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RE: June 1944 - 3/19/2017 8:24:23 PM   
Lowpe

 

Posts: 14355
Joined: 2/25/2013
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Anachro

7.4.2.3 KAMIKAZES

Once a squadron is converted to Kamikaze, it may only conduct three Mission types – Kamikaze, Training, and Stand Down. The Kamikaze Mission is a variant of the Naval Attack Mission, which of course if successful means unit casualties.


Not true!

I have used them as escorts and CAP and they do fly. I had hoped they were more likely to ram P47 and B24...alas it didn't seem to work.

(in reply to Anachro)
Post #: 3601
RE: June 1944 - 3/20/2017 3:08:26 PM   
John 3rd


Posts: 15002
Joined: 9/8/2005
From: La Salle, Colorado
Status: online
June 8, 1944

A TK TF carrying 56,400 Fuel and 38,400 Oil departs Singapore.

The 1.0^10x6 very slowly moves westwards to Brunei/Miri. It is now near the Puerto Princesa.

Philippines
Over the skies of Luzon 105 Frank/George jump 22 P-38 and beat up that unit then the remaining 88 Japanese Fighters hit a formation of 45 B-29 at Manila. He is using the B-29s to continuously hit places in Luzon and I LIKE that! The net result is a loss of 12 P-38 and 18 B-29. Not bad for a days work.

An ID begins unloading at San Fernando. No contest there. Another ID, 4 more AA units, and supply will be unloading here in about 4 days. These shall be the last reinforcements for Luzon. We'll fight to delay and hold.

The recently laid MF at Batangas SINKS an American DD. NICE!

Pacific
A large convoy picks up an HQ, 2 big Base Forces, and 3 Engineering units at Rabaul. It will haul these bad boys to Saipan and then on from there.

Reinforcement/Supply convoys unloading at Iwo Jima, Naha, and Daito Soho.

Thailand
The roadblock at 57,56 (west of Rahaeng) continues to hold. A series of single unit attacks over the last six days (all very badly mauled by my boys) culminates in a full scale Deliberate Attack today. The result must really disappoint Dan. It is a 1-2 with Japan losing 1.050 Troops and 26 Guns for the Allies 932 Cas, 31 Guns, and 55 Vehicles.

A number of Infantry units are rebuilding in Bangkok currently. My one and ONLY ID has gone from an AV of 98 to over 300 in two weeks. Given another week, I can begin redeploying these units to build a real defensive line. We'll see if that happens.





_____________________________



Member: Treaty, Reluctant Admiral and Between the Storms Mod Team.

Reluctant Admiral Mod:
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(in reply to Lowpe)
Post #: 3602
RE: May 1944 - 3/21/2017 1:54:35 AM   
Mike Dubost

 

Posts: 248
Joined: 8/24/2008
From: Sacramento, CA
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: John 3rd


quote:

ORIGINAL: Aurorus


quote:

ORIGINAL: JohnDillworth

full stop. the complaint was that 4EB were not operationally used to bomb ground troops. John said he was fine with 2EB, but 4 EB should not be allowed. I called BS. 4EB can, and were, and should be, allowed to bomb troops. There track record is short...but it certainly happened to great effect.


Allied generals were concerned with the inaccuracy of the 4 engine bombers as close support bombers, not the effectiveness of 4 EBs on ground troops. Everyone acknowledged that they were very effective against ground troops.

That 4 EB were not used frequently against ground troops in WWII has more to do with allied strategic decisions than the aircraft capabiities. The allies chose to use them against airbases, railheads, and industry. There is no reason that an allied player in WiTP should be bound by this strategic decision, just as the Japanese player should not be forced to send 4 of his carriers half way across the Pacific blind in support of an invasion of an insignificant atoll.

In my opinion, the game engine handles all aspects of the airwar very well. That is just my opinion. If I did not think so, I would not enjoy the game.


Everyone points to the single big example of Cobra for 4EB. How about the massive 'friendly fire' casualties that happened in several the Bocage attacks there. Didn't the army lose a 3-Star General who went to watch and got killed when they bombed short?

Simple reality, as alluded to earlier, is that the game engine simply cannot handle it.

EX: June 5th Turn just run in Dan and I's game. A 32 plane Liberator attack at Batangas against troops in Sz-4 Forts, not moving, two AA units present, and CAP. Result: 1 Liberator shot down, 11 Damaged to AA/Fighters, and 404 Japanese Cas on the ground.




Well, at the risk of beating a dead horse, I would like to point out a fact that no one has mentioned yet. While it is true that Leslie McNair (the highest ranking American casualty of the ETO) was killed, this was partly due to the approach.
In his memoirs, General Bradley spoke about the friendly fire issue. His statement (note, I have not seen this in detail elsewhere, so be advised it is one credible source only) was that he had planned to have the bombers approach along the front. The Army Air Corps over-ruled him and insisted that it had to be perpendicular to the front. My recollection is that he stated that he never wanted to have another carpet bombing mission that came in perpendicular to the front, not necessarily no carpet bombing at all.
Please consider that when objecting to the example of Cobra. Could the planners of other missions have agreed to a perpendicular approach? Yes, possibly. Would it have made the bombing as effective as you see in game? I don't have enough knowledge of the technology of the time to say.

(in reply to John 3rd)
Post #: 3603
RE: May 1944 - 3/21/2017 2:03:33 AM   
Aurorus

 

Posts: 958
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Dubost

Well, at the risk of beating a dead horse, I would like to point out a fact that no one has mentioned yet. While it is true that Leslie McNair (the highest ranking American casualty of the ETO) was killed, this was partly due to the approach.
In his memoirs, General Bradley spoke about the friendly fire issue. His statement (note, I have not seen this in detail elsewhere, so be advised it is one credible source only) was that he had planned to have the bombers approach along the front. The Army Air Corps over-ruled him and insisted that it had to be perpendicular to the front. My recollection is that he stated that he never wanted to have another carpet bombing mission that came in perpendicular to the front, not necessarily no carpet bombing at all.
Please consider that when objecting to the example of Cobra. Could the planners of other missions have agreed to a perpendicular approach? Yes, possibly. Would it have made the bombing as effective as you see in game? I don't have enough knowledge of the technology of the time to say.




As I mentioned, Cobra is probably not comparable for a number of reasons, especially in that in Cobra the 4 EBs were used in close support. Using 4 EBs to bomb rear echelon positions, which is more comparable to what John experienced here, was commonplace in the Asian theater, especially in Burma, and the casualty estimates that the WiTP is generating are very much in line with those reported in these types of missions.

The allies did not do this more frequently, because they used the 4 EBs more frequently to establish air superiority by hitting Japanese airfields. That is also why the allies did not make a habit of losing 18 B-29s in one raid to 100 Japanese fighters. There is a tradeoff for all things. If the allies want to use their 4 EBs to attack ground troops and not to establish air superiority, they must expect to take heavy 4 EB loses.

(in reply to Mike Dubost)
Post #: 3604
RE: May 1944 - 3/21/2017 2:23:20 AM   
MechFO

 

Posts: 402
Joined: 6/1/2007
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Dubost


quote:

ORIGINAL: John 3rd


quote:

ORIGINAL: Aurorus


quote:

ORIGINAL: JohnDillworth

full stop. the complaint was that 4EB were not operationally used to bomb ground troops. John said he was fine with 2EB, but 4 EB should not be allowed. I called BS. 4EB can, and were, and should be, allowed to bomb troops. There track record is short...but it certainly happened to great effect.


Allied generals were concerned with the inaccuracy of the 4 engine bombers as close support bombers, not the effectiveness of 4 EBs on ground troops. Everyone acknowledged that they were very effective against ground troops.

That 4 EB were not used frequently against ground troops in WWII has more to do with allied strategic decisions than the aircraft capabiities. The allies chose to use them against airbases, railheads, and industry. There is no reason that an allied player in WiTP should be bound by this strategic decision, just as the Japanese player should not be forced to send 4 of his carriers half way across the Pacific blind in support of an invasion of an insignificant atoll.

In my opinion, the game engine handles all aspects of the airwar very well. That is just my opinion. If I did not think so, I would not enjoy the game.


Everyone points to the single big example of Cobra for 4EB. How about the massive 'friendly fire' casualties that happened in several the Bocage attacks there. Didn't the army lose a 3-Star General who went to watch and got killed when they bombed short?

Simple reality, as alluded to earlier, is that the game engine simply cannot handle it.

EX: June 5th Turn just run in Dan and I's game. A 32 plane Liberator attack at Batangas against troops in Sz-4 Forts, not moving, two AA units present, and CAP. Result: 1 Liberator shot down, 11 Damaged to AA/Fighters, and 404 Japanese Cas on the ground.




Well, at the risk of beating a dead horse, I would like to point out a fact that no one has mentioned yet. While it is true that Leslie McNair (the highest ranking American casualty of the ETO) was killed, this was partly due to the approach.
In his memoirs, General Bradley spoke about the friendly fire issue. His statement (note, I have not seen this in detail elsewhere, so be advised it is one credible source only) was that he had planned to have the bombers approach along the front. The Army Air Corps over-ruled him and insisted that it had to be perpendicular to the front. My recollection is that he stated that he never wanted to have another carpet bombing mission that came in perpendicular to the front, not necessarily no carpet bombing at all.
Please consider that when objecting to the example of Cobra. Could the planners of other missions have agreed to a perpendicular approach? Yes, possibly. Would it have made the bombing as effective as you see in game? I don't have enough knowledge of the technology of the time to say.



That was Bradley whitewashing. Army (meaning Bradley) was pushing for extremely close safety distances, a mile or so. Air Force wanted 5, ended up compromising on 2 or 3. Perpendicular probably would have been worse because it made navigation much more difficult.

In practice CAS FB's etc. did try to fly perpendicular, but usual problems of accurate air navigation, target identification etc. meant even they caused FF.

In the end the got it right with QUEEN, but that was with much bigger safety distances and again, marginal results for considering the resources invested.

(in reply to Mike Dubost)
Post #: 3605
RE: May 1944 - 3/21/2017 2:27:56 AM   
MechFO

 

Posts: 402
Joined: 6/1/2007
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Aurorus


quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Dubost

Well, at the risk of beating a dead horse, I would like to point out a fact that no one has mentioned yet. While it is true that Leslie McNair (the highest ranking American casualty of the ETO) was killed, this was partly due to the approach.
In his memoirs, General Bradley spoke about the friendly fire issue. His statement (note, I have not seen this in detail elsewhere, so be advised it is one credible source only) was that he had planned to have the bombers approach along the front. The Army Air Corps over-ruled him and insisted that it had to be perpendicular to the front. My recollection is that he stated that he never wanted to have another carpet bombing mission that came in perpendicular to the front, not necessarily no carpet bombing at all.
Please consider that when objecting to the example of Cobra. Could the planners of other missions have agreed to a perpendicular approach? Yes, possibly. Would it have made the bombing as effective as you see in game? I don't have enough knowledge of the technology of the time to say.




As I mentioned, Cobra is probably not comparable for a number of reasons, especially in that in Cobra the 4 EBs were used in close support. Using 4 EBs to bomb rear echelon positions, which is more comparable to what John experienced here, was commonplace in the Asian theater, especially in Burma, and the casualty estimates that the WiTP is generating are very much in line with those reported in these types of missions.

The allies did not do this more frequently, because they used the 4 EBs more frequently to establish air superiority by hitting Japanese airfields. That is also why the allies did not make a habit of losing 18 B-29s in one raid to 100 Japanese fighters. There is a tradeoff for all things. If the allies want to use their 4 EBs to attack ground troops and not to establish air superiority, they must expect to take heavy 4 EB loses.


Your "source" being a straight reprint of period dispatches without any cross checking or correlating. Rule of thumb, divide reported losses by a factor of anything from 3 to 10 to reach something that might be accurate. And that's for relatively easily counted items such as AFV's or planes.

Casualty figures by their nature are even harder to count so the range of mistakes will probably be even higher.

(in reply to Aurorus)
Post #: 3606
RE: May 1944 - 3/21/2017 2:31:04 AM   
John 3rd


Posts: 15002
Joined: 9/8/2005
From: La Salle, Colorado
Status: online
Thanks for remembering that it was Leslie McNair. Could not remember his name whatsoever. Appreciate it!


_____________________________



Member: Treaty, Reluctant Admiral and Between the Storms Mod Team.

Reluctant Admiral Mod:
https://sites.google.com/site/reluctantadmiral/

(in reply to MechFO)
Post #: 3607
RE: June 1944 - 3/21/2017 3:03:24 AM   
Lowpe

 

Posts: 14355
Joined: 2/25/2013
Status: online
I just wanted to say well done with the fuel oil shipments.

(in reply to Lowpe)
Post #: 3608
RE: June 1944 - 3/21/2017 4:09:04 AM   
John 3rd


Posts: 15002
Joined: 9/8/2005
From: La Salle, Colorado
Status: online
Here is to HOPING we can get a couple more thru. It all depends on where his Fleet is moving to.

Have staged a bit of a surprise. He has been reconning CRB and Saigon continuously and I have purposefully left them as inviting targets. What he doesn't know is that I have two full strength ID and 3 Brigades in central to northern Indochina all in Strategic Mode. They are ready to move. If he shows any sign of moving towards the coast then they move into the two areas listed above and get ready to fight. Since both of these locations have plenty of supply and Forts-4 or higher, I really hope to shock him and make a landing very costly. Perhaps we could even crush on of his rambling landings.

Sort of like fishing and dangling that bait...


_____________________________



Member: Treaty, Reluctant Admiral and Between the Storms Mod Team.

Reluctant Admiral Mod:
https://sites.google.com/site/reluctantadmiral/

(in reply to Lowpe)
Post #: 3609
RE: May 1944 - 3/21/2017 4:33:04 AM   
Aurorus

 

Posts: 958
Joined: 5/26/2014
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: MechFO

Your "source" being a straight reprint of period dispatches without any cross checking or correlating. Rule of thumb, divide reported losses by a factor of anything from 3 to 10 to reach something that might be accurate. And that's for relatively easily counted items such as AFV's or planes.

Casualty figures by their nature are even harder to count so the range of mistakes will probably be even higher.


My source is Grehan and Mace, who have publised extensively on the second world war. Their sources are the actual After Action Reports. When you open your combat report, that is what you are seeing... an After Action Report... that is designed... even in the graphics, to look like a WWII After Action Report. There is even a typewriter sound.

If you want to corroborate allied After Action Reports with those of the Japanese, you will at pains to do so. The Japanese war archives are scattered and partial. As with Germany, many documents were destroyed, both by the axis government figures and in the general destruction of Germany and Japan in the final years of the war. Keep in mind that most of the history of the war, until fairly recently, was based almost exclusively on allied After Action Reports. It was only about 20 years ago that an Englishman, who was a colleague of mine at the time at university, wrote the first history of the Normandy campaign that used both German and English-language sources. It was his doctorial dissertation, and I believe is now a published book.

(in reply to MechFO)
Post #: 3610
RE: May 1944 - 3/21/2017 1:20:51 PM   
MechFO

 

Posts: 402
Joined: 6/1/2007
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Aurorus


quote:

ORIGINAL: MechFO

Your "source" being a straight reprint of period dispatches without any cross checking or correlating. Rule of thumb, divide reported losses by a factor of anything from 3 to 10 to reach something that might be accurate. And that's for relatively easily counted items such as AFV's or planes.

Casualty figures by their nature are even harder to count so the range of mistakes will probably be even higher.


My source is Grehan and Mace, who have publised extensively on the second world war. Their sources are the actual After Action Reports. When you open your combat report, that is what you are seeing... an After Action Report... that is designed... even in the graphics, to look like a WWII After Action Report. There is even a typewriter sound.


straight from amazon:

Despatches in this volume include Air Operations in Burma and Bay of Bengal 1 January to 22 May 1942 by General Wavell, the despatch on air operations in South-East Asia November 1943 to May 1944, by Air Chief Marshal Sir R.E.C. Peirse, the despatch on air operations in South-East Asia from June 1944 to May 1945, by Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park, and the despatch on air operations in South East Asia between May 1945 and September 1945, by Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park.

This unique collection of original documents will prove to be an invaluable resource for historians, students and all those interested in what was one of the most significant periods in British military history.

Published normally implies more than simple reprinting of somebody else's documents.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Aurorus
If you want to corroborate allied After Action Reports with those of the Japanese, you will at pains to do so. The Japanese war archives are scattered and partial. As with Germany, many documents were destroyed, both by the axis government figures and in the general destruction of Germany and Japan in the final years of the war. Keep in mind that most of the history of the war, until fairly recently, was based almost exclusively on allied After Action Reports. It was only about 20 years ago that an Englishman, who was a colleague of mine at the time at university, wrote the first history of the Normandy campaign that used both German and English-language sources. It was his doctorial dissertation, and I believe is now a published book.


So you agree you base your opinion of effectiveness on reports that without fail have been shown to have massively overestimated damage inflicted in each and every case where such reports have been cross checked. Thank you.

(in reply to Aurorus)
Post #: 3611
RE: May 1944 - 3/21/2017 2:21:07 PM   
Chickenboy


Posts: 22735
Joined: 6/29/2002
From: San Antonio, TX
Status: online
My opinion is that we are arguing by degrees. Allied "close air support" involving P-47s, P-51s and other close support aircraft (mostly on the Western Front) was very helpful in scouting Allied flanks, attacking enemy communication columns and also attacking enemy concentrations while in contact with friendly Allied troops. Several high-level autobiographies cite the value of this support in exploiting static positions.

Generally further back were the (IMO understated) 2EB massed attacks. Mostly tactical in nature, B-26, A-26, B-25 and the like were effective in interdicting marshalling yards, train yards, heavily used roads, port facilities, etc. Typically these actions were several miles behind the lines of advancing troops.

Massed application of 4EBs was done only a handful of times in the tactical "close support" model. Both times during Cobra resulted in unacceptably high friendly ground casualties. These casualties have been counted, verified and recorded. Less verifiable were enemy (read: German) ground casualties. But these were by any standards-at least locally-extremely high.

From a pure military perspective: the bombing was effective, but at a high 'friendly' cost. If I recall correctly, the Allied brass (SHAEF-Europe) forswore further use of this approach (4EB bombers used as "tactical close air support") due to friendly casualties.

So-in the game how would that translate? We all recognize that Allied 4EBs are 'overused' compared to historical in theatre. I'm OK with that-Japanese 3rd and 4th generation fighters are tremendously overused compared to historical, so these 'cancel each other out' in my book.

I don't have a problem with Allies using 4EBs on enemy ground troop targets as part of a concerted effort to break through fixed lines in general. But-to retain realism-the game should code for friendly casualties or the Allies should voluntarily limit the practice to keep with reality. As it stands now, the game will not code for *any* Allied casualties from ahistoric massed application of 4EBs in this role. And some Allied players seem to think that they have mastered the fog of war of communications between ground troops and air force pilots dropping from 10,000+ feet. Just because the game doesn't 'punish' that behavior doesn't mean that the game (or the player) is dealing with it realistically or 'fairly'.

Is it 'gamey'? Does it need a house rule? Meh. It's not the 'hill I want to die on' as far as the game is concerned. I'd probably make my point to my opponent and leave it at that.

Oh-and then find a way to stack that hex with EVERY.STINKING.FIGHTER.I.HAVE.WITH.CANNONS. Turn it into a charnel house of 'Sweinfurt kicked up a notch' casualties and he'll reduce the use of the 4EBs in such a role. Because he'll run out of 4EBs.

Don't forget that each 4EB counts as 2 VPs.

_____________________________


(in reply to MechFO)
Post #: 3612
RE: May 1944 - 3/21/2017 2:56:55 PM   
MakeeLearn

 

Posts: 1914
Joined: 9/11/2016
Status: offline
"A War of Their Own: Bombers over the Southwest Pacific"


Download

(in reply to Chickenboy)
Post #: 3613
RE: May 1944 - 3/21/2017 3:44:20 PM   
Lowpe

 

Posts: 14355
Joined: 2/25/2013
Status: online
Chickenboy, I agree with your sentiments. Too often we lose sight that this game operates pretty much as an abstraction.

(in reply to MakeeLearn)
Post #: 3614
RE: May 1944 - 3/21/2017 5:07:44 PM   
Ol_Dog


Posts: 318
Joined: 2/23/2003
From: Southern Illinois
Status: offline
My Father's Bombardment Group (H), flew B-24s from Italy Jan 1944 to April 1945 - 245 missions. According to their records, they flew troop support to Velletri, Anzio, Cassino, Piombino, and Subiaco. They flew Genoa and Toulon gun positions and Frejus beach area. Also troop concentrations at Podgorica and Novi Pazar. Then in April 1945 they listed 4 days ground support in Italy at Area Able and Area Baker. That is about 15 missions of 245. The other missions generally were marshalling yards, oil refineries, airfields, aircraft factories, and other factories and rail targets.

According to "their records" the ground support missions were very effective, but that was not why they were there.

< Message edited by Ol_Dog -- 3/21/2017 5:11:38 PM >


_____________________________

Common Sense is an uncommon virtue.
If you think you have everything under control, you don't fully understand the situation.

(in reply to Chickenboy)
Post #: 3615
RE: May 1944 - 3/21/2017 11:13:43 PM   
John 3rd


Posts: 15002
Joined: 9/8/2005
From: La Salle, Colorado
Status: online
That was well said Poultry Man. We'll see what happens next turn as the troops try to hold Batangas. I've got over 200 fighters scheduled to be on LRCAP at either 15K or 30K. We'll see what happens...


_____________________________



Member: Treaty, Reluctant Admiral and Between the Storms Mod Team.

Reluctant Admiral Mod:
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(in reply to Ol_Dog)
Post #: 3616
RE: May 1944 - 3/22/2017 12:42:48 AM   
Chickenboy


Posts: 22735
Joined: 6/29/2002
From: San Antonio, TX
Status: online

quote:

ORIGINAL: John 3rd

That was well said Poultry Man. We'll see what happens next turn as the troops try to hold Batangas. I've got over 200 fighters scheduled to be on LRCAP at either 15K or 30K. We'll see what happens...



Gut 'em like a fish, John.

_____________________________


(in reply to John 3rd)
Post #: 3617
RE: May 1944 - 3/22/2017 12:52:28 AM   
Aurorus

 

Posts: 958
Joined: 5/26/2014
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: MechFO

straight from amazon:

Despatches in this volume include Air Operations in Burma and Bay of Bengal 1 January to 22 May 1942 by General Wavell, the despatch on air operations in South-East Asia November 1943 to May 1944, by Air Chief Marshal Sir R.E.C. Peirse, the despatch on air operations in South-East Asia from June 1944 to May 1945, by Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park, and the despatch on air operations in South East Asia between May 1945 and September 1945, by Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park.

This unique collection of original documents will prove to be an invaluable resource for historians, students and all those interested in what was one of the most significant periods in British military history.

Published normally implies more than simple reprinting of somebody else's documents.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Aurorus
If you want to corroborate allied After Action Reports with those of the Japanese, you will at pains to do so. The Japanese war archives are scattered and partial. As with Germany, many documents were destroyed, both by the axis government figures and in the general destruction of Germany and Japan in the final years of the war. Keep in mind that most of the history of the war, until fairly recently, was based almost exclusively on allied After Action Reports. It was only about 20 years ago that an Englishman, who was a colleague of mine at the time at university, wrote the first history of the Normandy campaign that used both German and English-language sources. It was his doctorial dissertation, and I believe is now a published book.


So you agree you base your opinion of effectiveness on reports that without fail have been shown to have massively overestimated damage inflicted in each and every case where such reports have been cross checked. Thank you.


It is not accurate at all to state that allied After Action Reports "massively overestimated damaged inflicted in each and every case." That is simply not true. You sell the British and American commanders very short in assuming that they solicited or believed grossly exaggerated casualty estimates. In many cases, the allies actually underestimated the effectiveness of their operations.

The people involved in military intelligence and reconnaissance were very good on both the axis and the allied side. This was a different time in history, when people were, in general, more honest. The goal and focus of military intelligence was very different then. It has since become a proving ground for liars and its goals have become political: i.e. weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. At that time, the goal was accuracy, and it was achieved more often than later skeptics and critics admit. This is often the case in the study of history, where future generations assume, with arrogance, their inferiority of their predecessors. In fact, I can tell you that the allied casualty reports for the German forces in Cobra were remarkably accurate.

quote:


I don't have a problem with Allies using 4EBs on enemy ground troop targets as part of a concerted effort to break through fixed lines in general. But-to retain realism-the game should code for friendly casualties or the Allies should voluntarily limit the practice to keep with reality. As it stands now, the game will not code for *any* Allied casualties from ahistoric massed application of 4EBs in this role. And some Allied players seem to think that they have mastered the fog of war of communications between ground troops and air force pilots dropping from 10,000+ feet. Just because the game doesn't 'punish' that behavior doesn't mean that the game (or the player) is dealing with it realistically or 'fairly'.


The game is not going to punish the allies for focusing on ground troops. That is the job of Japanese player. I think that 18 B-29s shot down in one day is the "punishment" that you are looking for.

(in reply to MechFO)
Post #: 3618
RE: May 1944 - 3/22/2017 2:26:37 AM   
Mike Dubost

 

Posts: 248
Joined: 8/24/2008
From: Sacramento, CA
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Aurorus


quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Dubost

Well, at the risk of beating a dead horse, I would like to point out a fact that no one has mentioned yet. While it is true that Leslie McNair (the highest ranking American casualty of the ETO) was killed, this was partly due to the approach.
In his memoirs, General Bradley spoke about the friendly fire issue. His statement (note, I have not seen this in detail elsewhere, so be advised it is one credible source only) was that he had planned to have the bombers approach along the front. The Army Air Corps over-ruled him and insisted that it had to be perpendicular to the front. My recollection is that he stated that he never wanted to have another carpet bombing mission that came in perpendicular to the front, not necessarily no carpet bombing at all.
Please consider that when objecting to the example of Cobra. Could the planners of other missions have agreed to a perpendicular approach? Yes, possibly. Would it have made the bombing as effective as you see in game? I don't have enough knowledge of the technology of the time to say.




As I mentioned, Cobra is probably not comparable for a number of reasons, especially in that in Cobra the 4 EBs were used in close support. Using 4 EBs to bomb rear echelon positions, which is more comparable to what John experienced here, was commonplace in the Asian theater, especially in Burma, and the casualty estimates that the WiTP is generating are very much in line with those reported in these types of missions.

The allies did not do this more frequently, because they used the 4 EBs more frequently to establish air superiority by hitting Japanese airfields. That is also why the allies did not make a habit of losing 18 B-29s in one raid to 100 Japanese fighters. There is a tradeoff for all things. If the allies want to use their 4 EBs to attack ground troops and not to establish air superiority, they must expect to take heavy 4 EB loses.


Well, I had meant to mostly address the issue of friendly fire as a counter-argument to the analogy. My apologies for not being clear in that respect.
That being said, I am not sure that the distinction of close air support versus more distant targets is significant. I am re-reading Eisenhower's Lieutenants by Russell Weigly, and in his section on Cobra, he mentions in the aborted air attack the day before, 3 bombardment divisions of heavies were not able to be called back due to having no dedicated radio channels. He too talks about perpendicular approach being adopted against Bradley's wishes, but his citation is A Soldier's Story, the aforesaid memoir, so it is not really independent. The point of this statement about lack of radio communication is that forward air controllers were not adding to the effectiveness of the bombing.
Maybe I should stop hijacking the AAR and simply agree that there is arguable evidence in support of the effect, but nothing conclusive. I propose to agree to disagree at this time, unless others wish to continue the debate.
I certainly agree with you that using the 4EB in this role does come with an opportunity cost, and the risk of losses. It is not something that was historically done with much frequency, but I think the limited sample size of historical examples shows that it could have been done more often had the Allies been willing to pay the price.

(in reply to Aurorus)
Post #: 3619
RE: May 1944 - 3/22/2017 2:28:20 AM   
Mike Dubost

 

Posts: 248
Joined: 8/24/2008
From: Sacramento, CA
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: John 3rd

Thanks for remembering that it was Leslie McNair. Could not remember his name whatsoever. Appreciate it!



You're welcome. By the way, I realized today that I misspelled Lesley McNair's first name. Sigh, I automatically typed it like a former co-worker spelled it.

(in reply to John 3rd)
Post #: 3620
RE: May 1944 - 3/22/2017 4:41:43 AM   
crsutton


Posts: 9278
Joined: 12/6/2002
From: Maryland
Status: online

quote:

ORIGINAL: Lowpe

Chickenboy, I agree with your sentiments. Too often we lose sight that this game operates pretty much as an abstraction.


Actually, with the improved AA effectiveness (yes, even Japan) and the buffing up of the George and Jack fighters, I still have American heavy and medium bomber units that are empty or flying obsolete aircraft in 1/44. I am fairly cautious with my bombers but replacements for the Allies are pretty thin and I am losing more this campaign that the last (stock) campaign. It is starting to get better for me but I am losing bombers.

_____________________________

I am the Holy Roman Emperor and am above grammar.

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(in reply to Lowpe)
Post #: 3621
RE: May 1944 - 3/22/2017 5:23:06 AM   
John 3rd


Posts: 15002
Joined: 9/8/2005
From: La Salle, Colorado
Status: online
WISH I had Jack. Not in any of my Mods...

_____________________________



Member: Treaty, Reluctant Admiral and Between the Storms Mod Team.

Reluctant Admiral Mod:
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(in reply to crsutton)
Post #: 3622
RE: May 1944 - 3/22/2017 4:47:11 PM   
MechFO

 

Posts: 402
Joined: 6/1/2007
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Aurorus

In fact, I can tell you that the allied casualty reports for the German forces in Cobra were remarkably accurate.


Which was due to an accurate assessment being possible because the ground could be captured and assessed immediately after the operation. That was a unique set of circumstances.

Where casualty assessments had to be made only based on air crew claims, maybe some post bombing photo recon combined with incomplete knowledge of what the enemy strength was both prior and post bombing...the results were predictably less than ideal.


quote:

ORIGINAL: Aurorus


quote:

ORIGINAL: MechFO

straight from amazon:

Despatches in this volume include Air Operations in Burma and Bay of Bengal 1 January to 22 May 1942 by General Wavell, the despatch on air operations in South-East Asia November 1943 to May 1944, by Air Chief Marshal Sir R.E.C. Peirse, the despatch on air operations in South-East Asia from June 1944 to May 1945, by Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park, and the despatch on air operations in South East Asia between May 1945 and September 1945, by Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park.

This unique collection of original documents will prove to be an invaluable resource for historians, students and all those interested in what was one of the most significant periods in British military history.

Published normally implies more than simple reprinting of somebody else's documents.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Aurorus
If you want to corroborate allied After Action Reports with those of the Japanese, you will at pains to do so. The Japanese war archives are scattered and partial. As with Germany, many documents were destroyed, both by the axis government figures and in the general destruction of Germany and Japan in the final years of the war. Keep in mind that most of the history of the war, until fairly recently, was based almost exclusively on allied After Action Reports. It was only about 20 years ago that an Englishman, who was a colleague of mine at the time at university, wrote the first history of the Normandy campaign that used both German and English-language sources. It was his doctorial dissertation, and I believe is now a published book.


So you agree you base your opinion of effectiveness on reports that without fail have been shown to have massively overestimated damage inflicted in each and every case where such reports have been cross checked. Thank you.


It is not accurate at all to state that allied After Action Reports "massively overestimated damaged inflicted in each and every case." That is simply not true. You sell the British and American commanders very short in assuming that they solicited or believed grossly exaggerated casualty estimates. In many cases, the allies actually underestimated the effectiveness of their operations.

The people involved in military intelligence and reconnaissance were very good on both the axis and the allied side. This was a different time in history, when people were, in general, more honest. The goal and focus of military intelligence was very different then. It has since become a proving ground for liars and its goals have become political: i.e. weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. At that time, the goal was accuracy, and it was achieved more often than later skeptics and critics admit. This is often the case in the study of history, where future generations assume, with arrogance, their inferiority of their predecessors.


I wish you the best of luck in your research.

(in reply to Aurorus)
Post #: 3623
RE: May 1944 - 3/22/2017 4:59:41 PM   
Lowpe

 

Posts: 14355
Joined: 2/25/2013
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quote:

ORIGINAL: John 3rd

That was well said Poultry Man. We'll see what happens next turn as the troops try to hold Batangas. I've got over 200 fighters scheduled to be on LRCAP at either 15K or 30K. We'll see what happens...



I guess I have more rain to add to this AAR: if this happened to me, i.e. Japan defending in open terrain, I could expect to be swept so heavily...and my LRCAP would just be shredded. And then the likely air fields they flew from would also be swept, and of course everything would be bombed too.

I have defended open terrain against the Allies in 43 and 44...but it was with 10+ good AA units present, ENG units present to provide radar and some soak, and of course lots of ART -- so there was lots of units there to soak up the bombers attacks and not just the infantry.

I would cycle units in and out, break divisions down to their thirds, but leave one as the target which would act as a bomber soak unit.

My rule of thumb is that Japan can only defend in x2 or better, with forts, and every position has ART/ENG/AA and preferably HQ all prepped or prepping for bases, but often defending in non base x2 or x3 terrain was better. Preferably the infantry has 43 squads.

Heck, even the 20 and 25mm AA rapidfire guns provide a benefit in that they get targeted...preserving somewhat the infantry..even if they can't shoot down diddly.

NO AA or ART present then there was no chance of holding. Troops would be shattered for absolutely minimal damage done in return.

Tank units I used as a mobile fire brigade and reserve.



(in reply to John 3rd)
Post #: 3624
RE: May 1944 - 3/22/2017 5:26:10 PM   
Chickenboy


Posts: 22735
Joined: 6/29/2002
From: San Antonio, TX
Status: online

quote:

ORIGINAL: Aurorus
The game is not going to punish the allies for focusing on ground troops.

I think anyone that plays this game knows what the game will or won't do code-wise by this point. I'm not expecting a re-write. My comments were in the context of what a more balanced approach would be.

It wouldn't be hard at all to code in some 'friendly fire' or counter-battery fire casualties when strategic bombers are used on ground attack with friendly troops in the same hex. Easy as pie. One could probably use a metric similar to the counter-battery fire or a percentage damage allotted to the Allied side receiving friendly fire.

For example, Allies might suffer 10-20% of the casualties the enemy does based upon 'short drops' and miscommunication. That percentage could go down or up in that range based upon crew experience, HQ experience, fatigue, spotting DL, recon, terrain, etc.

In any case, I didn't say "focus on ground troops". Your words. I said use of heavy bombers in a close air support mission. That means with friendly troops in the same hex for the intents and purposes of this game. Focusing on ground troops is expected and there are myriad examples of heavy bombers doing just that. Just not with friendly troops in intimate contact.

quote:


That is the job of Japanese player. I think that 18 B-29s shot down in one day is the "punishment" that you are looking for.


Meh. I'm actually looking for something different. I'd feel better if there was a regimented 'punishment' unique to the use of heavy bombers in a close air support mission. Fighter intercepts will happen and they are insufficient dissuasion in and of themselves.

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(in reply to Aurorus)
Post #: 3625
RE: May 1944 - 3/22/2017 5:33:49 PM   
Chickenboy


Posts: 22735
Joined: 6/29/2002
From: San Antonio, TX
Status: online

quote:

ORIGINAL: Aurorus
It has since become a proving ground for liars and its goals have become political: i.e. weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. At that time, the goal was accuracy, and it was achieved more often than later skeptics and critics admit. This is often the case in the study of history, where future generations assume, with arrogance, their inferiority of their predecessors.


Knock it off.

Tarring a branch of the service with your broad brush of damnation on *this* site is most unwelcome. Your proselytizing about the woeful state of current generations vis a vis past generations is also also yawn-inducing sociopolitical drivel.

I know several people in military intelligence, JAG and related fields. They are-without exception-honorable and good people.

You're new here-relatively speaking-and you haven't posted much. So consider this a pleasant request to check your language and your political bent at the door before you post.

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(in reply to Aurorus)
Post #: 3626
RE: May 1944 - 3/22/2017 6:23:49 PM   
adarbrauner

 

Posts: 783
Joined: 11/3/2016
Status: offline
quote:


ORIGINAL: Chickenboy
For example, Allies might suffer 10-20% of the casualties the enemy does based upon 'short drops' and miscommunication. That percentage could go down or up in that range based upon crew experience, HQ experience, fatigue, spotting DL, recon, terrain, etc.


There was not only the preparing bomardement around St Lo before Cobra.

there was also Goodwood before, and others:

"Middlebrook's "Bomber Command War diaries" has the following for 30 June (pg 536) under the heading "Villers-Bocage".

"266 aircraft - 151 Lancasters, 105 Halifaxes, 10 Mosquitoes of 3, 4 and 8 Groups to bomb a road junction through which the tanks of two German Panzer Divisions, the 2nd and 9th, would have to pass in order to carry out a planned attack on the junction of the British and american Armies in Normandy, that night. The raid was controlled with great care by the master bomber, who ordered the bombing force to come down to 4000ft in order to be sure of seeing the markers in the smoke and dust of the exploding bombs. 1100 tons of bombs were dropped with great accuracy and the planned German attack did not take place. 1 Halifax and 1 Lancaster lost."

There was a say in Normandy: "when the RAF strikes, Jerry ducks; when the Luftwaffe strikes, the British ducks; when the Americans strike, everyone duck"

Any how your idea and suggestion is sound, I like it.

(in reply to Chickenboy)
Post #: 3627
RE: May 1944 - 3/22/2017 6:52:21 PM   
MakeeLearn

 

Posts: 1914
Joined: 9/11/2016
Status: offline

I haven't played far enough into the game and I don't have access to it at the moment, so Is napalm modeled in WitPAE?

Daisy cutters were made in theatre by wrapping thick wire around the bomb.

(in reply to adarbrauner)
Post #: 3628
RE: May 1944 - 3/22/2017 7:11:59 PM   
Chickenboy


Posts: 22735
Joined: 6/29/2002
From: San Antonio, TX
Status: online

quote:

ORIGINAL: adarbrauner

quote:


ORIGINAL: Chickenboy
For example, Allies might suffer 10-20% of the casualties the enemy does based upon 'short drops' and miscommunication. That percentage could go down or up in that range based upon crew experience, HQ experience, fatigue, spotting DL, recon, terrain, etc.


There was not only the preparing bomardement around St Lo before Cobra.

there was also Goodwood before, and others:

"Middlebrook's "Bomber Command War diaries" has the following for 30 June (pg 536) under the heading "Villers-Bocage".

"266 aircraft - 151 Lancasters, 105 Halifaxes, 10 Mosquitoes of 3, 4 and 8 Groups to bomb a road junction through which the tanks of two German Panzer Divisions, the 2nd and 9th, would have to pass in order to carry out a planned attack on the junction of the British and american Armies in Normandy, that night. The raid was controlled with great care by the master bomber, who ordered the bombing force to come down to 4000ft in order to be sure of seeing the markers in the smoke and dust of the exploding bombs. 1100 tons of bombs were dropped with great accuracy and the planned German attack did not take place. 1 Halifax and 1 Lancaster lost."


I don't consider this setup the same as that of the massed Cobra attack with troops waiting for a jump off signal. Many of those Cobra troops were within a few thousand feet of the jump off line. The use of medium bombers to blast roads, railways, marshalling yards, etc. was commonplace. What you've cited is effective interdiction, not massed bomber close air support.


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Post #: 3629
RE: May 1944 - 3/22/2017 7:19:45 PM   
MakeeLearn

 

Posts: 1914
Joined: 9/11/2016
Status: offline
After Cobra, Doolittle came up with a technique of marking the Allied front line using colored AA fired in a continuous line. This proved very effective in trials. The breakout put it on hold.

< Message edited by MakeeLearn -- 3/22/2017 10:23:45 PM >

(in reply to Chickenboy)
Post #: 3630
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