Whatever this is - John says it's something between Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 - but I'm not sure, I still think he's lagging on what you'd expect to see from the way of Japanese conquests at this stage of the game.
I haven't seen body counts in my AAR. Have I missed them?
As for a "linking construct," I don't understand. Allied strategy has been linked since the beginning of the game. Perhaps I'm just not laying it out clearly, but every single move has been done with a purpose - looking both to the future and in an effort to take advantage of John's proclivities.
Aluetians operations in early '42 were done to prompt John's concerns in NoPac. I thinkit worked.
Gilberts in early June was done to free up the Ramree operation (or, if John went the other way by focusing on Ramree, the Allies would concentrate on the Gilberts).
The Gilberts opened up the move on Carnavon/Exmouth, which had mixed results. This was mainly to heighten John's concern over Oz so that I can use it as an effective feinting target later.
While John worked hard on Luganville, Gilberts and NoPac, the Allies beefed up things at Ramree and Assam.
Now I'm hoping to goad John into moving into the Bay of Bengal in a big way, since I've tried to set it up as an effective fighting theater and since that might open up opportunities elsewhere (the Aleutians was my hope, though that may be stillborn).
The ultimate objective for the Allies is to move east from Burma and west through CenPac. That might change as circumstances warrant, but that's been the goal since the start of the game.
The Allied moves are as complimentary to these objectives as possible, so I don't understand the point Crackaces is making.
By body counts I mean loss of squads and platforms. The fact you are up 1,500 aircraft as an example does not link into victory conditions IMHO. The squad body count is mainly emphasized by the poultry man; however, Unless you sink CV's and even then I am not sure the count alone makes the difference, it's the ability to exploit that loss is far more important in my mind.
My comments on strategy was solely coming from my belief system, but it looks like to me you are doing an excellent job of tying down IJ resources and then look to exploit where the weakness shows, rather than have Burma has a primary front. That is because right now my understanding if Burma is going to be an axis of advance that one has to fight as soon as possible/practical in the clear terrain using 2E's in your case, rather than letting the IJ get jungle hexes that far forward. I think that is going to make Burma tougher to take in the light that it looks like the IJA plan to form a viable MLR that far forward .. .but it will tie up a lot of IJ troops.
My thoughts on a linking construct clearly come from my thought patterns. It is my thought that this game centers around two possibilites of victory. SCLS or Autovictory before Aug 1945. That is I try to extend my moves not only within the tactical realm but strategically into 1945. I also assume my opponent is seeing the world this way, but often this is a very bad assumption . So, in my naive mind I think the Allies every move needs to link to another move that links to eventual victory in 1945. So I tend to think AV in April 1945, to get there for example I might adopt a strategy that I need Cam Rahn Bay by 1944 with X victory points. To get to Cam Rahn Bay I need crush the IJ in the Irrawaddy Valley ...losing no more than 3 IJ to 1 Allied VP[including base/port/airfield, ship, airframe, and squad VP's], which leads to armor in Thailand and taking of Cam Rahn Bay by April 1944 cutting of the DEI with X number of VP advantage.
[I set a 3:1 for my Burma operations because I tend to get creamed in my CenPac/SoPac Operations .. trying to balance 2:1 by April 1945 ... My last game I got the 3:1 on Feb 25, 1944 ... Autovictory] ....
So in this case, your 1500 airframe advanatage you have been promoting has a 1500 VP advantage that links to ???? You have lost X number of troop points in the Pacific that has to be made up .. How? If the plan is to simply move thorugh Burma and CenPAC without a thought of VP costs .. a smart IJ player can come out on top in 1945. The Allies at the doorstep of Japan with just over 1:1 and no autovictory possible .... I am not sure John is capable of this ....So my comment on a lack of linking constructs. It might very well be in your head, and you just intutively have a gut feel of how things unfold. As a kibitzer I am trying to figure that out.
One thought I have and certainly players with far more experience than I disagree .. but I am getting more convinced everyday that the IJ must take less and have shortened perimeters that still defend critical VP's and sources of resources [oil, resources, & fuel] rather than to expand out to the point of almost achieving AV ... and then getting crushed at a single weak point of the Allies choosing ... I think the IJ needs a defense of depth that the IJN can react and punish .. taking Oz for example only extends LOC's for the eventual hammer ....
Laughter and tears are both responses to frustration and exhaustion. I myself prefer to laugh, since there is less cleaning up to do afterward. - Kurt Vonnegut