That's a reasonable approach. I hesitated to do any of that because I really don't know what I'm doing and I didn't want to screw up Andrew's model.
But yeah, here's some numbers. They are probably different from numbers other people have, but they all come from the same source, so they are ok relatively, if not absolutely. Calcs done using 7.7 bbls/ton.
Japan Refinery capacity, 1941 (from a range of sources, min to max)
~ 70 - 90,000 bbls/day in 28 refinery complexes
--> 25,550,000 – 32,850,000 bbls annually
--> 3,320,000 – 4,266,000 tons annually
DEI Well and Refinery capacity, 1940
8,000,000 tons oil field output in 1940 (DEI)
61,600,000 bbls oil field output in 1940 (DEI)
6,300,000 tons refinery output in 1940 (DEI)
48,510,000 bbls refinery output in 1940 (DEI)
1,000,000 tons oil field output in 1940 (Br.Borneo)
7,700,000 bbls oil field output in 1940 (Br.Borneo)
900,000 tons refinery output in 1940 (Br.Borneo)
6,930,000 bbls refinery output in 1940 (Br.Borneo)
So the SRA had 7.2M tons of refinery capacity vs Japan's 4.3M tons. But, Japan got the oil fields producing at near pre-war levels, but refinery efficiency bit the mighty wazoo. In 1943 the Dutch refineries (in Borneo/Java?Sumatra) were operating (peak opperational efficiency) at between 30% to 50% of pre-war levels. Japan spent most of its repair resources on the biggie at Lutong/Miri, which peaked out at an effective capacity of 12,000 bbls per day in 1943. That’s 4,380,000 bbls compared to 6,930,000 bbls pre-war (63%).
So, yes, in a perfect system, I would rape the refineries outside Japan. But Andrew has calculated fuel production and consumption pretty well. Cutting fuel production totals would probably cause comsumption to push things off the cliff way earlier than expected. It's a hard one to figure out.