Oberst_Klink
Posts: 785
Joined: 2/10/2008
From: Germany
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Well, an interesting thought. There are 'What-if' variants, e.g. Guderian thought the whole operation 'Wacht am Rhein' was ridiculous and that the forces should be used to clear the salient or at least 'stabilize' the Vistula front and perhaps link up with the trapped AG North in the Kurland pocket where AG North was trapped. One also could question 'Unternehmen Konrad' aka 'Frühlingserwachen' in Hungary with a much depleted 6ths SS Pz Armee after the Ardennes gamble.
I quote from Wiki; though I have read about Guderian's thoughts somewhere:
Impact on the Eastern Front
On the eve of the Soviet Vistula–Oder Offensive, in January 1945, the Red Army had an impressive force of 1,670,000 soldiers, 28,360 artillery guns and heavy mortars, over a thousand Katyusha rocket launchers, 3,300 armored fighting vehicles and nearly 3,000 aircraft.[124] Against this, two out of five army groups positioned on the Eastern Front, Army Group Center and Army Group A, lay in the path of the Soviet offensive; together, they could count on roughly 980,000 personnel, 1,800 armored fighting vehicles, and nearly 900 combat aircraft.[125] During December 1944 the Wehrmacht had concentrated the bulk of its mechanized forces and logistical support on the Western Front, reducing its ability to defend Germany's eastern border from the Soviet Union.[126] For example, 2,299 new and refitted tanks had been delivered to the Western Front by December 1944, while German forces in the East had only received approximately 920.[127] In January 1945 the Wehrmacht was roughly 800,000 men short of complete strength, despite the reorganization of German units in order to take into consideration manpower losses, much if its strength used for the Ardennes Offensive.[128]
This was made clear to the German Armed Forces' high command when General Heinz Guderian presented them with intelligence on the impending Soviet assault, and on a comparison of strength; the German general claimed that the Red Army had an advantage of eleven to one in infantry, seven to one in armor and twenty to one in artillery.[129] It was then mentioned that the defense of the Eastern Front would require the redeployment of armored divisions from the Ardennes.[130] In fact, von Rundstedt had asked for the Ardennes Offensive to be called off on 22 December 1944, in favor of reorienting Germany's armored strength to the East, but this was flatly refused by Hitler.[131] The offensive against American forces in the Ardennes forest had preoccupied Hitler's mind, and the Eastern Front had suddenly become of secondary importance to the Wehrmacht High Command[132] For example, the Sixth Panzer Army would not be transferred to the Eastern Front until 16 January 1945.[133]
Klink, Oberst
P.S. Red Storm on the Reich was the book, as well as others.
Not involved in the planning of Operation 'Wacht am Rhein
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< Message edited by Oberst_Klink -- 5/14/2013 3:52:25 AM >
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