Operation SF Aircraft and Air OOB

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US87891
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Operation SF Aircraft and Air OOB

Post by US87891 »

JWE finally finished the IJ special convoys of squads, devices, and airframes for the Op SF scenario. This caused a re-exam of a few aspects of the database. It also sparked a more detailed answer to some email questions re IJAAF operations in the Solomons and New Guinea. Here are his comments.
Finally got the 5th and 13th Sentais put to bed. 5th Sentai never made it to New Guinea. It was on Java in July ’43 and on Ambon Jan. ’44. However, 5th Sentai formed a special attack unit (the Tokushu Kogekitai) March ’42, with 6 Ki-45 KAI pre-series Nicks and 6 specially modified Ki-46-II Dinahs, each daitai comprised of 3, 2-plane hintais, operating with “Rotte” tactics. The Nicks scrambled against the Doolittle raid April 18, ’42. This particular unit was sent to Truk Oct. ’42 as an un-numbered dokuritsu chutai, but officially remained part of 5th Sentai. It was subsequently absorbed by 13th Sentai May ’43 at Rabaul.

13th Sentai arrived Rabaul with 20 Nicks May 11, ’43. By Sept. 16, ’43, only 2 were left. 13th Sentai took over the remaining Ki-43-I aircraft from the departing 1st Sentai and subsequently transitioned into the ki-43-II at Wewak Nov. ’43, but remained on the books as a Type 2 Hy fighter unit. They officially became a Type 1 fighter unit Feb. ’44. Woof.

Also redid Ki-46s from TAIC 253A and 253B in same manner as the aircraft data modifications of version-05. Quite a few surprises. Had to redo the special Ki-46 KAI that outfits the Ki-46 daitai of the special Tokushu Kogekitai . The Dinah couldn’t accommodate a center-line mounted Type 94 37mm. The observer position was too far behind the pilot and the intervening space held a large fuel tank. The hand loaded breech would thus be inaccessible, even in a ventral tunnel. Since it operated alongside the Nick KAIa, a better combination would be one or two Ho-3 20mm, or a mix of a 20mm and a 12.7mm in the nose, as was done in the IIIb and III Kai later. This is supported by SWP TAI team report 220 on planes investigated at the Tuluvu boneyard.

Senshi Sosho, Vols 14, 22, 28, 94 ; Japanese Monographs 31, 32 ; SWP Technical Air Intelligence reports ; TAIC reports ; Richard Dunn ; Ikuhito Hata ; Yasuho Izawa ; Rene Francillon ; Stewart Wilson.

I expect a completed file set within the week.

Matt
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RE: Operation SF Aircraft and Air OOB

Post by Oberst_Klink »

Great news! I was waiting for just that... because it is a perfectly managable smaller 'What-if' scenario of a huge scale!

Glad you resumed work on it!

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RE: Operation SF Aircraft and Air OOB

Post by DanSez »


Yes, add many thanks for all the good work
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US87891
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RE: Operation SF Aircraft and Air OOB

Post by US87891 »

Thanks all for the kind words.

Oberst Klink - It isn’t as ‘what if’ as it seems. IJN vessels are where they historically were in the op area and the historical Midway forces are simply in a different place with a different mission. Sho and Zui kaku are even in Japan licking their historical wounds from Coral Sea.

Land forces are where they historically were in the op area or introduced at historically appropriate places and times, some already in historical transport convoys, but with ‘scenario’ destinations rather than the irl destination. What changes is the reinforcement introduction schedule (38 ID, 6 ID, 21 and 65 Brigs for 17 Army, and 51 ID, 20 ID, and 41 ID for 18 Army) all units of which were historically present, in the same sequence, but more spaced-apart timewise. Great care was taken to ensure each accelerated unit was actually available (not tied up in ops) at the advanced date.

IJAAF poses a bit of a problem with advancing arrival the early sentai. The best example is 12th Air Brigade transitioning from Ki-27 to Ki-43-I at Akeno: the 1st sentai Jun/Jul ’42, the 11th sentai Aug/Sep ’42. The 11th arrived Truk, by sea, 12/10/42, the 1st arrived Truk, by sea, 12/29/42. So far this suggests a 3 to 5 month possible acceleration. Butt … the 11th arrived with 59 airframes (or 57 or 60, depending on source). Turns out 1st and 11th went from Akeno back to Burma/Malaya till November, when they got the reassign to 6 Air Div. 11th went first, but also picked up the left-behind Ki-43-1 aircraft from 64th sentai whose aircrews went to Akeno, in Nov, to transition into the Ki-43-II. This is what beefed up the 11th from its nominal 33 plane TOE to 59 aircraft; i.e., a ton of spares for 12 Air Brigade in an out-of-the-way place. The 1st arrived at Truk with its nominal establishment of 33 aircraft.

So they ‘could’ be accelerated, but they couldn’t have the excess airframes, which didn’t exist until November. What we did was accelerate them with their nominal establishment only. There were some other bumps like that but nothing without a solution. All in all, we were as historical as humanly possible, even with the advanced intro dates.

Matt
US87891
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RE: Operation SF Aircraft and Air OOB

Post by US87891 »

Have JWE's file set. The test drive is working very nicely, particularly the IJ reinforcement system. Some land devices have a minimal build rate, but generally, land devices and airframes arrive to the pools by the 'magic' convoys. Pools might go for two months with almost nothing and then suddenly get 150 squads or 30 zeros. This happens at around two or two and a half month intervals.

For IJN carrier planes, replacements are provided by periodic 'replenishment' air groups arriving at Manila. This is the only place (by a hard scenario rule) where CV air groups can reconstruct. They are approximately beefy kokutai in size so if one has several air groups needing replenishment, one must prioritize and get replacement aircraft one-at-a-time instead of simply 'filing out'. It is very important to have all land units and air groups set to 'replacements off' and handle reinforcement on an individual basis. IJ upgrades should remain OFF for the duration; we tried to delete upgrade entries in the database as much as possible, but Murphy remains the god of all plans.

Allied CV air groups are replenished in the same way (by a hard scenario rule) and CVs have to go to either Pearl or San Diego to fill out.

Japan is finished and functioning to standard. Allies are functioning to standard. The last remaining task is refining the Aus/NZ build rates and pools. Scenario will then be posted.

Matt
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RE: Operation SF Aircraft and Air OOB

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RE: Operation SF Aircraft and Air OOB

Post by drw61 »

Thanks, cant wait to take a look at this one.
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RE: Operation SF Aircraft and Air OOB

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RE: Operation SF Aircraft and Air OOB

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RE: Operation SF Aircraft and Air OOB

Post by Oberst_Klink »

Can't wait to test it!!!

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RE: Operation SF Aircraft and Air OOB

Post by TOMLABEL »

Very interesting.
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RE: Operation SF Aircraft and Air OOB

Post by traskott »

Suscribed... The IJN magic convoys sound very good...
US87891
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RE: Operation SF Aircraft and Air OOB

Post by US87891 »

Several PMs have very nicely asked for a beta preview. The scenario, as it now stands, has been posted on the website. Not many tasks remain for completion.

The Rules are also posted. The Best Practices portion is in preparation and final editorialization.

https://sites.google.com/site/dababeswitpae/

Go to the Operation SF page under Section 5.Small Scenarios.

Matt
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RE: Operation SF Aircraft and Air OOB

Post by chemkid »

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RE: Operation SF Aircraft and Air OOB

Post by US87891 »

Before the scenario is posted, there is one further detail that ought to get addressed. One of the So. Cal. Group is a Marine pilot, stationed at Miramar. He had some interesting ideas about the pilots system and data file. Put simply, the reserve pilots have their experience ratings altered to reflect certain archetypes and the prevailing national experience ratings of new pilot infusions. The details for the reserve pilot file are straight forward.

Experience is gained by operational flying, not by training. Training imparts and polishes foundational skills. Ensigns and 2nd Lieutenants have not been in-service long enough to get experience beyond flight school and type training. All reserve Ens and 2Lt are adjusted to the national average plus a few points for being around for a while and presumably undergoing intensified type training under combat conditions and instructors. Base experience is 57 – 62, depending on their arrival year.

A 1st LT/LtJG has been in-service for 2-4 years (O-1 to O-2 is typically 1.5 to 2 years at 100% promotion rate, O-2 to O-3 is another 2 years at 95% promotion rate). They are presumed to have greater maturity, more time in type, and may have some operational time, particularly those who arrive in 1943 and beyond. All reserve 1st LT/LtJG are adjusted upward from the O-1 levels. Base experience is 62 to 67, depending on year.

A Capt/Lt has been in-service 4 to 8 years, unless promoted early from O-3 to O-4 for exemplary conduct. They are presumed to have operational experience. All reserve Capt/Lt are adjusted upward from the O-2 levels. Base experience is 68 to 73, depending on year.

A Maj/LtCmdr got there by exhibiting exemplary efficiency and fitness. Their base experience is 76 to 81, depending on year.

In all rank cases, individual pilots that are identified as aces have an adder applied to their base experience, based on a factor of their number of kills.

Douglas included an updated file set for the USMC and USN, but it should be easy enough to replicate for the US Army pilots. Japan is somewhat more obscure since Navy pilots of warrant and enlisted rank were promoted very infrequently. Commissioned officer pilots had a promotion ladder, but its rate and scale was different from their US counterparts. We will need to develop a reasonable paradigm for Japanese reserve pilots. A lot of individuation will be necessary for reserve pilots. The replacement pools, rates, and base experience should be adjusted accordingly.

Matt
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RE: Operation SF Aircraft and Air OOB

Post by US87891 »

Once again, the USN/USMC pilots in California came up with an exemplary response for the review of the scenario's pilot experience. I do not know who wrote it, or where someone may have found it, but it is the best general overview of the state of the respective naval air forces that I have read. It puts many things in perspective and sharpens focus. I hope some of you will enjoy it.
The availability of Japanese carrier qualified pilots is a difficult number to ascertain, but the generally accepted view is about 1500 carrier qualified pilots in 1941. In preparing for the war, the IJN brought its operational aircraft up to a level of about 1800, with about 1200 of them shore based and 600 ship based (aircraft carriers and scouts). If there were indeed 1500 carrier qualified IJN pilots, it is highly likely that the IJN, much like the USN/USMC, carrier qualified the majority of its single engine pilots in its equivalent of Squadron-3.

These numbers pretty much correlate with those of the USN/USMC; examining active 1941 USN/USMC squadrons yields a similar number of available aviators. USN carrier squadrons, at the end of 1941, only mustered about 580 flying slots in 38 squadrons. Active land-based USMC VMF and VMSB squadrons probably accounted for another 200-250 readily available carrier qualified pilots. Certainly this was not the total pool of available carrier qualified USN/USMC pilots as it does not take into account carrier qualified pilots assigned to such mundane activities as training and staff positions, as well as land based squadrons. The same would be true of the IJN. There were undoubtedly many carrier qualified pilots not actually assigned to a carrier squadron and operating in that environment.

Reviewing USN pilot training, in the years 1925 through 1941, 7,061 pilots had completed the program. Of these, 44 percent, 3,112 completed the program just in 1941. Those most likely to endure most of the fighting were those who completed flight training between 1934 and 1941, some 5,687 pilots. How many of these were carrier qualified? They all were, at some point. It was pre-war USN practice to move pilots from “community” to “community”. Fighter pilot Jimmy Thach, for example, spent two or three tours in patrol planes, which amounts to five to six years, if not more. All USN pilots, prewar, were carrier qualified at some point regardless of the community to which they were eventually assigned.

In 1942 USN pilot training programs started to ramp up; 10,869 aviators received their wings of gold, almost twice as many as had completed the program in the previous 8 years. In 1943 there were 20,842 graduates; 1944, 21,067; and, with then end of the war in sight, 1945 ended with 8,880 graduates. As best ascertained, during the course of the war the IJN trained some 24,000 pilots of all stripes. Thus, in the period 1942 to 1945, the USN produced more than 2.5 times the number of pilots as the IJN. Each of those USN pilots went through a program of primary, intermediate, advanced, and, for the carrier pilots combat preparation in RAGs before heading west. New pilots were arriving for action in USN carrier squadrons with as many as 600 hours flying under their belts and as much as 200 hours of that in type.

Many will remark on the overall superiority of the start-of-the-war IJN carrier pilots, but this, too, may be somewhat of a distorted view. Popularly, the IJN pilots are given credit for racking up all that great combat experience in China. Well, so what about this great combat experience? It was exciting work, bombing raids blasting relatively, certainly by later wartime standards, undefended villages, towns, cities and the odd US gunboat. Fighter plane wise, this meant flying strike escort for these mostly unchallenged air raids; shooting up an occasional column of troops or refugees; and, on rare occasions, cornering a bunch of Russian built and Chinese flown I-15 biplanes or a rare I-16 monoplane.

Also, consider that IJN air units had considerably less involvement in China than IJA air units. Apropos, virtually all, if not actually all, USN/USMC VF vs Japanese VF encounters, were against IJN VF, during those critical first 12 months of the war. This is not to say the IJN flyers had no combat experience, but to posit instead that it was, perhaps, a "lower quality combat experience" than that for which they are popularly given credit . . . really not much more than overly realistic training.

The entire argument of the IJN pilots having all this vast combat experience must rest on some fairly unlikely presuppositions, such as (1) that all IJN pilots/air groups went off to China and obtained this vast combat experience (2) all sorties resulted in air-to-air combat action and as a result all VF pilots had the benefit of this air-to-air combat experience, and (3) all VF air-to-air combat experience was obtained flying the A6M2. The extensions of these pre-suppositions are also equally unlikely (1) that no IJN pilots/air groups went off to fight the Americans without this experience (2) that there were no PCS transfers out of these units (3) there had been no operational casualties in these units (4) there were no assignments of new pilots fresh from whatever advanced training to these units, and (5) there were no PCS transfers into these units from pilots who were busy elsewhere during the China adventure.

Significantly, whatever combat experience the IJN pilots did acquire in China would only stand them good stead if the USN pilots flew like the Chinese Air Force . . . which was, most definitely, not the case. So the popular theory, that green, inexperienced, fresh from training, USN/USMC pilots faced all these, combat experienced, multiple victory, mature late 20's to early 30's, rock steady, hardened professionals, is not really true.

The USN/USMC VF pilots of the period, while not combat experienced, were, in most cases, well trained, well led, and possessed of sound tactical doctrine. Their squadron commanders and executive officers, for the most part, were experienced aviators who had received their wings by the early 1930'. The division and section leaders usually had anywhere from three years to slightly less than a year in type. While the IJN pilots were presumably cavorting around in China, they were flying and training, flying and training, flying and training, ad nauseam. They had a good idea who they were going to have to fight, and some had a pretty good idea how they were going to go about it. Their training was much less rigid and inflexible than Japan’s, so rapid adaptation to new tactical patterns was uncomplicated.
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