both the allies and japanese had fuel
The japanese had more fuel on location, better airbases from which to operate, better resupply to those airbases, and more stockpiled spare parts. They also had superior numbers and a war plan that was well-planned, promply executed.
Against that, the allies had pre-located very little in the way of supplies, spare parts, and service crew, and operated from facilities that were very crude. Wear and tear on allied a.c. under the circumstances was much greater.
so.. yes.. they had better marksmanship, better aerobatic skill, navigation, etc
The problem for your claim is that there is no evidence for any of those suppositions. Indeed, there is compelling evidence that Japanese pilots were worse at leading their targets than allied a.c. Certainly USN pilots were much better trained at deflection shooting. Likewise, there is no evidence of particularly bad allied navigation or good japanese navigation.
The open question you want to ask is whether or not it was JUST better pre-located assets that helped the Japanese win, or whether other factors came into play. I can only note that once the Japanese ran into allied forces that were positioned in places with strategic depth and good logistical support, they lost badly.
and they had been fighting for 4 years against the chinese (add up all the planes the chinese had during
those 4 years, and the number of troops killed on the ground by japanese planes, and you will see how experienced
the japanese pilots were)
The Chinese air force ceased to exist as a force in 1938. The campaign against them lasted a bit more than 28 days. While one may note that flying time helps, the general supposition that flying time in combat against Chinese pilots flying Polikarpovs was helpful when Japanese pilots ran into RAF pilots in Hurricanes is suspect. Different planes, different enemy pilots, different tactics.
Arguably, whatever experience the Japanese did gain in China served them poorly in the naval campaigns. Japanese zero drivers were badly defeated in the Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal campaigns when they flew against USN pilots -- to the tune of about 1.8 Zeroes shot down for each F4F shot down when you just count combat between Zeroes and F4Fs.
Nor were they particularly successful against USAAF/RAAF pilots once radar detection became commonplace in Australia and New Guinea.
once those pilots died however, the tactical ineffectiveness of the japanese planes was made evident during 1943
Long before 1943. The weaknesses of the A6M2 were apparent by the end of May 1942.
who needs 600L of fuel in your zero, when you are fighting B-24s above rabaul?
what use is maneouverability against bombers?
Oh true. On that we agree. As an interceptor against heavy bombers, it was weak. The Japanese never developed an effective interceptor for that role.
the Tojo was the most advanced airframe design until the bearcat, just poorly configured
The Tojo was inferior in airspeed, range, armament, defensive armor, dive, high altitude, and mid-high altitude climb, to all of the following: the Spitfire IX+, the FW-190D, the P-51, the P-47. the F4U, the Hawker Tempest, and the Lavochkin La-5+ series.
Show me a fellow who rejects statistical analysis a priori and I'll show you a fellow who has no knowledge of statistics.
Didn't we have this conversation already?