Operation Hailstone...

[MakeeLearn]

"Was a massive naval air and surface attack launched on February 16–17, 1944, during World War II by the United States Navy against the Japanese naval and air base at Truk"


Often referred to as the Japanese equivalent of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Truk Tour

12 Japanese warships, 32 merchant ships and over 250 aircraft were destroyed.

The U.S. lost twenty-five aircraft

U.S. Marine Corps ace Gregory "Pappy" Boyington, survived this raid while being held prisoner on Truk, after being captured at Rabaul



Trucks inside of the sunken cargo ship Hoki Maru at the bottom of Truk.

[Buckrock]

ORIGINAL: MakeeLearn

Often referred to as the Japanese equivalent of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

I've seen it referred to that way as well but I'd say it's safe to call that hyperbole. Maybe if the Japanese strikes had arrived over Pearl Harbor on
Dec 7th only to find the bulk of the Pacific Fleet had gone elsewhere, then it might be an accurate comparison.

[morejeffs]

But it did severely affect their planning/thinking for the rest of the war. It really seem (with good reason) to wake them up to the fact that
they were not only being beaten with a big stick...there was little to do other than to hope and pray (and throw in lots of kamikaze).

[Grfin Zeppelin]

Its Hailstone and not Hailstorm afaik.
Also comparisons to Pearl Harbor are laughable. "Look Bob we raided a port, its literally like Pearl Harbor but this time we did it"

[GetAssista]

The only resemblance to PH is that it is US port raid that did the most damage compared to other US port raids

[MakeeLearn]

ORIGINAL: Gräfin Zeppelin

Its Hailstone and not Hailstorm afaik.
Also comparisons to Pearl Harbor are laughable. "Look Bob we raided a port, its literally like Pearl Harbor but this time we did it"

Someone is paying attention. A professors' trick?

[MakeeLearn]

Truk - The Japanese Pearl Harbor?

///

Rear Admiral James D. Ramage (USN, ret.), composed the article below. At the time of the February strikes, then-Lieutenant Ramage was Executive Officer of Big E's Bombing Squadron 10:



On 11 February, LT Lou Bangs and I were tossing a medicine ball with a circle of naval aviators on the flight deck of Enterprise. It was clear that something was up because ships' boats were churning around the lagoon. We obviously were getting underway fairly soon. Powerful Task Force 58, with six heavy and six light carriers, was impressive, particularly when compared to a scant year before when the Big E had been the only fleet carrier in the South Pacific.


Our air group commander, CDR William R. "Killer" Kane, came up to our circle and beckoned to Lou and me to join him on the bow of the flight deck.

"We're going to hit Truk," he said.

All I could say was, "Wow!"

My gunner, ARM 1/c Dave Cawley, says that he specifically remembered how tense and concerned we all were as we contemplated hitting Truk: the Japanese "Pearl Harbor" of the Pacific. He fully expected a significant portion of their fleet to tangle with us. "For the previous two years of the war, the very thought of approaching Truk seemed fatal."

///

The Japanese listened to their intelligence reports and move a lot of ships out of Truk.

[Revthought]

I mean, arguably, it was a more effective raid than Pearl Harbor. The IJN managed to disable a number of capital ships at Pearl Harbor, sure; however, not only were most of these old battleships, but most of the ships sunk or damaged at Pearl were repaired and back in service by 1943.

Operation Hailstone destroyed 3 IJN CAs and 4 IJN Destroyers, ships that, at that point in the war, were a far bigger strategic blow than the American temporary losses at Pearl Harbor. On top of that, the Japanese lost over 250 planes (around 100 more than were destroyed at Pearl Harbor), 40ish merchants (laden with supply), and 4,500 men (about twice American losses at Pearl Harbor). The attack on Truk basically eliminated it as a forward operating base for the IJN and IJA in the South Pacific, and effectively isolated Eniwetok and all other Japanese troops West and South of Truk.

So I would say it was a much bigger kick in the teeth to the Japanese than the Pear Harbor raid was to the Americans.

[Buckrock]

ORIGINAL: MakeeLearn

My gunner, ARM 1/c Dave Cawley, says that he specifically remembered how tense and concerned we all were as we contemplated hitting Truk: the Japanese "Pearl Harbor" of the Pacific.

OK, so "the Japanese equivalent of the attack on Pearl Harbor" refers to the similarity of an intimidating major naval base as the objective rather
than the results of the strikes against that objective.

I've seen it at times elsewhere called "a Pearl Harbor" equivalent due to "catastrophic" Japanese losses in ships and planes. That's what I wrongly
assumed you were also referring to.

He fully expected a significant portion of their fleet to tangle with us.

He wasn't the only one. The USN planners thought it likely that their invasion of Kwajalein would bring out the main units of the IJN for its defence.
One of the key reasons for the strike at Truk was to catch part of that IJN main force at anchor there and perhaps even draw out further IJN units
from other locations into a major battle away from the Kwajalein area.

Spruance's operational orders for Hailstone included a battle plan for just such a contingency, with a battle line of 6 BBs to engage the enemy with
long range fire, screened and flanked by 5 CAs and 3 CLs and with a CV and 2 CVL supplying air cover from the disengaged side.

Additionally, 4 CVs, 2 CVLs and 2 CLAAs would operate independently in the rear and on the flanks of the USN battle force, concentrating their striking
power against the most dangerous threats. And some 28 DDs formed the escort for the various battle line and supporting groups.

Spruance still seemed a battleship guy at heart in his battle plans.

[MakeeLearn]

Spruance still seemed a battleship guy at heart in his battle plans.

"I remember a Japanese cruiser (Katori) up to the north of Truk lagoon," states Cawley. "I'm sure I watched it on the clear calm sea as a TBF attacked with four 500-lb. bombs. They were dropped in a row with two missing, one hit and one (exploding) close aboard. There was considerable smoke from AA, fires and bombs."

When I sighted the cruiser, she was low in the water and barely moving. Since we were without bombs and ammo, I opened up on guard channel, saying "Any strike leader from 51-Bobcat, there is a damaged Japanese cruiser just to the north of the lagoon. Come sink it."

Immediately on guard channel came back, "Bobcat leader, this is Bald Eagle (Mitscher). Cancel your last. Do not, repeat do not, sink that ship. Acknowledge."

I was stunned! I later found out that ADM Spruance wanted to move his surface ships up for target practice on the cripple. I guess the battleships had to participate in some way!

[Revthought]

ORIGINAL: MakeeLearn
Spruance

Spruance was keen on forcing a surface engagement that never came. The battleship fan in me is sad about this; however, if you really think on the extra human beings who probably would have lost their lives in such an engagement, I think I am fine with the historical results. [:'(]

[Grfin Zeppelin]

ORIGINAL: Revthought

Operation Hailstone destroyed 3 IJN CAs and 4 IJN Destroyers, ships that, at that point in the war, were a far bigger strategic blow than the American temporary losses at Pearl Harbor.

3 CLs and three out of the four Destroyers been obsolete ones.

[Zorch]

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

ORIGINAL: MakeeLearn

Often referred to as the Japanese equivalent of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

I've seen it referred to that way as well but I'd say it's safe to call that hyperbole. Maybe if the Japanese strikes had arrived over Pearl Harbor on
Dec 7th only to find the bulk of the Pacific Fleet had gone elsewhere, then it might be an accurate comparison.

The Japs moved their best ships out of Truk a few days earlier. Supposedly US recon flights tipped them off.

[dcpollay]

ORIGINAL: Gräfin Zeppelin

ORIGINAL: Revthought

Operation Hailstone destroyed 3 IJN CAs and 4 IJN Destroyers, ships that, at that point in the war, were a far bigger strategic blow than the American temporary losses at Pearl Harbor.

3 CLs and three out of the four Destroyers been obsolete ones.

Obsolete, perhaps, but strategically, irreplaceable. The larger cruisers, too.

I read somewhere that it was pretty much dumb luck that the major fleet units left the week before. I suppose the recon flights could have made them nervous, though it seems if they suspected a raid they would have been more alert. As it was, they were pretty much caught with their pants down.

[CaptBeefheart]

WITP-AE forumites should consider doing a dive trip at Truk Lagoon (AKA Chu'uk) as a bucket list item. I dove 11 of those wrecks in 1998. Those included the Nippo Maru with the Type-97 tank in my avatar, the sub tender Heian Maru with its load of spare periscopes and torpedoes and the Yamagiri Maru, which is full of 18.1 inch shells.

It's too bad the fleet absquatulated before Hailstone. Although it's generally considered the best wreck diving in the world, imagine if the Mushashi had been sunk in a 150-foot-deep lagoon.

Cheers,
CC

[MakeeLearn]

ORIGINAL: Commander Cody

WITP-AE forumites should consider doing a dive trip at Truk Lagoon (AKA Chu'uk) as a bucket list item. I dove 11 of those wrecks in 1998. Those included the Nippo Maru with the Type-97 tank in my avatar, the sub tender Heian Maru with its load of spare periscopes and torpedoes and the Yamagiri Maru, which is full of 18.1 inch shells.

It's too bad the fleet absquatulated before Hailstone. Although it's generally considered the best wreck diving in the world, imagine if the Mushashi had been sunk in a 150-foot-deep lagoon.

Cheers,
CC

I was hoping someone would mention the diving aspect. Ive never dove, and sharks notwithstanding it looks like a incredible experience. Those pics are high quality. Do you have any you would care to post?

Swimming in such places is as a surreal time travel machine.

[Buckrock]

ORIGINAL: Commander Cody
It's too bad the fleet absquatulated before Hailstone. Although it's generally considered the best wreck diving in the world, imagine if the Mushashi had been sunk in a 150-foot-deep lagoon.

And the Musashi could have been tall enough to be its own wreck marker.

[Revthought]

ORIGINAL: Gräfin Zeppelin
3 CLs and three out of the four Destroyers been obsolete ones.

Sure, but at that particular point in the war this was still a serious degradation of Japanese surface forces, which the IJN could never, and would never, recover from.

In other words, the loss of those cruisers and destroyers, arguably, had a bigger impact on the ability of the IJN to fight than the temporary losses of "obsolete" slow battleships at Pearl Harbor--and temporary is the operative word here.

And that doesn't even touch the strategic outcome, which is the total isolation of IJ forces West and South of Truk and the permanent removal of IJN's ability to project power in the South and West Pacific.

[Macclan5]

The "reverse Pearl Harbor" moniker is an American Assignment based on the success of the mission.

Quoted in - comes from - Battle 360 History TV series covering the deployment of the CV Enterprise.

I cannot ever actually recall reading the 'Pearl Harbor analogy' in any book... however I may be wrong. [:D]

--

The strategic impact on Japan is certainly debatable.

I think the psychological / confidence impact on the USNavy is a far more important outcome and sort of missed in this conversation.

1) The USN knew practically nothing about Truk; didn't even have accurate maps. They relied on maps generated by British Explorers in the 18 century. There was fear of the great unknown in planning the raid.

2) The USN had the "germ of the idea" of how effective the 5th/3rd Fleet Fast Carrier Strike force could become. This was a proving test of sorts. They assumed they may find carriers. They assumed they may find battleship. They didn't find either but they still struck against the target flushing out the concept of the Fast Carrier Task Force.

3) The USN had relatively new F6F Hellcats which once and for all dispelled the fear of the Zero superiority. The F6 could not only compete but win consistently with anything close to equal numbers. This dispelled a lot of the concerns about the IJN Air Force.

So I think the emphasis of the debate is not so much about the strategic impact on Japan - as much as it is about the psychological impact on the USN.

After Hailstone the USN never stopped attacking with a high degree of confidence that had both the initiative AND the weapons that would lead to at least a "favorable outcome".

[Revthought]

ORIGINAL: Macclan5

The "reverse Pearl Harbor" moniker is an American Assignment based on the success of the mission.

Quoted in - comes from - Battle 360 History TV series covering the deployment of the CV Enterprise.

I cannot ever actually recall reading the 'Pearl Harbor analogy' in any book... however I may be wrong. [:D]

--

The strategic impact on Japan is certainly debatable.

I think the psychological / confidence impact on the USNavy is a far more important outcome and sort of missed in this conversation.

1) The USN knew practically nothing about Truk; didn't even have accurate maps. They relied on maps generated by British Explorers in the 18 century. There was fear of the great unknown in planning the raid.

2) The USN had the "germ of the idea" of how effective the 5th/3rd Fleet Fast Carrier Strike force could become. This was a proving test of sorts. They assumed they may find carriers. They assumed they may find battleship. They didn't find either but they still struck against the target flushing out the concept of the Fast Carrier Task Force.

3) The USN had relatively new F6F Hellcats which once and for all dispelled the fear of the Zero superiority. The F6 could not only compete but win consistently with anything close to equal numbers. This dispelled a lot of the concerns about the IJN Air Force.

So I think the emphasis of the debate is not so much about the strategic impact on Japan - as much as it is about the psychological impact on the USN.

After Hailstone the USN never stopped attacking with a high degree of confidence that had both the initiative AND the weapons that would lead to at least a "favorable outcome".

I don't think they're arguable. The IJN never again used Truk as a forward staging base for the KB. Troops and supplies in transit to Eniwetok were prevented from reaching there prior to the American landings there. What is more, any hope of reinforcement and resupply to there, or anywhere else in the South/South West Pacific ended. Basically, the Caroline and Gilbert Islands were totally isolated and the Japanese "outer ring" defenses rendered impotent.

I suppose you could argue that the Japanese could have re-supplied and reinforced if they really wanted to, but in my mind the mechanism of action is irrelevant. Whether or not it was because the attack on Truk material prevented the Japanese from maintaining their positions in the South Pacific, or it was the psychological impact of the raid (on both sides) that prevented the same, does not really matter in the end. Secondarily, as the game beautifully illustrates, the warships the IJN lost at Truk were irreplaceable and their loss had a very real impact on the IJN--obsolete or not.

The fact of the matter is, after Operation Hailstone, the IJ in the South West Pacific were abandoned to their fate by the Japanese high command.



This was the outcome, though in reverse, the Japanese hoped for at Pearl Harbor; however, there was a real underestimation of American strength, and a lack of recognition that the United States government was, in part, trying to goad the Axis into bringing the United States into the war.

That and, of course, the fact the United States Navy was more than capable of recovering from the losses at Pearl Harbor. All but what two American ships sunk at Pearl were refloated and repaired, all while the USN continued to churn out ships from their 1939 build plan.