"The revised borders and friendship" treaty event should be changed

[AshFall]

A recent post about this decision caught my interest and I checked out different variables surrounding it.

In my opinion, this decision event and the following annexation events should be changed to make this a little less of a total no-brainer.

As currently stands, the USSR loses territory near Brest Litovsk, and annexes Lithuania if accepted. It also moves away from the allies by 5%. This equates to about 340mpps worth of income lost assuming a historical date barbarossa.

The only "downside" of saying no is giving Germany an opportunity to annex Lithuania 40-03-01, at the cost of pushing the USSR further 6-10% towards the allies. That push would give the USSR an additional income before historical barbarossa between 374 - 620mpps.

The total windfall of refusing the event if the Axis annex Lithuania is then between 714 and 960mpps. The axis gains a nice forward foothold from which to cut minsk and reach Leningrad, which should gain them 2 turns towards leningrad and 3 turns towards moscow. They would also gain around 360mpp extra themselves. But given the economic win early for the USSR it's not too much of an issue.

Proposed change As I understand it the allies were leery of Soviet annexations, protesting and "growing colder" towards the aggressive power even in the spring of 40, though not as much as with the attack on Finland partly due to ennui and partly due to pragmatism. The area could be construed as an entirely local affair by the USSR and the Germans, especially if formal agreements were made.

The "Annex the baltic states" event should move the USSR 0-2% away from the allies if the friendship agreement was offered but not accepted. Rising to 2-6% if neutral Lithuania is also annexed following a refusal of an offered friendship pact and a non annexation by Germany. Powers who overreach and grab all they can were seen badly by the west.

Effects: This would make the event a much more interesting choice.

As the USSR, If you accept it, you can annex all of the baltic states with no further political cost than the 5% and preempt an axis strategy that annexes Lithuania.

If you refuse, you can annex two of the states very "Cheaply", gambling on getting no reaction from the west. Or decline the annexation, staying entirely in the wests favor and forcing the Germans to invade to take them and giving you 8-15% (Lithuania), +25-40% (Latvia/Estonia), making it hard for them to capitalize fully.

Or also annex Lithuania to get the buffer, but then definitely suffering a hit, though it might not be as much as accepting the friendship agreement.

[BillRunacre]

Hi Ashfall

I'm a little confused by one thing here, because if the USSR agrees to the German Offer of a Revised Borders and Friendship Treaty then it moves away from the Allies and therefore its income reduces.

In your description, and correct me if I'm wrong, but this loss appears to have been added to the gain that the USSR makes from Germany annexing Lithuania?

[AshFall]

Hi Ashfall

I'm a little confused by one thing here, because if the USSR agrees to the German Offer of a Revised Borders and Friendship Treaty then it moves away from the Allies and therefore its income reduces.

In your description, and correct me if I'm wrong, but this loss appears to have been added to the gain that the USSR makes from Germany annexing Lithuania?

Heya Bill

Currently, as far as I can see both by testing it and by event description, there isn't actually any movement away from the Allies on the USSRs part if it does not accept the deal. The Germans just proposing it doesn't do anything but give the USSR the option to accept and then if they do they move away from the allies.

So the chain events look like:

Germany: Offer friendship? There is no real reason not to. Option to annex Lithuania if not offered, or if USSR says no.

USSR: Say no to friendship (can annex the baltic states, and Lithuania without impact it the Germans do not), or say yes, moving 5% away from allies and denying the Germans the chance to annex Lithuania (only nominal upside).

The total difference in USSR mobilization between being offered the treaty and accepting it, and not being offered/accepting it and the Germans annexing Lithuania is 5 + 7-10% = 12-15%. Which would be 714-960mpps before Barbarossa.

The USSR simply saying no to the agreement once offered still lets them annex the entire Baltics if the Germans dont, and regardless nets them 340mpps from mobilization before Barbarossa.

All of this comes down to that there really isnt any reason for the USSR to accept the treaty. Sure, if the Germans go full on and Annex Lithuania they get a nice foreward position. But the amount of MPPS you get as the USSR from that chain easily outweighs that to my mind. Scarcity of MPPs before the invasion is the biggest difficulty for the USSR, and having more of it lets them start out with better Industry, Production and other techs that will be essential.

[BillRunacre]

I've been working through some of the various chains of events as follows:

- If Germany says YES to DE 630 and the USSR also says YES, then the USSR moves 5% away from the Allies and this will reduce Soviet income.
If Germany subsequently annexes Lithuania by saying YES to DE 610 then the USSR moves 7-10% towards the Allies.
Overall that can be a move at best of 5 minus 7-10% = 2-5% towards the Allies.

If Germany says NO to DE 630 and subsequently says YES to DE 632 to annex Lithuania then the USSR moves 7-10% towards the Allies.

If Germany says YES to DE 630 and the USSR says NO, and Germany subsequently says YES to DE 633 to annex Lithuania then the USSR moves 7-10% towards the Allies.

I’m still struggling to see where 5 + 7-10% = 12-15% comes from in your calculations.

Can you spell it out in the same way as I’ve written, with reference to the DE events and YES/NO answers?

[AshFall]

I've been working through some of the various chains of events as follows:

- If Germany says YES to DE 630 and the USSR also says YES, then the USSR moves 5% away from the Allies and this will reduce Soviet income.
If Germany subsequently annexes Lithuania by saying YES to DE 610 then the USSR moves 7-10% towards the Allies.
Overall that can be a move at best of 5 minus 7-10% = 2-5% towards the Allies.

If Germany says NO to DE 630 and subsequently says YES to DE 632 to annex Lithuania then the USSR moves 7-10% towards the Allies.

If Germany says YES to DE 630 and the USSR says NO, and Germany subsequently says YES to DE 633 to annex Lithuania then the USSR moves 7-10% towards the Allies.

I’m still struggling to see where 5 + 7-10% = 12-15% comes from in your calculations.

Can you spell it out in the same way as I’ve written, with reference to the DE events and YES/NO answers?

Of course, I'm sorry for being unclear. I might also be missing something completely, it would not be the first time.

I'm comparing "Heaviest possible allied leaning" against "Weakest possible allied leaning" as a result of event chain outcomes. Let's pick an arbitrary starting leaning to work with as a comparison, say 20% allied.

1. If Germany says YES to DE 630 and USSR also says YES, then the USSR moves 5% away from the allies: Now 15%
If both say yes, Germany does not get the opportunity to Annex Lithuania. So this concludes the chain with the USSR annexing the entire Baltics, with an end mobilization of 15%.

2. - If Germany says NO to DE 630 (Leaving the USSR at 20% allied leaning) and subsequently says YES to DE 632 to annex Lithuania then the USSR moves 7-10% towards the Allies (Pushing the USSR to a 27-30% Allied leaning).

3. - If Germany says YES to DE 630 and the USSR says NO, and Germany subsequently says YES to DE 633 to annex Lithuania then the USSR moves 7-10% towards the Allies. (This leaves the exact same result as above, 27-30%)

Additional option:
4. If Germany says YES to DE 630 and the USSR says NO (Leaving it at 20% leaning), and Germany subsequently says NO to DE 633 to annex Lithuania then the event chain concludes with the USSR annexing all of the Baltics, but at a 20% leaning compared to 15% if they accepted.

The 5+7-10% calculation is the total difference between accepting the event as the USSR, and not accepting and having Lithuania annexed by Germany. (15% (weakest possible) leaning at 1. above, and 27-30% (heaviest possible) at 2. or 3.)

My argument is that it is -always- better to say NO to the friendship agreement. You get a 5% "heavier" allied leaning regardless compared to saying YES. If the Germans annex you get even more, which is even better. The economic benefit far outweighs the ground lost. If they dont annex it, better still. You remain at 20% and get to annex Lithuania for free.

Changing the event to something like my original suggestion would make this much more of a choice.

[AshFall]

Why would the USSR ever accept the Revised Borders and Friendship Treaty? The USSR moves 5% towards the Axis and Germany is much closer to Brest-Litovsk. Sure you get Lithuania (and Germany doesn't), but does that really make up for it, especially as if Germany doesn't annex Lithuania (as there is the trade-off of increased USSR mobilization), you still get Lithuania anyway?

To answer your question they wouldn't. The DE really only trips up very new players.

I'll also leave this quote here from a post asking about the event, just to further back up the point.

The thread:
https://www.matrixgames.com/forums/view ... p#p4969841

[PvtBenjamin]

T.

[BillRunacre]

The Axis player has the ability to keep SU mobilization in the low 20's going into '41 w/o taking Lithuania.

It would be very useful for me to know how they're doing that?

[PvtBenjamin]

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[BillRunacre]

Thanks for the explanation. I get the impression that by not allowing Major diplomacy the Axis are receiving a benefit that wouldn't apply in games where that is allowed. Perhaps that is something worth reconsidering.

[PvtBenjamin]

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[BillRunacre]

Thanks for the explanation.

I think if players can use diplomacy on the USSR then 1-2 successes would render her more defensible come Barbarossa, which makes me hesitate to change anything here.

[Taxman66]

The only country that has spare mpp to drop 150 on a 5% chance is Germany, much less 300. The UK has to defend against diplo in Spain.

The only suggestion I would have for pvt. Benjamin would be to prioritize RU Inf Weapons over Industry. The sooner you get to lvl 2 (lvl 2 AA is also really helpful) the sooner you slow down (not stop) the bleeding. You can absorb/survive first encounter attacks and operate out.

As for excessive GE naval in the Artic, bite the bullet and buy the RU Maritime bomber, it's relatively inexpensive and can harras the port. Forcing GE to use the other Norway ports.

[Duedman]

I think what Ashfall is saying is that there is absolutely nothing to gain from saying yes to the Friendship Treaty as USSR.
You will lose territory for the "reward" of losing mobilization.
I saw youtubers with quite a few matches played already say "Yes" to this as USSR. Not even realizing that they just shot their own foot.
To me, this Event is a total noob trap. Unless I missed something completely (then I'm the noob haha)

[Taxman66]

Well, if Germany Annexes Lithuania, Russia does get to buy another Tech or maybe 2 with the increased mobilization. However it also very likely means Lenningrad will fall by the end 1941.