Matrix Games Forums

Battle Academy Mega Pack releases on SteamDeal of the Week Da Vinci's Art of WarCivil War II Patch 1.4 public BetaHappy Easter!Battle Academy is now available on SteamPlayers compare Ageods Civil War to Civil War IIDeal of the week - An updated War in the East goes half Price!Sign up for the Qvadriga beta for iPad and Android!Come and say hi at Pax and SaluteLegends of War goes on sale!
Forums  Register  Login  Photo Gallery  Member List  Search  Calendars  FAQ 

My Profile  Inbox  Address Book  My Subscription  My Forums  Log Out

USA submarines

 
View related threads: (in this forum | in all forums)

Logged in as: Guest
Users viewing this topic: none
  Printable Version
All Forums >> [Current Games From Matrix.] >> [World War II] >> War In The Pacific - Struggle Against Japan 1941 - 1945 >> USA submarines Page: [1]
Login
Message << Older Topic   Newer Topic >>
USA submarines - 9/28/2004 1:15:10 AM   
kevini100

 

Posts: 136
Joined: 6/29/2004
Status: offline
The History channel has a program about WW2 subs or just sub history. They talked about how effective US subs are with the combination of radar, ultra, broken Japanese codes, good operational tactics and good strategic doctrine like going after tankers or hunting in wolf packs. They were being very aggressive attacking on the surface sinking entire convoys and even going after destroyers. It almost seems like the US subs should be able to win the war single handedly.

Kevin
Post #: 1
RE: USA submarines - 9/28/2004 2:20:59 AM   
Beezle


Posts: 1427
Joined: 7/15/2004
Status: offline
quote:

It almost seems like the US subs should be able to win the war single handedly.


As I understand it (don't have a reference at hand)

1) The US sank more than 98% of all IJ Merchant shipping. Subs sank the most, but aircraft and surface ships sank a lot too.

2) The destruction of IJ merchant shipping was so great that, given the IJ dependence on imported raw materials, the bombinb of IJ factories by the Air Force was relatively ineffective, since the IJ had so few raw materials by that point in the war (due to all those AKs being sunk) that they could only use a few percent of their factory capacity anyway. IE if you only have enough coal and iron ore to run 3% of your steel mills at capacity, bombing 80% of your steel mills does not reduce your steel production.

_____________________________


Beezle - Rapidly running out of altitude, airspeed and ideas.

(in reply to kevini100)
Post #: 2
RE: USA submarines - 9/28/2004 2:21:03 AM   
pompack


Posts: 2507
Joined: 2/8/2004
From: University Park, Texas
Status: offline
From late-43 on they cerainly have a pretty good case. Prior to that they were stuck with poor torps, a bad pre-war doctrine that rewarded timid commanders, and those pre-war commanders (not all of course; some of the aggressive ones were able to hide their true colors pre-war). Primary source is Blair, but there are a multitude of other sources that bring out the same points a little less aggressively than Blair

(in reply to kevini100)
Post #: 3
RE: USA submarines - 9/28/2004 2:23:14 AM   
Beezle


Posts: 1427
Joined: 7/15/2004
Status: offline
How much was Nimitz personally involved in cashiering bad Sub Captains and promoting good execs to command? Does anyone know?

Did he delegate that to someone else, or was he personally involved?

_____________________________


Beezle - Rapidly running out of altitude, airspeed and ideas.

(in reply to pompack)
Post #: 4
RE: USA submarines - 9/28/2004 5:06:23 AM   
pompack


Posts: 2507
Joined: 2/8/2004
From: University Park, Texas
Status: offline
From what I have read, Nimitz delegated operational and personnel responsibilities to the sub fleet commander, but he did reinforce success ((at least at PH) by personnally greeting the returning subs and publicly praising the successful ones (although there were relatively few really successful ones early on because of the torp problems).

My favorite story about the pre-war doctrine was the one where a sub commander copied the German U-Boat tactics and attacked on the surface at night in a prewar (1941) exercise. He was relieved for "recklessly endangering his command".

(in reply to Beezle)
Post #: 5
RE: USA submarines - 9/28/2004 6:21:30 AM   
Platoonist


Posts: 665
Joined: 5/11/2003
From: Seattle, WA
Status: offline
The story of American sub torpedoes in World War 2 is a major scandal that received no real coverage at the time due to the silent service's need for secrecy. Not only were the torpedoes defective but production bottlenecks meant sub commanders were put on notice not to 'waste' torpedoes....making them even more cautious. The Torpedo Section of the Bureau of Ordinance acted at times like it was on the Axis side. Fighting all attempts to fix the torpedo problem and denying they even existed.

It could be said the U.S. submarine war against Japan did not truly begin rolling until the opening days of 1944. What had come before was a learning period of testing, of weeding out timid commanders, of fixing weapon system defects and waiting for more submarines and torpedoes. Makes one think how much shorter the war could have been if more of these things had been put right before the conflict began. But they did the most important thing right off. Unrestricted submarine warfare from the get-go. No beating around the bush around like in the opening days in the Atlantic in both World Wars.

_____________________________

Ever the optimist..


(in reply to pompack)
Post #: 6
RE: USA submarines - 9/28/2004 1:03:49 PM   
Ron Saueracker


Posts: 12107
Joined: 1/28/2002
From: Ottawa, Canada OR Zakynthos Island, Greece
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Platoonist

The story of American sub torpedoes in World War 2 is a major scandal that received no real coverage at the time due to the silent service's need for secrecy. Not only were the torpedoes defective but production bottlenecks meant sub commanders were put on notice not to 'waste' torpedoes....making them even more cautious. The Torpedo Section of the Bureau of Ordinance acted at times like it was on the Axis side. Fighting all attempts to fix the torpedo problem and denying they even existed.

It could be said the U.S. submarine war against Japan did not truly begin rolling until the opening days of 1944. What had come before was a learning period of testing, of weeding out timid commanders, of fixing weapon system defects and waiting for more submarines and torpedoes. Makes one think how much shorter the war could have been if more of these things had been put right before the conflict began. But they did the most important thing right off. Unrestricted submarine warfare from the get-go. No beating around the bush around like in the opening days in the Atlantic in both World Wars.


So what is the basis ot hte Allied Sub Doctrine?

_____________________________





Yammas from The Apo-Tiki Lounge. Future site of WITP AE benders! And then the s--t hit the fan

(in reply to Platoonist)
Post #: 7
RE: USA submarines - 9/28/2004 5:27:17 PM   
Bradley7735


Posts: 2073
Joined: 7/12/2004
Status: offline
It's been a while since i read some US submarine books, but from what I remember, US subs sank over 60% of Japanese merchantmen and about 40% of all Japanese combat vessels. So, yeah, US subs were probably one of the weapons that could have won the war.

But, a poll taken after the war of Japanese citizens sites airpower as the number one reason Japan lost the war. I believe Hirohito decided to surrender because of the terrible toll that the civilians were taking from the fire bombing. (Flyboys by James Bradley)

(in reply to kevini100)
Post #: 8
RE: USA submarines - 9/28/2004 7:34:37 PM   
TulliusDetritus


Posts: 4225
Joined: 4/1/2004
From: Back to Reality :(
Status: offline
In case you are interested, that's what I found out about the japanese merchant marine losses:

1. 288 american submarines launched 14 343 torpedoes. 4 790 hits. 1 130 merchant ships sunk (4 780 000 tons).
2. US navy planes sank more than 1 500 000 tons (attacks started on 1944).
3. US army planes sank 688 000 tons.
4. mines sank more than 500 000 tons.

And then there are the "bottom mines" (sorry, I don't know how to call them in english ):
On december 1944 the US navy convinced the US Air Force to use the heavy bombers to drop such mines. It was called "Operation Starvation" and started on april 1945 (mines were dropped on japanese and korean waters).

5. Till august 670 ships were heavily damaged or sunk: 1 400 000 tons.

[we may conclude from the the american submarines data:

- hit/Launched = 1/3
- and that they needed 4 hits to sink a merchant ship (average, of course)]

P.S:
british submarines sank 65 000 tons and dutch ones 42 000 tons.

P.P.S.S:
american submarines sank 200 japanese warships more or less. Among them:
- 7 CVs, 1 BB, 12 cruisers, 43 DDs and 23 SS (??)

P.P.P.S.S.S.:
oops, I almost forgot: 55 american SSs were lost

(in reply to Bradley7735)
Post #: 9
RE: USA submarines - 9/28/2004 8:16:23 PM   
Beezle


Posts: 1427
Joined: 7/15/2004
Status: offline
quote:

But, a poll taken after the war of Japanese citizens sites airpower as the number one reason Japan lost the war.


I always love these polls. The US Subs (which no one can see) sink all these ships, Japan has no raw materials, and so some organization ask the Japanese man in the street (who is completely informed about such matters, Japan having a totally free press throughout the war, which free press had daily articles about Japanese setbacks and the reasons for those setbacks) "Do you think Airplanes did more damage than submarines?"

Heck, that is like reading a CNN poll.

_____________________________


Beezle - Rapidly running out of altitude, airspeed and ideas.

(in reply to TulliusDetritus)
Post #: 10
RE: USA submarines - 9/28/2004 9:04:48 PM   
Bradley7735


Posts: 2073
Joined: 7/12/2004
Status: offline
Hey Beezle,

I agree with you on the polls. You can get almost any result you want in a poll. Pretty much useless. But, what the author was trying to say was that he thought Hirohito surrendured becuase of the population taking a beating from the air, not because they lost the war in so many other areas. If we didn't fire bomb cities, it's possible that Japan would have kept fighting, even though they had almost no merchant marine or navy left. At least that's what the author was trying to say.

Bye the way, Flyboys is an ok book. It doesn't have a lot of action in it. But the main focus of the book is to talk about the atrocities that both sides did to each other. Of course, it's written by an american, so it could be a little biased. I thought it'd be more of an action book, so I'm a little dissapointed. If I knew it wasn't that kind of book, I wouldn't have had my expectations let down and might have liked it a little more. (not a book to read during your lunch hour. Cannibalism = bad)

bc

(in reply to Beezle)
Post #: 11
RE: USA submarines - 9/28/2004 11:46:58 PM   
madflava13


Posts: 1499
Joined: 2/7/2001
From: Alexandria, VA
Status: offline
Just some info for those interested:
* Once Admiral Lockwood took over SubPac (following the death of the former commander in a plane crash), he began to shake up the captains ranks. 2 patrols in a row without a score was grounds for removal. Lockwood was also instrumental in ordering "unauthorized" tests on the warheads and firing pin mechanisms in order to solve the torpedo problem. Nimitz wasn't personally involved in these things, but Lockwood operated with his approval.

* Subs did indeed win the war against Japan - a great book for anyone interested in this aspect of the war is written by Clay Blair, Jr. - has everything you'd want to know about the US Sub war. Also, for some firsthand perspectives, try "Wahoo" and "Clear the Bridge" by Dick O'Kane. He was XO of the Wahoo and then CO of the Tang, two of the most successful subs in the war. Clear the Bridge may be out of print, but you can usually find it no problem...

_____________________________

"The Paraguayan Air Force's request for spraying subsidies was not as Paraguayan as it were..."

(in reply to Bradley7735)
Post #: 12
RE: USA submarines - 9/29/2004 12:30:38 PM   
strawbuk


Posts: 289
Joined: 4/30/2004
From: London via Glos
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: madflava13

Subs did indeed win the war against Japan - a great book for anyone interested in this aspect of the war is written by Clay Blair, Jr. - has everything you'd want to know about the US Sub war.


And a few you didn't - warning on Blair; great data, well presented, but overly opiniated assertions not supporteed by said data.

_____________________________



Twinkle twinkle PBY
Seeking Kido Bu-tai
Flying o' the sea so high
An ill-omen in the sky
Twinkle twinkle PBY
Pointing out who's next to fry

(in reply to madflava13)
Post #: 13
RE: USA submarines - 9/29/2004 6:05:08 PM   
mdiehl

 

Posts: 5998
Joined: 10/21/2000
Status: offline
Another good narrative is Pigboat 39. It follows S-39 from Manila on 7 Dec 1941 through its demise in 1942 (grounded on a reef off of New Guinea).

_____________________________

Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.

Didn't we have this conversation already?

(in reply to strawbuk)
Post #: 14
RE: USA submarines - 9/29/2004 6:31:16 PM   
Ron Saueracker


Posts: 12107
Joined: 1/28/2002
From: Ottawa, Canada OR Zakynthos Island, Greece
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Another good narrative is Pigboat 39. It follows S-39 from Manila on 7 Dec 1941 through its demise in 1942 (grounded on a reef off of New Guinea).


Been trying to find this. Hope mine meets a worse fate... I'm using Allied sub doctrine and this sub refuses to fire a warshot despite being in contact with enemy TFs every few days for most of it's first patrol.

_____________________________





Yammas from The Apo-Tiki Lounge. Future site of WITP AE benders! And then the s--t hit the fan

(in reply to mdiehl)
Post #: 15
RE: USA submarines - 9/29/2004 6:38:20 PM   
Chris H

 

Posts: 3360
Joined: 1/17/2002
From: Bexhill-on-Sea, E Sussex
Status: offline
I came accross this little item. It might be of interest.

The Shipping War

The War in the Pacific depended, like any other, on supply. Being an ocean war, the supplies, quite naturally, had to go by ship. At the beginning of the war, the shipping available to both Japan and the United States was, surprisingly enough, quite equal. Japan had some 5.98 million tons of shipping while the USAhad some 6.7 million tons. The crunch, however, came when one compared the shipbuilding capabilities of the two nations. Japan, an island nation, had to import to survive. Japan had few natural resources. And Japan could only build some 600,000 tons of new shipping each year. America could build over ten times that amount, and was doing so by 1943. Before the war began, the United States had already started on a shipbuilding campaign which was to produce 10.8 million tons during 1942-43. This was increased once America entered the war. Of course, the majority of American shipping was to be engaged in getting material to Europe and fighting its way through Nazi U-Boats in the North Atlantic. The Germans lost the Shipping War in the Atlantic, but only after sinking 23.3 million tons of shipping. On the other hand, the Japanese sank or seized only a million tons of shipping during 1942 (and not much after that). Much of this, of course, was not American shipping, but these ships were lost to the Allied cause. The Allies eventually built far more (some 19 million tons more) shipping than was sunk. The Japanese weren't so fortunate. From the very beginning the Japanese realized that they would have to carefully ration their available shipping. They were all too correct in this estimation. In fact, from the very beginning (despite the 400,000 tons of enemy shipping they seized initially) the Japanese merchant marine declined. Slowly at first (a net loss of less than 200,000 tons in 1942), but the effects of the American "U-Boat" campaign soon took hold. By mid-1943 the net loss (from the 1941 tonnage) was 440,000 tons. After that one crisis followed another as the Japanese vainly tried to do more with less shipping. What DO you do with shipping ? You carry troops. An American infantry division required from 70,000 to 100,000 tons of shipping. Once carried across the Pacific it required another 15,000 tons a month to maintain it. The "lift" tonnage fell as the war went on due to increased experience and expertise in putting men and equipment aboard ships. Other units required more tonnage to "lift". Overall, the 518,000 men carried to the Pacific in the first eighteen months of the war required some 3.6 million tons of shipping. Once there, they required some 500,000 tons of shipping a month for maintenance. In the first eighteen months of the war, the United States Army moved some 1.6 million men and some 23 million tons of material overseas (only 6 million tons went to the Pacific). The US Navy tied up some 600,000 tons of shipping, mostly for maintaining the fleet. By mid-1943 some 200,000 naval personnel (including Marines) were in the Pacific. Over half of the US fleet was concentrated in the Pacific. This increased after mid-1943 with the neutralization of the German U-Boat offensive in the Atlantic. This German defeat was but another nail in Japan's coffin.

At the beginning of the war, Japan calculated that 3 million tons would be needed to maintain their economy. This left some 3 million for the military to use in their offensive. But to support an offensive in the Pacific would require some 2.1 million tons for the Army alone, plus 1.8 million tons needed by the Navy. Of course, the shipping allocated for the Army would gradually decrease as the Army completed its troop movements. Initially the Japanese Army had to move some ten divisions (or their equivalent) by sea. This took up some 700,000 tons of shipping. Also to be moved were engineer, aircraft support and base maintenance units. Finally, all of these units had to be supplied. Not as lavishly as American units, but you couldn't grow ammunition and equipment locally. By the Spring of 1942, the Japanese had some 250,000 land-based troops in the central and south Pacific. These required nearly 200,000 tons of shipping a month to supply. In addition, every time a unit was to be moved, more shipping was tied up. The Japanese planned to reduce army shipping to one million tons by August of 1942. Navy shipping was expected to remain constant at 1.8 million tons. This would leave 3.2 million tons for the civilian economy, which produced all that the armed forces needed to wage war.

In early August 1942 American forces went over to the offensive, seizing Guadalcanal Island. The Army, in the course of its attempts to retake the island, took away from the homeland shipping fleet some 400,00 tons of shipping. But this was quickly stopped, for since the war began, Japan had not been able to muster the necessary three million tons of shipping needed for her economy. At the outbreak of the war the Army had 2.15 million tons, the Navy 1.55 million and the economy 1.71 million tons. By August 1942 this had changed to Army, 1.27 million tons; Navy, 1.5 million; and the economy 2.76 million tons. by January 1943, at the peak of the Army's build-up to retake the "Southern Areas" held by the Americans, the Army controlled 1.41 million tons of shipping, the Navy 1.46 million and the economy 2.34 million tons. American attacks on Japanese shipping increased throughout 1943 (the Japanese refused to adopt a convoy policy until too late, and then American subs had adopted the "wolf pack" technique). The Japanese managed to build 3.2 million tons of shipping during the war, but Allied air and naval units managed to sink some 7.5 million tons, all but a million tons of it after mid-1943. All things considered, Japan never had enough shipping to meet the demands of a naval war in the Pacific. The United States was not much better off for the first eighteen months of the war. At the beginning of the war the Army had 778,000 tons of shipping available to it. By the end of 1942 this had risen to 3.9 million tons and by mid-1943 approached 5 million tons. But after the Spring of 1942 the bulk of available shipping went to the Atlantic. Shipping in the Pacific reached a peak in May 1942 with 2 million tons in use. By the end of the year there was but 1.14 million tons available 1.7 million tons and this amount continued to grow until the war's end. Even though the United States committed itself from the beginning to the defeat of Germany first, additional tonnage had to go to the Pacific in order to move ground troops and aircraft units into what, for all practical purposes, was a vacuum. Once this had been accomplished (and particularly after Midway crippled the Japanese carrier force) the Pacific had to get along on what could be spared from the Battle for the Atlantic. This meant that much of the American material superiority could not be brought to bear on Japan immediately. For example, in 1942 Japan produced 12,100 combat aircraft, the USAproduced 30.800. But only B-17 heavy bombers could be flown out to Pacific bases, all others had to come by ship, as well as the base equipment and personnel for all aircraft. What about Japan's submarine Fleet?It was, initially, the equal of America's. It was crippled by a doctrine which prohibited the wasting of torpedoes on merchant ships. Japanese submarines were expected to go after combat ships, and nothing else. The Japanese held to this doctrine throughout the war. What if they had adopted the more logical approach, and gone after US merchant ships? This would have probably had a two-fold effect. First, it would have inhibited the US fleet in the Pacific. Destroyers and other light fleet units would be taken away for escort duty to a much greater extent than was actually the case. The second effect would have been felt in the Atlantic. Shipping lost in the Pacific would have to be made up, it was at the bare survival level as it was. This would have probably meant that the American invasion of North Africa in late 1942 would have been put off, or at least seriously curtailed. Much of the same effect would have been evident had the Japanese not been stopped at Midway. But the Japanese could have hurt the Allied cause tremendously simply by changing their submarine doctrine. They didn't, and the Pacific War ended that much sooner. Decided, to a large extent, by hundreds of lightly armed and rather unmilitary looking merchant ships.

A footnote on Japanese and American Merchant Ships
As the war progressed the USA gained not only a quantitative edge over the Japanese in military equipment, but a qualitative one also. This was also evident in the wartime merchant shipping built by both nations. During 1941 America began building a new class of merchant ships, the Type EC2-S-C1 (or "liberty" ship). During the course of the war over 2500 of these vessels were produced. The basic version (there were numerous sub-types for special applications) was 441 feet long and had a lift-capacity of over 14,000 tons. Vessels of this type alone amounted to over 30 million tons of shipping. The EC2-S-CS1cruised at about 12 knots and had a crew of 45 (plus a gun crew of 36). The Japanese never had anything like it. At the outbreak of the war the Japan ee merchant fleet had only 19 ships with a lifting capacity of over 10,000 tons. The ships they built during the war averaged between 2,000 and 3,000 tons each. Their performance was also below the American standard. Their cruising speed, for example, was often 30 to 50% less than that of American merchant ships. This was not particularly crucial during normal operations, but when these ships were used to transport troops in the combat zone their slow speed became decisive. Even during normal shipping operations this slow speed had its effect. For all their shipping tonnage, the average "time" from Pacific areas to the Japanese homeland was greater distances to the US West Coast. The main reason for the slowness of Japanese shipping was the "bottleneck" in their shipbuilding industry caused by an inadequate engine industry. Japan could have produced twice as many merchant ships had they a larger marine engineering capacity. They spread this capacity as thin as possible, thus producing smaller, slower ships. Both Japan and the United States produced special "fast transports."Both nations usually used converted destroyers. In addition the United States was able to produce a special line of "fast transports" built specifically for the task. The United States was also far ahead in its ability to produce amphibious shipping. Even in 1942 the United States was able to unload merchant ships in the combat zone in one third to one half the time it took the Japanese.

Were did I find it? In this games predecessor's manual - PACWAR

(in reply to mdiehl)
Post #: 16
RE: USA submarines - 9/29/2004 6:43:40 PM   
mdiehl

 

Posts: 5998
Joined: 10/21/2000
Status: offline
quote:

I'm using Allied sub doctrine and this sub refuses to fire a warshot despite being in contact with enemy TFs every few days for most of it's first patrol.


Taht's because Matrix has sneakily hardcoded the engine troubles that she had on her first patrol (much of which was conducted running on one engine). ;)

_____________________________

Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.

Didn't we have this conversation already?

(in reply to Chris H)
Post #: 17
RE: USA submarines - 9/29/2004 6:56:21 PM   
Ron Saueracker


Posts: 12107
Joined: 1/28/2002
From: Ottawa, Canada OR Zakynthos Island, Greece
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

quote:

I'm using Allied sub doctrine and this sub refuses to fire a warshot despite being in contact with enemy TFs every few days for most of it's first patrol.


Taht's because Matrix has sneakily hardcoded the engine troubles that she had on her first patrol (much of which was conducted running on one engine). ;)


Actually, I'm OK with S-Boat results in the Allied sub doctrine because they were real old cranky boats. (unfortunately all subs affected for all nations)

_____________________________





Yammas from The Apo-Tiki Lounge. Future site of WITP AE benders! And then the s--t hit the fan

(in reply to mdiehl)
Post #: 18
RE: USA submarines - 9/29/2004 10:12:00 PM   
freeboy

 

Posts: 8513
Joined: 5/16/2004
From: Colorado
Status: offline
In my games s stands for Super-miners.. they also carry Supplys and troops unSeen, but they do Suck as sub missions.. maybe that is what s really Stood for?

< Message edited by freeboy -- 9/30/2004 5:38:18 AM >

(in reply to Ron Saueracker)
Post #: 19
Page:   [1]
All Forums >> [Current Games From Matrix.] >> [World War II] >> War In The Pacific - Struggle Against Japan 1941 - 1945 >> USA submarines Page: [1]
Jump to:





New Messages No New Messages
Hot Topic w/ New Messages Hot Topic w/o New Messages
Locked w/ New Messages Locked w/o New Messages
 Post New Thread
 Reply to Message
 Post New Poll
 Submit Vote
 Delete My Own Post
 Delete My Own Thread
 Rate Posts


Forum Software © ASPPlayground.NET Advanced Edition 2.4.5 ANSI

0.098