Whilst Allied players continue to employ the wrong strategy and tactics in China, they will continue to get these results with or without stacking limits.
Does this statement presume there is no Japanese counter to China played the right way? I would hazard a guess there is. If the Allies would play China differently, it begs the question, wouldn't the Japanese too?
No, there is always a counter.
What this thread and the other concurrent one on the oft raised "how do we fix China (insert for an Allied player)" issue is focussed on structural considerations.
My point, which I have made a few times in AARs and in the concurrent thread, is that almost all Allied players adopt the totally wrong dynamic which is impossible to be supported by any structural arrangements which attempt to still retain any connection with the historical situation.
Without exception, every Allied player who complains about Japanese ahistorical advances in China is confronted with an opponent who is using an unhistorical force posture.
There are two fundamental problems with these Allied complaints.
(a) what is so strange to expect a Japanese player to achieve unhistorical results if deploying an unhistorical strategy with the requisite assets to carry it out successfully, and
(b) Allied players do not, I repeat do not, use the historical Chinese strategy which helped to discourage the Japanese employing in 1942-43 the ahistorical strategy which Japanese AE players commonly adopt
Both of the above are dynamic, not structural, issues.
I will say it again, the attempt to establish a MLR in China will always fail. There was no historical MLR in China, so on what objective historical basis do Allied players expect to be able to establish and successfully maintain in China a WWI Western Front MLR. If they want to play a game which very successfully captures the historical essence of the capabilities of the time, then it is time to stop thinking they are entitled to approach the Chinese theatre as if it were an American theatre of operations.
Structurally China can never be made to resemble a 1943 Kharkov with it's 5-7 heavily fortified lines of defence in depth. It cannot replicate the Heinrici planned response to Zhukov's pending attack on Berlin with an orderly redeployment within his 3 lines of defence stretching back to the Seelowe Heights festung.
In all of this, there is a substantial opportunity cost to Japan when it pursues an unhistorical strategy in China. Part of adopting an appropriate Allied response to this is to exploit this opportunity cost. A Chinese MLR does zilch in terms of exploiting this opportunity cost.
So next time an Allied player demands China be "fixed" by tinkering with structural factors, there is a very simple question to be put to them;
"How exactly does a China with every single city under Japanese ownership by September 1942 and solely as a result of that ahistorical outcome, prevent an Allied player who outplays his opponent from achieving a decisive victory as detailed in chapter 17 of the manual?"