… in this specific game?
I am curious to hear your views on the above question. But please do not rush blindly to the standard answer (which is valid in most cases and in the long run - but will there be a long run?) that DEI is of course crucial for IJ and any further thought can be dismissed as a fool's errand without further consideration.
One of the peculiarities of the Allied position in this game is that they still control essentially all of Timor and Ceram including a mostly intact Dutch army (This is one of the reasons to which I alluded in my response to BIF1961's question in post #76). Potentially this is a great jumpoff position to cause massive trouble in the DEI/SRA region more quickly than usual. So naturally, IJ has to take care of that,a threat to that region is something that forces IJ to react and/or eliminate it – or not?
I currently still cannot fathom my opponent properly – unfortunately, he is not very communicative in his mails and in the forums. But the longer I play against him, the stronger gets my impression that the Portland invasion may be part of a plan developed to attempt to get an early IJ autovictory by the beginning of 43. And if this is the case, is the DEI/SRA truly a region where IJ has to get active (especially as my opponent does have use of its oil and resources currently and my curtail some of his industry expenditures in an optimized pursuit of this strategy)?
We have a 2.8:1 VP ratio right now, with only 7000 Allied points (which can be kept low by denying plane and ship VPs, this is why I think the lack of action can be part of a plan and why I am actually trying to get into more contact).
For comparison, I dug out the data for the same game date in my latest PBEM game as Allied: 1.6:1 with about 11600 Allied points. You see that a lot of the difference is explained by the low VP denominator in this game, which is why I feel I have to look for ways to add VPs.
(In view of the previous “welcome” early active Allied air war discussion, let me add that in said other game 2511 of those VPs are for destroyed IJ planes, wheras I lost 1779 planes in return; as for the issue of sustainability in that game we are in mid November 42 now with 6900 IJ and 4500 Allied planes destroyed).
If, however, I were to pursue this early autovictory strategy as IJ, I would next look hard at the victory points to be gained in the Pacific. Check the big VP multiplier bases, most of which can still be taken and expanded – Luganville, Effate, Suva, Johnston Isl, Palmyra,… Full expansion of these bases will give you a bunch of additional points. Take Noumea to induce another notable VP loss (currently 300 IIRC) for Allied, complete buildup of high multiplier bases already in IJ hands, make use of China as a VP generation engine. If necessary, do one more late invasion, triggering another emergency package with a timing that it does not arrive in time to affect things significantly, chosen in a way that allows you to get strat bombing points.
With sufficient concentration of assets and under KB cover, in my experience throughout 42 Allied strongpoints can still be destroyed and will provide not only base points and potential base points when expanded if they have a good VP multiplier, but also additional points for LCU destruction.
So… from IJ's point of view maybe I could just look at anything happening in the DEI in a relaxed way as IJ and actually be glad about any activity/use of Allied assets in this area, because my Allied opponent is moving his reinforcements to an area that is of no real interest to me, fueled by hopes that this may be a way to avoid feeling the dire consequences of the Portland raid in 1944?
Am I just paranoid, or do you think this may be a real possibility?
Thanks for your views
(edited for clarification, more editing for spelling)
Being paranoid is good in war.
The logic of this strategy is to go after Australia rather than the South Pacific. The VP multiplier for Japan is generally much higher on the Australian bases plus the infrastructure is already built there and likely to have been further built up by the end of 1942. This strategy does not allow Japan the time to build up infrastructure which is the main problem with focussing on the few high multiplier South Pacific bases like Noumea et al.
The more Allied assets forward deployed to counter the standard Japanese expansion operations the less available to defend Sydney/Melbourne from a massed IJA landing in December 1942. Those bases have a 100x multiplier and there are few bases elsewhere with equivalent multipliers. Plus there are many other Australian bases with excellent multipliers which exist outside of the Australian LOD.
your thoughts are very much along my first take in this. But it is worth rereading Alfred's above post (IMO it is always worth rereading his posts several times) and then think carefully about the ideal timing for IJ(which I haven't completed). I have highlighted two important points: In fact, one has to look at the infrastructure buildup IJ can realistically manage and compare to the expansion levels required (which may be easier to achieve if one allows Allied to do more of the infrastructure buildup for IJ), and in fact a late landing as described above may be desirable for IJ.
Am running out of time now, maybe I will add/post some more later.
< Message edited by modrow -- 9/17/2018 12:11:31 PM >