From: Brisbane, Australia
I flew non-carrier aircraft off a carrier to transfer to a base airfield.
This from a different thread about warm fuzzies etc.
The Doolittle Raid has been discussed (and dismissed as impossible or unimportant or both) before. But it seems the game engine will permit the above so perhaps some Modder can make it happen. It is very unlikely to change anything about the game but it was cool and had some significant political repercussions in Japan.
In the overall play of the game it won't change much just like the real raid. What will change is the Japanese response with of course the game fore knowledge that this raid is possible. In real life the idea of the US launching such an audacious attack would have been seen as laughable. Not so in this Mod where the Japanese have the opportunity to at least recognise the possibilty. One thing that it may possibly achieve is the stationing of fighter groups in the HI instead of on the front lines - earlier than in the real war but it would still have the same result of pulling fighter groups away from the main action. So given that I know this attack is possible what to do? I will be facing just such a possibility in a couple of months worth of game time. Will the US go ahead and make the attack or leave it hanging as a threat in being. Do I position KB in order to pursue a possible intercept or do I carry on using KB without regard to a HI raid. Do I station fighter groups in the HI for this eventuality. Do I get picket boats out there to warn of a possible approach by a US fleet. What role will Intel have in informing the US of Japanese ship positions.
The fact that this raid is possible will cause decisions to be made (on both sides) and this will have an affect on a myriad of unit dispositions across the board.
Well, I think IRL the Japanese did in fact recognize the possibility of a carrier attack on the Home Islands - that's why they had the picket boats out there:
At 07:38 on the morning of 18 April, while the task force was still about 650 nautical miles (1,200 km; 750 mi) from Japan (around 35°N 154°E), it was sighted by the Japanese picket boat No. 23 Nittō Maru, a 70-ton patrol craft, which radioed an attack warning to Japan. The boat was sunk by gunfire from USS Nashville.
A raid by carrier-borne aircraft on the Japanese Home Islands wasn't unexpected. Admiral Matome Ugaki, chief of staff of the Combined Fleet, referred to the possibility as early as Feb. 2, 1942. To safeguard against a strike, a line of picket boats were stationed between 650 and 800 miles offshore. This was unknown to the Americans, who were surprised when they detected the pickets on radar as they approached the raid's launching point.
The Japanese supposed that carriers would have to approach within 200 miles of their targets in order to launch a strike. The Americans, as surprised as they were by the Japanese pickets, had a surprise of their own. The Japanese didn't expect that the U.S. would fly long-range land-based bombers off their carriers. The Americans had intended to launch 400 miles off the Japanese coast, but the picket boats forced them to do so almost half again that distance. As a result, the Doolittle raiders would be forced to ditch, rather than land, in China.
Pertinent points LST. I would be more correct in referring to the idea of long range land bombers being flown off of American carriers as being unexpected. As the idea obviously occurred to the Americans I wonder if the Japanese also gave any serious consideration to the idea. I knew of the Japanese picket boats. In terms of the arguments for and against picket boats - this use of picket boats by the Japanese supports the use of early warning boats by either side. As the Japanese are poor in aerial search and have such an expanse of ocean leading to their front door step why not position some ships as trip wires. Surely, on the other side of the coin, a consideration for Pearl and the US west coast too.