Not sure that I agree with your intial assumption: IJ has too much supply and can turn off its LI. I think this depends entirely upon the tempo of the game.
In a lot of games, the tempo is slower than historical as the allies use a Sir Robin. I'm not criticizing that tactic, in reality it is a good one. Historically though, it wasn't possible. Thus, the IJ captures far more supply and resources than it did historically with this defense.
If the the allied player puts up a stout defense (a la Nemo), my experience is that you have to be really careful on your air factory changes as you will have to export a lot of supplies in the early going from the HI. I'm not suggesting that the allied player can starve the IJ, but he can make it a LOT more difficult on him.
Anyway, my point is that before you go and take some whacks at the IJ economy, make sure that you don't create an easy allied victory strategy of simply following the historical tactic of fighting for every inch which crashes the IJ economy. Remember, IJ wasn't so much resource starved as she was oil/energy starved.
Indead, it was not that their was not enough resources/Oil to be had but ratehr a problem of transportation.
The vast bulk of the neaded raw material did come from Close at hand China/Korea, some did come from the SRA but as noted elsewhear thats all abstracted in game, the small quanities of specialised raw materials neaded from the SRA (comparatively small) other than Oil tend to slip through the cracks represenataion wise.
The basic game as noted elsewhear represents the vast bulk of the Japanese tonage available at wars start and sorta models the ships built during the war, many of the Standarised types are not built on game.
Why their tends to be ample shiping to hand in game, is because players use those assests much better than the Japanese did.
1) The Japanese did not maintain their merchant fleat very well, and as a result many ships were in port awaiting repair during the mid war perioud because regular mainitance was not done on them.
2) The Japanese did not convoy many of the ships for most of the war, only Military Convoys were escorted with regularity during the entire war, Civilain later in the war.
3) The Japanese did not asigne decent escorts to many of the convoys they did escort during the early part of the war.
4) The Ships asigned to the military did not (mostly) move raw materials back to Japan.
5) The Militry took the best ships for the most part.
6) When they gave them back (rarely) they were mostly were worn out for lack of maintance.
7) The Japanese ecenomy did not realy start to starve out untill the Mining campagine of Japanese home waters by the B-29's. In 1944 Japan produced more war materials than she had in all the war years before.
8) The japanese figured they had enough ships and resources to make everything work, wheir they fell down was managing that resource, and what they did do played right into the allies hand.
Gross merchant tonage built by Japanese yards b year, I noted a the peak pre war figure to show an example of pre war capacity:
1937 aprox. 450,000 (subsidy programs)
1941 aprox 250,000
1942 aprox. 350,000
1943 aprox. 1,100,000
1944 aprox 1,600,000
1945 aprox 200,000 (by Aug.)
Cargo ships represent about half those figures and Tankers the bulk of the rest with a tiny fraction as Fishing/Ferry/Tug/and pasanger Ships.
p.163 Japanese Merchant Marine in WW2.
Subs sank aprox. 60% of the Japanese merchants, Air sank the bulk of the rest and Mines acounted for a lesser amount than air.
1944 being the worst year for Japa sinking wise.
Mines acounted for a half million tons, Air 2.5 million tons and subs- 4.8million tons (aprox.). p 207
< Message edited by Brady -- 2/21/2011 7:00:17 AM >
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