Matrix Games Forums

Forums  Register  Login  Photo Gallery  Member List  Search  Calendars  FAQ 

My Profile  Inbox  Address Book  My Subscription  My Forums  Log Out

RE: What German Heavy Bomber Progra put m...

 
View related threads: (in this forum | in all forums)

Logged in as: Guest
Users viewing this topic: none
  Printable Version
All Forums >> [New Releases from Matrix Games] >> Gary Grigsby's War in the East Series >> RE: What German Heavy Bomber Progra put m... Page: <<   < prev  1 [2]
Login
Message << Older Topic   Newer Topic >>
RE: What German Heavy Bomber Progra put m... - 9/7/2011 3:28:49 AM   
Klydon


Posts: 2292
Joined: 11/28/2010
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: Zebedee


quote:

ORIGINAL: Klydon

That may have been Nazi propaganda (bombing the British out of the war), but most any reasonable person in the Luftwaffe didn't have it in mind. The Ju-88 was a replacement for the prewar bombers that were converted from fast passinger planes or courier planes that were designed to also have military uses (HE-111 and Do-17). The Ju-88 was a warplane from the start; not built with civil aviation in mind. If the Germans had been serious about a Battle of Britain scenario, drop tanks would have had a lot more attention paid to them sooner, because it doesn't take a rocket scientist to know a Me-109 is going to have issues in any projection of power over Britain. Of course, a lot of people were all in on the Me-110 as being the big time plane to project fighter power over enemy airspace.


To cut a long and tedious discussion short, you may find the theoretical work presented in Militaerwissenschaftliche Rundschau of interest as background to a discussion on the development of German air doctrine in the late 30s. As Felmy highlighted in spring 1939, they knew what they wanted to do but feared they had not the resources to do it. Felmy was proven to be correct in 1940. Events elsewhere prevented a concerted repeat performance. Nazi propaganda is one thing, planning for the conduct of a war is another. They're not really mutually interchangeable. Although Germany did try in 1941.



We may have our time lines a bit off from each other. When I say the Luftwaffe was not really thinking of an air war with England except in the most general terms, I am more or less in the early to mid 30's when the Luftwaffe was far more concerned with their neighbors. After Wever got killed, there was no real huge advocate for simple strategic bombing because the one thing Wever would not really deal with was the shortage of raw materials (not to mention the cost) the Germans were dealing with. That and the other thing was the Nazi administration was more interested in overall numbers when it came to aircraft. By the late 30's, I grant that far more attention was being paid to the issue of trying to bomb the British out, but they didn't get a chance to really do anything about it before the war started.


(in reply to Zebedee)
Post #: 31
RE: What German Heavy Bomber Program... - 9/7/2011 4:54:28 AM   
Caltone


Posts: 651
Joined: 9/5/2001
From: Raleigh, NC USA
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: glvaca


quote:

ORIGINAL: Tarhunnas

Have you read Macksey's "Invasion"? Interesting read of an alternative history where the Germans win the BoB and invade - or rather, win by invading. A great read!


Interesting, on to amazon

quote:

Macksey's "Invasion


hah, just did the same thing Found a nice copy with Amazon Prime shipping as well.

_____________________________

"Order AP Hill to prepare for battle" -- Stonewall Jackson

(in reply to glvaca)
Post #: 32
RE: What German Heavy Bomber Program... - 9/7/2011 10:27:02 AM   
paullus99


Posts: 1928
Joined: 1/23/2002
Status: offline
There are two versions of "Invasion" out there - the main book (that I've had for years, despite a few small errors it is a fantastic read!) and a slight variation that he did later for a compilation of Alt-History (I'll find a copy & edit here later) that makes some small changes relating to German decisions with their Battlecruisers.

_____________________________

Never Underestimate the Power of a Small Tactical Nuclear Weapon...

(in reply to Caltone)
Post #: 33
RE: What German Heavy Bomber Progra put m... - 9/7/2011 11:23:52 AM   
lastdingo

 

Posts: 110
Joined: 7/31/2006
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: cherryfunk
As I understand it -- the worst case scenario for the British is that they're forced to pull back to bases in Scotland, which are out of Luftwaffe range, where they rest and refit and wait.  When the invasion comes, the RAF pours down from the north to contest the air space while the Royal Navy obliterates the invasion "fleet" (consisting mostly of river barges which could be capsized by the wake of a fast-moving destroyer...)


That, the destruction of the exposed industries and storage facilities of the south, a large-scale blunting (wrecking) of the Home Fleet by mines, 500 kg bombs and 21" torpedoes and the large-scale destruction of bomber command during the invasion.

By the way - mid England was already out of range of fighters and thus quite safe.

(in reply to cherryfunk)
Post #: 34
RE: What German Heavy Bomber Progra put m... - 9/7/2011 2:01:10 PM   
Rasputitsa


Posts: 2300
Joined: 6/30/2001
From: Bedfordshire UK
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: lastdingo
quote:

ORIGINAL: cherryfunk
As I understand it -- the worst case scenario for the British is that they're forced to pull back to bases in Scotland, which are out of Luftwaffe range, where they rest and refit and wait.  When the invasion comes, the RAF pours down from the north to contest the air space while the Royal Navy obliterates the invasion "fleet" (consisting mostly of river barges which could be capsized by the wake of a fast-moving destroyer...)


That, the destruction of the exposed industries and storage facilities of the south, a large-scale blunting (wrecking) of the Home Fleet by mines, 500 kg bombs and 21" torpedoes and the large-scale destruction of bomber command during the invasion.

By the way - mid England was already out of range of fighters and thus quite safe.


RAF Fighter Command would not have withdrawn to Scotland, it was enough, if it became necessary, to pull back to 12 Group airfields, just North of London. From these airfields, Leigh-Mallory and Douglas Bader were using the 'Big Wing' tactic of grouping squadrons into larger formations, as the greater distance from the Channel gave time to form these forces.

Dowding and Park would have been able to add 11 Group squadrons to the 'Big Wings', just as in 1943 the US daylight bombing missions met German fighters as there own escorts headed for home, so the German bombers would have met massed attacks as the Me 109s turned back.

The Luftwaffe in 1940 was unable to stop the uplift of 327,000 troops from Dunkirk, despite many slow and unarmed vessels included in the rescue fleet and good weather. They had not perfected the techniques that would be so effective later in 1941 and would have found it difficult to cope with the the Royal Navy, in full force, both day and night, over the weeks the invasion would have taken.

Just as Barbarossa was doomed by logistics and distance, only successful in the event of a Russian collapse, so Sealion was a forlorn hope, which could only succeed with a British collapse. Strategic bombers would not have made any difference in either case.


_____________________________

"In politics stupidity is not a handicap" - Napoleon

“A people which is able to say everything becomes able to do everything” - Napoleon

“Among those who dislike oppression are many who like to oppress" - Napoleon

(in reply to lastdingo)
Post #: 35
RE: What German Heavy Bomber Progra put m... - 9/7/2011 3:09:24 PM   
gradenko_2000

 

Posts: 933
Joined: 12/27/2010
Status: offline
http://www.philm.demon.co.uk/Miscellaneous/Sealion.htm

The Sealion option just wasn't a feasible one for Germany:

* The Kriegsmarine was badly outnumbered, and it wasn't realistic to expect that the Luftwaffe could sink enough ships to even the score, given the historical track record they had.

* Comparisons to D-Day:
D-Day had 2 years set aside for planning. Sealion had 84 days
D-Day transported 5 Allied divisions. Sealion intended to transport as many as 9.
D-Day saw the Allies having complete air and naval superiority, specially designed equipment for the task, 2 years' worth of experience performing amphibious landings, friendly local resistance, and branch inter-operability. Not so much for the Germans
D-Day landings were conducted over a 50 mile stretch of coastline. Sealion intended to have a front of 275 miles across.

* According to the planners, there would be a period of 8-10 days between the landings and a second wave of reinforcements and supplies. That is, the 9 German divisions would have to hold out against 28 Allied divisons for more than a week without resupply

* The west end of the English Channel was supposed to be blocked off by U-boats, while the east end was supposed to be blocked off by mines and 14 torpedo boats. In both cases, neither of these forces are quite suited to stopping the 17-20 RN destroyers that they were expected to face.

* The means of protection for the transport fleet against any RN ships that penetrated this "blockade" would be for the soldiers in the transport barges to shoot at any ships that they could not positively identify. At night.

* Speaking of the transport barges, these were suited for river travel, and could be sunk simply by the RN driving over them and letting the sea-wash do the rest.

* There were not enough ship-trained men to man the barges anyway, as scraping the bottom of the maritime-trained barrel meant that they still lacked 4 000 sailors, not to mention that the Kriegsmarine's own ships would be operating with minimal crew, while being expecting to fight a major fleet action.

* The barges travel at 2-3 knots while being towed by a tug. Against the 5 knot tides of Channel, the soldiers in these barges would be sailing for about 30 hours, exposed to the elements all the while, only to land on a hostile beach.

* The barges were expected to sail until they were 10 miles out from the beach, then form an order line parallel to the coast, then advance simultaneously. At night. With only hailers to provide communication and coordination. Without practice. Without a complete complement of sailors.

* Attempts to create makeshift ferries / rafts / pontoons were disastrous failures, especially since they were tasked to an Engineer Battalion that was based in Bavaria. That they could not create these improvised floatation devices meant that the Wehrmacht's landing forces would have to make do without their horse-based transportation.

* In order to capture a port in short order to facilitate resupply, the Luftwaffe planned to use paratroopers, except there were no provisions for escorting the paradrop planes, and the drop zones were 10-15 miles away from Dover itself.

* There were no plans to deal with coordination or organization of the units after they had landed. The Wehrmacht would basically instruct Regimental and Battalion commanders to do whatever they could with whatever forces they could scrape together after the landing, in the hopes that these small "weak but continuous fronts" would somehow gel together into a coherent force.

* There were no plans to include artillery with the first wave, which meant that even 19th century fortifications like the Martello Towers might prove to be useful against the rifles and hand grenades of the Germans.

* There were no plans to include engineers or their equipment with the first wave, which meant that after passing the Martello Towers, the Germans would be stopped cold at the Royal Military Canal, since it would be uncrossable without bridging equipment.

* Since there were not enough life jackets for everyone, the first wave was expected to take off their life jackets (which are worn UNDERNEATH the combat pack) and bring them back to the water's edge. All the while being shot at by the British. There were no plans for who was supposed to coordinate the retrieval of the life jackets, and their retrieval would have conflicted with the Kriegsmarine's orders to leave as soon as the troops had been dropped off the barges anyway.

* Despite the lack of engineers, artillery or any other heavy equipment, 4 000 horses were supposed to be included in the first wave.

* The Luftwaffe was expected to act as artillery for the first wave, keep the RN at bay, achieve total air superiority, cut off supplies and reinforcements by bombing railway lines, and engage in anti-civilian terror bombing to cause a road-choking panicked evacuation. Mind you, the RAF's 11 Fighter Group had about as many Spitfires and Hurricanes (570) as the Luftwaffe had ME-109s (600)

* Simply pulling 11 Fighter Group back to the English Midlands would have been sufficient to put them out of reach of German fighters, which meant that the British airfields, industrial areas, ports, supply dumps and troop concentrations would have been nigh-untouchable, unless the Luftwaffe was willing to send unescorted bombing raids against these.

* If the Luftwaffe slow down their anti-RAF operational tempo in support of the landings, then 11 Group has a chance to rest, rearm and recover, as would 10 Group and 12 Group. If the Luftwaffe allocate their fighters to protect the landing barges, then the bombers (i.e. the artillery) have to go unescorted. If the Luftwaffe decides to protect their bombers, then RAF Bomber Command can attack the huge mass of barges moving along at 2 knots. If the barges are somehow protected from air attack anyway, then the Luftwaffe isn't watching out for the RN, which as said before, can simply sink these barges by driving over them with a Destroyer or two.

* Britain was producing more fighters than Germany was, and the setting of the battle favored the British in recovering any downed pilots.

* During the single exercise meant to practice the planned operation, less than 50% of the troops managed to make it ashore, despite the fact that it was done in broad daylight (unlike the planned night landings), without hostile beach defenders, without hostile aircraft, in good weather, and with only a mile's worth of sailing.

* The suggestion of invading earlier, in July, would arguably have been worse, as you're pitting a weaker Kriegsmarine (still recovering from Norway), a weaker Luftwaffe (still recovering from supporting Fall Gelb) and a weaker Wehrmacht (still recovering from executing Fall Gelb) against a stronger RAF (no attrition from the Battle of Britain) and possibly stronger Allied forces (if we assume the variant where France isn't completely beaten before the invasion begins). Even if we handwaved all of this away, invading in July means no time to have gathered up those oh-so-sinkable barges. Without them, the Kriegsmarine can transport a grand total of one division.

(in reply to Rasputitsa)
Post #: 36
RE: What German Heavy Bomber Progra put m... - 9/7/2011 5:33:21 PM   
Zebedee


Posts: 535
Joined: 8/30/2005
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Klydon
We may have our time lines a bit off from each other. When I say the Luftwaffe was not really thinking of an air war with England except in the most general terms, I am more or less in the early to mid 30's when the Luftwaffe was far more concerned with their neighbors. After Wever got killed, there was no real huge advocate for simple strategic bombing because the one thing Wever would not really deal with was the shortage of raw materials (not to mention the cost) the Germans were dealing with. That and the other thing was the Nazi administration was more interested in overall numbers when it came to aircraft. By the late 30's, I grant that far more attention was being paid to the issue of trying to bomb the British out, but they didn't get a chance to really do anything about it before the war started.


I must confess to being confused by the arguments you're presenting.

Wever was a firm advocate for the need to develop a capability for strategic bombing. Given the range needed to bomb, say, the Soviet Union, such a capability would of course be applicable to whether the Luftwaffe could perform such a mission over the British Isles. So I'm not certain how one can argue that the "The brain trust behind the Luftwaffe never envisioned a Battle of Britain scenario." They evidently did foresee a need for a strategic element to the LW - whether their immediate focus was to the East or not - based upon the desire to reduce the capabilities of a future enemy's industry and/or inciting internal disorder through the already tested method of bombing the civilian population (tested during WW1 - the experiences of the Spanish Civil War actually dented that theory somewhat). That, combined with the missions to support the KM in reducing an enemy's naval capabilities and to acheive air superiority over a battlefield, is surely the essence of the 'Battle of Britain scenario'?

The capability was behind other priorities in the initial 2 1/2 years as the LW found its feet - there's no doubt of that - but eg 1936's Die Luftkriegfuehrung is more a statement of current capability than theoretical ideals. One sees that in the decision to cancel the Do-19 and Ju-89 projects which was a reflection on the difficulties in creating a 4 engined strategic bomber force (you rightly mention raw materials, but more mundane issues revolved around having a good enough engine too) rather than a rejection of the merits of strategic bombing. Hence the focus on the JU-88 (the sacred cow of German aircraft production in its role as the 'schnellbomber' - so fast, it requires no fighter escort and with a range, perhaps coincidentally, just sufficient to allow it to operate over the British Isles - divebombing was of course a later requirement tacked on to address the issues of putting a bomb on a target) as well as the high hopes for the He-177 (a project intended to overcome the difficulties with engines which borked the Do-19 and Ju-89).


So I can't really buy into the idea that the LW was somehow thrust into doing something it hadn't been prepared to do because it had faulty foundations from the start or that it latterly had become overly focused on the tactical rather than it following a very similar learning curve to the RAF in how to conduct a strategic bombing campaign when theory met actuality.

< Message edited by Zebedee -- 9/7/2011 5:47:15 PM >

(in reply to Klydon)
Post #: 37
RE: What German Heavy Bomber Program... - 9/8/2011 8:59:08 PM   
WilliePete

 

Posts: 265
Joined: 8/27/2010
Status: offline
this is one area of the war that I do not know much about. Regarding the Eastern Front, I never did understand why the Germans didnt try to curb Soviet war production, especially by hitting tank factories...

_____________________________

- They That Sow The Wind, Shall Reap The Whirlwind -

(in reply to Klydon)
Post #: 38
RE: What German Heavy Bomber Program... - 9/9/2011 2:15:48 AM   
pipewrench


Posts: 450
Joined: 1/5/2010
Status: offline
off in the archives:

good reading material

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ww2/batlbrit.pdf
and a very good read is Len Deighton, The Battle of Britain

warspite1 I totally agree with you.

'Kesselring and Udet "advocated the
continuance and extension of the Air Force's
ground-support role, and argued against the
creation of a bomber force along Douhetian
lines."41 The two had reasoned that for the
Luftwaffe to support a major continental war in
1943 (given the constraints under which
Germany had to orchestrate its rearmament
plans) that a heavy bomber was simply not
feasible, nor was it required.'


If on the other hand Germany had pushed the production of the U-boat the air campaign by the Luftwaffe might of succeeded. We will never know



< Message edited by pipewrench -- 9/9/2011 2:20:23 AM >

(in reply to WilliePete)
Post #: 39
Page:   <<   < prev  1 [2]
All Forums >> [New Releases from Matrix Games] >> Gary Grigsby's War in the East Series >> RE: What German Heavy Bomber Progra put m... Page: <<   < prev  1 [2]
Jump to:





New Messages No New Messages
Hot Topic w/ New Messages Hot Topic w/o New Messages
Locked w/ New Messages Locked w/o New Messages
 Post New Thread
 Reply to Message
 Post New Poll
 Submit Vote
 Delete My Own Post
 Delete My Own Thread
 Rate Posts


Forum Software © ASPPlayground.NET Advanced Edition 2.4.5 ANSI

0.102