el cid again
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Joined: 10/10/2005 Status: online
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My reply to Big Red's pm request for more details was too long - so it is here - in re the Chinese diplomacy in re the origins of the Pacific War: See China and the Origins of the Pacific War 1931-1941 Youli Sun St Martin's Press ISBN 0-312-09010-2 or in paper 0-312-16454-8 1992 This was based on work as a graduate student at the University of Chicago starting in 1987 by the author. Although based on ROC materials, Yaouli was the first student from PRC of Japanese professor Akiria Iriye, whose name implies he is Japanese. Likely these two - professor and student - had a better grasp of how to read the Chinese language archives than most people in the USA would have. Four other academics are cited for helping the author, one of them Chinese and his professor of Chinese history, three apparently "American" (a term I dislike using as it offends Canadians and Latinos). That is - I do not suspect the writer of a PRC bias. His wife, also Chinese, is also acknowledged as helping in the capacity of a librarian. That is, this combination of people almost certainly have a superior grasp of Chinese language materials than I do. The book is in English. Material came from the Far Eastern Library of the University of Chicago, the Library of Congress, the Hoover Institution, the Archival Section of the Butler Library at the Columbia University (a major Chinese library, under a different name in the new movie RED starring Bruce Willis), the National Archives and the Franklin Roosevelt Library. The author has a uniformly pro Chinese vs Imperial Japan attitude, something common between both PRC and ROC during the War of Resistance and afterward. He thinks China was the only one of the "9 powers" (referring I think to the 9 countries which relieved the siege of Peking during the Boxer Rebellion and which established a new regime for China) to resist Japan's unilateral breech of the deal in 1931. The decision to fight Japan dates, he says, from 1937. [Other dates include 1935 or 1931 - I usually say 1935 as the start of the War of Resistance] Regardless, WWII properly begins here, in China, and does not stop until 1945, by all measures. In important respects, China is a vital strategic opponant to Japan, comparable to Russia for Germany, one that possibly may be impossible to defeat. He cites one book and two articles based on ROC materials prior to his own work whch "revealed to us the active and shrewd diplomatic maneuvers of the Chinese government from 1937 to 1945" He also says the "best study of China's relations with Japan" is Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism" by Park's Coble. It is "the most detailed treatment of Chinese politics available in the English language and, while still following a somewhat traditional approach, sheds much light on Chiang Kai-shek's polices toward Japan." This implies Yaouli in his own mind is NOT following a "taditional approach." He says there is much work on Japanese politics, but not much on Chinese, in this period. His view is there are two main points from a Chinese perspective: 1) Japan's aggression in China threatened Western interests; also that there would be inivitable conflicts between Japan and the other Imperialist powers in China. 2) It was practical to seek alliances against Japan not only to defend the country, but also to permit ROC to concentrate on its domestic enimies (which I assume means the Reds and various warlordy's). This is entirely consistent with what I glean from Stillwell, among others. There was a serious movement toward an accomodation between KMT and Japan (the No 2 politician, Wang Jing-wei, defected in fact, and led the so-called pupit regime in Nanking, and it "made it extremely difficult" for the ROC regime). Youli accounts for the pressures, international and domestic, which caused the concept of such accomodation to fail. There was real hope the Soviet Union would intervene, as well as the United States. He cites a political phrase re the USA unusually - in caps: "The Last Best Hope" - to imply I suppose it was a very strong opinion. But I have run into the same phrase without caps in other materials and it apparently was in general use during the war. The publisher's reviewer summarizes the material by saying that the decision to keep fighting Japan as well as diplomacy were critical factors in preventing a possible American-Japanese accomodation. We see an example of such an accomodation after the Panay Incident. We also see in the original terms of the embargo of oil, iron ore and rubber provisions the intent not to fully impose them at once - although in fact they were - for reasons unclear. This was the critical diplomatic development that led to Japan's decision to mobilize in July 1941. [See Japan's Decision for War, records of the 1941 Foreign Policy Conference, a study of Japanese materials but, in this book, translated into English. Nobutaka Ike, Stansford University Press, 1967 ISBN not in the original edition I have; Library of Congress 940.5352 I26]
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