Tarhunnas - thanks for the advice - I hadn't thought of that.
76mm - I never suggested abusing the logistics model. My comments on realism are based on the idea of WITE creating a game based on realistic capabilities to recreate the Axis/Soviet conflict. I personally will not mule HQs as the Axis. I don't think that is realistic either.
My comments about partisans focus on that they should not be able to completely cutoff supplies to major portion of the front. Flavius came up with the best way I have seen to model their realistic capabilities in the game. The major effect they had overall was to reduce the locomotives that the Germans could use to transport supplies. In 1941, they were not very well organized and their attacks were uncoordinated and few in number.
Here is an excerpt from Christian Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde (one of many sources) that will give you a flavor of how effective partisans were (notice two things ... they did not completely cutoff supplies and the Germans were able at times to very quickly restore the rail lines):
The Belarusian partisans are mainly known for blowing up railway installations and trains. But also in this field their successes where in certain respects limited. They managed to distinctly reduce the capacity of many lines, but not to cut off or decisively reduce German supplies for the front. [Footnote: See Pottgießer, pages 90f. und 100f. (in the week between 20 and 26.7.1943 partisans reduced the time during which the main lines could be used by 16 to 46%). Similarly for instance General des Transportwesens Mitte, Transportlage Nr. 9 v. 11.1.1944, BA-MA WF-03/5388, Bl. 643. The information in Kalinin, page 341, about a reduction of railway traffic by two thirds from 1942 to 1943 is incorrect. Bonwetsch's assessment (page 112) is correct in this respect.] This also applies regarding bridge blastings and the heydays of the »rail war« in August 1943 and June 1944 with up to 10,500 explosion spots in one day. [Footnote: See Pottgießer, pages 85 and 88; AWiFü beim AOK 4, Lagebericht 16.6.-15.7. v. 28.7.1944, BA-MA (BArchP)F 18039, Bl. 303. The number of attacks in the area of General Traffic Direction East exceeded 100 for the first time in May 1942, 500 for the first time in August, 750 in September 1942, 400 in January 1943 and 1,050 in May. Most of these occurred in the area of RVD Minsk. See for instance Kühnrich, pages 287 ff.; Wilenchik, page 285. Blasts in a row were counted by the Germans as only one, thus the difference in numbers.] Only few secondary lines the Germans had to temporarily give up completely. The high number of railway blasts is undisputed, but the Germans gradually got used to a kind of partisan war normality and especially managed to remove most damages on rails within the shortest time. [Footnote: Characteristic is the verdict of Linkow (page 448), who considered the German line security and mine clearing to have been very bad: »In one area, however, the Fascists achieved something extraordinary. They managed to thoroughly remove the consequences of a train disaster within the shortest time. Eight to ten hours, in difficult cases fifteen hours, were sufficient for them to make a line operational again.« See Pottgießer, pages 84-101. In the area of RVD Minsk there were 510 blasts in December 1943 and 598 blasts in January 1944, but of these only 43 respectively 48 led to line closures of more than 12 hours. Mineis (L) beim Transportchef, Auswirkung der Bandenanschläge v. 11.2.1944, BA-MA H 12/244). One must however point out the materially most important effect of the Belarusian partisans struggle, which was felt throughout Europe: according to German sources they destroyed as many locomotives each month as the whole of German-dominated Europe could produce in the same period - and the Soviets knew this. Given the lack of rolling stock which had occurred anyway throughout the German area of influence by shifting locomotives and wagons to the occupied Soviet territories, this had an effect on the outcome of the war in general that should not be underestimated.