Soviet Airborne Brigades?
Moderators: Joel Billings, Sabre21
Soviet Airborne Brigades?
Has anyone every performed a successful airdrop? I think historically they were all disasters. Seems per 7.5.3.1 they can be combined into a rifle division. This action likely negates the airborne function.
RE: Soviet Airborne Brigades?
Well used, soviet paradrops can be a killing for the german player (cutting a rail line, closing a Pocket....)
I suffered it once and find it unrealistic. So, as soviet I don't use it.
I suffered it once and find it unrealistic. So, as soviet I don't use it.
GHC 9-0-3
SHC 10-0-4
SHC 10-0-4
RE: Soviet Airborne Brigades?
Most house rules preclude air drops so there are few published examples of the issues. From my novice point of view however, a blanket ban on Soviet air drops seem like an over reaction.
I can see that the WITE ability of the Soviets to drop airborne units well exceeds reality, so perhaps a middle ground is to allow only a limited number per year.
I can see that the WITE ability of the Soviets to drop airborne units well exceeds reality, so perhaps a middle ground is to allow only a limited number per year.
RKhan
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WilliSaenger
- Posts: 50
- Joined: Wed May 11, 2016 1:09 pm
RE: Soviet Airborne Brigades?
I don't think paradrops are unrealistic at all.
It's rather unrealistic not to make use of them in the game.
They have been used for exactly the same missions you described.
Google for "The Soviet Airborne Experience" by Lieutenant Colonel David M. Glantz.
I cite from it:
"After the tragic border battles, only the 4th and 5th
Airborne corps in the Moscow region remained relatively intact.
In August and September 1941,
the High Command reorganized the airborne forces and redefined the
guidelines for their future employment.
A 4 September order of the People’s Commissariat of Defense created the
higher level Administration of the Command of Airborne Forces to replace
the older lower level airborne force administration.
The order also withdrew all airborne forces from front command and
subordinated them to the new administration,
now commanded by Maj m Gen. V. A. Glazunov, Henceforth, airborne units would be used only
with specific Stavka approval to perform the following missions:
# Cooperate with ground forces in encircling and
destroying large enemy groups.
# Disorganize enemy command and control and rear area
logistics facilities.
# Secure and hold important terrain, crossings, and
points in the enemy rear.
# Secure and destroy enemy airfields.
# Secure landings of naval infantry and river crossings.
To bolster the depleted airborne force structure,
a new airborne brigade TOE strengthened the parachute battalion (see table 7),
and five new airborne corps (6ththrough 10th) were organized using this new brigade TOE.
The Soviets reorganized or reinforced the older corps (1stthrough 5th) with personnel and equipment
and created five new maneuver airborne brigades.
By June 1942, creation of these new units was completed.
The new administration also established schools and courses to train cadre for these units.
The Stavka formed nine separate aviation transport squadrons and five separate aviation detachments
to perform the critical function of transporting airborne units.
During 1942, these units combined to form two separate aviation-glider regiments and two aviation
transport regiments equipped with U-2, R-5, TB-1, TB-3, and FS-84 aircraft.
Because of heavy losses ofaircraft early in the war,
the lack of sufficient aircraft posed a serious problem for the airborne forces."
Further more:
"During the Soviet counteroffensive at Moscow in December 1941 and January 1942,
the Stavka marshaled all available forces in an attempt to drive German Army Group Center away from Moscow
and destroy the German army group.
While committing the bulk of its rifle forces in an offensive against the Germans,
the Stavka marshaled its scarce mobile forces in an attempt to convert tactical successes into operational
success and even strategic victory.
Into the boiling cauldron of battle around Moscow,
the Stavka threw mobile groups consisting of ski battalions, cavalry divisions and
corps, its few precious tank brigades, and its airborne forces, as well.
In addition to the role played by airborne forces in conducting minor tactical and
diversionary operations on main army attack axes,
ultimately an entire airborne corps dropped into German
Army Group Center's rear near Vyaz'ma to aid in the
encirclement and destruction of that enemy army group
(see chaps. 3 and 4).
At this stage of the war, the limited mobility
and staying power of Soviet forces thwarted Stavka's ambitious plans,
and airborne forces ultimately had to fight a four-month battle of encirclement before
breaking free of the German rear and rejoining Soviet main forces.
While major airborne operations went on near Moscow,
a smaller tactical drop occurred at Kereh in the Crimea."
It's rather unrealistic not to make use of them in the game.
They have been used for exactly the same missions you described.
Google for "The Soviet Airborne Experience" by Lieutenant Colonel David M. Glantz.
I cite from it:
"After the tragic border battles, only the 4th and 5th
Airborne corps in the Moscow region remained relatively intact.
In August and September 1941,
the High Command reorganized the airborne forces and redefined the
guidelines for their future employment.
A 4 September order of the People’s Commissariat of Defense created the
higher level Administration of the Command of Airborne Forces to replace
the older lower level airborne force administration.
The order also withdrew all airborne forces from front command and
subordinated them to the new administration,
now commanded by Maj m Gen. V. A. Glazunov, Henceforth, airborne units would be used only
with specific Stavka approval to perform the following missions:
# Cooperate with ground forces in encircling and
destroying large enemy groups.
# Disorganize enemy command and control and rear area
logistics facilities.
# Secure and hold important terrain, crossings, and
points in the enemy rear.
# Secure and destroy enemy airfields.
# Secure landings of naval infantry and river crossings.
To bolster the depleted airborne force structure,
a new airborne brigade TOE strengthened the parachute battalion (see table 7),
and five new airborne corps (6ththrough 10th) were organized using this new brigade TOE.
The Soviets reorganized or reinforced the older corps (1stthrough 5th) with personnel and equipment
and created five new maneuver airborne brigades.
By June 1942, creation of these new units was completed.
The new administration also established schools and courses to train cadre for these units.
The Stavka formed nine separate aviation transport squadrons and five separate aviation detachments
to perform the critical function of transporting airborne units.
During 1942, these units combined to form two separate aviation-glider regiments and two aviation
transport regiments equipped with U-2, R-5, TB-1, TB-3, and FS-84 aircraft.
Because of heavy losses ofaircraft early in the war,
the lack of sufficient aircraft posed a serious problem for the airborne forces."
Further more:
"During the Soviet counteroffensive at Moscow in December 1941 and January 1942,
the Stavka marshaled all available forces in an attempt to drive German Army Group Center away from Moscow
and destroy the German army group.
While committing the bulk of its rifle forces in an offensive against the Germans,
the Stavka marshaled its scarce mobile forces in an attempt to convert tactical successes into operational
success and even strategic victory.
Into the boiling cauldron of battle around Moscow,
the Stavka threw mobile groups consisting of ski battalions, cavalry divisions and
corps, its few precious tank brigades, and its airborne forces, as well.
In addition to the role played by airborne forces in conducting minor tactical and
diversionary operations on main army attack axes,
ultimately an entire airborne corps dropped into German
Army Group Center's rear near Vyaz'ma to aid in the
encirclement and destruction of that enemy army group
(see chaps. 3 and 4).
At this stage of the war, the limited mobility
and staying power of Soviet forces thwarted Stavka's ambitious plans,
and airborne forces ultimately had to fight a four-month battle of encirclement before
breaking free of the German rear and rejoining Soviet main forces.
While major airborne operations went on near Moscow,
a smaller tactical drop occurred at Kereh in the Crimea."
RE: Soviet Airborne Brigades?
I think airborne forces were used to create guards rifle divisions and thrown into combat when situation was dire. Some were then rebuilt but the cycle continued. There were never enough planes to make major drops en masse. So it was logical to use those husbanded reserves as ground troops when situation was dire.
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WilliSaenger
- Posts: 50
- Joined: Wed May 11, 2016 1:09 pm
RE: Soviet Airborne Brigades?
Yes I agree, airborne divisions were reorganized as guards rifle divisions, nevertheless,
even if unsuccessful, two major airborne operations took place, the one in Vyaz'ma and the one near the Dnepr River.
Citing again "The Soviet Airborne Experience":
"After the defeat of German forces at Kursk, the bulk
of the airborne divisions joined forces in the pursuit of German to the Dnepr River.
Even as ten guards airborne divisions fought at the front,
new airborne brigades formed in the rear areas.
In April and May 1943, twenty brigades formed and
trained for future airborne operations.
Most of these brigades had become six new
guards airborne divisions (11th through 16th) by September 1943.
The Stavka, however, earmarked three of these
airborne brigades for use in an airborne operation to
cross the Dnepr River.
As Soviet forces approached the new German defensive line on the Dnepr,
the problem of securing bridgeheads for offensive
operations across the river was paramount.
Advanced elements of Soviet forces seized a number of
small bridgeheads, but only light infantry formations were
able to cross into these footholds. Larger bridgeheads
free from German interdiction were necessary to build
bridges across the Dnepr and to introduce heavy armored
forces needed to continue the offensive.
To gain a larger bridgehead ,
the Stavka ordered three airborne brigades to
conduct a major airborne operation across the Dnepr River
near Velikeyi Bukr in.
This second, and last, operational use of airborne
forces failed because of inadequate preparations,forces,
poor reconnaissance, clumsy coordination of
and many of the same reasons that had caused the
Vyaz ‘ma operation to fail (see chap. 5). The Soviets
would conduct no further large-scale airborne operations.
Instead, airborne forces continued to fight in a ground
combat role."
And:
"After the failure of the Dnepr operation, the original
ten guards airborne divisions participated in campaigns on
the left and right banks of the Ukraine, in particular as
part of 5th Army at Kirovograd, at Korsun-Shevchenkovskii,
and in the advance to the Dnestr River. In January 1944,
the newer guards airborne divisions became rifle divisions
within 37th Guards Rifle Corps, 7th Army, and fought to liberate Karelia.
In the summer and fall of 1944,
seven guards airborne divisions, fighting as infantry and
as part of 4th Guards Army, joined in the rout of German
and Rumanian forces at Yassy-Kishinev and marched with
Soviet forces into Hungary."
even if unsuccessful, two major airborne operations took place, the one in Vyaz'ma and the one near the Dnepr River.
Citing again "The Soviet Airborne Experience":
"After the defeat of German forces at Kursk, the bulk
of the airborne divisions joined forces in the pursuit of German to the Dnepr River.
Even as ten guards airborne divisions fought at the front,
new airborne brigades formed in the rear areas.
In April and May 1943, twenty brigades formed and
trained for future airborne operations.
Most of these brigades had become six new
guards airborne divisions (11th through 16th) by September 1943.
The Stavka, however, earmarked three of these
airborne brigades for use in an airborne operation to
cross the Dnepr River.
As Soviet forces approached the new German defensive line on the Dnepr,
the problem of securing bridgeheads for offensive
operations across the river was paramount.
Advanced elements of Soviet forces seized a number of
small bridgeheads, but only light infantry formations were
able to cross into these footholds. Larger bridgeheads
free from German interdiction were necessary to build
bridges across the Dnepr and to introduce heavy armored
forces needed to continue the offensive.
To gain a larger bridgehead ,
the Stavka ordered three airborne brigades to
conduct a major airborne operation across the Dnepr River
near Velikeyi Bukr in.
This second, and last, operational use of airborne
forces failed because of inadequate preparations,forces,
poor reconnaissance, clumsy coordination of
and many of the same reasons that had caused the
Vyaz ‘ma operation to fail (see chap. 5). The Soviets
would conduct no further large-scale airborne operations.
Instead, airborne forces continued to fight in a ground
combat role."
And:
"After the failure of the Dnepr operation, the original
ten guards airborne divisions participated in campaigns on
the left and right banks of the Ukraine, in particular as
part of 5th Army at Kirovograd, at Korsun-Shevchenkovskii,
and in the advance to the Dnestr River. In January 1944,
the newer guards airborne divisions became rifle divisions
within 37th Guards Rifle Corps, 7th Army, and fought to liberate Karelia.
In the summer and fall of 1944,
seven guards airborne divisions, fighting as infantry and
as part of 4th Guards Army, joined in the rout of German
and Rumanian forces at Yassy-Kishinev and marched with
Soviet forces into Hungary."
RE: Soviet Airborne Brigades?
I have tried to get the German side to agree to limited air drop house rules but no luck. I find German players prefer a highly predictable game where only they get to surprise the other side. 
RKhan
RE: Soviet Airborne Brigades?
I'm sure they would have nothing against failed airborne ops, as in reality 
I think due to how the supply system works, airborne ops can be too good in this game, and have too big impact. Maybe that's why some dislike them?
I think due to how the supply system works, airborne ops can be too good in this game, and have too big impact. Maybe that's why some dislike them?-
WilliSaenger
- Posts: 50
- Joined: Wed May 11, 2016 1:09 pm
RE: Soviet Airborne Brigades?
A suggestion for the next update could be a combat penality for airborne units fighting in the enemy rear, not affecting the actual possibility of using them.Intended as a force for temporary disruption of enemy logistics but too weak to withstand a sustained counter attack.
This could give the player the possibility to decide if the havoc caused in the opponent logistics is worth the sacrifice of those elite units.
This could give the player the possibility to decide if the havoc caused in the opponent logistics is worth the sacrifice of those elite units.
RE: Soviet Airborne Brigades?
The reason for the house rules is that the Soviet airborne and amphibious capabilities in the game are far in excess of what was possible. The work to fix it in the game system is not worth it with WITE2 on the way.
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WilliSaenger
- Posts: 50
- Joined: Wed May 11, 2016 1:09 pm
RE: Soviet Airborne Brigades?
Is it that difficult to write a routine that penalizes airborne units dropped in enemy ZOC for one turn and as long as cut off from main forces?
Besides, are you sure that WITE2 is around the corner?I read in another post that it could take years..(for good reasons)
Besides, are you sure that WITE2 is around the corner?I read in another post that it could take years..(for good reasons)
RE: Soviet Airborne Brigades?
You didn't see the point with your combat penaltys.
The game engine works with retreat attrition and you could get better results if your opponent must retreat in enemy ZoC.
Example 1: I land one brigade behind a front. One hex away and than I attacked that front (succesfull). After the wins, the brigade isn't deep in enemy territory, but all units which must retreat take higher losses.
Example 2: I land three or four behind a german front and attack (succesfull) at both ends of the front. With two vitories I get a small pocket. Each unit in the pocket suffers 1 moral drop because of the isolation and they get no supplies/fuel.
Example 3: I land at a railroad which cuts the railroad. I'm not sure at the moment how deep I could land them, but with one strike all supply for one front must be drive over a long distance (fewer supply, more truck losses).
As the soviet side this 2k men didn't hurt, but for the germans it really hurts!
You could cloes or open pockets which will give you time and that is really, really well for the soviets in 1941 and 1942. And in the later years the soviet are so powerfull, that it doesn't really matter.
This game is a strategy game and in the complete war in europe there are onyl three to five strategic paradrop landings. (Kreta, Arnheim, Dnpre Bend).
There are many tactical paradrops to destroy a brigde, a fort or something else, but this was more commando scale operations and no strategical operations.
The game engine works with retreat attrition and you could get better results if your opponent must retreat in enemy ZoC.
Example 1: I land one brigade behind a front. One hex away and than I attacked that front (succesfull). After the wins, the brigade isn't deep in enemy territory, but all units which must retreat take higher losses.
Example 2: I land three or four behind a german front and attack (succesfull) at both ends of the front. With two vitories I get a small pocket. Each unit in the pocket suffers 1 moral drop because of the isolation and they get no supplies/fuel.
Example 3: I land at a railroad which cuts the railroad. I'm not sure at the moment how deep I could land them, but with one strike all supply for one front must be drive over a long distance (fewer supply, more truck losses).
As the soviet side this 2k men didn't hurt, but for the germans it really hurts!
You could cloes or open pockets which will give you time and that is really, really well for the soviets in 1941 and 1942. And in the later years the soviet are so powerfull, that it doesn't really matter.
This game is a strategy game and in the complete war in europe there are onyl three to five strategic paradrop landings. (Kreta, Arnheim, Dnpre Bend).
There are many tactical paradrops to destroy a brigde, a fort or something else, but this was more commando scale operations and no strategical operations.
RE: Soviet Airborne Brigades?
WilliSaenger, the problem is with binary hex control and its consequences. Landing a weakened brigade (2-3 bns of infantry) converts an area with 10 mile radius to enemy control, destroying rail in the process and exerts some influence on an even greater area (30 mile radius). Assuming you do a drop when there is only single rail rail supplying an army group, you can put an entire army group in an isolated, out of supply, state. This is too big an impact (compare it to the effects of historical drops) and why most players fear and try to restrict use of paradrops. So usually dropping airborne units has close to no effect (forcing a rout is nice, but in the big picture it's a small effect), but sometimes it can ruin the game, due to how the supply system works. Hence need for house rules.
RE: Soviet Airborne Brigades?
the airborne divisions in the late game as well as the mountain divisions are very nice as they dont have the guard limit like infantry I dont believe....so you get you can get them the guards and elite unit morale bump so that by late 1943 they are actually as strong if not better than a german infantry division. This can allow you to hold the line with fewer troops in quiet areas and concentrate all your corps for offensive actions.
RE: Soviet Airborne Brigades?
I'm not exactly sure how it was in WWII, but when I was a construction engineer company commander in Korea, a North Korean airborne battalion was not going to drop a couple of KMs away from me, march over to my position and cause me to route some 5-10 KM away.
Looking at the TOE of a 105 MM field gun - a gun and 8 rifles - you know the same is true for the artillery. The whole HQ, airbase route logic in the game when faced with a light infantry unit is completely broken. Play one of the Market Garden games to get an understanding of the challenges airborne troops face against rear area troops
Looking at the TOE of a 105 MM field gun - a gun and 8 rifles - you know the same is true for the artillery. The whole HQ, airbase route logic in the game when faced with a light infantry unit is completely broken. Play one of the Market Garden games to get an understanding of the challenges airborne troops face against rear area troops
RE: Soviet Airborne Brigades?
In WITE, a 5000 man HQ does not have a single rifle. Really?
Many of these men were hardened combat veterans. Route when a light infantry unit staggers up to them - I do not think so.
In the US Army in the 70's and 80's - everyone was armed.
Many of these men were hardened combat veterans. Route when a light infantry unit staggers up to them - I do not think so.
In the US Army in the 70's and 80's - everyone was armed.
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WilliSaenger
- Posts: 50
- Joined: Wed May 11, 2016 1:09 pm
RE: Soviet Airborne Brigades?
Hi morvael, thank you for your explanations.
What if airborne units will not have a ZOC and will not gain control of adjacent unoccupied enemy hexes (like routed units) for 1 turn, simulating the initial landing problems of troops in the enemy rear (that soviet airborne ops historically had) and the time needed to reorganize and reassamble the airborne units after the landing.
Not having ZOC and the ability to control adjacent unoccupied hexes will not destroy rail and exert influence on an area of 30 miles for one turn right?
This will raise realism and give the german player the time to react to the situation.If unable to do so for whatever reason though, it will give strategic advantage to the soviet player.
What if airborne units will not have a ZOC and will not gain control of adjacent unoccupied enemy hexes (like routed units) for 1 turn, simulating the initial landing problems of troops in the enemy rear (that soviet airborne ops historically had) and the time needed to reorganize and reassamble the airborne units after the landing.
Not having ZOC and the ability to control adjacent unoccupied hexes will not destroy rail and exert influence on an area of 30 miles for one turn right?
This will raise realism and give the german player the time to react to the situation.If unable to do so for whatever reason though, it will give strategic advantage to the soviet player.
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rainman2015
- Posts: 229
- Joined: Thu Feb 12, 2015 1:52 am
RE: Soviet Airborne Brigades?
ORIGINAL: WilliSaenger
Hi morvael, thank you for your explanations.
What if airborne units will not have a ZOC and will not gain control of adjacent unoccupied enemy hexes (like routed units) for 1 turn, simulating the initial landing problems of troops in the enemy rear (that soviet airborne ops historically had) and the time needed to reorganize and reassamble the airborne units after the landing.
Not having ZOC and the ability to control adjacent unoccupied hexes will not destroy rail and exert influence on an area of 30 miles for one turn right?
This will raise realism and give the german player the time to react to the situation.If unable to do so for whatever reason though, it will give strategic advantage to the soviet player.
Even if they didn't have ZOC, they could land directly on an unguarded rail line, and that rail line could be the ONLY functioning rail line for an entire AG, as was said before, so even without a ZOC, they could be a big problem with just one small unit dropping.
Randy
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WilliSaenger
- Posts: 50
- Joined: Wed May 11, 2016 1:09 pm
RE: Soviet Airborne Brigades?
Well if you have only 1 functioning rail line for an entire ag, it would be wise to guard it at least with security units..
RE: Soviet Airborne Brigades?
Sure, but unless a heavy bridge over a major river was destroyed by airborne troops, a damage to a regular segment of rail wouldn't disrupt rail movement for full two weeks... Rail damage/repair and their impact on supplies is too binary in this system, hence the problems a disruption may cause.
Scenario A:
turn X - Soviet airborne units captures hex with rail, rail damage 100
turn X+1 - Axis units out of supply, recapture rail, rail damage 100
turn X+2 - Axis units out of supply, rail repaired by rail repair units
turn X+3 - Axis units in supply
Scenario B (FBD on hand)
turn X - Soviet airborne units captures hex with rail, rail damage 100
turn X+1 - Axis units out of supply, recapture rail, rail damage 100, rail repaired by FBD
turn X+2 - Axis units partially in supply (damage 1 goes away only for second segment)
turn X+3 - Axis units in supply
No way an airborne operation could result in three week long disruption to supply chain.
Scenario A:
turn X - Soviet airborne units captures hex with rail, rail damage 100
turn X+1 - Axis units out of supply, recapture rail, rail damage 100
turn X+2 - Axis units out of supply, rail repaired by rail repair units
turn X+3 - Axis units in supply
Scenario B (FBD on hand)
turn X - Soviet airborne units captures hex with rail, rail damage 100
turn X+1 - Axis units out of supply, recapture rail, rail damage 100, rail repaired by FBD
turn X+2 - Axis units partially in supply (damage 1 goes away only for second segment)
turn X+3 - Axis units in supply
No way an airborne operation could result in three week long disruption to supply chain.