


Really? But doesn't this "lock in" a paradigm from the war? Why shouldn't the Japanese player have the option of being smarter in the area of code usage and signals practices? If "real life US torpedoes" is an optional switch (based on absolutely nothing but hindsight), why not something similar for Japanese intel practices? I'm not advocating that, but you have a habit of decrying forced Allied ineptitudes. This situation is no different, except now the Japanese player is locked into an extremely detrimental RL behaviour with no ability to change it.



So you want to throw the Japanese starting superiority in pilot quality into the mix? I don't have any problem with it..., but the Japanese player sure will. The only reason to decry "forced ineptitudes" is if they are undeserved. But I wouldn't have a problem with a similar "toggle" to that provided for Allied torpedoes.

Your Japanese opponent wants his ASW to be better than awful? Or his "intel" to be better than useless? Fine, let him offer working US torpedoes as a swap... Problem is that the game has already given him far better ASW than he deserves, and a far better officer pool than he deserves---and his opponent has received nothing in return. Toggles would be much better..., and fairer.


(in reply to Kull)
Post #: 25
RE: Jap Signal intelligence - 2/8/2010 9:11:07 PM   
Bradley7735


Posts: 2073
Joined: 7/12/2004
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl


quote:

ORIGINAL: Kull

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

I'd say just the opposite of GB68.  The Japanese had some incredibly dumb practices like every merchant ship reporting it's noon position each day back to Tokyo.  The only thing that kept Allied subs from sinking them all was that the navigation was so poor that the reported position was often wrong by a dozen miles or more (leaving the sub to watch smoke on the horizon).

Overall, while Allied intel shouldn't be anything like 100%, it should far outstrip Japanese capabilities in every respect.  I think it's under-rated. 


Really? But doesn't this "lock in" a paradigm from the war? Why shouldn't the Japanese player have the option of being smarter in the area of code usage and signals practices? If "real life US torpedoes" is an optional switch (based on absolutely nothing but hindsight), why not something similar for Japanese intel practices? I'm not advocating that, but you have a habit of decrying forced Allied ineptitudes. This situation is no different, except now the Japanese player is locked into an extremely detrimental RL behaviour with no ability to change it.



So you want to throw the Japanese starting superiority in pilot quality into the mix? I don't have any problem with it..., but the Japanese player sure will. The only reason to decry "forced ineptitudes" is if they are undeserved. But I wouldn't have a problem with a similar "toggle" to that provided for Allied torpedoes.

Your Japanese opponent wants his ASW to be better than awful? Or his "intel" to be better than useless? Fine, let him offer working US torpedoes as a swap... Problem is that the game has already given him far better ASW than he deserves, and a far better officer pool than he deserves---and his opponent has received nothing in return. Toggles would be much better..., and fairer.




Toggles for a lot of things would be better. Did anyone notice that somewhere between UV, WITP and AE, the historical Japanese Sub Doctrine toggle dissapeared? Historically, Japanese submarines were very limited in firing torpedoes at merchant ships, and even when they could do so, could only fire 1 torpedo. You can see all sorts of AAR's where merchie after merchie go down to IJN subs off the WC and OZ. This is not a historical representation.

In some ways, the game might be better to just eliminate (ie: toggle) any advantage/disadvantage each side has. Bad torps, good damage control, Kamikazes, A-bomb, Intelligence, sub doctrines, landing bonuses, surprise, coordinated CV attacks, construction, long lance attacks, great exp for starting ships, bad exp for starting ships, pilot experience, etc.

Ok, I have some sarcasm in my post above.

I think the Japanese had around 6-8 codes they used throughout the war. From Merchant communication to High Imperial Command communication. At any given time, the US could read, fluently, about half of them. That doesn't mean the Allied player should be able to see all details of the Japanese side. But, it does mean that the game doesn't (and can't) give enough information to the Allied player. Sure, the US never did break the highest level code of the Japanese, something Brady pointed out. But, you can't say that the Japanese were just as good at code breaking as the US because they could read the Weather Code and the US couldn't read the High Command code.

_____________________________

The older I get, the better I was.

(in reply to Mike Scholl)
Post #: 26
RE: Jap Signal intelligence - 2/8/2010 10:13:52 PM   
Kull


Posts: 2526
Joined: 7/3/2007
From: El Paso, TX
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
So you want to throw the Japanese starting superiority in pilot quality into the mix? I don't have any problem with it..., but the Japanese player sure will. The only reason to decry "forced ineptitudes" is if they are undeserved. But I wouldn't have a problem with a similar "toggle" to that provided for Allied torpedoes.

Your Japanese opponent wants his ASW to be better than awful? Or his "intel" to be better than useless? Fine, let him offer working US torpedoes as a swap... Problem is that the game has already given him far better ASW than he deserves, and a far better officer pool than he deserves---and his opponent has received nothing in return. Toggles would be much better..., and fairer.


The point is that forced ineptitudes and their counterpart, overdone superiorities, are endemic to the game, and apply to BOTH sides. Because it is a game, and the devs have made some design decisions that can be torn apart in singularity, but which in toto create an enjoyable experience. One that doesn't wander too far from history and all the while preserves the the strategic production and resource realities which - 99 times out of 100 - will produce a real life historical result in roughly the real life time frame.

Does allegedly superior Japanese ASW change that? Superior early war Japanese pilots? Better Japanese officers? Not one of them, alone or in combination.

(in reply to Mike Scholl)
Post #: 27
RE: Jap Signal intelligence - 2/8/2010 10:40:13 PM   
Mike Scholl

 

Posts: 9349
Joined: 1/1/2003
From: Kansas City, MO
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Bradley7735

Toggles for a lot of things would be better. Did anyone notice that somewhere between UV, WITP and AE, the historical Japanese Sub Doctrine toggle dissapeared? Historically, Japanese submarines were very limited in firing torpedoes at merchant ships, and even when they could do so, could only fire 1 torpedo.




Actually I don't have any problem with doing away with "Japanese Submarine Doctrine". The Japanese player is the one who should and will decide what his "doctrine" will be. Same with concentrating more effort on ASW measures when the war starts.

My objection is to giving him abilities and skills the Japanese didn't have when the war started. Their submarine crews and captains had no more experience than anyone else in the Pacific! The China Incident was NOT a naval war, so who were they to gain experience against? And Japanese ASW equipment, doctrine, and training were woefully inadequate on December 7th.

Most US submarines are handicapped by their historically lousy Mark XIV's..., and it is up to the US Player to figure out how to get whatever use he can out of them. All the Allies (except the Brits) are handicapped by poor sub CO's..., fact of life, and a balancing act for the player to try and correct.

But the game has solved the Japanese ASW weaknesses for the player by eliminating them..., and given him a huge pool of over-rated officers to man his subs and PB's with. This is what I object to.

(in reply to Bradley7735)
Post #: 28
RE: Jap Signal intelligence - 2/9/2010 3:37:16 AM   
Mynok


Posts: 12108
Joined: 11/30/2002
Status: offline

Here's a thought for consideration: since the torpedo problem was as much as political issue as anything else, why not make a trade off with the grossly underrepresented political issue of IJA/IJN cooperation? Don't know how that would be implemented, but it does seem strange that the two are so easily intermixed in the game.

As for Japanese ASW, the issue seems to be leaders more than anything else. The individual ship capabilities seem adequately limited. But if the leaders are truly boosting the effects too much, then give leaders an ASW rating. And make it low for pretty much all leaders early in the war.

On intelligence, I simply don't find it a game-changing aspect. Both sides have way more intelligence than they did historically just from hindsight. I don't see how this could be radically changed without running into the pitfalls discussed in the thread about that very matter. There is really not a whole lot that either side doesn't know about the early objectives of the Japanese or the abilities of the Allies. This truly changes the equation, and leaves us in the position of having to accept an ahistorical intelligence situation, no matter what. Better to leave it where it is, IMO, as a system that gives the Allies a bit more info down the road, and the Japanese little more than what is already known from history. Keep a sidelight in my book, and keep giving the Allies enough to ensure they have more.



_____________________________

"Measure civilization by the ability of citizens to mock government with impunity" -- Unknown

(in reply to Mike Scholl)
Post #: 29
RE: Jap Signal intelligence - 2/9/2010 4:29:05 AM   
spence

 

Posts: 5373
Joined: 4/20/2003
From: Vancouver, Washington
Status: offline
quote:

underrepresented political issue of IJA/IJN cooperation? Don't know how that would be implemented, but it does seem strange that the two are so easily intermixed in the game.


The AI might need all the help it can get but a real player should be unable to assign IJN fighters to escort IJA bombers and vice versa. I've observed IJA bombers escorted by Zero's flying from carriers. That's over the top fantasy.

One thought though would be to have the Japanese Player pay Political Points to change his industry. The IJA and IJN were not the only powerhouses in Japanese Politics. The industrial families likewise wielded enormous power and had hundreds of years of heritage as the employers of the warrior class. Closing somebodies factory or telling the owner to produce somebody else's design would involve a loss of face for these families and would cost somebody a heck of alot more political capital than changing the skipper of 120 ft subchaser (especially one outranked by the prospective captain).


(in reply to Mynok)
Post #: 30
Page:   [1] 2   next >   >>
All Forums >> [New Releases from Matrix Games] >> War in the Pacific: Admiral's Edition >> Jap Signal intelligence Page: [1] 2   next >   >>
Jump to:





New Messages No New Messages
Hot Topic w/ New Messages Hot Topic w/o New Messages
Locked w/ New Messages Locked w/o New Messages
 Post New Thread
 Reply to Message
 Post New Poll
 Submit Vote
 Delete My Own Post
 Delete My Own Thread
 Rate Posts


Forum Software © ASPPlayground.NET Advanced Edition 2.4.5 ANSI

0.523