From: Beijing, China
Are you sure you didn't read me exactly the opposite way? It's interesting to see I'm questioned from both sides. Maybe it's my English.
I'm not a scholar and certainly have no interest to devote much time into research. But as it happens, I was just reading "The other side of the hill", by B. H. Liddell Hart, a few days ago. So while the memory is still fresh, I actually can give you some evidence, a quotation from Rundstedt, on pp 178-179.
He told me: "Hitler insisted we must
strike before Russia became too strong, and that she was
much nearer striking than we imagined. He provided
us with information that she was planning to launch an
offensive herself that same summer, of 1941. For my part,
I was very doubtful about this — and I found little sign of
it when we crossed the frontier.
I asked him further about the reasons that had led him
to discredit Hitler's belief in an imminent Russian offensive.
He replied: "In the first place, the Russians appeared to
be taken by surprise when we crossed the frontier. On my
front we found no signs of offensive preparations in the
forward zone, though there were some farther back.
They had twenty-five divisions in the Carpathian sector,
facing the Hungarian frontier, and I had expected that
they would swing round and strike at my right flank as it
advanced. Instead, they retreated. I deduced from this
that they were not in a state of readiness for offensive
operations, and hence that the Russian Command had
not been intending to launch an offensive at an early date."
And there are certainly similar remarks by other generals. Just search and you'll find them.
< Message edited by beender -- 3/13/2018 11:35:49 PM >