Ports, airfields - strategic targets?

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Yaab
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Ports, airfields - strategic targets?

Post by Yaab »

Did Allies use heavy bombers for bombing ports and airfields in the Pacific? I think I ia have seen just a few photographs of four-engine bombers bombing such targets ( Rangoon port, some base in the Solomons), yet I have seen plenty of photographs showing medium (two-engine) bombers bombing airfields and ports. So, were ports and airfields considered tactical or strategic targets in the Pacific campaign?
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RE: Ports, airfields - strategic targets?

Post by witpqs »

I really don't fully understand the context of the question. Is somebody claiming that Allied heavy bombers were not used against ports and airfields (except a few times)?
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RE: Ports, airfields - strategic targets?

Post by Yaab »

I mean, in the game four-engine bombers are very effective in closing airfields and wrecking ports, but I have a hard time finding examples of such action during the war itself. On the other hand, I have seen countless photographs of medium bombers attacking airfieds or ship in harbors. It just seems to me that ports and airfields fell into tactictal target category and not strategic. Had there been any B-17/B-29 raids against airfields/ports prior to the bombing campaign against Home Islands?
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RE: Ports, airfields - strategic targets?

Post by Numdydar »

Yes [:)]

My Dad was a bombider on a B25 and consstantly flew raids against Rabaul along side B17s. Does that count [:)]?
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RE: Ports, airfields - strategic targets?

Post by Yaab »

Did they bomb together or separately at different altitudes? I have seen many B-25 photos bombing airfields with parafrag bombs but almost no 4Es.
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RE: Ports, airfields - strategic targets?

Post by AW1Steve »

B-29's shut down several airfields late in the war. B-17' and B-24's tried pretty much throughout , but never in large numbers. Martin Caiden wrote in several of his books about it.
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RE: Ports, airfields - strategic targets?

Post by Numdydar »

ORIGINAL: Yaab

Did they bomb together or separately at different altitudes? I have seen many B-25 photos bombing airfields with parafrag bombs but almost no 4Es.

He said they bombed togeather in different waves.
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RE: Ports, airfields - strategic targets?

Post by Flicker »

Yes, heavy bombers were used to attack Japanese-held ports.

This is a great story:
Old 666, B-17E 41-2666 was a World War II B-17 Flying Fortress Bomber which was assigned to the United States' 43rd Bomb Group in 1943...

By 1943, Old 666, tail number 41-2666, had suffered heavy battle damage and had gained a reputation as a cursed bomber, often coming back from missions with heavy damage. Grounded at Port Moresby Airport, it was parked at the end of the runway where other aircrews could cannibalize it for needed parts...

Captain Zeamer, who had been unable to acquire an aircraft of his own, had the bomber towed out of the 'bone yard' and, with enormous effort, not only restored the badly battered aircraft to flight status but made many changes.

They included increasing the number of machine guns from 13 to 19, replacing the waist gunners' standard single guns with twin guns, replacing all .30 cal machine guns with the larger and more powerful .50 cal, and adding a fixed-position gun that could be fired from the pilot's station... These modifications made Old 666 the most heavily armed bomber in the Pacific Theater.

...Zeamer and crew made a skip-bombing run on a Japanese aircraft carrier, swooping within fifty feet of its decks.

A few days later on a daylight bombing raid over Rabaul, Old 666 came in so low it was brushing the roofs of the housetops. On a night mission over Wewak the Japanese gunners on the ground managed to fix the flight of incoming American bombers in the glare of several large searchlights, but, in an audacious display of airmanship, Zeamer dove on the positions, shooting out three lights and damaging two others.

...special mission: an unescorted, single-ship mapping mission over hostile territory. Capt. Zeamer and crew volunteered... 'Old 666' and crew headed for Bougainville, where they were instructed to take reconnaissance of the Japanese controlled island, to determine logistics and enemy strength for the upcoming Invasion of the Solomon Islands.

The flight required flying over 600 miles (970 km) of open sea to reach the target. By 7:40 a.m., with only 22 minutes of flight-time remaining to complete its mission, Old 666 was intercepted by at least 17 Japanese fighters (15 A6M Zeros and 2 Ki-46 Dinahs) of the 251st Kokutai Squadron, commanded by Chief Flight Petty Officer Yoshio Ooki.[2] After making a pass at the heavily armed tail, the fighters came in against the normally lightly armed nose, only to find that this specific bomber possessed much-heavier forward firepower, resulting in two A6M Zeros being shot down. 20mm cannon shells from a third Zero smashed into the cockpit and nose, wounding both Zeamer and Sarnoski before being shot down itself.

...Zeamer, however, was not dead, and lived to receive the Medal of Honor; Sarnoski was awarded his Medal of Honor posthumously. In one of the most decorated flights in history, the rest of the crew received Distinguished Service Crosses.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Old_666

More of the same:
In August and September 1942 Major William Benn, who had come to Australia as General Kenney's aide and then given command of the B-17s of 63rd Squadron, 43rd Bombardment Group, began practicing the new skip-bombing technique on a wrecked ship in the harbor at Port Moresby. Rather than releasing their bombs from high above the enemy ship, the plan was for Benn's daring pilots to fly as low as 200 feet, aiming the nose of their bombers directly at enemy targets, and then releasing their bombs on a near horizontal trajectory to skip across the water into the ship's side. Under combat conditions the pilots would be flying directly into the enemy guns at speeds over 200 miles per hour. The bombs were to be released from a distance of 300 yards or less, forcing the pilot to climb quickly to avoid collision. The practice was dangerous and required concentration and nerves of steel.

By October 23, 1942, Benn's pilots were ready to try the concept on actual enemy targets. During a night raid over Rabaul six Flying Fortresses dropped bombs on the enemy harbor from 10,000 feet, while six other B-17s came in at 100 feet to skip their bombs. Piloting the bomber named Black Jack, Captain Ken McCullar sank a destroyer with two hits amidships...

During those late-October missions Captain McCullar flew into Rabaul three times with a particular good friend in the navigator's chair once, and then in the copilot's seat twice. That friend was the most likeable man in the 43rd Bombardment Group, an officer who was generally popular everywhere except in the cockpit.

Until the missions with McCullar no one had wanted to fly with Lieutenant Zeamer. For this reason he had no assigned airplane or crew. Instead, he roved the entire group as a "pilot-at-large". To make matters more complicated, Jay Zeamer wasn't actually even a pilot.

He was, in fact, the most senior non-pilot, pilot in the entire Group.


http://www.homeofheroes.com/wings/part2 ... noski.html


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RE: Ports, airfields - strategic targets?

Post by crsutton »

If they did not use B17s and Liberators to bomb airfields and ports, what the heck else would they use them for?
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RE: Ports, airfields - strategic targets?

Post by Yaab »

Well, it seems to me that after the initial Japanese expansion, there would be only three big targets (other than industrial) for strategic bombing by 4Es:

port in Rangoon
port/airfields in Rabaul (but was Rabaul port so developed to warrant a strategic bombing?)

Is there a list of substantial 4E raids in the PTO on port/airfields prior to Home Islands bombings?
I am only aware of raids on Truk.
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RE: Ports, airfields - strategic targets?

Post by Omat »

Hello
In 1944, the group converted from medium, twin engined B-25 Mitchell and B-26 marauder bombers to heavy four engined B-24 Liberator bombers. Following its conversion to B-24 Liberators, on 11 February 1944 the 22d Bomb Group was redesignated 22 Bomb Group, Heavy. Bombed Japanese airfields, shipping, and oil installations in Borneo, Ceram, and Halmahera. Began raiding the southern Philippines in September 1944 to neutralize Japanese bases in preparation for the invasion of Leyte.

Some Pictures:

Nauru Island:

Image

Salamaua:

Image

Gizo Island

Image


So it seems 4 engine bombers attack everything..even ships


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RE: Ports, airfields - strategic targets?

Post by Yaab »

Thanks!
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RE: Ports, airfields - strategic targets?

Post by msieving1 »

ORIGINAL: Yaab

Is there a list of substantial 4E raids in the PTO on port/airfields prior to Home Islands bombings?
I am only aware of raids on Truk.

Heavy bomber raids in the Pacific, prior to the B-29 attacks beginning in late 1944, generally consisted of one or two squadrons. There were few if any massed raids like the operations in Europe.
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RE: Ports, airfields - strategic targets?

Post by Barb »

In 1942 the "heavy bomber" force was lucky to survive:
- Initially the few B-17s of the 7th and 19th Bomb groups were used to hit tactical targets - shipping in ports and captured airfields to slow down Japanese expansion (like Lingayen gulf, Davao, Tarakan, Menado, Balikpapan, etc...). However as most of the planes were older (B-17Ds and first B-17Es), they badly needed overhaul and often part of the strike has to return due to engine problems - so most of the strikes were just 3-6 planes.
- As situation deteriorated and USAAF had to retreat from Java to Australia there were just handful of worn-out planes with almost no spare parts. Most of the flyable planes were thus used for vital Naval Search (as the planes had the legs) - all through the 1942 - B-17s made Naval Search from Luganville to support Guadalcanal campaign.

For example 10th Air Force in India in the end of 1942 had just 10 heavy bombers (B-17Ds and few LB-30s), after best ones were sent to Middle east. These spent the monsoon on airstrips in India waiting for engines/parts.

From the 1943 the situation started to improve:
- In SWPAC heavy bombers lacked industrial targets, so their main targets were airfields and harbours - in true air superiority and interdiction campaigns. Usually a group flew missions together (that means each squadron sent few planes on strike - usually 3-6) giving a usual strike package of 18-21 planes - IRL you do did not need more planes to cover runway with craters to make it unusable for few hours.
- In SEA the few heavy bombers started with strikes against Andamans, Rangoon port, airfields and railways - in an interdiction role. But given the number of available planes these were usually flights of 3-12 planes. And often at night!
- In CENPAC heavy bombers made several attacks on exposed Japanese holdings - Wake, Tarawa, etc. However these were at the extreme range of the planes (they usually flew with extra fuel tanks in bomb bays) with reduced bombloads.

In 1944 it was much better:
- In CENPAC these were used to "soften" island targets before invasions - but usually not more than a group sized missions were flown (so up to 48 planes max) - cratering airfields and striking tactical targets on islands.
- In SWPAC the heavy bombers often flew in air superiority role - targeting airfields on New Britain, Bougainville and New Guinea. Their mission was usually to suppress/divide air defences for the following low level strafers (hitting flak along runways served better than trying to hit airplane hidden in jungle from 10.000 ft). But also usually one bomber group was used.
- In India and Chine heavies continued to strike interdiction targets - railways, ports, supply centers, etc. Rangoon port was quite often visited by Liberators, simply because mediums lacked the range.
- First XXth bomber command started attacks with B-29s from India against Rangoon, Bangkok, Sabang and even Singapore and Saigon usually targeting ports or industry.
- Moving to China (supply permitted) the strikes went against Japanese warehouses and river traffic in interdiction roles with first attacks on Japanese/Manchurian industry targets

Only in 1945 it started to be really a strategic bombing campaign:
- With B-29s moved to Marianas the real "strategic bombing campaign" had really begun targeting industry in Japan. Some missions were flown for support of fleet/amphib invasions like Formosa and Kyushu airfields for Okinawa campaign support.
- B-24s continued their work on air superiority/interdiction campaigns - striking airfields, ports, railways, bridges, warehouses, and other targets... but still usually in 1-2 group size packages - or about 48 heavies for single target (Actually I am laughing and crying at the same time when I see an AAR where 400 heavy bombers are bombing some troops in the middle of jungle, or hitting some small island).

So in the Pacific terms - strategic campaign really was not really the option until late 1944 with first B-29s arriving. Up to that date it was mainly survival (1942) and air superiority/interdiction campaigns - or what one could call "tactical targets". Or in the game terms - strike airfields and ports until you get some real strategic targets into range.

Sources: Air Force Historical Studies:
http://www.afhra.af.mil/studies/numbere ... tudies.asp
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RE: Ports, airfields - strategic targets?

Post by crsutton »

ORIGINAL: Barb

In 1942 the "heavy bomber" force was lucky to survive:
- Initially the few B-17s of the 7th and 19th Bomb groups were used to hit tactical targets - shipping in ports and captured airfields to slow down Japanese expansion (like Lingayen gulf, Davao, Tarakan, Menado, Balikpapan, etc...). However as most of the planes were older (B-17Ds and first B-17Es), they badly needed overhaul and often part of the strike has to return due to engine problems - so most of the strikes were just 3-6 planes.
- As situation deteriorated and USAAF had to retreat from Java to Australia there were just handful of worn-out planes with almost no spare parts. Most of the flyable planes were thus used for vital Naval Search (as the planes had the legs) - all through the 1942 - B-17s made Naval Search from Luganville to support Guadalcanal campaign.

For example 10th Air Force in India in the end of 1942 had just 10 heavy bombers (B-17Ds and few LB-30s), after best ones were sent to Middle east. These spent the monsoon on airstrips in India waiting for engines/parts.

From the 1943 the situation started to improve:
- In SWPAC heavy bombers lacked industrial targets, so their main targets were airfields and harbours - in true air superiority and interdiction campaigns. Usually a group flew missions together (that means each squadron sent few planes on strike - usually 3-6) giving a usual strike package of 18-21 planes - IRL you do did not need more planes to cover runway with craters to make it unusable for few hours.
- In SEA the few heavy bombers started with strikes against Andamans, Rangoon port, airfields and railways - in an interdiction role. But given the number of available planes these were usually flights of 3-12 planes. And often at night!
- In CENPAC heavy bombers made several attacks on exposed Japanese holdings - Wake, Tarawa, etc. However these were at the extreme range of the planes (they usually flew with extra fuel tanks in bomb bays) with reduced bombloads.

In 1944 it was much better:
- In CENPAC these were used to "soften" island targets before invasions - but usually not more than a group sized missions were flown (so up to 48 planes max) - cratering airfields and striking tactical targets on islands.
- In SWPAC the heavy bombers often flew in air superiority role - targeting airfields on New Britain, Bougainville and New Guinea. Their mission was usually to suppress/divide air defences for the following low level strafers (hitting flak along runways served better than trying to hit airplane hidden in jungle from 10.000 ft). But also usually one bomber group was used.
- In India and Chine heavies continued to strike interdiction targets - railways, ports, supply centers, etc. Rangoon port was quite often visited by Liberators, simply because mediums lacked the range.
- First XXth bomber command started attacks with B-29s from India against Rangoon, Bangkok, Sabang and even Singapore and Saigon usually targeting ports or industry.
- Moving to China (supply permitted) the strikes went against Japanese warehouses and river traffic in interdiction roles with first attacks on Japanese/Manchurian industry targets

Only in 1945 it started to be really a strategic bombing campaign:
- With B-29s moved to Marianas the real "strategic bombing campaign" had really begun targeting industry in Japan. Some missions were flown for support of fleet/amphib invasions like Formosa and Kyushu airfields for Okinawa campaign support.
- B-24s continued their work on air superiority/interdiction campaigns - striking airfields, ports, railways, bridges, warehouses, and other targets... but still usually in 1-2 group size packages - or about 48 heavies for single target (Actually I am laughing and crying at the same time when I see an AAR where 400 heavy bombers are bombing some troops in the middle of jungle, or hitting some small island).

So in the Pacific terms - strategic campaign really was not really the option until late 1944 with first B-29s arriving. Up to that date it was mainly survival (1942) and air superiority/interdiction campaigns - or what one could call "tactical targets". Or in the game terms - strike airfields and ports until you get some real strategic targets into range.

Sources: Air Force Historical Studies:
http://www.afhra.af.mil/studies/numbere ... tudies.asp

If I recall Kenny found some of his heavy bomber units to be so worn down that the only solution he could see was to disband them and send them home.
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RE: Ports, airfields - strategic targets?

Post by Barb »

ORIGINAL: crsutton

ORIGINAL: Barb

In 1942 the "heavy bomber" force was lucky to survive:
- Initially the few B-17s of the 7th and 19th Bomb groups were used to hit tactical targets - shipping in ports and captured airfields to slow down Japanese expansion (like Lingayen gulf, Davao, Tarakan, Menado, Balikpapan, etc...). However as most of the planes were older (B-17Ds and first B-17Es), they badly needed overhaul and often part of the strike has to return due to engine problems - so most of the strikes were just 3-6 planes.
- As situation deteriorated and USAAF had to retreat from Java to Australia there were just handful of worn-out planes with almost no spare parts. Most of the flyable planes were thus used for vital Naval Search (as the planes had the legs) - all through the 1942 - B-17s made Naval Search from Luganville to support Guadalcanal campaign.

For example 10th Air Force in India in the end of 1942 had just 10 heavy bombers (B-17Ds and few LB-30s), after best ones were sent to Middle east. These spent the monsoon on airstrips in India waiting for engines/parts.

From the 1943 the situation started to improve:
- In SWPAC heavy bombers lacked industrial targets, so their main targets were airfields and harbours - in true air superiority and interdiction campaigns. Usually a group flew missions together (that means each squadron sent few planes on strike - usually 3-6) giving a usual strike package of 18-21 planes - IRL you do did not need more planes to cover runway with craters to make it unusable for few hours.
- In SEA the few heavy bombers started with strikes against Andamans, Rangoon port, airfields and railways - in an interdiction role. But given the number of available planes these were usually flights of 3-12 planes. And often at night!
- In CENPAC heavy bombers made several attacks on exposed Japanese holdings - Wake, Tarawa, etc. However these were at the extreme range of the planes (they usually flew with extra fuel tanks in bomb bays) with reduced bombloads.

In 1944 it was much better:
- In CENPAC these were used to "soften" island targets before invasions - but usually not more than a group sized missions were flown (so up to 48 planes max) - cratering airfields and striking tactical targets on islands.
- In SWPAC the heavy bombers often flew in air superiority role - targeting airfields on New Britain, Bougainville and New Guinea. Their mission was usually to suppress/divide air defences for the following low level strafers (hitting flak along runways served better than trying to hit airplane hidden in jungle from 10.000 ft). But also usually one bomber group was used.
- In India and Chine heavies continued to strike interdiction targets - railways, ports, supply centers, etc. Rangoon port was quite often visited by Liberators, simply because mediums lacked the range.
- First XXth bomber command started attacks with B-29s from India against Rangoon, Bangkok, Sabang and even Singapore and Saigon usually targeting ports or industry.
- Moving to China (supply permitted) the strikes went against Japanese warehouses and river traffic in interdiction roles with first attacks on Japanese/Manchurian industry targets

Only in 1945 it started to be really a strategic bombing campaign:
- With B-29s moved to Marianas the real "strategic bombing campaign" had really begun targeting industry in Japan. Some missions were flown for support of fleet/amphib invasions like Formosa and Kyushu airfields for Okinawa campaign support.
- B-24s continued their work on air superiority/interdiction campaigns - striking airfields, ports, railways, bridges, warehouses, and other targets... but still usually in 1-2 group size packages - or about 48 heavies for single target (Actually I am laughing and crying at the same time when I see an AAR where 400 heavy bombers are bombing some troops in the middle of jungle, or hitting some small island).

So in the Pacific terms - strategic campaign really was not really the option until late 1944 with first B-29s arriving. Up to that date it was mainly survival (1942) and air superiority/interdiction campaigns - or what one could call "tactical targets". Or in the game terms - strike airfields and ports until you get some real strategic targets into range.

Sources: Air Force Historical Studies:
http://www.afhra.af.mil/studies/numbere ... tudies.asp

If I recall Kenny found some of his heavy bomber units to be so worn down that the only solution he could see was to disband them and send them home.
Yup...
For example two of the first groups engaged in combat - 19th and 7th.

7th BG left its worn out bombers to 19th BG and was moved to India.
In India 7th BG operated as a composite group with:
11th Bomb Squadron being equipped with B-25s detached to China Air Task Force
22nd Bomb Squadron being also equipped with B-25s
88th Recon Squadron (renamed 436th BS) with Liberators
93rd Bomb Squadron with Liberators.

19th BG left Australia for Continental US to be reestablished as training formation and later a B-29 unit leaving its worn out bombers to 43rd BG.

There was just one theatre worse on replacement planes, pilots, spare parts, replacements, manpower shortages, equipment shortages and long line of communications than SWPAC - and that was SEAC ...

Even in 1944 Kenney (and Tenth AF) has to keep large number of pilots (and yet more ground personnel) in the combat zone that had much more flying hours/months than was set by a rotation policy for that theatre - which was much severe than a rotation policy in England.

Also often the actual strength of their commands were calculated by planes "on hand" + "in repairs" + "being worked over for purpose of theatre" + "maintenance workshops" + "en route" + "assigned" ... giving actual combat strength of about 1/4-1/3 of total numbers as maintenance could take weeks, planes en route could be diverted or lost and those assigned, well they were still somewhere in the US eating pancakes for breakfast :) So when commander was asking for more planes, he was told: "But you have the allotted strength already".

Yet some air groups had to be kept in reserve, some were fresh arrivals needing indoctrination in theatre procedures, some had to undergo training, or (the lucky ones) reequipping with planes. Also newly graduated officers just arriving from states were given commands over old hands in the theatre not really helping morale.

Now in the game one just had to load some airgroup in CONUS, sail it down to Australia, fill it with whatever planes and pilots you can lay hands on and hurray to bomb some poor Jap base... Actually getting an outfit ready for combat took months![8|]
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Yaab
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RE: Ports, airfields - strategic targets?

Post by Yaab »

Barb, many thanks for the info!

Seems I have more luck in keeping my B-17s flying than in the real life. I can create spare parts and AvSup squads from the asbtracted supply and keep faster tempo of bombing operations.
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RE: Ports, airfields - strategic targets?

Post by obvert »

ORIGINAL: Barb

Only in 1945 it started to be really a strategic bombing campaign:
- With B-29s moved to Marianas the real "strategic bombing campaign" had really begun targeting industry in Japan. Some missions were flown for support of fleet/amphib invasions like Formosa and Kyushu airfields for Okinawa campaign support.
- B-24s continued their work on air superiority/interdiction campaigns - striking airfields, ports, railways, bridges, warehouses, and other targets... but still usually in 1-2 group size packages - or about 48 heavies for single target (Actually I am laughing and crying at the same time when I see an AAR where 400 heavy bombers are bombing some troops in the middle of jungle, or hitting some small island).

So in the Pacific terms - strategic campaign really was not really the option until late 1944 with first B-29s arriving. Up to that date it was mainly survival (1942) and air superiority/interdiction campaigns - or what one could call "tactical targets". Or in the game terms - strike airfields and ports until you get some real strategic targets into range.

Sources: Air Force Historical Studies:
http://www.afhra.af.mil/studies/numbere ... tudies.asp

Imagine if you were playing the game from the other side! I've done quite a bit of crying but not much laughing. [;)]

From late 42 on both my opponents have massed all that they could onto big well-supported fields and sent huge waves of 4Es, usually with 2Es mixed in to take advantage of their immensely overrated defensive fire. First 150+, then in 43 up to 300+, then in 44-45 up to 400+.

What can they do? It's the Allies best weapon in game and with this mass you can take out any base, hit every ship in any port, or knock out ALL of the industry of most bases. Should they not do it?

I've read a bit about 4E bombing in the CBI in detail, and raids were usually under 30 planes until late 43. As you mentioned there simply were not enough frames, supplies, parts personnel and other support including aircrews. In Burma they did bomb the sports and rail yards a lot, with some airfields mixed in occasionally.

In game though it works, it's allowed without great penalties, and it's tough to stop. The only method is massing defensive CAP in a very small area and leaving the rest to it's fate. That and a lot of taunting, swearing and aggressive posturing. [:D]
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RE: Ports, airfields - strategic targets?

Post by AW1Steve »

ORIGINAL: obvert

ORIGINAL: Barb

Only in 1945 it started to be really a strategic bombing campaign:
- With B-29s moved to Marianas the real "strategic bombing campaign" had really begun targeting industry in Japan. Some missions were flown for support of fleet/amphib invasions like Formosa and Kyushu airfields for Okinawa campaign support.
- B-24s continued their work on air superiority/interdiction campaigns - striking airfields, ports, railways, bridges, warehouses, and other targets... but still usually in 1-2 group size packages - or about 48 heavies for single target (Actually I am laughing and crying at the same time when I see an AAR where 400 heavy bombers are bombing some troops in the middle of jungle, or hitting some small island).

So in the Pacific terms - strategic campaign really was not really the option until late 1944 with first B-29s arriving. Up to that date it was mainly survival (1942) and air superiority/interdiction campaigns - or what one could call "tactical targets". Or in the game terms - strike airfields and ports until you get some real strategic targets into range.

Sources: Air Force Historical Studies:
http://www.afhra.af.mil/studies/numbere ... tudies.asp

Imagine if you were playing the game from the other side! I've done quite a bit of crying but not much laughing. [;)]

From late 42 on both my opponents have massed all that they could onto big well-supported fields and sent huge waves of 4Es, usually with 2Es mixed in to take advantage of their immensely overrated defensive fire. First 150+, then in 43 up to 300+, then in 44-45 up to 400+.

What can they do? It's the Allies best weapon in game and with this mass you can take out any base, hit every ship in any port, or knock out ALL of the industry of most bases. Should they not do it?

I've read a bit about 4E bombing in the CBI in detail, and raids were usually under 30 planes until late 43. As you mentioned there simply were not enough frames, supplies, parts personnel and other support including aircrews. In Burma they did bomb the sports and rail yards a lot, with some airfields mixed in occasionally.

In game though it works, it's allowed without great penalties, and it's tough to stop. The only method is massing defensive CAP in a very small area and leaving the rest to it's fate. That and a lot of taunting, swearing and aggressive posturing. [:D]


It's allowed because in the game you are the "grand-poo-bah". All allied forces get along , work together , and don't try to steal each others resources. This is balanced by the fact that the IJN and the IJA work together hand in glove. When in reality they would rather fight each other than the allies. The big problem is that the game works....reality didn't. [:D]
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Barb
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Location: Bratislava, Slovakia

RE: Ports, airfields - strategic targets?

Post by Barb »

As a grand-poo-bah for Allies or Japan, you still can create environment where such strikes would be at least limited.

1) Do not overbuild/overstack airfields - single Base Force on a size 5 airfield is all you need to base a heavy bomber group
2) Try to pair Base Forces with flying units - 3rd BG operates from airfield where 3rd Base Force is present, etc (it is harder to organize as some units change names, or base force numbers do not fit - but it is an extra challenge), as well as operating Army planes with army base forces units and Naval Planes with naval base forces in support.
3) Do not concentrate every bomber on a single lvl 9 airfield - because you will need every single fighter to defend the base creating just that mass everyone should avoid.
4) Assign single bomber group per target (and fighter group in support) at max. After all, air strikes should change the battlefield in chirurgical way, not roller-type-way...
5) Try flying only when weather is reported good (either in forecast, or over both home/target base) - this will lower both fatigue of pilots, planes, allow repairs, and slows tempo as well as keep operational losses to minimum.
6) Split enemy defence by striking several important targets in the same time frame
7) Avoid hitting enemy concentrations head-on - If you know enemy has 500+CAP over base A, hit base X that is 5 hexes distant
8) Create and use situations where enemy may be caught pants-down (like when he is LRCAPing important convoy, strike at his home base, or avoid hitting a base for weeks/months and then go for it.
9) Use passive defence for your advantage - spread over several smaller bases, your Air force is much harder to be taken off than if it is concentrated all in one airbase (imagine RAF based on just 2-3-4 airstrips alone! Every bombardiers wet dream!)
10) Use any kind of ruse, intel, cleverness, gutts, settings, altitudes, radars, detection levels, leaders ... everything to gain tactical advantage in the air combat (I know, numbers has quality of their own, but you can achieve wonders even at odds and with minimum strength).

One example from my recent PBEM:
January 1942 - 19th BG had retreated to Java (size 4 AF), all squadrons flying B-17Ds. Enemy is escorting his convoy to Palembang with closest air base at Singkawang. Lot of ships are spotted in size 1 port. Forecast says clear, enemy should have most fighters flying LRCAP, as Singapore airfield is fully operational. 17 B-17Ds took of from Java, got over Singkawang at 15.000ft, not a single japanese plane in the air, took CAREFULL aim and let go 68x500lb bombs...

Of these 7 strike damaged Kumano (which ate two torps fired by O-19 the turn before) - 8 other hits various targets: Landing Barge, Submarine, Minelayer, several cargo ships. 2 more bombs hit jetty area and two more put some fires on presumed fuel tanks - that is 19 hits total.

Perfect strike [X(] changing the battlefield in a chirurgical way - all B-17s are back home safely without a single bullet hole in their skins, enemy will surely get some CAP over the base for the next turn limiting available LRCAP over Palembang invasion force (creating opportunity for me), Kumano will take months to repair, and I have to find at least 17 DSMs for all those "Chuck Norrises" serving as bombardiers while they are given rest for next turn... [:D]
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