Semi OT - A Couple of Observations on the Pacific War

[wdolson]

Zuikaku translated means Fortunate Crane. Shokaku means Happy Crane. As long as the Shokaku was afloat, the Fortunate Crane never took any damage, despite many fights. The first time the Zuikaku was hit was a few hours after the Shokaku sank.

Osprey has many series of books on war subjects. One of them is the Duel series which documents battles between some type of equipment like Sherman vs Panther or P-51 vs Fw-190. One of the books in the series is about IJN CVs vs USN CVs in 1942. I've also been reading about the Battle of the Philippine Sea (there isn't really that much written about it even though it was the biggest carrier duel in history).

A couple of things struck me as a pattern. Except for one really lucky 5 minutes in June 1942, the USN was not great at offense though they played defense better than any navy in history. Except for Midway, the 42 carrier battles were mostly draws to slight Japanese victories, though strategically the US won them all because the Japanese failed to achieve any of their strategic objectives. The US was able to damage a number of IJN CVs, but only sank a couple of small ones. The IJN was usually able to get the first strike or got a simultaneous blow in. The Shokaku was a bomb magnet, but the Zuikaku got off with essentially no damage. The IJN sank 3 CVs in carrier battles and one more by subs. The Yorktown, Enterprise, and Saratoga all took damage but were able to get at least one more fight out of them. Excellent USN damage control saved many ships that otherwise would have been lost.

Between improving CAP and massive AA, the USN was ever more capable of shredding incoming attacks. This culminated in the Battle of the Philippine Sea where the USN carrier aircraft did very little damage to the KB, but essentially took out everything thrown against them. If it hadn't been for two USN subs getting the shot of a lifetime the three IJN fleet CVs in the battle may have escaped with only damage. At that point in the war the US had overwhelming air power, but bad planning only allowed one decent sized, but hardly decisive, strike against the IJN.

A few months later the USN carrier planes had a golden opportunity to close the deal on the IJN's battleships. They got the Musashi, but left the rest to come through the San Bernardino Strait and cause havoc with Taffy 3. By 1944 the Avenger crews were either untrained or very rusty at torpedo work and it showed. They sank the Hiyo in the Philippine Sea battle, but they over concentrated on the Musashi and let the rest escape.

The next day they did annihilate the remainder of the KB, but the KB had been staked out for the slaughter. It's primary role in the battle was to draw TF 38 away from the beachhead, which it did.

Of course by 1944 the Japanese were bad at both offense and defense, but in 1942 they were excellent at offense, though not that great at defense. Even early war the US had a doctrine of mutual air defense that the Japanese took awhile to adopt. By late 42 the upgrading of AA defenses and incorporating lessons learned started showing. The committing of the KB's air groups to the Solomons combined with excellent US defense tactics worked to dull the IJN's offensive capability down to very little.

One more observation, early war IJN sub doctrine had the subs deployed ahead of the main fleet with the intention of sinking some of the enemies ships and thinning it down the day before the major battle. Ironically that is what happened in the Battle of the Philippine Sea, though they were on the receiving end. The US didn't have that doctrine, but they happened to place their subs in the perfect spot to pick off a couple of Japan's most valuable ships early in the battle.

Just some things that have been kicking around in my head lately.

Bill

[dr.hal]

Very interesting observations indeed Bill, thanks for sharing. What do you say to those that indicate a contrary view of the Japanese ability to conduct offensive operations after their initial prewar planned wins? There is the view that such plans were in fact foundationally flawed. I allude to the vastly overcomplicated plan on both Midway and the Alaska domain. They repeatedly made plans that were impossibly complicated and relied upon the enemy (USA) doing what the Japanese figured they would do (which flies in the face of the dictum that if you plan on your enemy to do a dozen things, he is almost assured to do the 13th). This is not only true for Midway but for a number of engagements including the largest, the battle of Leyete Gulf. This tendency doesn't seem to suggest a very good understanding and execution of an offensive doctrine. As I recall "Shattered Sword" was notably critical of the Midway plan for these reasons. Thoughts?

[wdolson]

There are two levels here strategic and tactical. Once the Japanese had run through their pre-war playbook they had a lot of problems strategically. Tactically they remained very capable until the end of 1942 and into 1943. Midway was strategically a very bad plan, but the strikes from the Hiryu on the Yorktown were outstanding. Ultimately they were essentially suicide missions, but both strikes scored.

My point was more about the tactical skill of the individual crews than the strategic planning.

Another little tidbit of history, the US had a Japanese translator listening in on the Japanese aerial frequencies during the Battle of the Philippine Sea. The crews were so poorly trained the strike commander had to micromanage every element and it gave the Americans the tactical playbook. At the end of the strikes the strike commander was still out there alone and beginning to turn for his carrier when someone suggested that they send some fighters to get him. Mitchner vetoed that idea saying that the guy helped the USN so much that day he should be allowed to live and help them another day.

Bill

[dr.hal]

Well that helps my understand where your post was going. I was thinking more along the strategic lines. Yes Hiryu's strike was very well executed given the relatively few aircraft actually in the strike! One can only imagine if the timing was reversed, if all four had gotten a punch in. One of the interesting "what ifs". And yes, I have heard about that fellow in the Philippine Sea engagement!

[Nami Koshino]

ORIGINAL: wdolson

Zuikaku translated means Fortunate Crane. Shokaku means Happy Crane. As long as the Shokaku was afloat, the Fortunate Crane never took any damage, despite many fights. The first time the Zuikaku was hit was a few hours after the Shokaku sank.

It is alleged that Nimitz referred to them as "those two ships" with the same sour tone that Robert E. Lee used to refer the Union armies as "those people."

Certainly one strand that connects most Japanese carrier operations is inept damage control. Taiho seemed like a ship built to withstand multiple torpedo hits but didn't survive one.

[John 3rd]

ORIGINAL: dr.hal

Well that helps my understand where your post was going. I was thinking more along the strategic lines. Yes Hiryu's strike was very well executed given the relatively few aircraft actually in the strike! One can only imagine if the timing was reversed, if all four had gotten a punch in. One of the interesting "what ifs". And yes, I have heard about that fellow in the Philippine Sea engagement!

Shattered Sword lays out one very interesting 'what if' in that Akagi was basically sunk by only ONE bomb hit. Three SBD sink the Flagship of the Kido Butai. AMAZING! The 'what if' to me concerns Akagi still being in the fight. IF those SBDs had followed doctrine and attacked with the rest of their unit, Akagi AND Hiryu would have been able to launch. Instead of 6 Zero and 18 Vals you have 15 Zero, 18 Val, and 21 Kate. My bet is Yorktown doesn't survive that attack and the Japanese air crews are far less attrited. It then goes to 2 vs 2.

Roll it from there...

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: John 3rd

ORIGINAL: dr.hal

Well that helps my understand where your post was going. I was thinking more along the strategic lines. Yes Hiryu's strike was very well executed given the relatively few aircraft actually in the strike! One can only imagine if the timing was reversed, if all four had gotten a punch in. One of the interesting "what ifs". And yes, I have heard about that fellow in the Philippine Sea engagement!

Shattered Sword lays out one very interesting 'what if' in that Akagi was basically sunk by only ONE bomb hit. Three SBD sink the Flagship of the Kido Butai. AMAZING! The 'what if' to me concerns Akagi still being in the fight. IF those SBDs had followed doctrine and attacked with the rest of their unit, Akagi AND Hiryu would have been able to launch. Instead of 6 Zero and 18 Vals you have 15 Zero, 18 Val, and 21 Kate. My bet is Yorktown doesn't survive that attack and the Japanese air crews are far less attrited. It then goes to 2 vs 2.

Roll it from there...

Actually doctrine was for the two SBD squadrons to attack separate carriers, and those three aircraft aborted on the first target when they realized that the next carrier was being left without service. They were the ones who followed doctrine!

The (I believe it was) Yorktown's dive bombers were a different matter. One group was held back in case other IJN carriers were spotted (IIRC they thought only two had been sighted when the strike was launched. If that second DB squadron from Yorktown had been launched, then there would have been a squadron for each of the four IJN carriers.

[wdolson]

Dick Best had quite possibly one of the greatest highs and lows someone can experience. He is the one who planted the 1000 lber in the middle of the deck on the Akagi. Later that day he also put a bomb into the Hiryu. Probably the only pilot to ever hit two carriers in the same day.

That night he started coughing up blood. Problems with his oxygen system caused permanent damage to his lungs and he never flew again. He was put on limited duty and medically retired in 1944.

If Commander Best had not been grounded and continued to fly, he would almost certainly become a CAG soon after Midway and would have been leading an air group in the late 42 battles, which may have made a difference in some of the late 42 battles.

So many "what ifs". Another "what if" is what would have happened if one of the attacks on the Yorktown didn't happen. It took two air strikes and a submarine to sink her. She would probably have survived the battle and rejoined the fight later in 1942.

Yet another would have been if the Japanese had been flexible enough to combine the Shokaku and Zuikaku air groups aboard the Zuikaku after coral Sea and sent her to Midway. That would have given the Japanese 5 CVs.

Bill

[KenchiSulla]

The fun part is - it shows in the game itself as well. Just sandbox a carrier clash a couple of times, you'll never have the same outcome...

[moore4807]

I'm always amazed after reading all those books on USN and Japanese theories and tactics, is that playing this game I've never been able to have a game be historical the same way as IRL, despite the painstaking detailed effort put into recreating the Pacific War...

The other amazing thing is what I've learned here from just reading the AAR's and forums, you guys (n gals) are a never ceasing fountain of information of things I've forgotten or never knew and I've read/studied this War for over 30 years! Very honored to be able to partake with you folks!

[Puhis]

ORIGINAL: wdolson


Yet another would have been if the Japanese had been flexible enough to combine the Shokaku and Zuikaku air groups aboard the Zuikaku after coral Sea and sent her to Midway. That would have given the Japanese 5 CVs.

Bill

Even without Zuikaku, Japan could have had 2 separate carrier TF: KB and 3 smaller and slower carriers. Zuiho was already part of Midway Force, and Ryujo and Junyo were part of Aleutian Force. Those 3 carriers had 36 Zeros, 14 Vals and 30 Kates, planes worth 1.5 big CV.

To me that's most interesting what if.

[SuluSea]

ORIGINAL: wdolson

Zuikaku translated means Fortunate Crane. Shokaku means Happy Crane. As long as the Shokaku was afloat, the Fortunate Crane never took any damage, despite many fights. The first time the Zuikaku was hit was a few hours after the Shokaku sank.

Osprey has many series of books on war subjects. One of them is the Duel series which documents battles between some type of equipment like Sherman vs Panther or P-51 vs Fw-190. One of the books in the series is about IJN CVs vs USN CVs in 1942. I've also been reading about the Battle of the Philippine Sea (there isn't really that much written about it even though it was the biggest carrier duel in history).

A couple of things struck me as a pattern. Except for one really lucky 5 minutes in June 1942, the USN was not great at offense though they played defense better than any navy in history. Except for Midway, the 42 carrier battles were mostly draws to slight Japanese victories, though strategically the US won them all because the Japanese failed to achieve any of their strategic objectives. The US was able to damage a number of IJN CVs, but only sank a couple of small ones. The IJN was usually able to get the first strike or got a simultaneous blow in. The Shokaku was a bomb magnet, but the Zuikaku got off with essentially no damage. The IJN sank 3 CVs in carrier battles and one more by subs. The Yorktown, Enterprise, and Saratoga all took damage but were able to get at least one more fight out of them. Excellent USN damage control saved many ships that otherwise would have been lost.

Between improving CAP and massive AA, the USN was ever more capable of shredding incoming attacks. This culminated in the Battle of the Philippine Sea where the USN carrier aircraft did very little damage to the KB, but essentially took out everything thrown against them. If it hadn't been for two USN subs getting the shot of a lifetime the three IJN fleet CVs in the battle may have escaped with only damage. At that point in the war the US had overwhelming air power, but bad planning only allowed one decent sized, but hardly decisive, strike against the IJN.

A few months later the USN carrier planes had a golden opportunity to close the deal on the IJN's battleships. They got the Musashi, but left the rest to come through the San Bernardino Strait and cause havoc with Taffy 3. By 1944 the Avenger crews were either untrained or very rusty at torpedo work and it showed. They sank the Hiyo in the Philippine Sea battle, but they over concentrated on the Musashi and let the rest escape.

The next day they did annihilate the remainder of the KB, but the KB had been staked out for the slaughter. It's primary role in the battle was to draw TF 38 away from the beachhead, which it did.

Of course by 1944 the Japanese were bad at both offense and defense, but in 1942 they were excellent at offense, though not that great at defense. Even early war the US had a doctrine of mutual air defense that the Japanese took awhile to adopt. By late 42 the upgrading of AA defenses and incorporating lessons learned started showing. The committing of the KB's air groups to the Solomons combined with excellent US defense tactics worked to dull the IJN's offensive capability down to very little.

One more observation, early war IJN sub doctrine had the subs deployed ahead of the main fleet with the intention of sinking some of the enemies ships and thinning it down the day before the major battle. Ironically that is what happened in the Battle of the Philippine Sea, though they were on the receiving end. The US didn't have that doctrine, but they happened to place their subs in the perfect spot to pick off a couple of Japan's most valuable ships early in the battle.

Just some things that have been kicking around in my head lately.

Bill

I enjoyed reading your thoughts as always Bill. Just to add regarding submarines Darter and Dace fired the first shots during the Battle of Leyte Gulf when worked over Kurita's force at Palawan Passage sinking Maya, Atago and damaging Takao enough to remove herself from the action.

I never heard that story on Dick Best, Thanks![:)]

[Apollo11]

Hi all,

Nice Bill! [:)]


BTW, for long time I thought about re-asking the following (and it is quite connected to this thread):


Are there any statistical analysis of gunnery performance (day and night) in WWII Pacific for both sides?


For example we know that Japanese fleet did rather poor at the daylight "Battle off Samar" and did rather good at night "Battle of Savo Island".

But were those exceptions to the rule or the norm?


Also, it seems that in almost all crucial battles Japanese lost their courage / determination at crucial point when some serious damage might have been possible against rather defenseless US transports (and even when extremely heavy cost by sacrifice of other elements was paid by IJN to put striking force is such position)...


Leo "Apollo11"

[Bo Rearguard]

ORIGINAL: Apollo11

For example we know that Japanese fleet did rather poor at the daylight "Battle off Samar" and did rather good at night "Battle of Savo Island".

But were those exceptions to the rule or the norm?

Sometimes it's difficult to believe that the Japanese Navy that fought at Leyte Gulf was the same institution which ran riot in the Pacific in 1941 and '42. Perhaps because of all the reverses in-between it wasn't anymore. At Leyte Gulf the commanders of Japan's greatest warships revealed stunning ineptitude. Their ship recognition skills were shockingly poor, their tactics primitive, their gunnery woeful, their spirit feeble. None of this diminishes the American achievement at Samar, but it does give rise to the bafflement of naval history.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Apollo11

Hi all,

Nice Bill! [:)]


BTW, for long time I thought about re-asking the following (and it is quite connected to this thread):


Are there any statistical analysis of gunnery performance (day and night) in WWII Pacific for both sides?


For example we know that Japanese fleet did rather poor at the daylight "Battle off Samar" and did rather good at night "Battle of Savo Island".

But were those exceptions to the rule or the norm?


Also, it seems that in almost all crucial battles Japanese lost their courage / determination at crucial point when some serious damage might have been possible against rather defenseless US transports (and even when extremely heavy cost by sacrifice of other elements was paid by IJN to put striking force is such position)...


Leo "Apollo11"

warspite1

Have a read of the last battle of the USS Edsall - that will tell you something about Japanese gunnery.

[John 3rd]

I Posted this in another Thread and felt it also applied to the present discussion:


Our conduct on this forum is TRIBUTE to the positive side of wargaming. RESPECT and KNOWLEDGE are more prevalent here then anywhere I have taught. There are discussion here regarding strategy and tactics that would never be approached in a Masters/Doctoral History Program. Simply put: I love it here.

How many have absolutely DREADED but could not wait to open a turn when you have a big op underway? How many need to take some valium to calm down after a horrific Carrier Battle? How many have let loose a REBEL YELL (In honor of our FINE Southern Gentleman) or a shout of triumph when that first bomb or TT hits their opponent's CV? NOTHING can match that in games I have played when younger.

CRAP like TMTSNBN is what leads to all sorts of horrific misunderstandings and prejudice. It does not foster respect and knowledge whatsoever.

My .02...

[desicat]

Have a read of the last battle of the USS Edsall - that will tell you something about Japanese gunnery.

Clicking on a link to the fate of the USS Edsall is well worth the time.

[Quixote]

ORIGINAL: desicat

Have a read of the last battle of the USS Edsall - that will tell you something about Japanese gunnery.

Clicking on a link to the fate of the USS Edsall is well worth the time.

Japanese attempts to hit a target as fast, nimble, and (apparently) well-handled as Edsall, especially given the ranges discussed in this brief article, shouldn't constitute much of a basis for evaluating overall Japanese gunnery effectiveness.

On the other hand, if you were evaluating writing skill, this could well be the worst article by a "noted historian" that I've ever seen. The dozen or more mistakes made in the first two pages alone tend to badly detract from whatever validity this article might otherwise have had...

Brave action by the Edsall, but a painful read.

[topeverest]

All wars and every battle have those tantalizing potential turns that easily could have changed the outcome of a battle or war. IMHO, perhaps the biggest what if in 42 beyond bagging two CV's at Pearl is if the empire employed the KB as a whole force into the carrier battles in 42. Any student of Midway has to severely fault the empire for failing to search out the American fleet. I've often thought Santa Anna's colossal blunder of not posting sentries at San Jacinto is the same kind of blunder. Only not as bad. Not four weeks before Midway, the American carriers were there when the empire launched their attack. really a rookie mistake at midway over and above the force dispersion (vs force concentration)

Certainly Yamamoto had every opportunity to deal a fatal blow to the American CV's in 42.

[crsutton]

ORIGINAL: topeverest

All wars and every battle have those tantalizing potential turns that easily could have changed the outcome of a battle or war. IMHO, perhaps the biggest what if in 42 beyond bagging two CV's at Pearl is if the empire employed the KB as a whole force into the carrier battles in 42. Any student of Midway has to severely fault the empire for failing to search out the American fleet. I've often thought Santa Anna's colossal blunder of not posting sentries at San Jacinto is the same kind of blunder. Only not as bad. Not four weeks before Midway, the American carriers were there when the empire launched their attack. really a rookie mistake at midway over and above the force dispersion (vs force concentration)

Certainly Yamamoto had every opportunity to deal a fatal blow to the American CV's in 42.

What-ifs as far as any battle went are fine and fun to speculate on, but there really was no what-if about the final outcome of the war. Even if the US lost all of it's carriers and half of the fleet to Japan the eventual outcome of the war could never have been in doubt no matter the early reverses inflicted on the US. Japan could never touch the US in any significant strategic manner and eventually the US would have outproduced and out scienced Japan. Even in the worse case scenario where Japan forces the US to an armistice, (highly unlikely) the incompatibility of two two diametrically opposing systems would have eventually led back to war and Japan's destruction.