Matrix Games Forums

Command gets huge update!Order of Battle: Pacific Featured on Weekly Streaming SessionA new fight for Battle Academy!Buzz Aldrin's Space Program Manager is out for Mac!The definitive wargame of the Western Front is out now! War in the West gets teaser trailer and Twitch Stream!New Preview AAR for War in the West!War in the West Manual previewThe fight for Armageddon begins! The Matrix Holiday sales are starting today!
Forums  Register  Login  Photo Gallery  Member List  Search  Calendars  FAQ 

My Profile  Inbox  Address Book  My Subscription  My Forums  Log Out

USAAF knowledge of japanese targets

 
View related threads: (in this forum | in all forums)

Logged in as: Guest
Users viewing this topic: none
  Printable Version
All Forums >> [New Releases from Matrix Games] >> War in the Pacific: Admiral's Edition >> USAAF knowledge of japanese targets Page: [1]
Login
Message << Older Topic   Newer Topic >>
USAAF knowledge of japanese targets - 12/8/2011 7:20:59 AM   
JeffK


Posts: 5229
Joined: 1/26/2005
From: Back in the Office, Can I get my tin hut back!
Status: offline
Rather than give GJ hundreds of more posts on his thread

From http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/Hansell/Hansell-4.html Around pages `67-`68
By the commander XXI Bomber Command

Memory of the Luftwaffe still fresh in its mind, the Air Staff advocated destruction or neutralization of the Japanese Air Force as an overriding priority for the XXI Bomber Command. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed. The aircraft and engine plants assigned as top priority targets to the XXI (based in the Marianas) were precision targets. Thirteen aircraft and engine plants were known to exist in Japan. It was estimated that eight of them turned out seventy percent of Japanese aircraft engines. The towns hosting these factories were known. Even so, the actual plants had not been pinpointed -- a major task for the reconnaissance squadron of the XXI.

We had some general knowledge of the industry. Right after World War I, the Japanese had canvassed European and American aircraft and engine builders and had obtained production licenses. Three major Japanese producers emerged at that time: Nakajima, Mitsubishi, and Kawasaki. They had continued to dominate the Japanese airframe, engine, and propeller business. As the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey later reported:

While waves of Japanese technicians were studying American factories, America's top engineering schools were training men who, on their return to Japan, were to design the Zero fighter, Betty bomber, and other planes on which the Japanese bid for Pacific domination was to be based.

By 1930, the Japanese Army and Navy had decided the industry should stand on its own feet, and established a policy of self-sufficiency, whereby only aircraft and engines of Japanese designs were to be considered. No more foreign engineers were to be hired. This was intended mainly as a sop to Japanese nationalistic pride, however, and did not prevent their technical missions from continuing to buy the best foreign models as starting points for Japanese designs. In 1935 Nakajima purchased licenses on the early Corsair from Chance Vought Corp., and it acquired designs of the Whirlwind and Cyclone engines from Wright Aeronautical Corp. in 1937. Mitsubishi purchased a French radial engine, which became the basis for their famous Kinsei series, and secured plans for a Curtiss fighter in 1937. Sumitomo Metals bought rights to the American Hamilton Standard and German VDM propellers. Kawasaki secured rights on the German Daimler-Benz engine, from which came the only Japanese liquid-cooled engine of the war. . . .

--168--

We knew that Japan had embarked upon a vast and hurried expansion of her military aircraft industry. We knew, for example, that the Japanese government had directed a near-doubling of the aircraft plants in 1941. Japanese newspapers bragged to the world that a great new airframe and assembly plant had been built at Musashino, near Tokyo, and another close to Nagoya was heralded as the second largest in the world. Kawasaki set up immense modern ones near Nagoya. However, the precise location and description of these plants was a mystery to us in the fall of 1944. We recognized that those concentrated in the vicinity of Tokyo, Nagoya, and Kobe would be extremely vital precision targets -- if and when we discovered their precise locations and descriptions.

The aircraft targets could not be found, hit, and destroyed with the radar bombing equipment and the meager information we had. So the units of the XXI Bomber Command required crash retraining to do high-altitude, daylight precision bombing and to fly in formations not yet selected. We had to plan on reconnaissance after we had created a base on Saipan. The airplane and engine factory targets were at the extreme limit of the B-29 radius of action as it was then understood. Formations flying always reduces range, and it made completion of our missions (marginal at best) even more of a problem. In fact, it took several months of actual operation to master the techniques of fuel control that would give the B-29 its design capability.

There was spirited dispute at the time over this change in bombing tactics. The dispute persists, but the reasoning is not hard to trace. Our only real experience in massive bombing operations was over Europe. Had we not learned a painful lesson there? In Europe the whole concept of American air power -- the selection of vital targets on the ground and their destruction through precision bombing -- had faced the possibility of disastrous failure. The ability of massive bomber formations to fight their way through enemy defenses and reach remote targets, without intolerable losses, came dangerously close to being disproved. If the German fighter forces had been left free to expand, the price might have been too high. And if it had been, the air offensive would have failed and with it any hope of surface invasion.


_____________________________

Interdum feror cupidine partium magnarum Europae vincendarum
Post #: 1
RE: USAAF knowledge of japanese targets - 12/8/2011 7:29:36 AM   
JeffK


Posts: 5229
Joined: 1/26/2005
From: Back in the Office, Can I get my tin hut back!
Status: offline
In early morning of November 1, 1944, an F-13A (a photoreconnaissance version of the B-29) took off from Saipan to become the first U.S. plane over Tokyo since the Doolittle raid in April 1942. The crewmembers, led by Capt. Ralph D. Steakley, insisted upon an immediate mission, even though they had just arrived from the United States. I advised a rest but they were persistent. Thank God they were. They found clear skies over Japan -- a phenomenon. Called "Tokyo Rose," the aircraft flew above the Japanese capital at 32,000 feet, photographing a complex of aircraft and engine plants just west of Tokyo and another on the outskirts of Nagoya. They shot over 7,000 excellent photographs. Before the first strike on Tokyo on November 24, 17 sorties had been flown over Japan by F-13s. Many of the missions were hampered by bad weather, but sufficient information on the location of aircraft factories was secured for the first bombing missions. Copies of the photographs were sent to General Arnold for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to Admirals Nimitz and Halsey. Mosaics were made, strips laid out, and initial points and target approaches selected. Every crew was required to trace its photo map, mark landmarks and target runs, and then redraw them from memory -- over and over.

_____________________________

Interdum feror cupidine partium magnarum Europae vincendarum

(in reply to JeffK)
Post #: 2
RE: USAAF knowledge of japanese targets - 12/8/2011 7:35:05 AM   
Yaab


Posts: 993
Joined: 11/8/2011
From: Poznan, Poland
Status: offline
7,000 photographs taken in one sortie? How much time did they spend circling over Tokyo and Nagoya?

(in reply to JeffK)
Post #: 3
RE: USAAF knowledge of japanese targets - 12/8/2011 7:59:29 AM   
wdolson

 

Posts: 8373
Joined: 6/28/2006
From: Near Portland, OR
Status: offline
My father flew some of those recon missions.  The plan was to film the approach to every target in Japan on 35mm motion picture film and these would be shown to navigators with various land marks pointed out.  His project had some experts on the geography of Japan.

The F-13s flew very long missions with both bomb bays completely full of fuel.  On the missions my father did, they would film several target runs in one mission, flying to one target, then leaving Japanese air space and returning for another run.  I think a typical mission was about 12 hours.

He frequently saw fighters clawing for altitude to intercept them, but none ever caught them.


_____________________________

WitP AE - Test team lead, programmer

(in reply to Yaab)
Post #: 4
RE: USAAF knowledge of japanese targets - 12/8/2011 8:02:11 AM   
JeffK


Posts: 5229
Joined: 1/26/2005
From: Back in the Office, Can I get my tin hut back!
Status: offline
How many Frames per second, how many cameras?
Joe Baugher has
An additional 117 B-29-BWs and B-29As were similarly modified as F-13 and F-13A to carry three K-17B, two K-22 and one K-18 cameras with provisions for others.

The whole article is an interesting story on the efforts put in toget B29 onto the Mariana airfields before Lemay took over


_____________________________

Interdum feror cupidine partium magnarum Europae vincendarum

(in reply to Yaab)
Post #: 5
RE: USAAF knowledge of japanese targets - 12/8/2011 8:09:51 AM   
wdolson

 

Posts: 8373
Joined: 6/28/2006
From: Near Portland, OR
Status: offline
My father never told me how the cameras were mounted on his missions.  He did talk about the tight squeeze getting around the turrets.  The F-13s he was flying in had a full crew with all guns.  A section of the bomb bay may have been set aside for the cameras.  They were making films to show crews, so I expect they were standard 24 frame per second cameras.

When he flew in B-25s he would be crammed into the nose with a standard 35mm motion picture camera and 4X .50 calibers.  It was cozy.  He said being that B-25s were very loud to begin with (he has hearing problems because of it), but being next to 4 .50s when they fired was even louder.  One time outbound on a mission he was just kicking back in the nose when the pilot decided to test fire the guns.  My father has almost no startle reflex, but he said he almost flew through the escape hatch above his head.

_____________________________

WitP AE - Test team lead, programmer

(in reply to JeffK)
Post #: 6
RE: USAAF knowledge of japanese targets - 12/8/2011 9:48:12 AM   
tocaff


Posts: 4677
Joined: 10/12/2006
From: USA now in Brasil
Status: offline
With both bomb bays filled with aux fuel tanks the B-29 could fly well in excess of 14 hours.  My father said that normal missions from Tinian lasted 11 hours or more.

_____________________________

Todd

I never thought that doing an AAR would be so time consuming and difficult.
www.matrixgames.com/forum/tm.asp?m=2080768

(in reply to wdolson)
Post #: 7
RE: USAAF knowledge of japanese targets - 12/8/2011 3:42:14 PM   
crsutton


Posts: 7421
Joined: 12/6/2002
From: Maryland
Status: offline
That is some nice info. Thanks. It does help clarify the debate. Photo recon was very important.

_____________________________

I am the Holy Roman Emperor and am above grammar.

Sigismund of Luxemburg

(in reply to tocaff)
Post #: 8
Page:   [1]
All Forums >> [New Releases from Matrix Games] >> War in the Pacific: Admiral's Edition >> USAAF knowledge of japanese targets Page: [1]
Jump to:





New Messages No New Messages
Hot Topic w/ New Messages Hot Topic w/o New Messages
Locked w/ New Messages Locked w/o New Messages
 Post New Thread
 Reply to Message
 Post New Poll
 Submit Vote
 Delete My Own Post
 Delete My Own Thread
 Rate Posts


Forum Software © ASPPlayground.NET Advanced Edition 2.4.5 ANSI

0.074