In reply to various posts,
I'm not sure about the accuracy of the V-2's. It might have taken quite a few to hit the supply beachheads and ports, but just the threat of them doing so on a regular basis was enough cause to capture the launch sites.
No, but they did enough to scare the politician into demanding action. Bombs hitting London again. According to Miles Dempsey 2nd british army commander, on hearing the rapport of the pressure being applied. He stated. Ok I guess MG have to be go then. Thinking behind that being that liberating/cutting off Holland would remove the threat.
As for the flank security of a single thrust, I think that the single thrust proposal would have been much more feasible had we have closed the Falaise Gap sooner, or had Bradley have authorized a thrust to the Seine and then NW to trap all of the German forces that eventually made their way out of Normandy. That would have left the Wermacht with very little to work with through the fall, short of transfering more divisions from the eastern front. As it was, the Normandy escapees formed the nuclei of the reconstituted divisions that counterattacked later. In any event, I think that Patton or a couple of motivated corps commanders (Collins comes to mind) could have, in cooperation with the AAF, protected the right flank of a narrow thrust up the Channel coast.
Certainly if they had bagged more troops in at Falaise some things might have been easier on, but it wasnt those troops that slowed down the Canadian army in clearing the Channel coast. Monty didnt relinquis command until sep 1st and still was in command of the troops that was responisble for taking that area afterwards. So he had the options of making more out of a up Channel coast thrust. Why didnt he? well it was the responsibility of the 1st Canadian army and exactly at the time Crerer decide to withdraw 2 of his limited supply of divsions for refitting... Monty "protested" but Crerer was firm and use the ill go back to my politicians if u try and force me arguement. Which seemed in every case to make Monty back off.
For supply purposes, could we not have established beach supply points farther up the coast? Mulberry's may have been too complicated to build, but I think that quite a lot of supply was off-loaded directly onto Omaha Beach for months after D-Day. And the road system through Belgium and Holland had to have been at least as good as that through France and western Germany -- it certainly aided the Germans when they drove their way to the coast in 1940.
Other than ports i think it would have been very hard to do. If u compare the tonnage in off loaded at beaches compared to the mulberry's its quite a significant difference.
Along with that, most of the heavy and medium amphibian vessels was sailed off to the pacific to participate in Leyte landings after the Dragoon landings. They only had a limited amount of those. Which wouldnt make over the beachsupply even if u had captured beaches higher up as u suggest much of a possibility. And as u say the allies didnt have any of the "pre" fabricated mulberries availble. Most of the fuel that was supplied after the channel pipeline was build, came from that and as far as i know they didnt have the capability and well time to build a new one higher up the coast. Which again means the limited off beach supply capability had to do it all. Both food, fuel, ammo and so on.
As i see it, backed by the logistians of the periode the only viable solution was a high tonnage port. The smaller high up French ports didnt have the tonnage capability.
Which again raises the question. Why didnt Monty make damn sure, since he had the perfect solution, no matter a narrow or a broad strategy, in making sure Antwerpen was rdy for use ASAP when he had the chance.
I think the narrow-thrust plan presumes that Monty and his American counterpart would have bagged all of the German forces in Normandy, cleared Antwerp and the Scheldte Estuary on time, and would have hit the lower Rhine in a timely manner with great momentum. All of that was possible. One army could have patrolled the eastern flank and given ample warning of any counterattacks, and slowed or held them at bay, as did the 30th division at Mortain.
I agree, but it reverts to the lack of supplying capability since he didnt get Antwerp up and running promptly. Which reverts me to my original arguement. That IMO a narrow strategy wasnt possible in sep '44 cuz of supply reasons. U cant supply 1-2 armies even for a narrow thrust all the way from Normandy, as the supply situasion was at the time. Even getting Le Havre up and running wasnt the answer since it was almost as far away as Normandy.
If that should have had a chance of working. The effeciency of the supply chain had to have been much improved. U could have started with firing its commander. Making the decision that in just 10 days time after Paris had fallen and during a supply crisis. To move all of ur HQ staff there, removing valueble Administation time in doing so. Not to mention his Staff numbered 10.000 men along with all their stuff! Thinking about how many typewritter is that. That move has done by the same trucks that was suppose to bring supplies forward to the advancing troops. Doesnt seem like the wisest choice.
On the other hand Paris was prolly a nice city to be in for supply GIs and officers just after its capture...
< Message edited by Walloc -- 10/22/2007 7:37:03 AM >