I'm not sure about whether that scenario got in, I haven't been able to do any significant testing of the final release version...
But I would note that CO:BftB or the earlier COTA/HTTR/RDOA were very scaleable - it was never absolutely necessary to issue large volumes of orders, and a span of command of 4-5 'units' was adequate for most scenarios (the AI controlling the subordinate units to accomplish the desired 'grand-plan'). Eg 3 Regts plus Reserves and Divisional troops for a Divisional attack (5 units), 2 Lead Regiments, 2 'Division Rumps', Corps Reserve and Artillery/HQ (5 units, with Corps Reserve released as 1-2 additional order groups if committed to combat).
I tend to run with a few more order-groups, because I have a more particular plan that the AI sometimes messes up, so I'll break each regiment into 3-4 'groups' with each Battalion being one 'order group' and the Rgt HQ and supports (artillery & supply) being a separate cluster of elements supporting their allocated subunits by proximity and using my assessment of the front-line and safe areas. Reserve units, administrative moves, reorganisations and resting at night can be accomplished by single order groups for a whole regiment or division at a time, so only during tactical movements and assaults at the front line would I break the force down so much with individual tasks. Each order during an assault would be a simple chain of waypoints (long-ish, but a single 'day's' movement for exploiting armour, and short and achievable single-attack objectives for each battalion attack, with up to 3-4 hitting a single area held by a few companies of enemy troops from various directions and to increasing depth, each regrouping, moving and then re-attacking after success). Because of this I usually have 20-30 orders in place, but they are simple and will run without interference to completion, allowing me to modify those that require attention without any pressure of time.
It must be said that a sound overall plan, that forces the enemy to react, while not being overly sensitive to unexpected minor setbacks is a prerequisite for 'easy' success - if the enemy has the sound plan, and is forcing you to react 'after the fact' then the order delays and limited intel picture will make it very hard to regain the initiative.