Rookie II - Saving MacArthur - against opponent no. 4

[Leandros]

This AAR is a rehash of my recently concluded Rookie – Saving MacArthur, but with a human opponent – here is a link to the previous AAR:

tm.asp?m=3840708&mpage=1&key=

Those who cared to look into my previous AAR may remember that it was test on how history could have developed with a much more aggressive US leadership – and a different political choice on how its warfare in Asia and the Southwest Pacific should be organized. My concept was based on, and inspired by, Glen Williford’s book Racing the Sunrise. In his book he describes in quite some detail what resources and manpower were available for immediate reinforcement of the US forces in the Philippines and the Southwest Pacific, what had been sent there before the war broke out, what was on its way and what was planned to go but was diverted or delayed. He also dismisses the myth of the “German First”-policy and the lack of shipping transport resources. While the Arcadia Conference in Washington in the year change 1941/1942 declared for the “German First”-policy, this was only in principle, not in practice. This is proven by the fact that of three US Army divisions originally planned to go to Europe, only one went there, and that the invasion in North Africa was delayed from Spring 1942 to Fall 1942. This was because priority for shipping was given to the Pacific Theatre. In other words, “Pacific First”. This lasted for much of 1942.

The aggressive US leadership also sets the US Navy right, to support the total warfare rather than its own narrow priorities. Finally, a different policy is chosen regarding the ABDA cooperation. This shall come to light as the story develops.

My first “Rookie” scenario was played against the Japanese AI which, of course, cannot be very realistic. To make this try more realistic the esteemed member “Chickenboy” has offered to play the Japanese side up till August 7th 1942. I have chosen that symbolic date as that was when the landings on Guadalcanal started, a viable point of comparison. It shall be the 8th December scenario and my only request to Andre has been that of “Reliable USN torpedoes”. I know this is a debatable point, but my reasons are the following: From the scenarios I have played up till now I have a distinct feeling that the game is projecting “unreliable” US torpedoes too much. Also, in RL part of the US Navy’s attitude was to caution their submarine crews. This is not the case with this leadership, on the contrary. I would describe it like: “Go closer, hit harder, use more torpedoes”. The USN destroyer torpedoes also did not have the same depth-holding problem because they were not exposed to the internal water leaks of the submarine ones. On the other hand, using torpedoes effectively in a high-speed destroyer engagement is more complicated.

One of my opinions on the WITP game is that it is too easy to “top” commanders and pilots. However, as my noble opponent opines, as it implies consumption of PPs, this can also only be done to a certain extent. We are therefore free to do this.

Many of the RL US ground units originally meant for the Philippines and the Southwest Pacific were delayed or diverted. In the game these are restricted, which they really shouldn’t be as this leadership wants to send them as originally planned. This has not been rectified in the game, it’s a drawback I have accepted and shall, of course, result in a heavy burden on my PP’s. This is also a guarantee to the Japanese opponent that little extra can be done in the other Theatres if MacArthur is to be saved.

We have agreed that this AAR shall not consist of long lists of copied combat reports but rather by regular journalistic-like overviews by both parties. We hope this shall result in an entertaining AAR.

Soon to come on a computer near you!

Fred

[BBfanboy]

Looking forward to seeing this one play out. How are you going to deal with the fact that the Japanese will know in advance precisely what you plan to do and where all the forces you are bringing are located?

[Orm]

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy

Looking forward to seeing this one play out. How are you going to deal with the fact that the Japanese will know in advance precisely what you plan to do and where all the forces you are bringing are located?

I was just wondering the same thing.

And I am planning to follow this show.

[inqistor]

Numbers are against you. It is possible to seriously beat overly aggressive Japan player, but Allies just don't have enough reserves early, to stop well prepared assault anywhere.

But, lets check how this will play out. Are you planning all out - low level air attack, against invasion fleets? Submarines with reliable torpedoes can be real pain, this early.

[Leandros]

Brisbane Evening Star December 8th 1941:

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy

Looking forward to seeing this one play out. How are you going to deal with the fact that the Japanese will know in advance precisely what you plan to do and where all the forces you are bringing are located?

I think part of it involves me 'playing along' to an extent. But I'm trying to put myself in the mindset of Japanese leadership in the status quo. I expect that the assets currently allocated will do the job unless proven otherwise. Then I'll react.

Not trying to 'game' the short duration of this game will keep me honest in terms of accelerating CVs and BBs, home island defenses, elimination of China and airframe R&D. All of these will be like 'normal' for me. I'll research late war engines and airframes even though I won't ever see them. I won't stack my R&D or production unrealistically 'forward' (e.g., produce 400 Ki-44IIa / month because that will be the premiere IJAAF fighter until August 1942).

For example, I usually forego the Pearl Harbor strike in favor of blasting Manila to kingdom come and getting all those tasty subs. With reliable torpedoes on that's even more important. But, alas, that's off the table with a December 8 start. A Manila-first strategy would negate the DEI-heavy defensive strategy. So I'm playing along and suspending my disbelief.

[Chickenboy]

Leandros and I are going to try to use this AAR for both of our posts. He will likely post here more often than I will, but I'll be by from time to time. Since we are both using this AAR, we request that users keep this in mind while posting here.

[Chickenboy]

Lastly, there are some aspect of foreknowledge that I am permitting myself. Since the Allies have taken pains to improve their submarine fleet (better Captains, better torpedoes) over the pre-war years, I am presuming that I can know that their capabilities are better than historical. I also know that there's a bunch of these submarines at Cavite that will endanger my necessary assault on the DEI. So I need to ensure that naval search training is above par and that my capabilities there expand quickly. I have no control over the poor reliability of my depth charges, but I can redouble my efforts to heavily escort my convoys all over the map.

Aerial ASW training-always a priority in my training programs-will certainly be at least as important as other games (with unreliable Allied torpedoes).

Bases near the SRA that are capable of provisioning for submarine operations will be priority targets. So will AS tenders.

[BBfanboy]

ORIGINAL: Leandros


Brisbane Evening Star December 8th 1941:

Please note the difference between the noun "revenge" and the verb "avenge". [:-]
No need to thank me - just a cheeky colonial giving back to the mother country! [:)]

[Leandros]

The game is on!

Fred

[Lecivius]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

Lastly, there are some aspect of foreknowledge that I am permitting myself. Since the Allies have taken pains to improve their submarine fleet (better Captains, better torpedoes) over the pre-war years, I am presuming that I can know that their capabilities are better than historical. I also know that there's a bunch of these submarines at Cavite that will endanger my necessary assault on the DEI. So I need to ensure that naval search training is above par and that my capabilities there expand quickly. I have no control over the poor reliability of my depth charges, but I can redouble my efforts to heavily escort my convoys all over the map.

Aerial ASW training-always a priority in my training programs-will certainly be at least as important as other games (with unreliable Allied torpedoes).

Bases near the SRA that are capable of provisioning for submarine operations will be priority targets. So will AS tenders.

I actually like this idea. I understand why "JFB's" don't like reliable torps, but bear in mind Japan went to war not knowing the allied submarine effort (doctrine published) was going to be so seriously defanged. Games like this will be seriously fun to follow.

[Leandros]

ORIGINAL: Lecivius

I actually like this idea. I understand why "JFB's" don't like reliable torps, but bear in mind Japan went to war not knowing the allied submarine effort (doctrine published) was going to be so seriously defanged. Games like this will be seriously fun to follow.

According to Morison, the official Navy historian, US submarines sank 300.000 tons of Japanese shipping up to April 1st 1942 - 4 months.
That is 300 ships averaging 1.000 tons displacement.

Considering that this was a difficult, and slow-starting and transitional, period for the US Navy I feel justified to say that
the "unreliable" USN torpedoes are grossly over-played in the game.

Fred

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: Leandros

ORIGINAL: Lecivius

I actually like this idea. I understand why "JFB's" don't like reliable torps, but bear in mind Japan went to war not knowing the allied submarine effort (doctrine published) was going to be so seriously defanged. Games like this will be seriously fun to follow.

According to Morison, the official Navy historian, US submarines sank 300.000 tons of Japanese shipping up to April 1st 1942 - 4 months.
That is 300 ships averaging 1.000 tons displacement.

Considering that this was a difficult, and slow-starting and transitional, period for the US Navy I feel justified to say that
the "unreliable" USN torpedoes are grossly over-played in the game.

Fred

Fred,

I love Morison's work and have read all volumes twice through. But with regards to these figures, he's off his nut. Those figures were initial estimates that didn't pan out after the war in JANAC records. JANAC is the word here, not the initial credits that were replete with overestimates and FOW.

According to Clay Blair's seminal Silent Victory:

Manila patrols in December 1941: JANAC credit 6 ships for 29,500 tons. Initial wartime credit for these ships was 21 ships for 120,400 tons.

Pearl Harbor December 1941: JANAC 4/14,100. wartime credit 8; 50,200

Java and Australia, January 1942: JANAC 1/4,124. Wartime credit 6/23,000.

Java and Australia, February 1942: JANAC 3/14,840. Wartime credit 7/34,000

Fremantle, March 1942: JANAC 4/12,587. Wartime credit 5/19,500

Pearl Harbor: January-March 1942: JANAC 15/53,261. Wartime credit 22/146,400.

Pearl Harbor: April-June 1942: JANAC 22/87,600. Wartime credit 34/220,600.

Sorry, but Morison's work needed to incorporate the post-war JANAC accounting to be accurate. It's just not so. JANAC records 33 sinkings between December 1941 and April 1942.

Must be the crummy Mk.14s? Not all the blame lies there-in all of 1942, S-boats sank a grand total of 1 ship.

Blair's account has the number of torpedoes fired to sink 33 ships-and it's staggering. The torpedo performed poorly. Staggeringly poorly. The BurOrd should have been lined up against a wall and shot for their intransigence on this matter. It was that bad. I think the "reliable torpedoes off" illustrates that pretty well.

[Disco Duck]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: Leandros

ORIGINAL: Lecivius

I actually like this idea. I understand why "JFB's" don't like reliable torps, but bear in mind Japan went to war not knowing the allied submarine effort (doctrine published) was going to be so seriously defanged. Games like this will be seriously fun to follow.

According to Morison, the official Navy historian, US submarines sank 300.000 tons of Japanese shipping up to April 1st 1942 - 4 months.
That is 300 ships averaging 1.000 tons displacement.

Considering that this was a difficult, and slow-starting and transitional, period for the US Navy I feel justified to say that
the "unreliable" USN torpedoes are grossly over-played in the game.

Fred

Fred,

I love Morison's work and have read all volumes twice through. But with regards to these figures, he's off his nut. Those figures were initial estimates that didn't pan out after the war in JANAC records. JANAC is the word here, not the initial credits that were replete with overestimates and FOW.

According to Clay Blair's seminal Silent Victory:

Manila patrols in December 1941: JANAC credit 6 ships for 29,500 tons. Initial wartime credit for these ships was 21 ships for 120,400 tons.

Pearl Harbor December 1941: JANAC 4/14,100. wartime credit 8; 50,200

Java and Australia, January 1942: JANAC 1/4,124. Wartime credit 6/23,000.

Java and Australia, February 1942: JANAC 3/14,840. Wartime credit 7/34,000

Fremantle, March 1942: JANAC 4/12,587. Wartime credit 5/19,500

Pearl Harbor: January-March 1942: JANAC 15/53,261. Wartime credit 22/146,400.

Pearl Harbor: April-June 1942: JANAC 22/87,600. Wartime credit 34/220,600.

Sorry, but Morison's work needed to incorporate the post-war JANAC accounting to be accurate. It's just not so. JANAC records 33 sinkings between December 1941 and April 1942.

Must be the crummy Mk.14s? Not all the blame lies there-in all of 1942, S-boats sank a grand total of 1 ship.

Blair's account has the number of torpedoes fired to sink 33 ships-and it's staggering. The torpedo performed poorly. Staggeringly poorly. The BurOrd should have been lined up against a wall and shot for their intransigence on this matter. It was that bad. I think the "reliable torpedoes off" illustrates that pretty well.

i have read Morrison but the more I read about WWII naval operations the less I believe Morrison. Also his comments on John Paul Jones just make me have issues believing what he wrote.

[Disco Duck]

One of the issues with the torpedoes was depth setting. doctrine said they were supposed to be deep and run under the target before the magnetic detonator set off under the keel breaking the back of the target. This didn't work real well. The captains who ran ran the torpedoes for shallow and impact had better luck.

I am really curious to follow this post.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: Lecivius
I understand why "JFB's" don't like reliable torps, but bear in mind Japan went to war not knowing the allied submarine effort (doctrine published) was going to be so seriously defanged.

Pre-war, the Americans (and British) decried the use of unrestricted submarine warfare and railed against it both in WWI and pre-WWII. After Pearl Harbor, it took the Americans exactly one day to reverse that long-standing policy and implement unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan. Published doctrine schmublished doctrine. But you're right. I'm sure the Japanese did not anticipate getting a 22-month 'head start' against the American SS force while BurOrd prevaricated and delayed producing functioning torpedoes.

[MakeeLearn]

It also lured the Japanese into a false belief that submarines were not that big of a threat, and added to the delay in their ASW campaign. As one Japanese Captain stated, they felt their ships were invincible as they sailed into port with a torpedo sticking out of the hull.

[Bif1961]

The problem with the MK-14s and less so with the MK-10s were they were initially set prewar with practice warheads. When the put on the real warheads, they were much heavier than the practice/test warheads. So the torpedoes ran much deeper than the settings would suggest. Once adjusted for the MK-10s were practically fixed but the sad saga on the MK-14s continued. Now the MK-14 magnetic field detonator issue became more appearant as they tested in the Northern Atlantic and used operationally is the pacific, who knew they had differnt magnetic signatures, causing the warheads not to go off the same as tested. So they finally got around to turning off the magnetic trigger and went to mechanic trigger, but alas a new issue cropped up as the mechanic trigger was developed from the MK-10 torpedo which had a much lighter warhead and when used on the MK-14 it was found to have deformed and not set off the warhead the vast majority of hits. So if you decide to play this game with reliable allied torpedoes on you are changing history.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: Bif1961
So if you decide to play this game with reliable allied torpedoes on you are changing history.

Yes. Agreed. But the purpose of this game / exercise is to sandbox reliable torpedoes' & aggressive submarine captainship's impact on early war outcome. [8D]

[Leandros]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: Bif1961
So if you decide to play this game with reliable allied torpedoes on you are changing history.

Yes. Agreed. But the purpose of this game / exercise is to sandbox reliable torpedoes' & aggressive submarine captainship's impact on early war outcome. [8D]

Not exactly - and I think you guys are a little blinded by the "reliable torpedoes" issue. The game shall still decide,
according to its parameters, how effective even "reliable" torpedoes are. My point, as stated earlier, is that the game
is over-playing the "non-reliable" part - that is, making them even worse than they, in reality, was. This is only my personal
impression after a few trial games - I may be wrong. That the US submarine force's commanders, initially, were somewhat
feeble in character is also supposed to be somewhat countered by "better" torpedoes - and the "topping" of US submarine
commanders. The topping of leaders, ship's commanders and pilots, is another part of the game I am not particularly fond of,
I find it a little too easy and therefore unrealistic. However, my opponent is of the opinion that we should do it so that
is how it shall be.

The most important aspect I am aiming at was the US ability to move forward large forces much earlier than they did and so,
among other things, to "save" MacArthur. In a way, even this shall be sabotaged a little by the game in that most of these
units are restricted, making it difficult to go through with this policy as much possible. On the other hand, this shall
also give some realism to the resistance Roosevelt (he is the aggressive actor here) would have met from his military leaders,
particularly the Navy.

Finally, the United States choose (press through) a different sort of cooperation with its allies, giving priority to use its
resources to reinforce The Philippines, rather than supporting the defense of Malacca/Singapore. The British shall, of
course, do their best to achieve their own goals - still with a reasonable support from the Dutch.

Hope this clarify my views - and that we now can go ahead with the game according to its decided basic principles. Both
parties are supposed to post regular bulletins from their different sides. That should be fun!

Fred